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I  
PREFACE 
 
“He who understands baboon would do more towards 
metaphysics than Locke” Charles Darwin 1838 
 
This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited to bring 
them up to date (2017). All the articles are about human behavior (as are all 
articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a 
recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) 
and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology 
as presented in the table of intentionality.  As famous evolutionist Richard 
Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but 
that in every important way, we are apes.  If everyone was given a real 
understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give 
them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance.  
As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than 
their constituents and so collapse into anarchy and dictatorship is inevitable.  
 
It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so I try to describe (not 
explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior.  I start with a brief review of the 
logical structure of rationality, which provides some heuristics for the 
description of language (mind, rationality, personality) and gives some 
suggestions as to how this relates to the evolution of social behavior.  This 
centers around the two writers I have found the most important in this regard, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend 
within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so 
useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view 
essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the 
enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped 
Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is 
to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a 
statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion.  
 
Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as 
Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run 
throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for 
philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, 
sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, 
religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology.  It 
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is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as 
to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has 
laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the 
Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness." (BBB p18) 
 
Nevertheless, a real understanding of Wittgenstein’s work, and hence of how 
our psychology functions, is only beginning to spread in the second decade of 
the 21st century, due especially to P.M.S. Hacker (hereafter H) and Daniele 
Moyal-Sharrock (hereafter DMS), but also to many others, some of the more 
prominent of whom I mention in the articles.  
 
Horwich gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding 
of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) 
as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense 
logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or 
Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre 
hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
Although there are countless books on Wittgenstein, in my view only a few 
very recent ones (DMS, H, Coliva etc.) come close to a full appreciation of him, 
none make a serious attempt to relate his work to one of the other modern 
geniuses of behavior John Searle (hereafter S) and nobody has applied the 
powerful two systems of thought framework to philosophical issues from the 
viewpoint of evolutionary psychology. I attempt to do this here.   
 
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and 
Searle on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), 
taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that  all 
truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use 
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language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at 
how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions 
(Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can 
say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance 
and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I analyze various 
writings by and about them from the perspective of the two systems of thought, 
employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. 
 
When I read ‘On Certainty’ a few years ago I characterized it in a review as the 
Foundation Stone of Philosophy and Psychology and the most basic document 
for understanding behavior, and about the same time DMS was writing articles 
noting that it had solved the millennia old epistemological problem of how we 
can know anything for certain. I realized that W was the first one to grasp what 
is now characterized as the two systems or dual systems of thought, and I 
generated a dual systems (S1 and S2) terminology which I found to be very 
powerful in describing behavior. I took the small table that John Searle 
(hereafter S) had been using, expanded it greatly, and found later that it 
integrated perfectly with the framework being used by various current workers 
in thinking and reasoning research.  
 
Since they were published individually, I have tried to make the book reviews 
and articles stand by themselves, insofar as possible, and this accounts for the 
repetition of various sections, notably the table and its explanation. I start with 
a short article that presents the table of intentionality and briefly describes its 
terminology and background. Next, is by far the longest article, which attempts 
a survey of the work of W and S as it relates to the table and so to an 
understanding or description (not explanation as W insisted) of behavior. 
 
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, 
language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or 
less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, 
and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything 
else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that 
intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) 
view it, includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious 
automated System 1 actions or reflexes.  
 
The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly 
counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every 
action, and in any case, there is no time for the slow, massively integrated 
System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we 
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must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the ‘thoughts’ of System 1) must 
lead directly to actions.  
 
The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads 
millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope 
to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell on Earth.  
As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see.   We 
live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is 
unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the 
universal blindness described by Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), 
Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides’ Standard Social Science Model.  
 
Thus, all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows 
how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our 
automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout 
philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg 
and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same 
problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, (or that that they differ only in 
degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their 
frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine (and over 100 other chemicals) via 
the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens), but it’s clearly true.  While 
the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the 
earth and their descendant’s future. 
 
The modern ‘digital delusions’, confuse the language games of System 2 with 
the automatisms of System 1, and so cannot distinguish biological machines 
(i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers).  The ‘reductionist’ 
claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually 
happens is that one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it.  
Hence the title of Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s book (“Consciousness 
Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”.  In most contexts ‘reduction’ 
of higher level emergent behavior to brain functions, biochemistry, or physics 
is incoherent. Also, for ‘reduction’ of chemistry or physics, the path is blocked 
by chaos and uncertainty.  Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but 
when they ‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear (and cannot be made 
clear) what the ‘results’ mean. Reductionist metaphysics is a joke, but most 
scientists and philosophers lack the appropriate sense of humor.  
 
I had hoped to weld my comments into a unified whole, but I came to realize, 
as Wittgenstein and AI researchers did, that the mind (roughly the same as 
language as Wittgenstein showed us) is a motley of disparate pieces evolved 
V  
for many contexts, and there is no such whole or theory except inclusive fitness, 
i.e., evolution by natural selection. 
 
Finally, as with my previous books 3DTV and 3D Movie Technology - Selected 
Articles 1996-2016 (2017), and Psychoactive Drugs-- Four Classic Texts (1976-
1982) 878p (2016), and in all my letters and email and conversations for over 50 
years, I have always used ‘they’ or ‘them’ instead of ‘his/her’, ‘she/he’, or the 
idiotic reverse sexism of ‘she’ or ‘her’, being perhaps the only one in this part 
of the galaxy to do so.  The slavish use of these universally applied egregious 
vocables is of course intimately connected with the defects in our psychology 
which generate academic philosophy, democracy and the collapse of industrial 
civilization, and I leave the further description of these connections as an 
exercise for the reader. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
I am aware of many imperfections and limitations of my work and continually 
revise it, but I took up philosophy ten years ago at 65, so it is miraculous, and 
an eloquent testimonial to the power of System 1 automatisms, that I have been 
able to do anything at all. It was ten years of incessant struggle and I hope 
readers find it of some use. 
 
mstarks3d@yahoo.com
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The Logical Structure of Consciousness (behavior, 
personality, rationality, higher order thought, 
intentionality) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest 
topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) and 
from the 50’s to the present by his logical successor John Searle, I have created 
the following table as a heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show 
various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary 
processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual 
processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be 
regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), 
of personality (LSP), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical 
philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the 
Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the 
Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my 
other very recent writings. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 
years ago had evolved to describe present events (perceptions, memory, 
reflexive actions with basic utterances that can be described as Primary 
Language Games (PLG’s) describing System 1—i.e., the fast unconscious 
automated System One, true-only mental states with a precise time and 
location). We gradually developed the further ability to encompass 
displacements in space and time to describe memories, attitudes and potential 
events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional 
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preferences, inclinations or dispositions) with the Secondary Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false propositional attitudinal 
thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities and not mental states). 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, 
Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, 
capacities, hypotheses. Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W RPP2 p148). “I 
believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts 
typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are 
true-only (excluding lying) while third person statements about others are true 
or false (see my review of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase 
since believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not 
propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., 
Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent 
mental representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in 
time or space while the evolutionarily more primitive System One mental 
states of perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now. 
This is one way to characterize System 2 and System 3--the second and third 
major advances in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to 
represent events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time 
(Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition 
and volition). S1 are potential or unconscious mental states (Searle-- Phil Issues 
1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 
or primary LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, 
no tests possible, so they can be true-only. Dispositions can be described as 
secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, 
even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I know what I believe, think, feel until 
I act). Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as well as 
being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 
1930’s) and are not Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto, 
Read, Hacker etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of 
evolutionary psychology, contextualism, enactivism, and the two systems 
framework, and his work a unique investigation of the functioning of our 
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axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with System 2. Though few 
have understood it well (and arguably nobody fully to this day) it was further 
developed by a few -- above all by John Searle, who made a simpler version of 
the table below in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on 
W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed 
from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work 
On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior 
or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or the 
logical structure of Higher Order Thought (HOT), and in my view the single 
most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology), and thus in the 
study of behavior. See my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) 
and the recent work of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. 
 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly 
Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Referential --Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control 
is possible). Emotions evolved to make a bridge between desires or intentions 
and actions. Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow 
thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities--described in SLG’s-- in which the mind 
tries to fit the world. 
 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions 
as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion or TPI of Searle). W understood this 
and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of 
language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to 
working memory and so we use consciously apparent but typically incorrect 
reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves of current research). Beliefs and 
other Dispositions are thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind 
to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior 
Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA- Searle) plus acts which try to 
match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., 
C+L p145, p190). 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
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tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). 
 
In accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the 
representations of S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this 
sense S1 such as perceptions do not have COS. In other writings S says they do 
but as noted in my other reviews I think it is then essential to refer to COS1 
(private presentations) and COS2 (public representations). To repeat this 
critical distinction, public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to 
by Searle and others as COS, Representations, truth makers or meanings (or 
COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as 
presentations by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
Likewise, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and 
his ‘Direction of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’. System 1 is involuntary, 
reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and 
is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle). 
 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of 
minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about 
brain function). Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but 
I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of 
Social Reality (the title of Searle’s well known book) and from many other 
viewpoints as well. 
 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s 
(the Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his successors 
Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Baker, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, 
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Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an heuristic for 
furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying 
and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors 
comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of 
Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of 
Rationality (LSR), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of 
language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical 
philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the 
Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the 
Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in 
my other very recent writings. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+T
) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA**
* 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
*               Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**            Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***          Searle’s Intention In Action 
****        Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****      Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this        causally self- referential. 
*******   Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
********  Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
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at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
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The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, 
Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 
 
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and 
Searle on the logical structure of intentionality(mind, language, behavior), 
taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that  all 
truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use 
language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking 
at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions 
(Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one 
can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary 
utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I begin 
with ‘On Certainty’ and continue the analysis of recent writings by and 
about them from the perspective of the two systems of thought, employing a 
new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: 
Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet 
(2017) or those articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century (2017) 
 
“If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting 
whether the word ‘hand’ has any meaning? So that is something I seem to 
know, after all.” Wittgenstein ‘On Certainty’ p48 
 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet 
no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and 
truth should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’. 
 
First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –
that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments or 
data gathering) are the same—confusions about how to use language in a 
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particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language 
can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of 
Satisfaction or COS) are clear.  The basic problem is that one can say anything 
but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning 
is only possible in a very specific context. Thus, W in his last masterpiece ‘On 
Certainty’ (OC) looks at perspicuous examples of the varying uses of the words 
‘know’, ‘doubt’ and ‘certain’, often from his 3 typical perspectives of narrator, 
interlocutor and commentator, leaving the reader to decide the best use 
(clearest COS) of the sentences in each context. One can only describe the uses 
of related sentences and that’s the end of it—no hidden depths, no 
metaphysical insights. There are no ‘problems’ of ‘consciousness’, ‘will’, 
‘space’, ’time’ etc., but only the need to keep the use (COS) of these words clear. 
It is truly sad that most philosophers continue to waste their time on the 
linguistic confusions peculiar to academic philosophy rather than turning their 
attention to those of the other behavioral disciplines and to physics, biology 
and mathematics, where it is desperately needed. 
 
What has W really achieved? Here is how a leading Wittgenstein scholar 
summarized his work: “Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that 
have dogged our subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two 
millennia, problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about the 
relationship between thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-
knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary 
truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European 
philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful 
array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn 
centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. 
He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision 
of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the 
conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker-- 
'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe the 
two systems of thought--fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective 
linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is possible with a 
vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be 
doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness, self, time and space are 
innate true-only axioms. He noted in thousands of pages and hundreds of 
examples how our inner mental experiences are not describable in language, 
this being possible only for behavior with a public language (the impossibility 
of private language). He predicted the utility of paraconsistent logic which only 
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emerged much later. Incidentally he patented helicopter designs which 
anticipated by three decades the use of blade-tip jets to drive the rotors, and 
which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas turbine engine, designed a 
heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the building of a modernist 
house, and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, subsequently completed by 
others. He laid out the psychological foundations of mathematics, logic, 
incompleteness, and infinity. 
 
And Paul Horwich gives a beautiful summary of where an understanding of 
Wittgenstein leaves us. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) 
as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic  to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense 
logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124,132) as in Mackie’s error theory or 
Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre 
hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
He can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist, since he constantly 
explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it 
generates behavior. Though nobody seems aware of it, he described the 
psychology behind what later became the Wason test--a fundamental measure 
used in Evolutionary Psychology (EP) decades later. He noted the 
indeterminate or underdetermined nature of language and the game-like 
nature of social interaction. He described and refuted the notions of the mind 
as machine and the computational theory of mind, long before practical 
computers or the famous writings of Searle. He invented truth tables for use in 
logic and philosophy. He decisively laid to rest skepticism and metaphysics. 
He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of the mind lie open 
before us, a lesson few have learned since. 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part 
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of the world, and, like Einstein, nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein 
was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published 
only one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but 
became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years 
published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly garbled 
form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died 
in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in 
German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear 
relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted from 
other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings 
and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his 
literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they 
wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct 
meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the 
universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing 
slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real 
explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous 
due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even 
nonsense, and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds 
of books and tens of thousands  of papers discussing it; that many physicists 
knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive summation of 
Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and condensed form that 
it was difficult to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually 
forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the 
diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous 
references to him, and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, over 
half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who really 
grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is 
precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Had W lived into his 80’s he would have been able to directly influence Searle 
(another modern genius of descriptive psychology), Symons, and countless 
other students of behavior. If his brilliant friend Frank Ramsey had not died in 
his youth, a highly fruitful collaboration would almost certainly have ensued. 
If his student and colleague Alan Turing had become his lover, one of the most 
amazing collaborations of all time would likely have evolved. In any one case 
the intellectual landscape of the 20th century would have been different and if 
all 3 had occurred it would almost certainly have been very different. Instead 
he lived in relative intellectual isolation, few knew him well or had an inkling 
of his ideas while he lived, and only a handful have any real grasp of his work 
even today. He could have shined as an engineer, a mathematician, a 
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psychologist, a physiologist (he did wartime research in it), a musician (he 
played instruments and had a renowned talent for whistling), an architect (the 
house he designed and constructed for his sister still stands), or an 
entrepreneur (he inherited one of the largest fortunes in the world but gave it 
all away). It is a miracle he survived the trenches and prison camps and 
repeated volunteering for the most dangerous duty (while writing the 
Tractatus) in WW1, many years of suicidal depressions (3 brothers succumbed 
to them), avoided being trapped in Austria and executed by the Nazis (he was 
partly Jewish and probably only the Nazi’s desire to lay hands on their money 
saved the family), and that he was not persecuted for his homosexuality and 
driven to suicide like his friend Turing. He realized nobody understood what 
he was doing and might never (not surprising as he was half a century –or a 
whole century depending on your point of view-ahead of psychology and 
philosophy, which only recently have started accepting that our brain is an 
evolved organ like our heart.) 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), 
Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of TLP, PI, 
OC by W, and PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making the Social World 
(MSW), Seeing Things As They Are (STATA), Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese 
Philosophy (SPCP), John R Searle – Thinking About the Real World (TARW), 
and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description 
of higher order behavior, not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as 
the WS framework. I begin with some penetrating quotes from W and S. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness."(BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
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nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
"Many words then in this sense then don't have a strict meaning. But this is not 
a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is 
no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary." BBB p27 
 
"Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn't be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation" BBB p34 
 
"There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as 
from a reservoir." BBB p143 
 
"And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined 
to make is labeled by the word "to make" as we have used it in the sentence "It 
is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do", because there is an 
idea that "something must make us" do what we do. And this again joins onto 
the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the 
rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end." BBB p143 
 
"If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence 
and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a 
shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn't the slightest similarity 
with what it represents." 
BBBp37 
 
"Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are 
obviously not aware of the many different usages of the word "proof"; and that 
they are not clear about the differences between the uses of the word "kind", 
when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word "kind" 
here meant the same thing as in the context "kinds of apples." Or, we may say, 
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they are not aware of the different meanings of the word "discovery" when in 
one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the 
other case of the discovery of the South Pole." BBB p29 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
"Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus." TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
"We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer." 
TLP 6.52 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
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deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." PI 126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
"The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have 
got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in 
the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is 
already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the 
future." (said in 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle 
(1979) p183 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel 
p312-314 
 
"Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations." BBB p125 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from two of our greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy (in the strict sense I consider here) is the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought (HOT), which is another of the obvious 
facts that are totally overlooked -i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated 
anywhere. In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is 
descriptive psychology, philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they 
expect to contribute to this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) 
do not, so after noting W's above remark on science envy, I will quote again 
from Hacker who gives a good start on it. 
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"Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition ..., or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... 
We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p be 
identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say `he believes that p, but it is 
not the case that p', whereas one cannot say `I believe that p, but it is not the 
case that p'? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining 
or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one 
know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? Why can 
one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, foolishly, 
thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one know, but 
not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on - 
through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognizing, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to 
mention the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to 
be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic 
concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various 
forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, 
their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this 
venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, 
neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing 
whatsoever." (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine's cul-de-sac- p15-
2005). 
 
On his death in 1951 W left behind a scattered collection of some 20,000 pages. 
Apart from the Tractatus, they were unpublished and largely unknown, 
although some were widely circulated and read (as were notes taken in his 
classes), leading to extensive but largely unacknowledged influences. Some 
works are known to have been lost and many others W had destroyed. Most of 
this Nachlass was microfilmed in 1968 by Cornell University and copies were 
bought by a very few libraries. Budd, like most W commentators of the period, 
does not reference the microfilm. Although much of the Nachlass is repetitive 
and appears in some form in his subsequently published works (which are 
referenced by Budd), many variant texts are of great interest and there is 
substantial material that has never been translated from the original German 
nor published in book form. Even now (2016) we are awaiting a book of 
unpublished writings to be called ‘Dictating Philosophy’, and a new edition of 
the Brown Book, left with his lover Francis Skinner. In 1998, the Bergen CD of 
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the complete Nachlass appeared -- Wittgenstein's Nachlass: Text and Facsimile 
Version: The Bergen Electronic Edition $2500 ISBN 10: 0192686917. It is 
available through interlibrary loan and apparently free on the net as well. Like 
the other CDs of W’s work, it is available from Intelex (www.nlx.com). It is 
indexed and searchable and the prime W resource. However, my extensive 
readings of the W literature show that very few people have bothered to 
consult it and thus their works are lacking a critical element. One can see Victor 
Rodych’s papers on W’s remarks on Godel for one notable exception. One 
major work dating from W’s middle period (1933) that was published as a book 
in 2000 is the famous Big Typescript. Budd’s ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology (1991) is one of the better treatments of W (see my review) but since 
he finished this book in 1989, neither the Big Typescript nor the Bergen CD was 
available to him and he neglected the Cornell microfilm. Nevertheless, by far 
the most important works date from W’s 3rd period (ca. 1935 to 1951) and these 
were all used by Budd. 
 
In addition, there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century 
Viennese German into modern English. One must be a master of English, 
German, and W in order to do this and very few are up to it. All of his works 
suffer from clear translation errors and there are more subtle questions where 
one has to understand the whole thrust of his later philosophy in order to 
translate. Since, in my view, nobody except Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) has 
grasped the full import of his later works, one can see why W has yet to be fully 
appreciated. Even the more or less well known critical difference between 
understanding ‘Satz’ as ‘sentence’ (i.e., an S1 utterance) vs ‘proposition’ (i.e., an 
S2 utterance) in various contexts has usually escaped notice. 
 
Few notice (Budd p29-32, Stern and DMS in a recent article are rare exceptions) 
that W presciently (decades before chaos and complexity science came into 
being) suggested that some mental phenomena may originate in chaotic 
processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding to a 
memory trace. He also suggested several times that the causal chain has an end 
and this could mean both that it is just not possible (regardless of the state of 
science) to trace it any further and that the concept of `cause' ceases to be 
applicable beyond a certain point (p34). Subsequently, many have made similar 
suggestions without any idea that W anticipated them by decades (in fact over 
a century now in a few instances). 
 
With DMS I regard W’s last book ‘On Certainty’ (OC) as the foundation stone 
of philosophy and psychology. It is not really a book but notes he made during 
the last two years of his life while dying of prostate cancer and barely able to 
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work. He seems to have been principally motivated by the realization that G.E. 
Moore’s simple efforts had focused attention on the very core of all philosophy-
-how it’s possible to mean, to believe, to know anything at all, and not to be 
able to doubt it. All anyone can do is to examine minutely the working of the 
language games of ‘know’ and ‘certain’ and ‘doubt’ as they are used to describe 
the primitive automated prelinguistic system one (S1) functions of our brain 
(my K1, C1 and D1) and the advanced deliberative linguistic system two (S2) 
functions (my K2, C2 and D2).  Of course, W does not use the two systems 
terminology, which only came to the fore in psychology some half century after 
his death, and has yet to penetrate philosophy, but he clearly grasped the two 
systems framework (the ‘grammar’) in all of his work from the early 30’s on, 
and one can see clear foreshadowings in his very earliest writings. 
 
Much has been written on Moore and W and On Certainty (OC) recently, after 
half a century in relative oblivion. See e.g., Annalisa Coliva’s “Moore and 
Wittgenstein” (2010), “Extended Rationality” (2015), The Varieties of Self- 
Knowledge’(2016), Brice’s ‘Exploring Certainty’(2014) and Andy Hamilton’s 
‘Routledge Philosophy Guide Book to Wittgenstein and On Certainty’ (which 
I will review soon) and the many books and papers of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock 
(DMS) and Peter Hacker (PH), including Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human 
Nature. DMS and PH have been the leading scholars of the later W, each 
writing or editing half a dozen books (many reviewed by me) and many papers 
in the last decade. However, the difficulties of coming to grips with the basics 
of our higher order psychology, i.e., of how language (approximately the same 
as the mind, as W showed us) works are evidenced by Coliva, one of the most 
brilliant and prolific contemporary philosophers, who made remarks in a very 
recent article which show that after years of intensive work on the later W, she 
does not seem to get that he has solved the most basic problems of the 
description of human behavior. As DMS makes clear, one cannot even 
coherently state misgivings about the operations of our basic psychology (W’s 
‘Hinges’ which I equate with S1) without lapsing into incoherence. DMS has 
noted the limitations of both of these workers (limitations shared by all 
students of behavior) in her recent articles, which (like those of Coliva and 
Hacker) are freely available on the net. 
 
As DMS puts it: “…the notes that make up On Certainty revolutionize the 
concept of basic beliefs and dissolve scepticism, making them a corrective, not 
only to Moore but also to Descartes, Hume, and all of epistemology. On 
Certainty shows Wittgenstein to have solved the problem he set out to solve – 
the problem that occupied Moore and plagued epistemology – that of the 
foundation of knowledge. 
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Wittgenstein's revolutionary insight in On Certainty is that what philosophers 
have traditionally called 'basic beliefs' – those beliefs that all knowledge must 
ultimately be based on – cannot, on pain of infinite regress, themselves be based 
on further propositional beliefs. He comes to see that basic beliefs are really 
animal or unreflective ways of acting which, once formulated (e.g. by 
philosophers), look like (empirical) propositions. It is this misleading 
appearance that leads philosophers to believe that at the foundation of thought 
is yet more thought. Yet though they may often look like empirical conclusions, 
our basic certainties constitute the ungrounded, nonpropositional 
underpinning of knowledge, not its object. In thus situating the foundation of 
knowledge in nonreflective certainties that manifest themselves as ways of 
acting, Wittgenstein has found the place where justification comes to an end, 
and solved the regress problem of basic beliefs – and, in passing, shown the 
logical impossibility of hyperbolic scepticism. I believe that this is a 
groundbreaking achievement for philosophy – worthy of calling On Certainty 
Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'.” I reached the same general conclusions 
myself some years ago and stated it in my book reviews. 
 
She continues:” … this is precisely how Wittgenstein describes Moore-type 
hinge certainties in On Certainty: they 'have the form of empirical 
propositions', but are not empirical propositions. Granted, these certainties are 
not putative metaphysical propositions that appear to describe the necessary 
features of the world, but they are putative empirical propositions that appear 
to describe the contingent features of the world. And therein lies some of the 
novelty of On Certainty. On Certainty is continuous with all of Wittgenstein's 
earlier writings – including the Tractatus – in that it comes at the end of a long, 
unbroken attempt to elucidate the grammar of our language-games, to 
demarcate grammar from language in use. Baker and Hacker have superbly 
elucidated the second Wittgenstein's unmasking of the grammatical nature of 
metaphysical or super-empirical propositions; what sets On Certainty apart is 
its further perspicuous distinction between some 'empirical' propositions and 
others ('Our "empirical propositions" do not form a homogenous mass' (OC 
213)): some apparently empirical and contingent propositions being in fact 
nothing but expressions of grammatical rules. The importance of this 
realization is that it leads to the unprecedented insight that basic beliefs – 
though they look like humdrum empirical and contingent propositions – are in 
fact ways of acting which, when conceptually elucidated, can be seen to 
function as rules of grammar: they underlie all thinking (OC 401). So that the 
hinge certainty 'The earth has existed for many years' underpins all thought 
and action, but not as a proposition that strikes us immediately as true; rather 
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as a way of acting that underpins what we do (e.g., we research the age of the 
earth) and what we say (e.g., we speak of the earth in the past tense): ‘Giving 
grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is 
not certain propositions striking us immediately  as true, i.e. it is not a kind of 
seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-
game.’ (OC 204)” 
 
“The non-propositional nature of basic beliefs puts a stop to the regress that 
has plagued epistemology: we no longer need to posit untenable self-justifying 
propositions at the basis of knowledge. In taking hinges to be true empirical 
propositions, Peter Hacker fails to acknowledge the ground-breaking insight 
that our basic certainties are ways of acting, and not 'certain propositions 
striking us… as true' (OC 204). If all Wittgenstein were doing in OC was to 
claim that our basic beliefs are true empirical propositions, why bother? He 
would be merely repeating what philosophers before him have been saying for 
centuries, all the while deploring an unsolvable infinite regress. Why not rather 
appreciate that Wittgenstein has stopped the regress?” (“Beyond Hacker’s 
Wittgenstein” -(2013)).” 
 
It is amazing (and a sign of how deep the divide remains between philosophy 
and psychology) that (as I have noted many times) in a decade of intensive 
reading, I have not seen one person make the obvious connection between W’s 
‘grammar’ and the automatic reflexive functions of our brain which constitute 
System 1, and its extensions into the linguistic functions of System 2. For 
anyone familiar with the two systems framework for understanding behavior 
that has dominated various areas of psychology such as decision theory for the 
last several decades, it should be glaringly obvious that ‘basic beliefs’ (or as I 
call them B1) are the inherited automated true-only structure of S1 and that 
their extension with experience into true or false sentences (or as I call them B2) 
are what non-philosophers call ‘beliefs’. This may strike some as a mere 
terminological trifle, but I have used the two systems view and its tabulation 
below as the logical structure of rationality for a decade and regard it as the 
single biggest advance in understanding higher order behavior, and hence of 
W or any philosophical or behavioral writing. In my view, the failure to grasp 
the fundamental importance of the automaticity of our behavior due to S1 and 
the consequent attribution of all social interaction (e.g., politics) to the 
superficialities of S2 can be seen as responsible for the inexorable collapse of 
industrial civilization. The almost universal oblivion to basic biology and 
psychology leads to endless fruitless attempts fix the world’s problems via 
politics, but only a drastic restructuring of society with understanding of the 
fundamental role of inclusive fitness as manifested via the automaticities of S1 
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has any chance to save the world. The oblivion to S1 has been called by Searle 
‘The phenomenological Illusion’, by Pinker ‘The Blank Slate’ and by Tooby and 
Cosmides ‘The Standard Social Science Model’. 
 
OC shows W’s unique super-Socratic trialogue (narrator, interlocutor, 
commentator) in full bloom and better than anywhere else in his works. He 
realized by the late 20’s that the only way to make any progress was to look at 
how language actually works-otherwise one gets lost in the labyrinth of 
language from the very first sentences and there is not the slightest hope of 
finding one’s way out. The entire book looks at various uses of the word ‘know’ 
which separate themselves out into ‘know’ as an intuitive ‘perceptual’ certainty 
that cannot meaningfully be questioned (my K1) and ‘know’ as a disposition to 
act (my K2), which functions the same as think, hope, judge, understand, 
imagine, remember, believe and many other dispositional words. As I have 
suggested in my various reviews of W and S, these two uses correspond to the 
modern two systems of thought framework that is so powerful in 
understanding behavior (mind, language), and this (and his other work) is the 
first significant effort to show how our fast, prelinguistic automatic ‘mental 
states’ are the unquestionable axiomatic basis (‘hinges’) for our later-evolved, 
slow, linguistic, deliberative dispositional psychology. As I have noted many 
times, neither W, nor anyone else to my knowledge, has ever stated this clearly. 
Undoubtedly, most who read OC go away with no clear idea of what he has 
done, which is the normal result of reading any of his work. 
 
On Certainty (OC) was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s 
death and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. There are few 
references to it in Searle (along with Hacker, W’s heir apparent and the most 
famous living philosopher) and one sees whole books on W with barely a 
mention. There are however reasonably good books on it by Stroll, Svensson, 
Coliva, McGinn and others and parts of many other books and articles, but the 
best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume 
“Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated 
person, and perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein 
(W), psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) all analysis of W 
falls short of fully grasping his unique and revolutionary advances by failing 
to put behavior in its broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, 
which I will attempt here. I will not give a page by page explanation since (as 
with any other book dealing with behavior-i.e., philosophy, psychology, 
anthropology, sociology, history, law, politics, religion, literature etc.) we 
would not get past the first few pages, as all the issues discussed here arise 
immediately in any discussion of behavior. The table below summarizing the 
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Logical Structure of Rationality (Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order 
Thought) provides a framework for this and all discussion of behavior. 
 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is 
now known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, cognitive 
psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just 
animal behavior. Sadly, few realize that his works are a vast and unique 
textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was 
written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral 
sciences and humanities, and even those few who have understood him have 
not realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive 
illusions (e.g., the two selves of fast and slow thinking—see below). John Searle 
(S), refers to him infrequently, but his work can be seen as a straightforward 
extension of W’s, though he does not seem to see this. W analysts such as Baker 
and Hacker (B&H), Read, Harre, Horwich, Stern, Hutto and Moyal-Sharrock 
do marvelously but mostly stop short of putting him in the center of current 
psychology, where he certainly belongs. It should also be clear that insofar as 
they are coherent and correct, all accounts of higher order behavior are 
describing the same phenomena and ought to translate easily into one another. 
Thus, the recently fashionable themes of “Embodied Mind” and “Radical 
Enactivism” should flow directly from and into W’s work (and they do). 
 
The failure of most to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to the limited 
attention On Certainty (0C) and his other 3rd period works have received until 
recently, but even more to the inability of many philosophers and others to 
understand how profoundly our view of behavior alters once we embrace the 
evolutionary framework. I call the framework the descriptive psychology of 
higher order thought- DPHOT- or more precisely the study of the language 
used in DPHOT --which Searle calls the logical structure of rationality-LSR), 
which grounds anthropology, sociology, politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, 
aesthetics, literature and history. 
 
The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, 
intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least 
half a century earlier. One cannot help but incorporate T. rex and all that is 
relevant to it into our true-only axiomatic background via the inexorable 
workings of EP. Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is 
truly stupefying that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most 
basic fact of human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others) 
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which was laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation 
of logic and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and 
human nature (as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), but afaik nobody else, 
points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only 
extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without 
threatening our sanity. Football or Britney Spears cannot just vanish from my 
or our memory and vocabulary as these concepts, ideas, events, developed out 
of and are tied to countless others in the true-only network that begins with 
birth and extends in all directions to encompass much of our awareness and 
memory. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own 
unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other 
minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot 
really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of involuntary fast thinking 
axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
 
The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the 
default of the ‘second self’ of slow thinking conscious system 2, which (without 
education) is oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in 
the unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of system 1 (Searle’s 
‘Phenomenological Illusion’). Searle summed this up in a very insightful recent 
article by noting that many logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because the creation of meaningfulness (i.e., the COS 
of S2) out of meaninglessness (i.e., the reflexes of S1) is not consciously 
experienced. See Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p115-117 and my review 
of it. 
 
It is essential to grasp the W/S (Wittgenstein/Searle) framework so I will first 
offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein 
(W), Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Hutto, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock(DMS) et. 
al. To grasp my simple two systems terminology and perspective, it will help 
to see my reviews of W/S and other books about these geniuses, who provide 
a clear description of higher order behavior not found in psychology books. To 
say that Searle has extended W’s work is not necessarily to imply that it is a 
direct result of W study (and he is clearly not a Wittgensteinian), but rather that 
because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only 
ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing behavior must be 
enunciating some variant or extension of what W said. 
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However, S seldom mentions W and even then, often in a critical way but in 
my view his criticisms (like everyone’s) nearly always miss the mark and he 
makes many dubious assertions for which he is often criticized. In present 
context, I find the recent criticisms of DMS, Coliva and Hacker most relevant. 
Nevertheless, he is the prime candidate for the best since W and I recommend 
downloading the over 100 lectures he has on the net. Unlike nearly all other 
philosophy lectures they are quite entertaining and informative and I have 
heard them all at least twice. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms of S1 (which I equate with W’s ‘hinges’) 
from the less mechanical linguistic dispositional behavior of S2. To rephrase: 
all study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart fast System 1 (S1) 
and slow System 2 (S2) thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. 
dispositions. Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of 
higher order S2 social behavior including ‘we intentionality’, while the later W 
shows how S2 is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1, which in 
evolution and in each of our personal histories developed into conscious 
dispositional propositional thinking (acting) of S2. 
 
Wittgenstein famously remarked that the confusion and barrenness of 
psychology is not to be explained by calling it a young science and that 
philosophers are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way 
science does. He noted that this tendency is the real source of metaphysics and 
leads the philosopher into complete darkness. See BBB p18. Another notable 
comment was that if we are not concerned with “causes” the activities of the 
mind lie open before us –see BB p6 (1933). Likewise, the 20,000 pages of his 
nachlass demonstrated his famous dictum that the problem is not to find the 
solution but to recognize as the solution what appears to be only a preliminary. 
See his Zettel p312-314. And again, he noted 80 years ago that we ought to 
realize that we can only give descriptions of behavior and that these are not 
hints of explanations (BBB p125). See the full quotes at other places in this 
article. 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language (mind, 
speech) is a window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even 
(Fodor’s LOT, Carruthers’ ISA, etc.) that there must be some other “Language 
of Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to show, 
with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicuous examples of language in 
action, that language is not a picture of but is itself thinking or the mind, and 
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his whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. 
 
Many have deconstructed the idea of a ‘language of thought’ but in my view 
none better than W in BBB p37 — “if we keep in mind the possibility of a picture 
which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, the interpolation of a 
shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence 
itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which 
hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents.” So, language issues 
direct from the brain and what could count as evidence for an intermediary? 
 
W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology 
and computation could reveal what his Top Down analysis of Language Games 
(LG’s) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front 
of our eyes and to capture vagueness –i.e., “the greatest difficulty in these 
investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness” (LWPP1, 347). And 
so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a 
window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic 
blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later 
evolved Language Games (LG’s) of the Second Self--the dispositions such as 
imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). Some of W’s favorite 
topics in his later second and his third periods are the interdigitating 
mechanisms of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2), the irrelevance of our 
subjective ‘mental life’ to the functioning of language, and the impossibility of 
private language. The bedrock of our behavior is our involuntary, System 1, 
fast thinking, true-only, mental states- our perceptions and memories and 
involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily later LG’s are voluntary, System 2, 
slow thinking, testable true or false dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. He 
recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper (e.g., in LWPP1 
“the greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself”). 
 
W is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that our 
behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology. 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to describe and extend our innate axiomatic 
psychology, but all they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, 
multiply our language games, and extend S2. The true-only axioms of ‘’On 
Certainty’’ are W’s (and later Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, which we 
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now call evolutionary psychology (EP), and which is traceable to the 
automated true-only reactions of bacteria, which evolved and operate by the 
mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). 
 
See the recent works of Trivers for a popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb 
“Principles of Social Evolution” for a pro intro. The recent travesty of 
evolutionary thought by Nowak and Wilson in no way impacts the fact that IF 
is the prime mechanism of evolution by natural selection (see my review of 'The 
Social Conquest of Earth' (2012)). 
 
As W develops in OC, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes 
a true-only extension (i.e., S2 Hinges or S2H) of our axiomatic EP (i.e., S1 
Hinges or S1H) and cannot be found ‘mistaken’ without threatening our 
sanity—as he noted a ‘mistake’ in S1 (no test) has profoundly different 
consequences from one in S2 (testable). A corollary, nicely explained by DMS 
and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view 
of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense) cannot get a 
foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary ‘fast thinking’ axioms and not 
testable propositions (as I would put it). 
 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout 
his work, and especially in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 
that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and 
Slow”, but neither he, nor anyone afaik, has any idea W laid out the framework 
over 50 years ago), which is involuntary and automatic and which corresponds 
to the mental states of perception, emotion and memory, as W notes over and 
over. One might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our 
cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, 
more or less “conscious” (beware another network of language games!) second-
self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as “dispositions” or 
“inclinations”, which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not mental states, 
are conscious, deliberate and propositional (true or false), and do not have any 
definite time of occurrence. 
 
As W notes, disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
mostly philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to 
the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), originally 
termed Causally Self Referential (CSR) by Searle (but now Causally Self-
Reflexive) or reflexive or intransitive in W’s Blue and Brown Books (BBB), and 
the S2  use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, 
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and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have 
Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) in the strict sense, and are not CSR (called 
transitive in BBB). The equation of these terms from modern psychology with 
those used by W and S (and much else here) is my idea, so don’t expect to find 
it in the literature (except my articles and reviews on Amazon, viXra.org, 
philpapers.org, researchgate.net, academia.edu). 
 
Though seldom touched upon by philosophers, the investigation of 
involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., 
Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like “cognitive 
illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course these too 
are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways to use these 
words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear, but of course he did not 
use this terminology), but presumably not ever of slow S2 dispositional 
thinking only, since any thought (intentional action) cannot occur without 
involving much of  the  intricate S1 network of the “cognitive modules”, 
“inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, “cognitive 
axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and Searle call our EP) which must 
also use S1 to move muscles (action). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, 
that `will', `self' and `consciousness' (which as Searle notes are presupposed by 
all discussion of intentionality) are axiomatic true-only elements of S1, 
composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes., and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W 
made clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be 
judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. As he 
famously said in OC p94— “but I did not get my picture of the world by 
satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its 
correctness. -no: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish 
between true and false.” 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear Conditions 
of Satisfaction (COS), i.e., public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: 
" When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in 
addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." 
And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say 
it is, as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's aphorisms (p132 in 
Budd’s lovely book on W) – “It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet 
and like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is 
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to be found in the grammar of the language.” And one might note here that 
`grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP or LSR (DPHOT—see table) 
and that, in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing 
(for which he is often incorrectly criticized by Searle), this is about as broad a 
characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one 
can find (as DMS also notes).  
 
W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, and Searle 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning “speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction” -- which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence 
expressing COS in a context that can be true or false, and this is an act and not 
a mental state. i.e., as Searle notes in Philosophy in a New Century p193 — “the 
basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions.” -- propositions being public events 
that can be true or false –contra the perverse use of the word for the true-only 
axioms of S by Searle, Coliva and others. Hence, the famous comment by W 
from PI p217— “If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able 
to see there whom we were speaking of”, and his comments that the whole 
problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and “what gives the 
image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence 
W's summation (p140 Budd) – “what it always comes to in the end is that 
without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should 
happen-and- the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is 
fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does 
not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish 
had been satisfied. Suppose it were asked -do I know what I long for before I 
get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know.” 
 
One of W’s recurring themes is now called Theory of Mind, or as I prefer, 
Understanding of Agency (UA). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 
and UA2 (i.e., UA of S1 and S2) in experiments, has become aware of the work 
of Daniel Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor 
representation can be involved in UA1-- that being reserved for UA2—see my 
review of his book with Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has 
no idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily defensible 
view that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, 
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automatisms and higher order thought is compatible with and 
straightforwardly deducible from W. In spite of the fact that most of the above 
has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of a century in the case of 
some of W’s teachings), I have rarely seen anything approaching an adequate 
discussion in philosophy or other behavioral science texts, and commonly there 
is barely a mention. 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest 
topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, 
and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, 
Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following 
table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects 
or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and 
voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the 
Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality 
(LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality 
(LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of 
Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, 
the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms 
introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler 
table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three 
recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2   and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***         Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****      Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter 
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Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there 
is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language games) in 
an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— showing the correct 
context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, 
perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are 
automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 2 is 
abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in conscious 
deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently 
repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There 
is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 
2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they 
are successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since 
the description of our perceptual experience-the presentation of our senses to 
consciousness, can only be described in the same words (as the same COS - 
Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the percept or COS1 to 
distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will 
be True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will 
not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise 
duration, change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special 
quality, do not need language, are independent of general intelligence and 
working memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have 
voluntary content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language 
games) cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain 
(behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts (in sentences 
and in the world), and in the infinite variations of ‘brain states’ (‘mental states 
or the pattern of activations of billions of neurons that can correspond to ‘seeing 
a red apple’) and this is one reason why it’s not possible to ‘reduce’ higher order 
behavior to a ‘system of laws’ which would have to state all the possible 
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contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. And what counts as 
‘reducing’ and as a ‘law’ and a ‘system’ (see e.g., Nancy Cartwright). This is a 
special case of the irreducibility of higher level descriptions to lower level ones 
that has been explained many times by Searle, DMS, Hacker, W and others. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and location, and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to 
describe displacements in space and time of events (the past and future and 
often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, 
transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction- Searle’s term for 
truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and 
public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 representations 
and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all S2 functions having 
no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences are 
Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, 
Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional 
Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and not to 
propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W-‘Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic 
and fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-
person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while 
third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews 
of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that 
this is an incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown 
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e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). 
Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as 
opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or 
space, while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and 
reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize 
System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—
the ability to represent (state public COS for) events and to think of them as 
occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., 
the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain processes of System One) are 
potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe. Dispositions can be described as secondary 
LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for 
me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act 
or some event occurs—see my reviews of the well-known books on W by 
Johnston and Budd. Note that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or 
written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 
1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder 
of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the 
functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with 
System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 
30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table 
in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the 
axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On Certainty’ 
(OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or 
epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and 
pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view 
(shared e.g., by DMS) the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, in which the mind automatically fits (presents) the 
world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) -- the unquestionable, true-only, 
axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is possible. 
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Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries 
to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our 
default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 
working and describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2(The 
Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it 
with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in 
action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so we use 
consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two 
Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other 
Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the 
world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act 
(Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which try to 
match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., 
Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states 
(‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they 
act or might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive 
modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions 
— (believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential 
public acts such as language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, 
Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no 
language (concept, thought) of private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., 
no private language, thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts 
and to that extent they have a public psychology. 
 
Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature Memories:  
Remembering (X was true) Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions (X might 
become True): 
 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting. 
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CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
We can think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do. 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending. 
 
ACTIONS: (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting 
(Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using 
Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary 
and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior (The 
Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), The Blank Slate (BS)or the Standard Social 
Science Model (SSSM). 
 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the 
names of objects, nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans 
are governed by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or 
schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference 
engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of 
preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or 
intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or only 
preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of 
cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including 
neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of 
the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive 
in evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions 
and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our 
psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding and increase 
our power by giving clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them 
(culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, 
logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them faster and more 
efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional 
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probabilities which are algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human 
adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require 
public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase 
our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility or Bayesian utility 
maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly questionable due to severe 
underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This 
occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire 
Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and 
DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle 
movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics 
of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig 
Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 
1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in 
the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for 
exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of 
intentionality (e.g., our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, 
inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates 
(functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as 
they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of 
using the dispositional verb ‘thinking’)—non-rational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow 
thinking of S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as 
mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or 
internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even 
for oneself and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. 
Thinking like all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike 
perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act or 
event such as in speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our 
perceptions and memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) 
only when they are manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, 
feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates 
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S2. Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced 
humans to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for 
acts (gross contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is 
much better called UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 
for such functions in S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology 
or Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of 
consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions 
by contracting muscles—i.e., Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and 
Knowing. Thus, “propositional attitude” is an incorrect term for normal 
intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow deliberative functioning of System 2) 
or automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of frequently practiced System 2 
functions of speech and action into automatic fast functions). We see that the 
efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying 
neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we 
already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public 
view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, 
genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social 
life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described 
by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so 
famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind 
(thought, language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings 
of language. Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) 
was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, 
survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, 
intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we try 
to analyze it. This has been explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many 
others. 
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences 
have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly 
different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The 
present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” normally 
describe my ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) 
but can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental 
state and so not based on knowledge or information (W and see my review of 
the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a 
truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” 
makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present tense 
can be causally self-reflexive--they instantiate themselves but then they are not 
testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past or future tense or third person 
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use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain or can be resolved 
by information that is true or false, as they describe public acts that are or can 
become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart 
from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will 
think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime 
that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000). 
 
Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are 
Non-Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them 
functions or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky, Kahneman). Prior Intentions are 
stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must 
separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the 
conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., 
some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 
and are automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology 
(Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential reading 
for an understanding of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought are 
Coliva, Hutto, DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein and Read, who, like many 
scholars now, have posted most of their work (often in preprint form) free 
online at academia.edu, philpapers.org and other sites and of course the 
diligent can find everything free online. Baker & Hacker are found in their 
many joint works and on his personal page. The late Baker went overboard 
with a bizarre psychoanalytic and rather nihilistic interpretation that was ably 
refuted by Hacker whose “Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein” 
is a must read for any student of behavior. 
 
One can find endless metaphysical reductionist cartoon views of life due to the 
attempt to explain higher order thought of S2 in terms of the causal framework 
of S1 which Carruthers (C), Dennett, the Churchlands (3 of the current leaders 
of scientism, computationalism or materialist reductionism -- hereafter CDC—
my acronym for the Centers for (Philosophical) Disease Control) and many 
others pursue. Scientism has been debunked frequently beginning with W in 
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the BBB in the 30’s when he noted that – “philosophers constantly see the 
method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and 
answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of 
metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness”- and by Searle, 
Read, Hutto, Hacker and countless others since. The attempt to ‘explain’ (really 
only to describe as W made clear) S2 in causal terms is incoherent and even for 
S1 it is extremely complex and it is not clear that the highly diverse language 
games of “causality” can ever  be made to apply (as has been noted many 
times)-even their application in physics and chemistry is variable and  often 
obscure (was it gravity or the abscission layer or hormones or the wind or all 
of them that made the apple fall and when did the causes start and end)? But 
as W said-“now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, 
then the activities of the mind lie open before us”. 
 
However, I suggest it is a major mistake to see W as taking either side, as 
usually stated, as his views are much more subtle, more often than not leaving 
his trialogues unresolved. One might find it useful to start with my reviews of 
W, S etc., and then study as much of Read, Hutto, Horwich, Coliva, Hacker, 
Glock, DMS, Stern, etc. as feasible before digging into the literature of causality 
and the philosophy of science, and if one finds it uninteresting to do so then W 
has hit the mark. 
 
In spite of the efforts of W and others, it appears to me that most philosophers 
have little grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically different 
uses of ‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’), or of the nature of 
dispositions, and many (e.g., CDC) still base their ideas on such notions as 
private language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and computationalism, which 
W laid to rest ¾ of a century ago. 
 
 
Before I read any book, I go to the index and bibliography to see whom they 
cite. Often the authors most remarkable achievement is the complete or nearly 
complete omission of all the authors I cite here. W is easily the most widely 
discussed modern philosopher with about one new book and dozens of articles 
largely or wholely devoted to him every month. He has his own journal 
“Philosophical Investigations” and I expect his bibliography exceeds that of the 
next top 4 or 5 philosophers combined. Searle is perhaps next among moderns 
(and the only one with many lectures on YouTube, Vimeo, University sites 
etc.—over 100, which, unlike almost all other philosophy lectures, are a delight 
to listen to) and Hutto, Coliva, DMS, Hacker, Read, etc., are very prominent 
with dozens of books and hundreds of articles, talks and reviews. But CDC and 
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other metaphysicians ignore them and the thousands who regard their work 
as critically important. 
 
Consequently, the powerful W/S framework (as well by and large of that of 
modern research in thinking) is totally absent and all the confusions it has 
cleared away are abundant. If you read my reviews and the works themselves, 
perhaps your view of most writing in this arena may be quite different. But as 
W insisted, one has to work the examples through oneself. As often noted, his 
super-Socratic trialogues had a therapeutic intent. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are noted 
in my other reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are as 
simple as pie—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests 
can only be external and public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in 
the Box’. If we all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. and call 
what is inside a ‘beetle’ then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in language, for every 
box could contain a different thing or even be empty. So, there is no private 
language that only I can know and no introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X is not 
publicly demonstrable it cannot be a word in our language. This shoots down 
Carruther’s ISA theory of mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ theories 
which he references. I have explained W’s dismantling of the notion of 
introspection and the functioning of dispositional language (‘propositional 
attitudes’) above and in my reviews of Budd, Johnston and several of Searle’s 
books. See Stern’s “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations” (2004) for a 
nice explanation of Private Language and everything by Read et al for getting 
to the roots of these issues as few do. 
 
CDC eschew the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a ‘higher self’. But, 
the very act of writing, reading and all language and concepts (language 
games) presuppose self, consciousness and will, so such accounts are self- 
contradictory cartoons of life without any value whatsoever (and zero impact 
on the daily life of anyone). W/S and others have long noted that the first person 
point of view is just not intelligibly eliminable or reducible to a 3rd person one, 
but absence of coherence is no problem for the cartoon views of life. Likewise, 
with the description of brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, 
‘information processing’ etc., -- well debunked countless times by W/S, Hutto, 
Read, Hacker and many others. 
 
Writing that attempts to combine science with philosophy, with the meaning 
of many key terms varying almost at random without awareness, is schizoid 
and hopeless, but there are thousands of science and philosophy books like 
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this. There is the description (not explanation as W made clear) of our behavior 
and then the experiments of cognitive psychology. Many of these dealing with 
human behavior combine the conscious thinking of S2 with the unconscious 
automatisms of S1 (absorb psychology into physiology). We are often told that 
self, will, and consciousness are illusions, since they think they are showing us 
the ‘real’ meaning of these terms, and that the cartoon use is the valid one. That 
is, S2 is ‘unreal’ and must be subsumed by the scientific causal descriptions of 
S1. Hence, the reason for the shift from the philosophy of language to the 
philosophy of mind. See e.g., my review of Carruther’s recent ‘The Opacity of 
Mind’. Even Searle is a frequent offender here as noted by Hacker, Bennet and 
Hacker, DMS, Coliva etc. 
 
If someone says that I can’t choose what to have for lunch he is plainly 
mistaken, or if by choice he means something else such as that ‘choice’ can be 
described as having a ‘cause’ or that it’s not clear how to reduce ‘choice’ to 
‘cause’ so we must regard it as illusory, then that is trivially true (or 
incoherent), but irrelevant to how we use language and how we live, which 
should be regarded as the point from which to begin and end such discussions. 
 
Perhaps one might regard it as relevant that it was W, along with Kant and 
Nietzsche (great intellects, but neither of them doing much to dissolve the 
problems of philosophy), who were voted the best of all time by philosophers-
not Quine, Dummett, Putnam, Kripke or CDC. 
 
One can see the similarity in all philosophical questions (in the strict sense I 
consider here, keeping in mind W’s comment that not everything with the 
appearance of a question is one). We want to understand how the brain (or the 
universe) does it but S2 is not up to it. It’s all (or mostly) in the unconscious 
machinations of S1 via DNA. We don’t ‘know’ but our DNA does, courtesy of 
the death of countless trillions of organisms over some 3 billion years. We can 
describe the world easily but often cannot agree on what an ‘explanation’ 
should look like. So, we struggle with science and ever so slowly describe the 
mechanisms of mind. Even if we should arrive at “complete” knowledge of the 
brain, we would still just have a description of what neuronal pattern 
corresponds to seeing red, but it is not clear what it would mean (COS) to have 
an “explanation” of why it’s red (i.e., why qualia exist). As W said, explanations 
come to an end somewhere. 
 
For those who grasp the above, the philosophical parts of Carruther’s “Opacity 
of Mind” (a major recent work of the CDC school) are comprised largely of the 
standard confusions that result from ignoring the work of W, S and hundreds 
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of others. It can be called Scientism or Reductionism and denies the ‘reality’ of 
our higher order thought, will, self and consciousness, except as these are given 
a quite different and wholly incompatible use in science. We have e.g., no 
reasons for action, only a brain that causes action etc. They create imaginary 
problems by trying to answer questions that have no clear sense. It should 
strike us that these views have absolutely no impact on the daily life of those 
who spend most of their adult life promoting them. 
 
This situation is nicely summed up by Rupert Read in his article ‘The Hard 
Problem of Consciousness’ — “the hardcore problem becomes more and more 
remote, the more we de- humanize aspects of the mind, such as information 
and perception and intentionality. The problem will only really be being faced 
if we face up to it as a ‘problem’ that has to do with whole human beings, 
embodied in a context (inextricably natural and social) at a given time, 
etc…then it can become perspicuous to one that there is no problem. Only 
when one starts, say, to ‘theorize’ information across human and non-human 
domains (supposedly using the non-human-the animal {usually thought of as 
mechanical} or the machine-as one’s paradigm, and thus getting things back to 
front), does it begin to look as if there is a problem…that all the ‘isms’ 
(cognitivism, reductionism (to the brain), behaviorism and so on)…push 
further and further from our reach…the very conceptualization of the problem 
is the very thing which ensures that the ‘hard problem’ remains insoluble…no 
good reason has ever been given for us to think that there must be a science of 
something if it is to be regarded as real. There is no good reason to think that 
there should be a science of consciousness, or of mind or of society, any more 
than there need be a science of numbers, or of universes or of capital cities or 
of games or of constellations or of objects whose names start with the letter 
‘b’…. We need to start with the idea of ourselves as embodied persons acting 
in a world, not with the idea of ourselves as brains with minds ‘located’ in them 
or ‘attached’ to them… There is no way that science can help us bootstrap into 
an ‘external’/’objective’ account of what consciousness really is and when it is 
really present. For it cannot help us when there is a conflict of criteria, when 
our machines come into conflict with ourselves, into conflict with us. For our 
machines are only calibrated by our reports in the first place. There can be no 
such thing as getting an external point of view… that isn’t because… the hard 
problem is insoluble, …Rather, we need not admit that a problem has even 
been defined…’transcendental naturalism’ …guarantees... the keeping alive 
indefinitely of the problem. It offers the extraordinary psychological 
satisfaction of both a humble (yet privileged) ‘scientific’ statement of limits to 
the understanding and, the knowingness of being part of a privileged elite, that 
in stating those limits, can see beyond them. It fails to see what Wittgenstein 
45  
made clear in the preface to the Tractatus. The limit can… only be drawn in 
language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.” 
 
Many of W’s comments come to mind. He noted 85 years ago that ‘mysteries’ 
satisfy a longing for the transcendent, and because we think we can see the 
‘limits of human understanding’, we think we can also see beyond them, and 
that we should dwell on the fact that we see the limits of language (mind) in 
the fact that we cannot describe the facts which correspond to a sentence except 
by repeating the sentence (see p10 etc. in his Culture and Value, written in 
1931). I also find it useful to repeat frequently his remark that “superstition is 
nothing but belief in the causal nexus” --written a century ago in TLP 5.1361. 
 
Also, apropos is his famous comment (PI p308) about the origin of the 
philosophical problems about mental processes (and all philosophical 
problems). "How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and 
states and about behaviorism arise? The first step is the one that altogether 
escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature 
undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them -- we think. But 
that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For 
we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. 
(The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the 
very one that we thought quite innocent.) -- And now the analogy which was 
to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet 
uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as 
if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny 
them.” 
 
Another seemingly trivial comment by W (PI p271) asked us to imagine a 
person who forgot what the word ‘pain’ meant but used it correctly –i.e., he 
used it as we do! Also relevant is W’s comment (TLP 6.52) that when all 
scientific questions have been answered, nothing is left to question, and that is 
itself the answer. And central to understanding the scientistic (i.e., due to 
scientism, not science) failures of CDC et al is his observation that it is a very 
common mistake to think that something must make us do what we do, which 
leads to the confusion between cause and reason. “And the mistake which we 
here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to make is labeled by the word 
“to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no act of insight which makes 
us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that “something must make 
us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion between cause and 
reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain of 
reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
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He has also commented that the chain of causes has an end and that there is no 
reason in the general case for it to be meaningful to specify a cause. W saw in 
his own decades-long struggle the necessity of clarifying ‘grammar’ oneself by 
working out ‘perspicuous examples’ and the futility for many of being told the 
answers. Hence his famous comments about philosophy as therapy and 
‘working on oneself’. 
 
Another striking thing about so many philosophy books (and the disguised 
philosophy throughout the behavioral sciences, physics and math) is that there 
is often no hint that there are other points of view— that many of the most 
prominent philosophers regard the scientistic view as incoherent. There is also 
the fact (seldom mentioned) that, provided of course we ignore its incoherence, 
reduction does not stop at the level of neurophysiology, but can easily be 
extended (and has often been) to the level of chemistry, physics, quantum 
mechanics, ‘mathematics’ or just ‘ideas’. What exactly should make 
neurophysiology privileged? The ancient Greeks generated the idea that 
nothing exists but ideas and Leibniz famously described the universe as a giant 
machine. Most recently Stephan Wolfram became a legend in the history of 
pseudoscience for his description of the universe as a computer automaton in 
‘A New Kind of Science’. Materialism, mechanism, idealism, reductionism, 
behaviorism and dualism in their many guises are hardly news and, to a 
Wittgensteinian, quite dead horses since W dictated the Blue and Brown books 
in the 30’s, or at least since the subsequent publication and extensive 
commentary on his nachlass. But convincing someone is a hopeless task. W 
realized one has to work on oneself—self therapy via long hard working 
through of ‘perspicuous examples’ of language (mind) in action. 
 
An (unknowing) expression of how axiomatic psychology rules, and how easy 
it is to change a word’s use without knowing it, was given by physicist Sir 
James Jeans long ago: “The Universe begins to look more like a great thought 
than like a great machine."   But ‘thought’, ‘machine’, ‘time’, ‘space’,  ‘cause’, 
‘event’, ‘happen’, ‘occur’, ’continue’, etc. do not have the same meanings (uses) 
in science or philosophy as in daily life, or rather they have the old uses mixed 
in at random with many new ones so there is the appearance of sense without 
sense. Much of academic discussion of behavior, life and the universe is high 
comedy (as opposed to the low comedy of most politics, religion and mass 
media): i.e., “comedy dealing with polite society, characterized by 
sophisticated, witty dialogue and an intricate plot”-(Dictionary.com). But 
philosophy is not a waste of time--done rightly, it is the best way to spend time. 
How else can we dispel the chaos in the behavioral sciences or describe our 
mental life and the higher order thought of System 2--the most intricate, 
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wonderful and mysterious thing there is? 
 
Given this framework it should be easy to understand OC, to follow W’s 
examples describing how our innate psychology uses the reality testing of 
System 2 to build on the certainties of System 1, so that we as individuals and 
as societies acquire a world view of irrefutable interlocking experiences that 
build on the bedrock of our axiomatic genetically programmed reflexive 
perception and action to the amazing edifice of science and culture. The theory 
of evolution and the theory of relativity passed long ago from something that 
could be challenged to certainties that can only be modified, and at the other 
end of the spectrum, there is no possibility of finding out that there are no such 
things as Paris or Brontosaurs. The skeptical view is incoherent. We can say 
anything but we cannot mean anything. 
 
Thus, with DMS, I regard OC as a description of the foundation stone of human 
understanding and the most basic document on our psychology. Though 
written when in his 60’s, mentally and physically devastated by cancer, it is as 
brilliant as his other work and transforms our understanding of philosophy 
(the descriptive psychology of higher order thought), bringing it at last into the 
light, after three thousand years in the cave. Metaphysics has been swept away 
from philosophy and from physics. 
 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet 
no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and 
truth should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’. 
 
Let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the 
center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, 
difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to 
miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
An excellent recent work that displays many of the philosophical confusions in 
a book putatively about science and mathematics is Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer 
Limits of Reason: What Science, Mathematics and Logic Cannot Tell Us’(2013). 
 
W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem 
becomes a philosophical one-i.e., one of how language can be used intelligibly. 
Yanofsky, like virtually all scientists and most philosophers, does not get that 
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there are two distinct kinds of “questions” or “assertions” (i.e., Language 
Games or LG’s) here. There are those that are matters of fact about how the 
world is—that is, they are publicly observable propositional (True or False) 
states of affairs having clear meanings (Conditions of Satisfaction --COS) in 
Searle’s terminology—i.e., scientific statements, and then there are those that 
are issues about how language can coherently be used to describe these states 
of affairs, and these can be answered by any sane, intelligent, literate person 
with little or no resort to the facts of science. Another poorly understood but 
critical fact is that, although the thinking, representing, inferring, 
understanding, intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional psychology) of a true or 
false statement is a function of the higher order cognition of our slow, conscious 
System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are entangled, the star 
shows a red shift, a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part that involves seeing 
that the symbols are used correctly in each line of the proof), is always made 
by the fast, automatic, unconscious System 1 (S1) via seeing, hearing, touching 
etc. in which there is no information processing, no representation (i.e., no 
COS) and no decisions in the sense in which these happen in S2 ( which receives 
its inputs from S1). This two systems approach is now the standard way to view 
reasoning or rationality and is a crucial heuristic in the description of behavior, 
of which science, math and philosophy are special cases. There is a huge and 
rapidly growing literature on reasoning that is indispensable to the study of 
behavior or science. A recent book that digs into the details of how we actually 
reason (i.e., use language to carry out actions—see W, DMS, Hacker, S etc.) is 
‘Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science’ by Stenning and Van Lambalgen 
(2008), which, in spite of its limitations (e.g., limited understanding of W/S and 
the broad structure of intentional psychology), is (as of 2016) the best single 
source I know. 
 
W wrote a great deal on the philosophy of mathematics since it clearly 
illustrated many of the types of confusions generated by ‘scientific’ language 
games, and there have been countless commentaries, many quite poor. I will 
comment on some of the best recent work as it is brought up by Yanofsky. 
 
Francisco Berto has made some penetrating comments recently. He notes that 
W denied the coherence of metamathematics-i.e., the use by Godel of a 
metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for his “notorious” 
interpretation of Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept his argument, 
I think we are forced to deny the intelligibility of metalanguages, metatheories 
and meta anything else. How can it be that such concepts (words, language 
games) as metamathematics and incompleteness, accepted by millions (and 
even claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al to reveal 
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fundamental truths about our mind or the universe) are just simple 
misunderstandings about how language works? Isn’t the proof in this pudding 
that, like so many “revelatory” philosophical notions (e.g., mind and will as 
illusions –Dennett, Carruthers, the Churchlands etc.), they have no practical 
impact whatsoever? 
 
Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this framework, it is not possible that the very 
same sentence…turns out to be expressible, but undecidable, in a formal 
system… and demonstrably true (under the aforementioned consistency 
hypothesis) in a different system (the meta- system). If, as Wittgenstein 
maintained, the proof establishes the very meaning of the proved sentence, 
then it is not possible for the same sentence (that is, for a sentence with the same 
meaning) to be undecidable in a formal system, but decided in a different 
system (the meta-system) … Wittgenstein had to reject both the idea that a 
formal system can be syntactically incomplete, and the Platonic consequence 
that no formal system proving only arithmetical truths can prove all 
arithmetical truths. If proofs establish the meaning of arithmetical sentences, 
then there cannot be incomplete systems, just as there cannot be incomplete 
meanings.” And further “Inconsistent arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical arithmetics 
based on a paraconsistent logic, are nowadays a reality. What is more 
important, the theoretical features of such theories match precisely with some 
of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian intuitions…Their inconsistency allows 
them also to escape from Godel’s First Theorem, and from Church’s 
undecidability result: they are, that is, demonstrably complete and decidable. 
They therefore fulfil precisely Wittgenstein’s request, according to which there 
cannot be mathematical problems that can be meaningfully formulated within 
the system, but which the rules of the system cannot decide. Hence, the 
decidability of paraconsistent arithmatics harmonizes with an opinion 
Wittgenstein maintained thoughout his philosophical career.” 
 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or 
our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as a 
motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. 
“Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say 
(contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Gregory Chaitin show. W 
commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems 
derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the 
definitions, and this is utterly different from empirical matters where one 
applies a test. W often noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual 
sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must have real world 
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applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it 
cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much 
wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of 
PA it cannot be used in the real world either. As Victor Rodych notes 
“…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a mathematical calculus 
(i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra-systemic application in a 
system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary counting and measuring or 
in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one needs a warrant to apply 
our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, 
‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of games created with 
‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with ‘Incompleteness’ this 
warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On Wittgenstein’s account, 
there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical calculus because ‘in 
mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and nothing is meaning 
[semantics]…” 
 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, 
being misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and many other 
comments (see Rodych and Floyd). 
 
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of 
polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some 
stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) 
on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are 
independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of the 
laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior, 
which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical computer that can 
be assured of correctly processing information faster than the universe does. 
The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose 
observation apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose 
control apparatus. These results do not rely on systems that are infinite, and/or 
non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if one uses 
an infinitely fast, infinitely dense computer, with computational powers 
greater than that of a Turing Machine.” He also published what seems to be the 
first serious work on team or collective intelligence (COIN) which he says puts 
this subject on a sound scientific footing. Although he has published various 
versions of these over two decades in some of the most prestigious peer 
reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in 
NASA journals and has gotten news items in major science journals, few seem 
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to have noticed and I have looked in dozens of recent books on physics, math, 
decision theory and computation without finding a reference. 
 
It is most unfortunate that Yanofsky and others have no awareness of Wolpert, 
since his work is the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, 
incompleteness, and undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in 
Turing machine theory) by extending the liar paradox and Cantor’s 
diagonalization to include all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms 
and thus may be seen as the last word not only on computation, but on 
cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme generality by partitioning 
the inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it does and not 
how it does it) so that his mathematical proofs are independent of any 
particular physical laws or computational structures in establishing the 
physical limits of inference for past, present and future and all possible 
calculation, observation and control. He notes that even in a classical universe 
Laplace was wrong about being able to perfectly predict the future (or even 
perfectly depict the past or present) and that his impossibility results can be 
viewed as a “non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle” (i.e., there 
cannot be an infallible observation or control device). Any universal physical 
device must be infinite, it can only be so at one moment in time, and no reality 
can have more than one (the “monotheism theorem”). Since space and time do 
not appear in the definition, the device can even be the entire universe across 
all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of incompleteness with two 
inference devices rather than one self-referential device. As he says, “either the 
Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type of computation, or 
prediction complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic information complexity) 
in that there is one and only one version of it that can be applicable throughout 
our universe.” 
 
Another way to say this is that one cannot have two physical inference devices 
(computers) both capable of being asked arbitrary questions about the output 
of the other, or that the universe cannot contain a computer to which one can 
pose any arbitrary computational task, or that for any pair of physical inference 
engines, there are always binary valued questions about the state of the 
universe that cannot even be posed to at least one of them. One cannot build a 
computer that can predict an arbitrary future condition of a physical system 
before it occurs, even if the condition is from a restricted set of tasks that can 
be posed to it—that is, it cannot process information (though this is a vexed 
phrase as S and Read and others note) faster than the universe. The computer 
and the arbitrary physical system it is computing do not have to be physically 
coupled and it holds regardless of the laws of physics, chaos, quantum 
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mechanics, causality or light cones and even for an infinite speed of light. The 
inference device does not have to be spatially localized but can be nonlocal 
dynamical processes occurring across the entire universe. He is well aware that 
this puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., 
concerning the universe as computer or the limits of ”information processing”, 
in a new light (though the indices of their writings make no reference to him 
and another remarkable omission is that none of the above are mentioned by 
Yanofsky either). 
 
Wolpert says it shows that the universe cannot contain an inference device that 
can process information as fast as it can, and since he shows you cannot have a 
perfect memory nor perfect control, its past, present or future state can never 
be perfectly or completely depicted, characterized, known or copied. He also 
proved that no combination of computers with error correcting codes can 
overcome these limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical importance of the 
observer (“the liar”) and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of 
physics, math and language that concern Yanofsky. Again cf. Floyd on W: ”He 
is articulating in other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The 
argument is thus generally applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to 
any purported listing or rule-governed expression of them; it does not rely on 
any particular notational device or preferred spatial arrangements of signs. In 
that sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it is not 
essentially diagrammatical or representational, though it may be diagrammed 
and insofar as it is a logical argument, its logic may be represented formally). 
Like Turing’s arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any particular formalism. 
[The parallels to Wolpert are obvious.] Unlike Turing’s arguments, it explicitly 
invokes the notion of a language-game and applies to (and presupposes) an 
everyday conception of the notions of rules and of the humans who follow 
them. Every line in the diagonal presentation above is conceived as an 
instruction or command, analogous to an order given to a human being...” It 
should be obvious how Wolpert’s work is a perfect illustration of W’s ideas of 
the separate issues of science or mathematics and those of philosophy 
(language games). 
 
Yanofsky also does not make clear the major overlap that now exists (and is 
expanding rapidly) between game theorists, physicists, economists, 
mathematicians, philosophers, decision theorists and others, all of whom have 
been publishing for decades closely related proofs of undecidability, 
impossibility, uncomputability, and incompleteness. One of the more bizarre 
is the recent proof by Armando Assis that in the relative state formulation of 
quantum mechanics one can setup a zero-sum game between the universe and 
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an observer using the Nash Equilibrium, from which follow the Born rule and 
the collapse of the wave function. Godel was first to demonstrate an 
impossibility result, and (until the remarkable papers of David Wolpert—see 
below and my review article) it is the most far reaching (or just 
trivial/incoherent), but there have been an avalanche of others. One of the 
earliest in decision theory was the famous General Impossibility Theorem 
(GIT) discovered by Kenneth Arrow in 1951 (for which he got the Nobel Prize 
in economics in 1972—and five of his students are now Nobel laureates so this 
is not fringe science).  It states roughly that no reasonably consistent and fair 
voting system (i.e., no method of aggregating individuals’ preferences into 
group preferences) can give sensible results. The group is either dominated by 
one person, and so GIT is often called the “dictator theorem”, or there are 
intransitive preferences. Arrow’s original paper was titled "A Difficulty in the 
Concept of Social Welfare" and can be stated like this:” It is impossible to 
formulate a social preference ordering that satisfies all of the following 
conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual Sovereignty; Unanimity; Freedom 
From Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of Group Rank.” Those familiar with 
modern decision theory accept this and the many related constraining 
theorems as their starting points. Those who are not may find it (and all these 
theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to find a career path that has 
nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See ”The Arrow Impossibility 
Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and Imperfection”(2013) among legions 
of publications. 
 
Yanofsky mentions the famous impossibility result of Brandenburger and 
Keisler (2006) for two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and 
like all these impossibility results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind) 
which shows that any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. 
One interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically 
just logic) are available to the players in a game, then there are statements or 
beliefs that the players can write down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually hold 
(i.e., no clear COS). “Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that 
Bob’s assumption is wrong” seems unexceptionable and ‘recursion’ (another 
LG) has been assumed in argumentation, linguistics, philosophy etc., for a 
century at least, but they showed that it is impossible for Ann and Bob to 
assume these beliefs. And there is a rapidly growing body of such impossibility 
results for 1 or multiplayer decision situations (e.g., it grades into Arrow, 
Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser etc). For a good technical paper from among the 
avalanche on the B&K paradox, get Abramsky and Zvesper’s paper from 
arXiv.org, which takes us back to the liar paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as its 
title notes it is about “interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference”) 
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and thus to Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W and Godel. Many of these papers quote 
Yanofksy’s paper “A universal approach to self- referential paradoxes and 
fixed points. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–386, 2003. Abramsky (a 
polymath who is among other things a pioneer in quantum computing) is a 
friend, and so Yanofsky contributes a paper to the recent Festschrift to him 
‘Computation, Logic, Games and Quantum Foundations’ (2013). For maybe the 
best recent (2013) commentary on the BK and related paradoxes see the 165p 
powerpoint lecture free on the net by Wes Holliday and Eric Pacuit ’Ten 
Puzzles and Paradoxes about Knowledge and Belief’.  For a good multi-author 
survey see ’Collective Decision Making (2010). 
 
Since Godel’s famous theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing 
algorithmic ‘randomness’ (‘incompleteness’) throughout math (which is just 
another of our symbolic systems), it seems inescapable that thinking (behavior, 
language, mind) is full of impossible, random or incomplete statements and 
situations. Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems 
evolved by chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be 
regarded as unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says 
this ‘randomness’ (again a group of LG’s) shows there are limitless theorems 
that are true but unprovable— i.e., true for no reason. One should then be able 
to say that there are limitless statements that make perfect “grammatical” sense 
that do not describe actual situations attainable in that domain. I suggest these 
puzzles go away if one considers W’s views. He wrote many notes on the issue 
of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his work concerns the plasticity, 
“incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity of language, math and logic. 
The recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto are the best introduction I know 
of to W’s remarks on the foundations of mathematics and so to philosophy. 
 
As noted, David Wolpert has derived some amazing theorems in Turing 
Machine Theory and the limits of computation that are very apropros here. 
They have been almost universally ignored but not by well known 
econometricians Koppl and Rosser, who, in their famous 2002 paper “All that 
I have to say has already crossed your mind”, give three theorems on the limits 
to rationality, prediction and control in economics. The first uses Wolpert’s 
theorem on the limits to computability to show some logical limits to 
forecasting the future. Wolpert notes that it can be viewed as the physical 
analog of Godel’s incompleteness theorem and K and R say that their variant 
can be viewed as its social science analog, though Wolpert is well aware of the 
social implications. K and R‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence 
for Bayesian (probabilistic) forecasting in infinite-dimensional space. The third 
shows the impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with 
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agents knowing its forecasting program. The astute will notice that these 
theorems can be seen as versions of the liar paradox and the fact that we are 
caught in impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes 
ourselves has been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these 
contexts and again we have circled back to the puzzles of physics when the 
observer is involved. K&R conclude “Thus, economic order is partly the 
product of something other than calculative rationality”. Bounded rationality 
is now a major field in itself, the subject of thousands of papers and hundreds 
of books. 
 
Reasoning is another word for thinking, which is a disposition like knowing, 
understanding, judging etc. As Wittgenstein was the first to explain, these 
dispositional verbs describe propositions (sentences which can be true or false) 
and thus have what Searle calls Conditions of Satisfaction (COS). That is, there 
are public states of affairs that we recognize as showing their truth or falsity. 
“Beyond reason” would mean a sentence whose truth conditions are not clear 
and the reason would be that it does not have a clear context. It is a matter of 
fact if we have clear COS (i.e., meaning) but we just cannot make the 
observation--this is not beyond reason but beyond our ability to achieve, but 
it’s a philosophical (linguistic) matter if we don’t know the COS. “Are the mind 
and the universe computers?” sounds like it needs scientific or mathematical 
investigation, but it is only necessary to clarify the context in which this 
language will be used since these are ordinary and unproblematic terms and it 
is only their context which is puzzling. 
 
As always, the first thing to keep in mind is W’s dictum that there are no new 
discoveries to be made in philosophy nor explanations to be given, but only 
clear descriptions of behavior (language). Once one understands that all the 
problems are confusions about how language works, we are at peace and 
philosophy in their sense has achieved its purpose. As W/S have noted, there 
is only one reality, so there are not multiple versions of the mind or life or the 
world that can meaningfully be given, and we can only communicate in our 
one public language. There cannot be a private language and any “private 
inner” thoughts cannot be communicated and cannot have any role in our 
social life. It should also be very straightforward to solve philosophical 
problems in this sense. "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are 
concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein 
"The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
 
We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior 
(human nature or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the 
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bedrock or background and reflecting upon this we generate philosophy which 
S calls the logical structure of rationality and I call the descriptive psychology 
of Higher Order Thought (HOT) or, taking the cue from W, the study of the 
language describing HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s comments on 
philosophical aspects of human behavior (HOT) is to see if its translation into 
the W/S framework gives some clear descriptions which illuminate the use of 
language. If not, then showing how they have been bewitched by language 
dispels the confusion. I repeat what Horwich has noted on the last page of his 
superb ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’ (see my review): “What sort of 
progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no depths 
have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered 
or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as 
Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should 
be found satisfying enough.” 
 
Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W suggested we ought to say 
“describing”) and S states that the logical structure of rationality constitutes 
various theories, and there is no harm in it, provided one realizes they are 
comprised of a series of examples that let us get a general idea of how language 
(the mind) works and that as his “theories” are explicated via examples they 
become more like W’s perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by any other name...” 
When there is a question one has to go back to the examples or consider new 
ones. As W noted, language (life) is limitlessly complex and context sensitive 
(W being the unacknowledged father of Contextualism), and so it is utterly 
unlike physics where one can often derive a formula and dispense with the 
need for further examples. Scientism (the use of scientific language and the 
causal framework) leads us astray in describing HOT. 
 
Once again: “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their 
eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way 
science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness.” (BBB p18). Unlike so many others, S has 
largely avoided and often demolished scientism, but there is a residue which 
evinces itself when he insists on using dispositional S2 terms which describe 
public behavior (thinking, knowing believing etc.) to describe S1 ‘processes’ in 
the brain, that e.g., we can understand consciousness by studying the brain, 
and that he is prepared to give up causality, will or mind. W made it 
abundantly clear that such words are the hinges or basic language games and 
giving them up or even changing them is not a coherent concept. As noted in 
my other reviews, I think the residue of scientism results from the major 
tragedy of S’s (and nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his failure 
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to take the later W seriously enough (W died a few years before S went to 
England to study) and making the common fatal mistake of thinking he is 
smarter than W. 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel 
p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of the 
reptilian subcortical System One (S1) composed of perceptions, memories and 
reflexes, and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving 
sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear, they are the basis 
for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true- only axioms of our psychology 
are not evidential. 
 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting W’s 
above remark on science envy, I will quote from P.M.S Hacker (the leading 
expert on W for many years) who gives a good start on it and a counterblast to 
scientism. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
...What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of 
our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, 
the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and 
purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To 
this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, 
psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute 
nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de- sac- 
p15-2005) 
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The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic 
relationships so well described by Searle. I expect this fairly well abstracts the 
basic structure of social behavior. 
 
Several comments bear repeating. So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly 
causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) 
while S2 has content (i.e. is representational) and is downwardly causal (mind 
to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I 
would translate the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and 
ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as 
modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with 
how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire and imagination--
desires time shifted and decoupled from intention-- and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) originating in) 
the Causally Self Reflexive (CSR) rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive 
S1. In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases 
such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal 
connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the 
future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other 
and are often orchestrated seamlessly by learned deontic cultural relations, so 
that our normal experience is that we consciously control everything that we 
do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has 
described as `The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. 
One refers to the true- only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes 
(including basic speech) and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology 
which are Causally Self Reflexive (CSR)-(called reflexive or intransitive in W’s 
BBB), and the S2 use as disposition words (thinking, understanding, knowing 
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etc.) which can be acted out, and which can become true or  false (`I know my 
way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR 
(called transitive in BBB). 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviorism arise? 
 
– The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk about processes 
and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know 
more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way 
of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to 
learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick 
has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent). —And now 
the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, 
we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored 
medium. And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And 
naturally we don’t want to deny them.   W’s PI p308 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNCp193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
Like Carruthers, Coliva, S and others sometime state (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that 
S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in my reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. However, since what 
S and various authors here call the background (S1) gives rise to S2 and is in 
turn partly controlled by S2, there has to be a sense in which S1 is able to 
become propositional and they and Searle note that the unconscious or 
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conscious but automated activities of S1 must be able to become the conscious 
or deliberative ones of S2. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) 
because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2, but if S1 
were propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is 
intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact 
if true, life would not be possible. It would e.g., mean that truth and falsity and 
the facts of the world could be decided without consciousness. As W stated 
often and showed so brilliantly in his last book ‘On Certainty’, life must be 
based on certainty-- automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that 
always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die--no evolution, no people, no 
philosophy. 
 
Again, I will repeat some crucial notions. Another idea clarified by S is the 
Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). I would translate S's summary 
of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires (need 
to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent Reasons 
for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), which produce 
dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle 
movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in 
ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his description on 
p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 as "The resolution of the paradox is that the 
unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious 
DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires." 
Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these 
are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is “right” but the ultimate 
cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of 
their distant ancestors. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the 
unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the 
conscious slow thinking of S2, which produces reasons for action that often 
result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The 
general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and 
by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has 
generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and 
in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see 
that this view is not credible. 
 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
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public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd- 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology) "It is in language that wish and 
fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one 
might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as Evolutionary 
Psychology (EP) and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing 
and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher order 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find—beyond even Searle’s 
‘theories’ (who often criticizes W for his famous anti-theoretical stance). 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” W BBB p34 
 
“Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy” (2008) is a superb and unique 
book, but so totally ignored that my 2015 review is the only one! It should be 
obvious that philosophical issues are always about mistakes in language used 
to describe our universal innate psychology and there is no useful sense in 
which there can be a Chinese, French, Christian, Feminist etc. view of them. 
Such views can exist of philosophy in the broad sense but that is not what 
philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me what any interesting and substantive 
philosophy) is about. It could take a whole book to discuss this and S does an 
excellent job, so I will just comment here that re p35 propositions are S2 and 
not mental states which are S1 as W made quite clear over ¾ of a century ago 
and that both Quine and Davidson were equally confused about the basic 
issues involved (both Searle and Hacker have done excellent demolitions of 
Quine). As often, S’s discussion is marred by his failure to carry his 
understanding of W’s “background” to its logical conclusion and so he 
suggests (as he has frequently) that he might have to give up the concept of free 
will—a notion I find (with W) is incoherent. What are the COS (the truthmaking 
event, the test or proof) that could show the truth vs the falsity of our not 
having a choice to lift our arm? 
 
Likewise (p62) nobody can give arguments for the background (i.e., our 
axiomatic EP) as our being able to talk at all presupposes it (as W noted 
frequently). It’s also true that “reduction” along with “monism”, “reality”, etc.  
are complex language games and they do not carry meaning along in little 
backpacks! One must dissect ONE usage in detail to get clear and then see how 
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another useage (context) differs. 
 
Philosophers (and would-be philosophers) create imaginary problems by 
trying to answer questions that have no clear sense. This situation is nicely 
analyzed by Finkelstein in ‘Holism and Animal Minds’ and so admirably 
summed up by Read in ‘The Hard Problem of Consciousness’ quoted above. 
 
Wittgenstein’s ``Culture and Value``(published in 1980), but written decades 
earlier), though it´s perhaps his least interesting book, has much that is 
pertinent to this discussion, and of course to a large part of modern intellectual 
life. 
 
``There is no religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical 
expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.`` 
 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we 
are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. 
But the people who say this don´t understand why is has to be so. It is because 
our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the 
same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb ‘to be’ that looks as if it 
functions in the same way as ´to eat´ and ´to drink´, as long as we still have the 
adjectives ´identical´, ´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to talk of 
a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., etc., people will keep stumbling 
over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at something 
which no explanation seems capable of clearing up. And what´s more, this 
satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because, insofar as people think they 
can see `the limits of human understanding´, they believe of course that they 
can see beyond these.`` 
 
Likewise let us try to distill the essence from two of Searle’s recent works. 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent's desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's 
guillotine, the rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations...the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
63  
matters of deontic powers...to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action...these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action...The general 
point  is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
 
That is, the functioning of our linguistic System 2 presupposes that of our pre-
linguistic System 1. 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
That is, our mental functioning is usually so preoccupied with system 2 as to 
be oblivious to system 1. 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNCp193 
 
"So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created 
by collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic 
powers...With the important exception of language itself, all of institutional 
reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts 
that have the logical form of Declarations...all of human institutional reality is 
created and maintained in existence by (representations that have the same 
logical form as) Status Function  Declarations,  including the cases that  are not  
speech  acts in  the explicit  form of Declarations." 
Searle MSW p11-13 
 
"Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the 
upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like 
statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in that 
sense, they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world 
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direction of fit. The conative- volitional states such as desires, prior intentions 
and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we 
would like them to be or how we intend to make them be...In addition to these 
two faculties, there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional content 
is not supposed to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents of 
cognition and volition are supposed to fit...the world-relating commitment is 
abandoned and we have a propositional content without any commitment that 
it represent with either direction of fit." Searle MSWp15 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
"But there is no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. Prelinguistic 
intentional states cannot create facts in the world by representing those facts as 
already existing. This remarkable feat requires a language" MSW p69 
 
"...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according 
to the conventions of a language without creating commitments. This is true 
not just for statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or 
dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term `propositional 
attitudes'  by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of 
PNC: "Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of 
satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of 
satisfaction." As S states it in PNC, "A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction...and a condition of satisfaction... is that 
such and such is the case." Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have 
been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. Regarding 
intentions, "In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function causally 
in the production of the action."(MSWp34). 
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"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions 
of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive 
capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way that is 
essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker intentionally 
produces a physical utterance, but at another level the utterance represents 
something. And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level, it is a 
physical object like any other. At another level, it has a meaning: it represents 
a type of a state of affairs" MSW p74 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates 
the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat 
muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, 
which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or 
protolinguistic interactions in which gross muscle movements were able to 
convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
Most people will benefit greatly from reading W's "On Certainty" or "RPP1 and 
2" or DMS's two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the 
difference between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false 
propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to 
Searle's taking S1 perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his 
work) since they can only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them in MSW) 
after one begins thinking about them in S2. 
 
Searle often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description 
of one event so for Intention in Action (IA) "We have different levels of 
description where one level is constituted by the behavior at the lower level...in 
addition to the constitutive by way of relation, we also have the causal by 
means of relation."(p37 MSW). 
 
"The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are 
strikingly different."(p35 MSW). The COS of PI need a whole action while those 
of IA only a partial one. He makes clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions (PI) are 
mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result in intentions-in-action (IA) 
which are conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally self-reflexive (CSR). The 
critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs and desires) it is 
essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. These descriptions of 
cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1 (p38 MSW), which Searle 
has used for many years and is the basis for the much extended one I present 
here and in my many articles. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to 
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modern psychological research by using my S1, S2 terminology and W's true-
only vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-
only perception, memory and intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as 
belief and desire. 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 
just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully 
clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. 
The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
It is critical to understand the notion of `function' that is relevant here. "A 
function is a cause that serves a purpose...In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent...status functions... 
require... collective imposition and recognition of a status"(p59 MSW). 
 
 
I suggest,  the  translation  of  "The  intentionality  of  language  is  created  by  
the  intrinsic,  or  mind-  independent intentionality of human beings" (p66 
MSW) as "The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the 
unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1". That is, one must keep in 
mind that behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
Once again, Searle states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, 
perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have 
noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is 
correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional 
and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit 
(DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 
but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is 
intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact 
if true, life would not be possible. As W showed countless times and biology 
shows so clearly, life must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid 
reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no 
evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations 
of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than 
contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of 
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magnitude higher for visual information. 
 
S1 and S2 are critical parts of human EP and are the results, respectively of 
billions and hundreds of millions of years of natural selections by inclusive 
fitness. They facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally 
bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk in S’s MSW (e.g., p114) about `extra-
linguistic conventions' and `extra semantical semantics' is in fact referring to 
EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which are the basis for 
all behavior. As W said many times, the most familiar is for that reason 
invisible. 
 
Here again is my summary (following S in MSW) of how practical reason 
operates: We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which 
typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA-- i.e., desires 
displaced in space and time, often for reciprocal altruism--RA), which produce 
dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle 
movements that serve our inclusive fitness- IF (increased survival for genes in 
ourselves and those closely related). 
 
I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in higher animals and not at all 
unique to humans (think mother hen defending her brood from a fox) if we 
include the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but certainly 
the higher order DIRA of S2 (DIRA2) that require language are uniquely 
human. The paradox of how we can voluntarily carry out DIRA2 (i.e., the S2 
acts and their cultural extensions that are desire independent) is that the 
unconscious DIRA1, serving long term inclusive fitness, generate the conscious 
DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires. Agents 
do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are 
very restricted extensions of unconscious or merely automated DIRA1 (the 
ultimate cause). 
 
Following W, it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only 
reflexive actions and cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the 
basis for questioning. You cannot doubt you are reading this page as your 
awareness of it is the basis for doubting. 
 
Inevitably, W’s famous demonstrations of the uselessness of introspection and 
the impossibility of a truly private language pop up repeatedly 
(“…introspection can never lead to a definition…” p8). The basics of this 
argument are extremely simple—no test, no language and a test can only be 
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public. If I grow up alone on a desert island with no books and one day decide 
to call the round things on the trees ‘coconut’ and then next day I see one and 
say ‘coconut’ it seems like I have started on a language. But suppose what I say 
(since there is no person or dictionary to correct me) is ‘coca’ or even ‘apple’ 
and the next day something else? Memory is notoriously fallible and we have 
great trouble keeping things straight even with constant correction from others 
and with incessant input from media. This may seem like a trivial point but it 
is central to the whole issue of the Inner and the Outer—i.e., our true-only 
untestable statements of our experience vs the true or false testable statements 
regarding everything in the world, including our own behavior. Though W 
explained this with many examples beginning over ¾ of a century ago, it has 
rarely been understood and it is impossible to go very far with any discussion 
of behavior unless one does. As W, S, Hutto, Budd, Hacker, DMS, Johnston and 
others have explained, anyone who thinks W has an affinity with Skinner, 
Quine, Dennett, Functionalism or any other behaviorist excretions that deny 
our inner life needs to go back to the beginning. 
 
 Budd’s ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’(1991) is one of the better 
works for gaining insight so I discuss it in detail (see my review for more). 
 
On p21 he begins discussing dispositions (i.e., S2 abilities such as thinking, 
knowing, believing) which seem like they refer to mental states (i.e., to S1 
automatisms), another major confusion which W was the first to set straight. 
Thus, on p28 ‘reading’ must be understood as another dispositional ability that 
is not a mental state and has no definite duration like thinking, understanding, 
believing etc. 
 
Few notice (Budd p29-32, Stern, Johnston and Moyal-Sharrock are exceptions) 
that W presciently (decades before chaos and complexity science came into 
being) suggested that some mental phenomena may originate in chaotic 
processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding to a 
memory trace. He also suggested several times that the causal chain has an end 
and this could mean both that it is just not possible (regardless of the state of 
science) to trace it any further or that the concept of `cause' ceases to be 
applicable beyond a certain point (p34). Subsequently, many have made similar 
suggestions without any idea that W anticipated them by decades (in fact over 
a century now in a few instances). On p32 the “counter-factual conditionals” 
refer again to dispositions such as “may think it’s raining” which are possible 
states of affairs (or potential actions—Searle’s conditions of satisfaction) which 
may arise in chaos. It may be useful to tie this to Searle’s 3 gaps of intentionality, 
which he finds critically necessary. 
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Budd notes W’s famous comment on p33 -- “The mistake is to say that there is 
anything that meaning something consists in.” Though W is correct that there 
is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes (as quoted above) that there 
is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the 
imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” which is 
an act and not a mental state. As Budd notes on p35 this can be seen as another 
statement of his argument against private language (personal interpretations 
vs publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule following and interpretation on 
p36 -41—they can only be publicly checkable acts--no private rules or private 
interpretations either. And one must note that many (most famously Kripke) 
miss the boat here, being misled by W’s frequent referrals to community 
practice into thinking it’s just arbitrary public practice that underlies language 
and social conventions. W makes clear many times that such conventions are 
only possible given an innate shared psychology which he often calls the 
background. Budd correctly rejects this misinterpretation several times (e.g., 
p58). 
 
In Budd’s next chapter he deals with sensations which in my terms (and in 
modern psychology) is S1 and in W’s terms the true-only undoubtable and 
untestable background. His comment (p47) ...” that our beliefs about our 
present sensations rest upon an absolutely secure foundation- the ‘myth of the 
given’ is one of the principal objects of Wittgenstein’s attack...” can easily be 
misunderstood. Firstly, he makes the universal mistake of calling these 
‘beliefs’, but it is better to reserve this word for S2 true or false dispositions. As 
W made very clear, the sensations, memories and reflexive acts of S1 are 
axiomatic and not subject to belief in the usual sense but are better called 
understandings (my U1). Unlike our S2 beliefs (including those about other 
peoples S1 experiences), there is no mechanism for doubt. Budd explains this 
well, as on p52 where he notes that there is no possible justification for saying 
one is in pain. That is, justifying means testing and that is possible with S2 
dispositional slow conscious thinking, not S1 reflexive fast unconscious 
processing. His discussion of this on p52-56 is excellent but in my view, like 
everyone who discusses W on rules, private language and the inner, all he 
needs to do is say that in S1 there is no possible test and this is the meaning of 
W’s famous the ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria’. That is, 
introspection is vacuous. 
 
Budd’s footnote 21 confuses the true-only causal experiences of S1 and the 
reasoned dispositions of S2. 
 
The point of the next few pages on names for ‘internal objects’ (pains, beliefs, 
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thoughts etc.) is again that they have their use (meaning) and it is the 
designation of dispositions to act, or in Searle’s terms, the specification of 
Conditions of Satisfaction, which make the utterance true. 
 
Again, Budd’s discussion of “Sensations and Causation” is wrong in stating 
that we ‘self-ascribe’ or ‘believe’ in our sensations or ‘take a stance’ (Dennett) 
that we have a pain or see a horse, but rather we have no choice—S1 is true-
only and a mistake is a rare and bizarre occurrence and of an entirely different 
kind than a mistake in S2. And S1 is causal as opposed to S2, which concerns 
reasons, and that is why seeing the horse or feeling the pain or jumping out of 
the way of a speeding car is not subject to judgments or mistakes. But he gets 
in right again — “So the infallibility of non-inferential self-ascriptions of pain 
is compatible with the thesis that a true self-ascription of pain must be caused 
by a physical event in the subject’s body, which is identical with the pain he 
experiences (p67).” I do not accept his following statement that W would not 
accept this based on one or two comments in his entire corpus, since in his later 
work (notably OC) he spends hundreds of pages describing the causal 
automated nature of S1 and how it feeds into (causes) S2 which then feeds back 
to S1 to cause muscle movements (including speech). Animals survive only 
because their life is totally directed by the phenomena around them which are 
highly predictable (dogs may jump but they never fly). 
 
The next chapter on Seeing Aspects describes W’s extensive comments on how 
S1 and S2 interact and where our language is ambiguous in what we may mean 
by ‘seeing’. In general, it’s clear that ‘seeing as’ or aspectual seeing is part of the 
slow S2 brain actions while just seeing is the true-only S1 automatisms, but they 
are so well integrated that it is often possible to describe a situation in multiple 
ways which explains W’s comment on p97.He notes that W is exclusively 
interested in what I have elsewhere called ‘Seeing2’ or ‘Concepts2’—i.e., 
aspectual or S2 higher order processing of images. 
 
Here, as throughout this book and indeed in any discussion of W or of 
behavior, it is of great value to refer to Johnston’s ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the 
Inner’ (1993) and especially to his discussions of the indeterminate nature of 
language. 
 
In Budd’s chapter 5 we again deal with a major preoccupation of W’s later 
work—the relations between S1 and S2. As I have noted in my other reviews, 
few have fully understood the later W and, lacking the S1, S2 framework it is 
not surprising. Thus, Budd’s discussion of seeing (automatic S1) vs visualizing 
(conscious S2 which is subject to the will) is severely hampered. Thus, one can 
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understand why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the domination 
of S2 by S1 (p110). And on p115 it is the familiar issue of there being no test for 
my inner experiences, so whatever I say comes to mind when I imagine Jack’s 
face counts as the image of Jack. Similarly, with reading and calculation which 
can refer to S1, S2 or a combination and there is the constant temptation to 
apply S2 terms to S1 processes where that lack of any test makes them 
inapplicable. See Bennet and Hacker’s ‘Neurophilosophy’, DMS, etc. for 
discussions. On p120 et seq. Budd mentions two of W’s famous examples used 
for combatting this temptation—playing tennis without a ball (‘S1 tennis’), and 
a tribe that had only S2 calculation so ‘calculating in the head (‘S1 calculating’) 
was not possible. ‘Playing’ and ‘calculating’ describe actual or potential acts—
i.e., they are disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have 
said before one really ought to keep them straight by writing ‘playing1’ and 
‘playing2’ etc. But we are not taught to do this and so we want to either dismiss 
‘calculating1’ as a fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature undecided until 
later. Hence W’s famous comment (p120)— “The decisive movement in the 
conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite 
innocent.” 
 
Chapter 6 explains another frequent topic of W’s—that when we speak, the 
speech itself is our thought and there is not some other prior mental process 
and this can be seen as another version of the private language argument -- 
there are no such things as ‘inner criteria’ which enable us to tell what we 
thought before we act (speak). 
 
The point of W’s comments (p125) about other imaginable ways to use the verb 
‘intend’ is that they would not be the same as our ‘intend’—i.e., the name of a 
potential event (PE) and in fact it is not clear what it would mean. “I intend to 
eat” has the COS of eating but if it meant (COS is) eating then it wouldn’t 
describe an intention but an action and if it meant saying the words (COS is 
speech) then it wouldn’t have any further COS and how could it function in 
either case? 
 
To the question on p127 as to when a sentence expresses a thought (has a 
meaning), we can say ‘When it has clear COS’ and this means has public truth 
conditions. Hence the quote from W: “When I think in language, there aren’t 
‘meanings’ going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought.” And, if I think with or without words, 
the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible 
criterion (COS). Thus, W’s lovely aphorisms (p132) “It is in language that wish 
and fulfillment meet” and “Like everything metaphysical, the harmony 
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between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.” 
 
And one might note here that ‘grammar’ in W can usually be translated as ‘EP’ 
and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, 
this is about as broad a characterization of philosophy and higher order 
descriptive psychology as one can find. Again, this quashes Searle’s frequent 
criticism of W as anti- theoretical—it all depends on the nature of the 
generalization. 
 
It helps greatly in this section of Budd on the harmony of thought with reality 
(i.e., of how dispositions like expecting, thinking, imagining work-- what it 
means to utter them) to state them in terms of S’s COS which are the PE 
(possible events) which make them true. If I say I expect Jack to come then the 
COS (PE) which makes it true is that Jack arrives and my mental states or 
physical behavior (pacing the room, imagining Jack) are irrelevant. The 
harmony of thought and reality is that jack arrives regardless of my prior or 
subsequent behavior or any mental states I may have and Budd is confused or 
at least confusing when he states (p132 bottom) that there must be an internal 
description of a mental state that can agree with reality and that this is the 
content of a thought, as these terms should be restricted to the automatisms of 
S1 only and never used for the conscious functions of S2. The content (meaning) 
of the thought that Jack will come is the outer (public) event that he comes and 
not any inner mental event or state, which the private language argument 
shows is impossible to connect to the outer events. We have very clear 
verification for the outer event but none at all for ‘inner events’. And as W and 
S have beautifully demonstrated many times, the speech act of uttering the 
sentence ‘I expect Jack to come’ just is the thought that Jack will come and the 
COS is the same—that Jack does come. And so, the answer to the two questions 
on p133 and the import of W’s comment on p 135 should now be crystal clear 
— “In virtue of what is it true that my expectation does have that content?” and 
“What has become now of the hollow space and the corresponding solid?” as 
well as “…the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses 
all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow.” And thus, it 
should also be quite clear what Budd is referring to as to what makes it 
“possible for there to be the required harmony (or lack of harmony) with 
reality.” 
 
Likewise, with the question in the next section-- what makes it true that my 
image of Jack is an image of him? Imagining is another disposition and the COS 
is that the image I have in my head is Jack and that’s why I will say ‘YES’ if 
shown his picture and ‘NO’ if shown one of someone else. The test here is not 
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that the photo matches the vague image I had but that I intended it (had the 
COS that) to be an image of him. Hence the famous quote from W: “If God had 
looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were 
speaking of (PI p217)” and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in “that’s Him” and “…what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies.” Hence W’s summation (p140) that 
“What it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he 
calls what happened the wish that that should happen” … the question 
whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And 
the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied” … 
Suppose it were asked ‘Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have 
learned to talk, then I do know.” Disposition words refer to PE’s which I accept 
as fulfilling the COS and my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. 
have no bearing on the way dispositions function. 
 
As Budd rightly notes, I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, 
desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I 
express. Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be 
expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
W never devoted as much time to emotions as he did to dispositions so there 
is less substance to chapter 7. He notes that typically the object and cause are 
the same—i.e., they are causally self- referential (or self-reflexive as Searle now 
prefers)—a concept further developed by S. If one looks at my table, it is clear 
emotions have much more in common with the fast, true-only automatisms of 
S1 than with the slow, true or false thinking of S2, but of course S1 feeds S2 and 
in turn is often fed by it. 
 
Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the 
model of ‘object and designation’ for everyday psychological words—the 
denial that the picture of the inner process provides a correct representation of 
the grammar of such words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility 
to the use of introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate 
foundation.” 
 
Now let us take another dose of Searle. 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
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works as a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition ... There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description." Searle Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science 
is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological 
reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference by the fact 
that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to record 
both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of 
vision...in the sense of `information' used in cognitive science, it is simply false 
to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
And another shot of Wittgenstein. 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name 
`philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." PI 
126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
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considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel 
p312-314 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the 
logical extensions of S2 into culture. 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2 
social behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true- only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking 
of S2. 
 
One thing to keep in mind is that philosophy has no practical impact 
whatsoever except to clear up confusions about how language is being used in 
particular cases. Like various ‘physical theories’ but unlike other cartoon views 
of life (religious, political, psychological, sociological, anthropological), it is too 
cerebral and esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it is so 
unrealistic that even its adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. 
Likewise, with other academic ‘theories of life’ such as the Standard Social 
Science Model widely shared by sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, 
history and literature. However, religions big and small, political movements, 
and sometimes economics often generate or embrace already existing cartoons 
that ignore physics and biology (human nature), posit forces terrestrial or 
cosmic that reinforce our superstitions (EP defaults), and help to lay waste to 
the earth (the real purpose of nearly every social practice and institution, which 
are there to facilitate replication of genes and consumption of resources). The 
point is to realize that these are on a continuum with philosophical cartoons 
and have the same source (our evolved psychology). All of us could be said to 
generate/absorb various cartoon views of life when young and only a few ever 
grow out of them. 
 
Also note that, as W remarked long ago, the prefix “meta” is unnecessary and 
confusing in most (maybe all) contexts, so for ‘metacognition’ anywhere 
substitute ‘cognition’ or ‘thinking’, since thinking about what we or others 
believe or know is thinking like any other and does not have to be seen as 
‘mindreading’ (Understanding of Agency or UA in my terminology) either. In 
S’s terms, the COS are the test of what is being thought and they are identical 
for ‘it’s raining’, I believe it’s raining’, ‘I believe I believe it’s raining’ and ‘he 
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believes it’s raining’ (likewise for ‘knows’, wishes, judges, understands, etc.), 
namely that it’s raining. This is the critical fact to keep in mind regarding 
‘metacognition’ and ‘mindreading’ of dispositions (‘propositional attitudes’). 
 
Now for a few extracts from my review of Carruthers’ (C) ‘The Opacity of 
Mind’ (2013) which is replete with the classical confusions dressed up as 
science. It was the subject of a precis in Brain and Behavioral Sciences (BBS) 
that is not to be missed. 
 
One of the responses in BBS was by Dennett (who shares most of C’s illusions), 
who seems to find these ideas quite good, except that C should eliminate the 
use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a higher self (the aim being hard 
reduction of S2 to S1). Of course, the very act of writing, reading and all the 
language and concepts of anything whatsoever presuppose self, consciousness 
and will (as S often notes), so such an account would be just a cartoon of life 
without any value whatsoever, which one could say of most philosophical and 
many ‘scientific’ disquisitions on behavior. The W/S framework has long noted 
that the first person point of view is not eliminable or reducible to a 3rd person 
one, but this is no problem for the cartoon view of life. Likewise, with the 
description of brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, ‘information 
processing’ etc., -- all well debunked countless times by W/S, Hutto, Read, 
Hacker and many others. Worst of all is the crucial but utterly unclear 
“representation”, for which I think S’s use as a condition of satisfaction (COS) 
is by far the best. That is, the ‘representation’ of ‘I think it’s raining’ is the COS 
that it’s raining. 
 
Saddest of all is that C (like Dennett and Searle) thinks he is an expert on W, 
having studied him early in his career and decided that the private language 
argument is to be rejected as ‘behaviorism’! W famously rejected behaviorism 
and much of his work is devoted to describing why it cannot serve as a 
description of behavior. “Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t 
you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction? 
If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) And one 
can also point to real behaviorism in C in its modern ‘computationalist’ form. 
W/S insist on the indispensability of the first person point of view while C 
apologizes to D in the BBS article for using “I” or “self”. 
 
Hutto has shown the vast gulf between W and Dennett (D) which will serve to 
characterize C as well, since I take D and C (along with the Churchland’s and 
many others) to be on the same page. S is one of many who have deconstructed 
D in various writings and these can all be read in opposition to C. And let us 
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recall that W sticks to examples of language in action, and once one gets the 
point he is mostly very easy to follow, while C is captivated by ‘theorizing’ (i.e., 
chaining numerous sentences with no clear COS) and rarely bothers with 
specific language games, preferring experiments and observations that are 
quite difficult to interpret in any definitive way (see the BBS responses), and 
which in any case have no relevance to higher level descriptions of behavior 
(e.g., exactly how do  they fit into the Intentionality Table). One book he praises 
as definitive (Memory and the Computational Brain) presents the brain as a 
computational information processor—a sophomoric view thoroughly and 
repeatedly annihilated by S and others, including W in the 1930’s. In the last 
decade, I have read thousands of pages by and about W and it is quite clear 
that C does not have a clue. In this he joins a long line of distinguished 
philosophers whose reading of W was fruitless—Russell, Quine, Dummett, 
Kripke, Dennett, Putnam, Chomsky etc. (though Putnam began to see the light 
later). They just cannot grasp the message that most philosophy is grammatical 
jokes and impossible vignettes—a cartoon view of life. 
 
Books like ‘The Opacity of Mind’ that attempt to bridge two sciences or two 
levels of description are really two books and not one. There is the description 
(not explanation, as W made clear) of our language and nonverbal behavior 
and then the experiments of cognitive psychology. “The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the 
problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by."(W 
PI p232), Cet al are enthralled by science and just assume that it is a great 
advance to wed high-level descriptive psychology to neuroscience and 
experimental psychology, but W/S and many others have shown this is a 
mistake. Far from making the description of behavior scientific and clear, it 
makes it incoherent. And it must have been by the grace of God that Locke, 
Kant, Nietzsche, Hume, Wittgenstein, Searle et al were able to give such 
memorable accounts of behavior without any experimental science 
whatsoever. Of course, like politicians, philosophers rarely admit mistakes or 
shut up, so this will go on and on for reasons W diagnosed perfectly. The 
bottom line has to be what is useful and what makes sense in our everyday life. 
I suggest the philosophical views of CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, Churchland), 
as opposed to those of W/S, are not useful and their ultimate conclusions that 
will, self and consciousness are illusions make no sense at all—i.e., they are 
meaningless, having no clear COS. Whether the CDC comments on cognitive 
science have any heuristic value remains to be determined. 
 
This book (like a huge body of other writing) tries to discount the HOT of other 
animals and to reduce behavior to brain functions (to absorb psychology into 
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physiology). The philosophy is a disaster but, provided one first reads the 
many criticisms in the BBS, the commentary on recent psychology and 
physiology may be of interest. Like Dennett, Churchland and so many others 
often do, C does not reveal his real gems til the end, when we are told that self, 
will, consciousness are illusions (supposedly in the normal senses of this 
words). Dennett had to be unmasked by S, Hutto et al for explaining away these 
‘superstitions’ (i.e., doing the usual philosophical move of not explaining at all 
and in fact not even describing) but amazingly C admits it at the beginning, 
though of course he thinks he is showing us these words do not mean what we 
think and that his cartoon use is the valid one. 
 
One should also see Bennett and Hacker’s criticisms of cognitive science in 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ (2003) and their debate with S and 
Dennett in ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ (2009-and don’t miss the final essay 
by Daniel Robinson). It is also well explored in Hacker’s three recent books on 
"Human Nature". 
 
There have long been books on chemical physics and physical chemistry but 
there is no sign that the two will merge (nor is it a coherent idea) nor that 
chemistry will absorb biochemistry nor it in turn will absorb physiology or 
genetics, nor that biology will disappear nor that it will eliminate psychology, 
sociology, etc. This is not due to the ‘youth’ of these disciplines but to the fact 
that they are different levels of description with entirely different concepts, 
data and explanatory mechanisms. But physics envy is powerful and we just 
cannot resist the ‘precision’ of physics, math, information, and computation vs 
the vagueness of higher levels. It ‘must’ be possible. Reductionism thrives in 
spite of the incomprehensibility of quantum mechanics, uncertainty, 
wave/particles, live/dead cats, quantum entanglement, and the incompleteness 
and randomness of math (Godel/Chaitin—see my full review of Yanofsky’s 
‘The Outer Limits of Reason’ and the excerpts here) and its irresistible pull tells 
us it is due to EP defaults. Again, a breath of badly needed fresh air from W: 
“For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: 
it was a requirement.” PI p107. It is hard to resist throwing down most books 
on behavior and rereading W and S. Just jump from anything trying to ‘explain’ 
higher order behavior to e.g. these quotes from PI 
http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94-
138_239-309.html. 
 
It is clear to me after reading ten thousand pages of philosophy in the last 
decade that the attempt to do higher level descriptive psychology of this kind, 
where ordinary language morphs into special uses both deliberately and 
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inadvertently, is essentially impossible (i.e., the normal situation in philosophy 
and other behavioral disciplines).Using special jargon words (e.g., 
intensionality, realism etc.) does not work either as there are no philosophy 
police to enforce a narrow definition and the arguments on what they mean are 
interminable. Hacker is good but his writing so precious and dense it’s often 
painful. Searle is very good but requires some effort to embrace his terminology 
and makes some egregious mistakes, while W is hands down the clearest and 
most insightful, once you grasp what he is doing, and nobody has ever been 
able to emulate him. His TLP remains the ultimate statement of the mechanical 
reductionist view of life, but he later saw his mistake and diagnosed and cured 
the ‘cartoon disease’, but few get the point and most simply ignore him and 
biology as well, and so there are tens of thousands of books and millions of 
articles and most religious and political organizations (and until recently most 
of economics) and almost all people with cartoon views of life.  But the world 
is not a cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as the cartoon views of 
life collide with reality and universal blindness and selfishness bring about the 
collapse of civilization. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind 
exists for the same reason as all basic behavior—it is the default operation of 
our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious. 
 
However, it is true that most of behavior is mechanical and that The 
Phenomenological Illusion is of vastly greater reach than Searle describes. It is 
most striking to me when driving a car on the freeway and suddenly snapping 
back to S2 awareness startled to realize I have just driven for several minutes 
with no conscious awareness at all. On reflection, this automatism can be seen 
to account for almost all of our behavior with just minimal supervision and 
awareness from S2. I am writing this page and have to think about what to say, 
but then it just flows out into my hands which type it and by and large it’s a 
surprise to me except when I think of changing a specific sentence. And you 
read it giving commands to your body to sit still and look at this part of the 
page but the words just flow into you and some kind of understanding and 
memory happen but unless you concentrate on a sentence there is only a vague 
sense of doing anything. A soccer player runs down the field and kicks the ball 
and thousands of nerve impulses and muscle contractions deftly coordinated 
with eye movements, and feedback from proprioceptive and balance organs 
have occurred, but there is only a vague feeling of control and high level 
awareness of the results. S2 is the Chief of Police who sits in his office while S1 
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has thousands of officers doing the actual work according to laws that he 
mostly does not even know. Reading, writing or soccer are voluntary acts A2 
seen from above but composed of thousands of automatic acts A1 seen from 
below. Much of contemporary behavioral science is concerned with these 
automatisms. 
 
It is a good idea to read at least Chapter 6 of Searle’s PNC, “The 
Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI). It is clear as crystal that TPI is due to 
obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow conscious 
thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic Blank Slate 
blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier and gave the 
reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious automatic axiomatic 
network of our innate System 1 which is the source of the Inner. Very roughly, 
regarding ‘observer independent’ features of the world as S1 or The Inner, and 
‘observer dependent’ features as S2 or The Outer should prove very revealing. 
As Searle notes, the Phenomenologists have the ontology exactly backwards, 
but of course so does almost everyone due to the defaults of their EP. 
 
Another excellent work on W that deserves close study is Johnston’s 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ (1993). He notes that some will object that 
if our reports and memories are really untestable they would have no value but 
“This objection misses the whole point of W’s argument, for it assumes that 
what actually happened, and what the individual says happened, are two 
distinct things. As we have seen, however, the grammar of psychological 
statements means that the latter constitutes the criteria for the former. If we see 
someone with a concentrated expression on her face and want to know ‘what 
is going on inside her’, then her sincerely telling us that she is trying to work 
out the answer to a complicated sum tells us exactly what we want to know. 
The question of whether, despite her sincerity, her statement might be an 
inaccurate description of what she is (or was) doing does not arise. The source 
of confusion here is the failure to recognize that psychological concepts have a 
different grammar from that of concepts used to describe outer events. What 
makes the inner seem so mysterious is the misguided attempt to understand 
one concept in terms of another. In fact our concept of the Inner, what we mean 
when we talk of ‘what was going on inside her’ is linked not to mysterious 
inner processes, but to the account which the individual offers of her 
experience…As processes or events, what goes on inside the individual is of no 
interest, or rather is of a purely medical or scientific interest” (p13-14). 
 
“W’s attack on the notion of inner processes does not imply that only the Outer 
matters, on the contrary; by bringing out the true nature of utterances, he 
81  
underlines the fact that we aren’t just interested in behavior. We don’t just want 
to know that the person’s body was in such and such a position and that her 
features arranged in such and such a way. Rather we are interested in her 
account of what lay behind this behavior…” (p16-17) 
 
In laying out W’s reasoning on the impossibility of private rules or a private 
language, he notes that “The real problem however is not simply that she fails 
to lay down rules, but that in principle she could not do so…The point is that 
without publicly checkable procedures, she could not distinguish between 
following the rule and merely thinking she is following the rule.” 
 
On p55 Johnston makes the point with respect to vision (which has been made 
many times by W and S in this and other contexts) that the discussion of the 
Outer is entirely dependent for its very intelligibility on the unchallengeable 
nature of our direct first person experience of the Inner. The System 2 sceptical 
doubts concerning mind, will, senses, world, cannot get a foothold without the 
true-only certainties of System 1 and the certainty that you are reading these 
words now is the basis for judgment, not a thing that can itself be judged. This 
mistake is one of the most basic and common in all philosophy. 
 
On p81 he makes the point that the impossibility, in the normal case, of 
checking your statements concerning your dispositions (often but confusingly 
called ‘propositional attitudes’) such as what you thought or are feeling, far 
from being a defect of our psychology, is exactly what gives these statements 
interest. “I am tired” tells us how you are feeling rather than giving us another 
bit of data about the Outer such as your slow movements or the shadows under 
your eyes. 
 
Johnston then does an excellent job of explaining W’s debunking of the idea 
that meaning or understanding (and all dispositions) are experiences that 
accompany speech. As W pointed out, just consider the case where you think 
you understand, and then find out you did not, to see the irrelevance of any 
inner experience to meaning, understanding, thinking, believing, knowing etc. 
The experience which counts is the awareness of the public language game we 
participate in. Similar considerations dissolve the problem of the ‘lightning 
speed of thought’. “The key is to recognize that thinking is not a process or a 
succession of experiences but an aspect of the lives of conscious beings. What 
corresponds to the lightning speed of thought is the individual’s ability to 
explain at any point what she is doing or saying.” (p86). And as W says “Or, if 
one calls the beginning and the end of the sentence the beginning and end of 
the thought, then it is not clear whether one should say of the experience of 
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thinking that it is uniform during this time or whether it is a process like 
speaking the sentence itself” (RPP2 p237). 
 
Again: “The individuals account of what she thought has the same grammar 
as her account of what she intended and of what she meant. What we are 
interested in is the account of the past she is inclined to give and the assumption 
that she will be able to give an account is part of what is involved in seeing her 
as conscious” (p 91). That is, all these disposition verbs are part of our 
conscious, voluntary S2 psychology. 
 
In “The Complexity of the Inner”, he notes that it is ironic that our best way to 
communicate the Inner is to refer to the Outer but I would say it is both natural 
and unavoidable. Since there is no private language and no telepathy, we can 
only contract muscles and by far the most efficient and deep communication is 
by contracting oral muscles (speech). As W commented in several contexts, it 
is in plays (or now in TV and films) that we see language (thought) in its purest 
form. 
 
Dispositions like intending continue as long as we don’t change or forget them 
and thus lack a precise duration as well as levels of intensity and the content is 
a decision and so is not a precise mental state, so in all these respects they are 
quite different from S1 perceptions, memories and reflexive responses like S1 
emotions. 
 
The difference between S1 and S2 (as I put it- this was not a terminology 
available to J or W) also is seen in the asymmetry of the disposition verbs, with 
the first person use of ‘I believe’ etc., being (in the normal case of sincere 
utterance) true-only sentences vs the third person use ‘he believes’ etc., being 
true or false evidence-based propositions. One cannot say “I believe it is raining 
and it isn’t” but other tenses such as “I believed it was raining and it wasn’t” 
or the third person “He believes it is raining and it isn’t” are OK. As J says: 
“The general issue at the heart of the problem here is whether the individual 
can observe her own dispositions…The key to clarifying this paradox is to note 
that the individuals description of her own state of mind is also indirectly the 
description of a state of affairs…In other words, someone who says she believes 
P is thereby committed to asserting P itself…The reason therefor that the 
individual cannot observe her belief is that by adopting a neutral or evaluatory 
stance towards it, she undermines it. Someone who said “I believe it’s raining 
but it isn’t” would thereby undermine her own assertion. As W notes, there can 
be no first person equivalent of the third person use of the verb for the same 
reason that a verb meaning to believe falsely would lack a first person present 
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indicative...the two propositions are not independent, for ‘the assertion that 
this is going on inside me asserts: this is going on outside me’ (RPP1 p490)” 
(p154-56). Though not commented on by W or J, the fact that children never 
make such mistakes as “I want the candy but I don’t believe I want it” etc., 
shows that such constructions are built into our grammar (into our genes) and 
not cultural add-ons. 
 
He then looks at this from another viewpoint by citing W “What would be the 
point of my drawing conclusions from my own words to my behavior, when 
in any case I know what I believe? And what is the manifestation of my 
knowing what I believe? Is it not manifested precisely in this-that I do not infer 
my behaviour from my words? That is the fact.” 
 
(RPP1 p744). Another way to say this is that S1 is the axiomatic true-only basis 
for cognition, and as the non- propositional substrate for determining truth and 
falsity, cannot be intelligibly judged. 
 
He ends the chapter with important comments on the variability within the 
LG’s (within our psychology) and I suggest it be read carefully. 
 
Johnston continues the discussion in “The Inner/Outer Picture” much of which 
is summed up in his quote from W. “The inner is hidden from us means that it 
is hidden from us in a sense that it is not hidden from him. And it is not hidden 
from the owner in the sense that he gives expression to it, and we, under certain 
conditions, believe his expression and there, error has no place. And this 
asymmetry in the game is expressed in the sentence that the Inner is hidden 
from other people.” (LWPP2 p36). J goes on: “The problem is not that inner is 
hidden but that the language game it involves is very different from those 
where we normally talk about knowledge.” And then he enters into one of W’s 
major themes throughout his life—the difference between man and machine. 
“But with a human being the assumption is that it is impossible to gain an 
insight into the mechanism. Thus, indeterminacy is postulated…I believe 
unpredictability must be an essential characteristic of the Inner. As also is the 
endless diversity of expressions.” (RPP2 p645 and LWPP2 p65). Again, W 
probes the difference between animals and computers. 
 
J notes that the uncertainties in our LG’s are not defects but critical to our 
humanity. Again W: “[What matters is] not that the evidence makes the feeling 
(and so the Inner) merely probable, but that we treat this as evidence for 
something important, that we base a judgement on this involved sort of 
evidence, and so that such evidence has a special importance in our lives and 
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is made prominent by a concept.” (Z p554). 
 
J sees three aspects of this uncertainty as the lack of fixed criteria or fine shades 
of meaning, the absence of rigid determination of the consequences of inner 
states and the lack of fixed relationships between our concepts and experience. 
W:  ”One can’t say what the essential observable consequences of an inner state 
are. When, for example, he really is pleased, what is then to be expected of him, 
and what not? There are of course such characteristic consequences, but they 
can’t be described in the same way as reactions which characterize the state of 
a physical object.” (LWPP2 p90). J “Here her inner state is not something we 
cannot know because we cannot penetrate the veil of the Outer. Rather there is 
nothing determinate to know.” (p195). 
 
In his final chapter, he notes that our LG’s are not likely to change regardless 
of scientific progress. “Although it is conceivable that the study of brain activity 
might turn out to be a more reliable predictor of human behavior, the sort of 
understanding of human action it gave would not be the same as that involved 
in the language game on intentions. Whatever the value of the scientist’s 
discovery, it could not be said to have revealed what intentions really are.” 
(p213). 
 
This indeterminateness leads to the notion that correlation of brain states with 
dispositions seems unlikely. “The difficulty here is that the notion of one 
thought is a highly artificial concept. How many thoughts are there in the 
Tractatus? And when the basic idea for it struck W, was that one thought or a 
rash of them? The notion of intentions creates similar problems…These 
subsequent statements can all be seen as amplifications or explanations of the 
original thought, but how are we to suppose this relates to the brain state? Are 
we to imagine that it too will contain the answer to every possible question 
about the thought? ..we would have to allow that two significantly different 
thoughts are correlated with the same brain state…words may in one sense be 
interchangeable and in another sense not. This creates problems for the attempt 
to correlate brain states and thoughts…two thoughts may be the same in one 
sense and different in another…Thus the notion of one thought is a fragile and 
artificial one and for that reason it is hard to see what sense it could make to 
talk of a one to one correlation with brain states.” (p218-219). That is, the same 
thought (COS) “it’s raining” expresses an infinite number of brain states in one 
or many people. Likewise, the ‘same’ brain state might express different 
thoughts (COS) in different contexts. 
 
Likewise, W denies that memory consists of traces in the nervous system. 
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“Here the postulated trace is like the inner clock, for we no more infer what 
happened from a trace than we consult an inner clock to guess the time.” He 
then notes an example from W (RPP1 p908) of a man jotting marks while he 
reads and who cannot repeat the text without the marks but they don’t relate 
to the text by rules …  ”The text would not be stored up in the jottings. And 
why should it be stored up in our nervous system?” and also “…nothing seems 
more plausible to me than that people will someday come to the definite 
opinion that there is no copy in either the physiological or the nervous systems 
which corresponds to a particular thought or a particular idea of memory” 
(LWPP1 p504). This implies that there can be psychological regularities to 
which no physiological regularities correspond; and as W provocatively adds 
‘If this upsets our concepts of causality, then it is high time they were upset.’” 
(RPP1 p905) …’Why should not the initial and the terminal states of a system 
be connected by a natural law which does not cover the intermediary state? 
(RPP1 p909) ... [It is quite likely that] there is no process in the brain correlated 
with associating or with thinking, so that it would be impossible to read off 
thought processes from brain processes…Why should this order, so to speak, 
not proceed out of chaos? ...as it were, causelessly; and there is no reason why 
this should not really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talking and 
writing.’(RPP1 p903)…But must there be a physiological explanation here? 
Why don’t we just leave explaining alone? -but you would never talk like that 
if you were examining the behavior of a machine! – Well who says that a living 
creature, an animal body, is a machine in this sense?’” (RPPI p918) (p 220- 21). 
 
Of course, one can take these comments variously, but one way is that W 
anticipates the rise of chaos theory, embodied mind and self-organization in 
biology. Since uncertainty, chaos and unpredictability are standard doctrine 
now, from subatomic to molecular scale, and in planetary dynamics (weather 
etc.,) and cosmology, why should the brain be an exception? The only detailed 
comments on these remarks I have seen are in a recent paper by Daniele Moyal-
Sharrock (DMS). 
 
It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study 
of behavior—linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, 
politics, sociology, and art, he is not even mentioned in most books and articles, 
with even the exceptions having little to say, and most of that distorted or flat 
wrong. There is a flurry of recent interest, at least in philosophy, and possibly 
this preposterous situation will change, but probably not much. 
 
The discussion of the logical (psychological) difference between the S1 causes 
and the S2 reasons in Chapter 7 of Hacker’s recent book ‘Human Nature’ (2011), 
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especially p226-32, is critical for any student of behavior. It is a nearly universal 
delusion that “cause” is a precise logically exact term while “reason” is not but 
W exposed this many times. Of course, the same issue arises with all scientific 
and mathematical concepts. And of course, one must keep constantly in mind 
that ‘action’, ‘condition’, ‘satisfaction’, ‘intention’, and even ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘prior’, 
‘true’ etc. are all complex language games able to trip us up as W so beautifully 
described in BBB in the early 30’s. 
 
Searle make many interesting remarks in one of his most recent books 
‘Thinking About the Real World’ (TARW) (2013),and I seem to have written the 
only review, so I will discuss it in detail here. 
 
On p21 of TARW we again run into what I regard as the most glaring flaw in 
S’s work and one that should have been obviated long ago had he only read 
the later W and his commentators more carefully. He refers to free will as an 
“assumption” that we may have to give up! It is crystal clear from W that will, 
self, world, and all the phenomena of our lives are the basis for judging-the 
axiomatic bedrock of our behavior and there is no possibility of judging them. 
Can we “assume” we have two hands or live on the surface of the earth or that 
Madonna is a singer etc.? Perhaps this huge mistake is connected with his 
blending of true only S1 and propositional S2 which I have noted. Amazing 
that he can get nearly everything else right and stumble on this! 
 
On p22 and elsewhere he uses the notion of unconscious intentionality, which 
he first discussed in his 1991 paper in Phil. Issues, noting that these are the sorts 
of things that could become conscious (e.g., dreams). W was I think the first to 
comment on this noting that if you can’t speak of unconscious thoughts you 
can’t speak of conscious ones either (BBB). Here and throughout his work it is 
unfortunate that he does not use the S1/S2 concepts as it makes it so much easier 
to keep things straight and he still finds it necessary to indulge in very un-
Wittgensteinian jargon. E.g., “Once you have manipulable syntactical 
elements, you can detach intentionality from its immediate causes in the form 
of perceptions and memories, in a way that it is not possible to make 
detachments of unsyntactically structured representational elements.” (p31) 
just says that with language came the dispositional intentionality of S2 where 
conscious thought and reason became possible. 
 
Regarding reasons and desires (p39) see elsewhere here and my reviews of his 
other works. 
 
S’s continued reference to dispositions as mental states, and his reference to 
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mental states as representations (actually ‘presentations’ here) with COS, is (in 
my view) counterproductive. On p25 e.g., it seems he wants to say that the 
apple we see is the COS of the CSR – (Causally Self Reflexive--i.e., cause is built 
in) perception of the apple and the reflexive unconscious scratching of an itch 
has the same status (i.e., a COS) as the deliberate planned movement of the 
arm. Thus, the mental states of S1 are to be included with the actions of S2 as 
COS. Though I accept most of S’s ontology and epistemology I don’t see the 
advantage of this, but I have the greatest respect for him so I will work on it. I 
have noted his tendency (normal for others but a flaw in Searle) to mix S1 and 
S2 which he does on p29 where he seems to be referring to beliefs as mental 
states. It seems to me quite basic and clear since W’s BBB in the 30’s that S2 are 
not mental states in anything like the sense ofS1. 
 
The paragraph beginning “Because” on p25 is discussing the true-only 
unconscious percepts, memories and reflexive acts of S1—i.e., our axiomatic 
EP. As noted, one can read Hutto and Myin’s book ‘Radicalizing Enactivism: 
Basic Minds Without Content’ (2012) for a very different recent account of the 
nonrepresentational or enactive nature of S1. 
 
The table of intentionality on p26 updates one he has used for decades and 
which I have used as the basis for my extended table above. 
 
Nearly half a century ago S wrote “How to derive ought from is” which was a 
revolutionary advance in our understanding of behavior. He has continued to 
develop the naturalistic description of behavior and on p39 he shows how 
ethics originates in our innate social behavior and language. A basic concept is 
the Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA) which is explained in his 
various books. For an outline see my reviews of his MSW and other works. He 
tends to use the proximate reasons of S2 (i.e., dispositional psychology and 
culture) to frame his analysis but as with all behavior I regard it as superficial 
unless it includes the ultimate causes in S1 and so I break his DIRA into DIRA1 
and DIRA2. This enables the description in terms of the unconscious 
mechanisms of reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness. Thus, I would restate 
the last sentence on p39 “…people are asked to override their natural 
inclinations by making ethical considerations prevail” as “…people are 
compelled to override their immediate personal benefits to secure long term 
genetic benefits via reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness.” 
 
S’s obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two 
systems framework, and to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology 
as stated most dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is most unfortunate 
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(as I have noted in many reviews). It was W who did the first and best job of 
describing the two systems (though nobody else has noticed) and OC 
represents a major event in intellectual history. Not only is S unaware of the 
fact that his framework is a straightforward continuation of W, but everyone 
else is too, which accounts for the lack of any significant reference to W in this 
book. As usual one also notes no apparent acquaintance with EP, which can 
enlighten all discussions of behavior by providing the real ultimate 
evolutionary and biological explanations rather than the superficial proximate 
cultural ones. 
 
Thus, S’s discussion of the two ways to describe sensations (‘experiences’) on 
p202 is in my view vastly clearer if one realizes that seeing red or feeling pain 
is automatic true-only S1, but as soon as we attend to it consciously (ca. 500 
msec or more) it becomes ‘seeing as’ and a propositional (true or false) S2 
function that can be expressed publicly in language (and other bodily muscle 
contractions as well). Thus, the S1 ‘experience’ that is identical with red or the 
pain vs the S2 ‘experience’ of red or pain, once we begin to reflect on it, 
normally are blended together into one ‘experience’. For me by far the best 
place to get an understanding of these issues is still in W’s writings beginning 
with the BBB and ending with OC. Nobody else has ever described the 
subtleties of the language games with such clarity. One must keep constantly 
in mind the vagueness and multiple meanings of ‘mistake’, ‘true’, ‘experience’, 
‘understand’, ‘know’, ‘see’, ‘same’ etc., but only W was able to do it—even S 
stumbles frequently. And it is not a trivial issue—unless one can clearly restate 
all of p202 separating the true-only non-judgeable S1 from the propositional S2 
then nothing about behavior can be said without confusion. And of course, 
very often (i.e., normally) words are used without a clear meaning—one has to 
specify how ‘true’ or ‘follows from’ or ‘see’ is to be used in this context and W 
is the only one I know of who consistently gets this right. 
 
Again, on p203-206, the discussion of intrinsically intentional automatic causal 
dispositionality only makes sense to me because I look at it as just another way 
to describe S1 states which provide the raw material for deliberate conscious 
S2 dispositionality which, from a biological evolutionary point of view (and 
what other can there be?) has to be the case. Thus, his comment on p212 is right 
on the money— the ultimate explanation (or as W insists the description) can 
only be a naturalized one which describes how mind, will, self and intention 
work and cannot meaningfully eliminate them as ‘real’ phenomena. Recall S’s 
famous review of Dennett’s ‘Consciousness Explained’ entitled 
“Consciousness explained away”. And this makes it all the more bizarre that S 
should repeatedly state that we don’t know for sure if we have free will and 
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that we have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). 
 
Also, I once again think S is on the wrong track (p214) when he suggests that 
the confusions are due to historical mistakes in philosophy such as dualism, 
idealism, materialism, epiphenomenalism etc., rather than in universal 
susceptibility to the defaults of our psychology — ‘The Phenomenological 
Illusion’ (TPI) as he has termed it, and bewitchment by language as beautifully 
described by W. As he notes, “The neurobiological processes and the mental 
phenomena are the same event, described at different levels” and “How can 
conscious intentions cause bodily movement? …How can the hammer move 
the nail in virtue of being solid? …If you analyze what solidity is causally…if 
you analyze what intention-in-action is causally, you see analogously there is 
no philosophical problem left over.” 
 
I would translate his comment (p220) “A speaker can use an expression to refer 
only if in the utterance of the referring expressions the speaker introduces a 
condition that the object referred to satisfies; and reference is achieved in virtue 
of the satisfaction of that condition.” as “Meaning is achieved by stating a 
publicly verifiable condition of satisfaction (truth condition).” “I think it is 
raining” is true if it is raining and false otherwise. 
 
Also, I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, 
as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our 
representations.” (p223) as “Our life shows a world that does not depend on 
our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
 
Time for some more quotes and a discussion of his recent book of reprints 
‘Philosophy in a New Century’ (2008) and as elsewhere I will repeat some 
comments to place them in a different context. 
 
“Could a machine process cause a thought process? The answer is: yes. Indeed, 
only a machine process can cause a thought process, and ‘computation’ does 
not name a machine process; it names a process that can be, and typically is, 
implemented on a machine.” Searle PNC p73 
 
“…the characterization of a process as computational is a characterization of a 
physical system from outside; and the identification of the process as 
computational does not identify an intrinsic feature of the physics, it is 
essentially an observer relative characterization.” Searle PNC p95 
 
“The Chinese Room Argument showed that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax. 
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I am now making the separate and different point that syntax is not intrinsic to 
physics.” Searle PNC p94 
 
“The attempt to eliminate the homunculus fallacy through recursive 
decomposition fails, because the only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the 
physics is to put a homunculus in the physics.” Searle PNC p97 
 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description.” Searle PNC p101-103 
 
“In short, the sense of ‘information processing’ that is used in cognitive science 
is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological 
reality of intrinsic intentionality…We are blinded to this difference by the fact 
that the same sentence ‘I see a car coming toward me,’ can be used to record 
both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of 
vision…in the sense of ‘information’ used in cognitive science, it is simply false 
to say that the brain is an information processing device.” Searle PNC p104-105 
 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The   
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume’s 
guillotine, the rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.”  Searle PNC p165-171 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a  reason for action…these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The general 
point  is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
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“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the phenomenological 
illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness 
has no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the 
underlying neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to ontological 
reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and therefore it 
cannot be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, something 
that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
 
Though S does not say and seems to be largely unaware, the bulk of his work 
follows directly from that of W, even though he often criticizes him. To say that 
Searle has carried on W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W study, 
but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same 
reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately 
describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W said 
(as they must if they are both giving correct descriptions of behavior). I find 
most of S foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room 
argument against Strong AI and related issues which are the subjects of Chaps 
3-5. Incidentally, if the Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor 
Rodych's excellent, but virtually unknown, supplement on the CR--"Searle 
Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych has also written a series of superb papers on W's 
philosophy of mathematics --i.e., the EP (Evolutionary Psychology) of the 
axiomatic System 1 ability of counting up to 3, as extended into the endless 
System 2 SLG's (Secondary Language Games) of math. 
 
W’s insights into the psychology of math provide an excellent entry into 
intentionality. I will also note that nobody who promotes Strong AI, the 
multifarious versions of behaviorism, computer functionalism, CTM 
(Computational Theory of Mind) and Dynamic Systems Theory (DST), seems 
to be aware that W's Tractatus can be viewed as the most striking and powerful 
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statement of their viewpoint ever penned (i.e., behavior (thinking) as the logical 
processing of facts--i.e., information processing). Of course, later (but before 
the digital computer was a gleam in Turing's eye) W described in great detail 
why these were incoherent descriptions of mind that must be replaced by 
psychology (or you can say this is all he did for the rest of his life). S however 
makes little reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism, and 
his destruction of it in his later work. 
 
Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views 
of behavior, and perhaps the most important descriptive psychologist 
(philosopher), but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by 
and large, do others (but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and 
Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is vastly easier to follow than W’s, 
and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly clear if you approach 
it from the right direction.  See my articles for more details. 
 
Like W, Searle is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his 
written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his 
failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and 
confusions. On p7 of PNC he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is 
due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but as 
Coliva, DMS et al have noted, W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that 
there is no possibility of doubting the true-only axiomatic structure of our 
System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is the basis for judgment 
and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty 
is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the 
result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via 
experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of 
course a classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by language” which W demonstrated over and over again. One 
word-- two (or many) distinct uses. 
 
On p10 he chastises W for his antipathy to theorizing but as I noted above, 
‘theorizing’ is another language game (LG) and there is a vast gulf between a 
general description of behavior with few well worked out examples and one 
that emerges from a large number of such that is not subject to many 
counterexamples. Evolution in its early days was a theory with limited clear 
examples but soon became just a summary of a vast body of examples and a 
theory in a quite different sense. Likewise, with a theory one might make as a 
summary of a thousand pages of W’s examples and one resulting from ten 
pages. 
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Again, on p12, ‘consciousness’ is the result of automated System 1 functioning 
that is ‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the normal case, 
a matter of evidence but a true-only understanding in our own case and a true-
only perception in the case of others. 
 
As I read p13 I thought: “Can I be feeling excruciating pain and go on as if 
nothing is wrong?” No! —this would not be ‘pain’ in the same sense. “The inner 
experience stands in need of outer criteria” (W) and Searle seems to miss this.  
See W or Johnston. 
 
As I read the next few pages I felt that W has a much better grasp of the 
mind/language connection, as he regards them as synonymous in many 
contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of mind as exemplified in 
numerous perspicuous examples of language use. As quoted above, "Now if it 
is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities 
of the mind lie open before us." And as explained above I feel the questions 
with which S ends section 3 are largely answered by considering W’s OC from 
the standpoint of the two systems. Likewise, for section 6 on the philosophy of 
science. Rodych has done an article on Popper vs W which I thought superb at 
the time but I will have to reread it to make sure. 
 
Finally, on p25, one can deny that any revision of our concepts (language 
games) of causation or free will are necessary or even possible. You can read 
just about any page of W and much of DMS, Coliva, Hacker etc. for the reasons. 
It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the world using examples from 
quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything relevant 
to our normal use of words. 
 
On p31, 36 etc., we again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy and 
life) of identical words glossing over the huge differences in LG’s of ‘belief’, 
‘seeing’ etc., as applied to S1 which is composed of mental states in the present 
only, and S2 which is not. The rest of the chapter summarizes his work on 
‘social glue’ which, from an EP, Wittgensteinian perspective, is the automatic 
fast actions of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably 
and universally expanded during personal development into a wide array of 
automatic unconscious deontic relationships with others, and arbitrarily into 
cultural variations on them. 
 
Chapters 3 to 5 contain his well-known arguments against the mechanical view 
of mind which seem to me definitive. I have read whole books of responses to 
them and I agree with S that they all miss the very simple logical 
94  
(psychological) points he makes (and which, by and large, W made half a 
century earlier before there were computers). To put it in my terms, S1 is 
composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non- propositional, 
true-only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be described in 
terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious dispositions to 
behavior (potential actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F). 
Computers and the rest of nature have only derived (ascribed) intentionality 
that is dependent on our perspective while higher animals have primary 
intentionality that is independent of perspective. As S and W appreciate, the 
great irony is that these materialistic or mechanical reductions of psychology 
masquerade as cutting edge science, but in fact they are utterly anti-scientific. 
Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and cognitive psychology (freed of 
superstition) are becoming hand in glove and it is Hofstadter, Dennett, 
Carruthers, Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the cold. 
 
Page 62 nicely summarizes one of his arguments but p63 shows that he has still 
not quite let go of the blank slate as he tries to explain trends in society in terms 
of the cultural extensions of S2. As he does in many other places in his writings, 
he gives cultural, historical reasons for behaviorism, but it seems quite obvious 
to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the same 
reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of our EP which seeks 
explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through slowly, rather 
than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious. As noted 
above, Searle has described this as TPI. Again, on p65 I find W’s description of 
our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions in his OC and other 
works to be deeper than S’s (or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that 
dogs are conscious, but rather it is not open to doubt. See the earlier section of 
this article dealing with OC and DMS. 
 
Chapter 5 nicely demolishes CTM, LOT etc., noting that ‘computation’, 
‘information’, ‘syntax’, ‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, ‘program’, etc., are observer relative 
(i.e., psychological) terms and have no physical or mathematical 
meaning(COS) in this psychological sense, but of course there are other senses 
they have been given recently as science has developed. Again, people are 
bewitched by the use of the same word into ignoring that vast difference in its 
use (meaning). These comments are all extensions of classic Wittgenstein and 
in this connection, I recommend Hutto’s and Read’s papers too. 
 
Chapter 6 “The Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI) is by far my favorite, and, 
while demolishing that field, it shows both his supreme logical abilities and his 
failure to grasp the full power of both the later W, and the great heuristic value 
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of recent psychological research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal that TPI 
is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow 
conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic 
Blank Slate blindness. It is clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier and 
also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious 
automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1. Like so many others, 
Searle dances all around it but never quite gets there. Very roughly, regarding 
‘observer independent’ features of the world as S1 and ‘observer dependent’ 
features as S2 should prove very revealing. As S notes, Heidegger and the 
others have the ontology exactly backwards, but of course so does almost 
everyone due to the defaults of their EP. 
 
But the really important thing is that S does not take the next step to realizing 
that TPI is not just a failing of a few philosophers, but a universal blindness to 
our EP that is itself built into EP. He actually states this in almost these words 
at one point, but if he really got it how could he fail to point out its immense 
implications for the world. With rare exceptions (e.g., the Jaina Tirthankaras 
going back over 5000 years to the beginnings of the Indus civilization and most 
recently and remarkably Osho, Buddha, Jesus, Bodhidharma, Da Free John 
etc.), we are all meat puppets stumbling through life on our genetically 
programmed mission to destroy the earth. Our almost total preoccupation with 
using the second self S2 personality to indulge the infantile gratifications of S1 
is creating Hell On Earth. As with all organisms, it’s only about reproduction 
and accumulating resources therefor. Yes, much noise about Global Warming 
and the imminent collapse of industrial civilization in the next century, but 
nothing is likely to stop it. S1 writes the play and S2 acts it out. Dick and Jane 
just want to play house—this is mommy and this is daddy and this and this 
and this is baby. Perhaps one could say that TPI is that we are humans and not 
just another primate. 
 
Chapter 7 on the nature of the self is good but nothing really struck me as new. 
Chapter 8 on property dualism is much more interesting even though mostly a 
rehash of his previous work. The last of his opening quotes above sums this up, 
and of course the insistence on the critical nature of first person ontology is 
totally Wittgensteinian. The only big blunder I see is his blank slate or (cultural) 
type of explanation on p 158 for the errors of dualism, when in my view, it is 
clearly another instance of TPI—a mistake which he (and nearly everyone else) 
has made many times, and repeats on p177 etc., in the otherwise superb 
Chapter 9. The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts 
the muscles) of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read 
my comments or those of DMS on W’s OC so he changes the “good reason to 
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believe” at the bottom of p171 and the top of p172 to “knows” (in the true-only 
sense). 
 
A critical point is made again on p169. “Thus, saying something and meaning 
it involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that 
the utterance will be produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have 
conditions of satisfaction.” One way of regarding this is that the unconscious 
automatic System 1 activates the higher cortical conscious personality of 
System 2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which inform others that 
it sees the world in certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge 
advance over prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which only gross 
muscle movements were able to convey very limited information about 
intentions and S makes a similar point in Chapter10. The genes program S1 
which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts the muscles) of the meat puppets via 
S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read my comments and those of DMS, 
Coliva, Andy Hamilton etc., on W’s OC so he changes the “good reason to 
believe” at the bottom of p171 and the top of p172 to “knows” (in the true-only 
sense). 
 
His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) 
would also benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s various 
books and papers, as they make clear the difference between true only 
sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This 
strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as 
propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about 
them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or 
potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a 
huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it “A 
proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of 
satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the case.” 
Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined 
to be the case. 
 
Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is 
unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read 
together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated 
with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much 
younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
 
“So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created 
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by collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic 
powers…With the important exception of language itself, all of institutional 
reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts 
that have the logical form of Declarations…all of human institutional reality is 
created and maintained in existence by (representations that have the same 
logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not 
speech acts in the explicit form of Declarations.” 
Searle MSWp11-13 
 
“Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the 
upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like 
statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in that 
sense, they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world 
direction of fit. The conative- volitional states such as desires, prior intentions 
and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we 
would like them to be or how we intend to make them be…In addition to these 
two faculties, there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional content 
is not supposed to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents of 
cognition and volition are supposed to fit…the world-relating commitment is 
abandoned and we have a propositional content without any commitment that 
it represent with either direction of fit.” Searle MSWp15 
 
“Just as in intentional states we can make a distinction between the type of state 
…and the content of the state…so in the theory of language we can make a 
distinction between the type of speech act it is…and the propositional 
content…we have the same propositional content with different psychological 
mode in the case of the intentional states, and different illocutionary force or 
type in the case of the speech acts. Furthermore, just as my beliefs can be true 
or false and thus have the mind-to-world direction of fit, so my statements can 
be true or false and thus have the word-to-world direction of fit. And just as 
my desires or intentions cannot be true or false but can be in various ways 
satisfied or unsatisfied, so my orders and promises cannot be true or false but 
can be in various ways satisfied or unsatisfied—we can think of all the 
intentional states that have a whole propositional content and a direction of fit 
as representations of their conditions of satisfaction. A belief represents its 
truth conditions, a desire represents its fulfillment conditions, an intention 
represents its carrying out conditions…The intentional state represents its 
conditions of satisfaction…people erroneously suppose that every mental 
representation must be consciously thought…but the notion of a representation 
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as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has 
conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic 
of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of 
satisfaction…we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social 
phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction.”  Searle MSW p28-32 
 
“The first four types of speech acts have exact analogues in intentional states: 
corresponding to Assertives are beliefs, corresponding to Directives are 
desires, corresponding to Commissives are intentions and corresponding to 
Expressives is the whole range of emotions and other intentional states where 
the Presup fit is taken for granted. But there is no prelinguistic analog for the 
Declarations.Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create facts in the world by 
representing those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires a 
language” MSW p69 
 
“Speaker meaning… is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human 
cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a 
way that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker 
intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at another level the utterance 
represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one 
level, it is a physical object like any other. At another level, it has a meaning: it 
represents a type of a state of affairs” MSW p74 
 
“…once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according 
to the conventions of a language without creating commitments.  This is true 
not just for statements but for all speech acts” MSW p82 
 
This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all 
we can do is give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing 
theories but of course “theory” and “description” are language games too and 
it seems to me S’s theory is usually W’s description—a rose by any other 
name…. W’s point was that by sticking to perspicacious examples that we all 
know to be true accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of theories 
that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while S wants to 
generalize and inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own 
mistakes in PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account 
for the multifarious language games they get closer and closer to describing 
behavior by way of numerous examples as did W. 
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The Primary Language Games (PLG's) are the simple automated utterances by 
our involuntary, System  1,  fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, non-
propositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts 
(‘will’) including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and 
Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger, which can be described causally, while the 
evolutionarily later Secondary Language Games (SLG's) are expressions or 
descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, 
testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- 
joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc., which can 
only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's a fact that attempts to describe 
System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make 
no sense--see W for many examples and Searle for good disquisitions on this). 
 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons 
(e.g., ` I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms 
of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is 
meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make sense 
in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never. 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 
1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and 
Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical 
extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). 
W recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper. 
 
The ideas here are already published and nothing will come as a surprise to 
those who have kept up with Searle’s work. 
 
I feel that W has a better grasp of the mind/language connection, as he regards 
them as synonymous in many contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition 
of mind as exemplified in numerous perspicacious examples of language use. 
As quoted above, "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are 
concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." One can 
deny that any revision of our concepts (language games) of causation or free 
will are necessary or even possible. You can read just about any page of W for 
the reasons. It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the world using examples 
from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything 
relevant to our normal use of words. 
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The deontic structures or ‘social glue’ are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic unconscious universal 
cultural deontic relationships with others (S3). Though this is my précis of 
behavior I expect it fairly describes S’s work. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind 
exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of 
our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious (TPI). I find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited psychology 
and its extensions in his OC and other 3rd period works to be deeper than S’s 
(or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but rather 
it is not open to (not possible to) doubt. 
 
Now let us review Searle’s brilliant summary of his many years of work on the 
logical structure of the ‘social glue’ that holds society together as set forth is his 
‘Making the Social World’ (2010). 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or 
dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term ‘propositional 
attitudes’ by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of 
PNC: “Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of 
satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of 
satisfaction.” As S states it in PNC, “A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that 
such and such is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have 
been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. Regarding 
intentions, “In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function causally 
in the production of the action.” (MSWp34). 
 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or “RPP1 and 2” or 
DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference 
between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions 
describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 
perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they can 
only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them here) after one begins thinking 
about them in S2. However, his point in PNC that propositions permit 
statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and 
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fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, 
is cogent. 
 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of 
one event so for IA (Intention in Action) “We have different levels of 
description where one level is constituted by the behavior at the lower level…in 
addition to the constitutive by way of relation, we also have the causal by 
means of relation.” (p37). 
 
So, recognizing the S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal 
(e.g., see Hutto and Myin’s ‘Radical Enactivism’) I would change the 
paragraphs from p39 beginning “In sum” and ending on pg 40 with 
“conditions of satisfaction” as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (‘will’) are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior 
intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire things to be 
with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and 
imagination—desires time shifted and so decoupled from intention) and other 
S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are 
totally dependent upon (have their COS in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive 
true only reflexive S1. In language and perhaps in neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time 
shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in 
the present. The two systems feed into each other and are often orchestrated by 
the learned deontic cultural relations seamlessly, so that our normal experience  
is  that  we  consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of 
cognitive illusions that dominate our life S has described as ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion.’ 
 
He ends this amazing chapter by repeating for maybe the 10th time in his 
writings, what I regard as a very basic mistake that he shares with nearly 
everyone—the notion that the experience of ‘free will’ may be ‘illusory’. It 
follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W’s 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that 
‘will’, ‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 
just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully 
clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. 
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S understands and uses basically this same argument in other contexts (e.g., 
skepticism, solipsism) many times, so it is quite surprising he can’t see this 
analogy. He makes this mistake frequently when he says such things as that we 
have “good evidence” that our dog is a dog etc. The true-only axioms of our 
psychology are not evidential. Here you have the best descriptive psychologist 
since W so this is not a stupid mistake. 
 
His summary of deontics on p50 needs translation. Thus “You have to have a 
prelinguistic form of collective intentionality, on which the linguistic forms are 
built, and you have to have the collective intentionality of the conversation in 
order to make the commitment” is much clearer if supplemented with “The 
prelinguistic axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic dispositions of S2 (i.e., our 
EP) which evolve during our maturation into their cultural manifestations.” 
 
Since status function declarations play a central role in deontics it is critical to 
understand them and so he explains the notion of ‘function’ that is relevant 
here. “A function is a cause that serves a purpose…In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent…status functions… 
require… collective imposition and recognition of a status” (p59). 
 
Again, I suggest the translation of “The intentionality of language is created by 
the intrinsic, or mind- independent intentionality of human beings” (p66) as 
“The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the 
unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1” (p68). That is, one must keep 
in mind that behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
However, I strongly object to his statements on p66-67 and elsewhere in his 
writings that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional 
(i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other 
reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding 
behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They 
both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic 
intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same 
sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was 
philosophy before W would return and in fact life would not be possible (no 
this is not a joke). As W showed countless times and biology shows so clearly, 
life must be based on certainty— automated unconscious rapid reactions. 
Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die. 
 
Contrary to his comments (p70) I cannot imagine a language lacking words for 
material objects any more than I can imagine a visual system that cannot see 
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them, because it is the first and most basic task of vision to segment the world 
into objects and so that of language to describe them. Likewise, I cannot see any 
problem with objects being salient in the conscious field nor with sentences 
being segmented into words. How could it be otherwise for beings with our 
evolutionary history? 
 
On p72 and elsewhere, it will help to remember that expressions are the 
primitive reflexive PLG’s of S1 while representations are the dispositional 
SLG’s of S2. 
 
Another translation from Philosophese into English is needed for the second 
paragraph on p79 beginning ‘So far’ and ending ‘heard before’. “We convey 
meaning by speaking a public language composed of words in sentences with 
a syntax.” 
 
To his questions 4 and 5 on p105 as to the special nature of language and 
writing, I would answer: ’They are special because the short wavelength of 
vibrations of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information 
transfer than contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders 
of magnitude higher for visual information.’ 
 
On p106, a general answer to question 2 (How do we get away with it—i.e., 
why does it work) is EP and S1 and his statement that “My main strategy of 
exposition in this book is to try to make the familiar seem strange and striking” 
is of course classic Wittgenstein. His claim on the next page that there is no 
general answer to why people accept institutions is clearly wrong. They accept 
them for the same reason they do everything—their EP is the result of inclusive 
fitness. It facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally 
bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk here (e.g., p114) about ‘extra- 
linguistic conventions’ and ‘extra semantical semantics’ is in fact referring to 
EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which are the basis for 
all behavior. Yes, as W said many times, the most familiar is for that reason 
invisible. 
 
S’s suggestion (p115) that language is essential to games is surely mistaken. 
Totally illiterate deaf-mutes could play cards, soccer and even chess but of 
course a minimal counting ability would be necessary. I agree (p121) that the 
ability to pretend and imagine (e.g., the counterfactual or as-if notions involved 
in time and space shifting) are, in full form, uniquely human abilities and 
critical to higher order thought. But even here there are many animal 
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precursors (as there must be), such as the posturing of ritual combats and 
mating dances, the decoration of mating sites by bower birds, the broken wing 
pretense of mother birds, fake alarm calls of monkeys, ‘cleaner’ fish that take a 
bite out of their prey and simulation of hawk and dove strategies (cheaters) in 
many animals. 
 
More translation is needed for his discussion of rationality (p126 et seq.). 
Saying that thinking is propositional and deals with true or false ‘factitive 
entities’ means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed 
to the true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. 
 
In ‘Free Will, Rationality and Institutional Facts’ he updates parts of his classic 
book ‘Rationality in Action’ and creates some new terminology for describing 
the formal apparatus of practical reasons which I do not find felicitous. 
“Factitive Entities’ do not seem different from dispositions and ‘motivator’ 
(desire or obligation), ‘effector’ (body muscles), ‘constitutor’ (speech muscles) 
and ‘total reason’ (all relevant dispositions) do not, at least here seem to add to 
clarity (p126-132). 
 
We should do something here that rarely happens in discussions of human 
behavior and remind ourselves of its biology. Evolution by inclusive fitness has 
programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often 
give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified by the cultural 
extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in various 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. This may seem infelicitous as 
well, but has the virtue that it is based on fact, and given the complexity of our 
higher order thought, I don’t think a general description is going to get much 
simpler. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S ‘The Phenomenological 
Illusion’) is that S2 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which 
we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology 
and psychology knows this view is not credible. 
 
Again, I will repeat some crucial notions. Another idea clarified by S is the 
Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). I would translate S's summary 
of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires (need 
to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent Reasons 
for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time), which produce 
dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle 
movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in 
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ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his description on 
p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 as "The resolution of the paradox is that the 
unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious 
DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires." 
Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these 
are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is “right” but the ultimate 
cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of 
their distant ancestors. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the 
unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the 
conscious slow thinking of S2, which produces reasons for action that often 
result in activation   of   body   and/or   speech   muscles   by   S1   causing   
actions.   The   general   mechanism   is   via   both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall 
cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The 
Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') 
is that S2 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully 
aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
 
Thus, I would translate his summary of practical reason on p127 as follows: 
“We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire –Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA— i.e., desires displaced in 
space and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), which produce dispositions 
to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that 
serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those 
closely related).” 
 
Contrary to S’s comment on p128 I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal 
in higher animals and not at all unique to humans (think mother hen defending 
her brood from a fox) if we include the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 
(i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the higher order DIRA of S2 or DIRA2 that require 
language are uniquely human. This seems to me an alternative and clearer 
description of his “explanation” (as W suggested these are much better called 
‘description’) on the bottom of p129 of the paradox of how we can voluntarily 
carry out DIRA2 (i.e., the S2 desires and their cultural extensions). That is, “The 
resolution of the paradox is that the recognition of desire-independent reasons 
can ground the desire and thus cause the desire, even though it is not logically 
inevitable that they do and not empirically universal that they do” can be 
translated as “The resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 
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serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often 
override the short term personal immediate desires.” Likewise, for his 
discussion of this issue on p130-31—it is EP, RA, IF, S1 (Evolutionary 
Psychology, Reciprocal Altruism, Inclusive Fitness, System 1) which ground 
the dispositions and ensuing actions ofS2. 
 
On p140 he asks why we can’t get deontics from biology but of course we must 
get them from biology as there is no other option and the above description 
shows how this happens. Contrary to his statement, the strongest inclinations 
DO always prevail (by definition, otherwise it is not the strongest), but deontics 
works because the innate programming of RA and IF override immediate 
personal short term desires. His confusion of nature and nurture, of S1 and S2, 
extends to conclusions 2 and 3 on p143. Agents do indeed create the proximate 
reasons of DIRA2, but these are not just anything but, with few if any 
exceptions, very restricted extensions of DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). If he really 
means to ascribe deontics to our conscious decisions alone then he is prey to 
‘The Phenomenological Illusion’(TPI) which he so beautifully demolished in 
his classic paper of that name (see my review of PNC). As I have noted above, 
there is a huge body of recent research exposing cognitive illusions which 
comprise our personality. TPI is not merely a harmless philosophical error but 
a universal obliviousness to our biology which produces the illusion that we 
control our life and our society and the world and the consequences are almost 
certain collapse of industrial civilization during the next 150 years. 
 
He notes correctly that human rationality makes no sense without the ‘gap’ 
(actually 3 gaps which he has discussed many times). That is, without free will 
(i.e., choice) in some non-trivial sense it would all be pointless, and he has 
rightly noted that it is inconceivable that evolution could create and maintain 
an unnecessary genetically and energetically expensive charade. But, like 
nearly everyone else, he cannot see his way out and so once again he suggests 
(p133) that choice may be an illusion. On the contrary, following W, it is quite 
clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only reflexive actions and 
cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the basis for questioning. 
You cannot doubt you are reading this page as your awareness of it is the basis 
for doubting. 
 
Now lets us briefly review Searle’s most recent book, ‘Seeing Things As They 
Are’ (STATA-2015). See the full review for further comments. 
 
As one expects from any philosophy, we are in deep trouble immediately, for 
on page 4 we have the terms ‘perception’ and ‘object’ as though they were used 
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is some normal sense, but we are doing philosophy so we are going to be 
undulating back and forth between language games have no chance of keeping 
our day to day games distinct from the various philosophical ones. Again, you 
can read some of Bennett and Hacker’s ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ or 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ to get a feel for this. Sadly, like 
nearly all philosophers, Searle (S) has still not adopted the two systems 
framework, so it’s much harder to keep things straight than it needs to be. 
 
On p6, Believing and Asserting are part of system 2 which is linguistic, 
deliberative, slow, with no precise time of occurrence and ‘it is raining’ is their 
public Condition of Satisfaction (COS2) (Wittgenstein’s transitive) –i.e., it is 
propositional and representational and not a mental state and we can only 
intelligibly describe it in terms of reasons , while Visual Experience (VisExp) is 
system 1 and so requires (for intelligibility, for sanity) that it be raining (it’s 
COS1) and has a determinate time of occurrence, is fast (typically under 
500msec ), nontestable (Wittgenstein’s true-only), and nonpublic, automatic 
and not linguistic i.e., not propositional and presentational and only 
describable in terms of causes of a mental state. In spite of this on p7 after 
crushing the horrific (but still quite popular) term ‘propositional attitude’, he 
says that perception has propositional content, but I agree with W that S1 is 
true-only and hence cannot be propositional in anything like the sense of S2 
where propositions are public statements (COS) that are true or false. 
 
On p12 keep in mind that he is describing the automaticity of System 1 (S1), 
and then he notes that to describe the world we can only repeat the description 
which W noted as showing the limits of language. The last sentence on to the 
end of the paragraph middle of p13 needs translating (like most of philosophy!) 
so for “The subjective experience has a content, which philosophers call an 
intentional content and the specification of the intentional content is the same 
as the description of the state of affairs that the intentional content presents you 
with etc.” I would say ‘Perceptions are System 1 mental states that can only be 
described in the public language of System 2.” And when he ends by noting 
again the equivalence of a description of believing with that of a description of 
our perception, he is repeating what W noted long ago and which is due to the 
fact that S1 is nonlinguistic and that describing, believing, knowing, expecting, 
etc. are all different psychological or intentional modes or language games 
played with the same words. 
 
On p23 he refers to private ‘experiences’ but words are S2 and describe public 
events, so what warrants our use of the word for ‘private experiences’ (i.e., S1) 
can only be their public manifestations (S2) —i.e., language we all use to 
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describe public acts as even for myself I cannot have any way to attach 
language to something internal. This is of course W’s argument against the 
possibility of a private language. He also mentions several times that 
hallucinations of X are the same as seeing X but what can be the test for this 
except that we are inclined to use the same words? In this case, they are the 
same by definition so this argument rings hollow. 
 
On p35 top he again correctly attacks the use of ‘propositional attitude’ which 
is not an attitude to a sentence but an attitude (disposition) to its public COS, 
i.e., to the fact or truthmaker. Then he says “For example, if I see a man in front 
of me, the content is that there is a man in front of me. The object is the man 
himself. If I am having a corresponding hallucination, the perceptual 
experience has a content, but no object. The content can be exactly the same in 
the two cases, but the presence of a content does not imply the presence of an 
object.” The way I see this is that the ‘object’ is normally in the world and 
creates the mental state (S1) and if we put this in words it becomes S2 with 
COS2 (i.e., a public truthmaker) and this does entail the public object, but for 
an hallucination (or direct brain stimulation etc.) the ‘object’ is only the similar 
mental state resulting from brain activation. 
 
As W showed us, the big mistake is not about understanding perception but 
about understanding language—all the problems of philosophy proper are 
exactly the same—failure to look carefully at how the language works in a 
particular context so as to yield clear COS. 
 
Middle of p61 we see the confusions that arise here and everywhere when we 
fail to keep S1 and S2 separate. Either we must not refer to representations in 
S1 or we must at least call them R1 and realize they have no public COS—i.e., 
no COS2. 
 
On p63 nondetachability only means that it is a caused automatic function of 
S1 and not a reasoned, voluntary function of S2. This discussion continues onto 
the next page, but of course is relevant to the whole book and to all of 
philosophy, and it is so unfortunate that Searle, and nearly all in the behavioral 
sciences, cannot get into the 21st century and use the two systems terminology 
which renders so many opaque issues very clear. Likewise with the failure to 
grasp that it’s always just a matter of whether it’s a scientific issue  or  a  
philosophical  one  and  if philosophical then which language game is going to 
be played and what the COS are in the context in question. 
 
On p64 he says the ‘experience’ is in his head but that is just the issue—as W 
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made so clear there is no private language and as Bennett and Hacker take the 
whole neuroscience community to task for, in normal use ‘experience’ can only 
be a public phenomenon for which we share criteria, but what is the test for my 
having an experience in my head? At the least, there is an ambiguity here which 
will lead to others. Many think these don’t matter, many think they do. 
Something happens in the brain but that’s a scientific neurophysiological issue 
and certainly by ‘experience’ or by ‘I saw a rabbit’ one never means the 
neurophysiology. Clearly this is not a matter for investigation but one of using 
words intelligibly. 
 
On p65 indexical, nondetachable, and presentational are just more 
philosophical jargon used instead of System 1 by people who have not adopted 
the two systems framework for describing behavior (i.e., nearly everyone). 
Likewise, for the following pages if we realize that ‘objects and states of affairs’, 
‘visual experiences’, ‘fully determinate’ etc., are just language games where we 
have to decide what the COS are and that if we just keep in mind the properties 
of S1 and S2 all of this becomes quite clear and Searle and everyone else could 
stop ‘struggling to express’ it. Thus (p69) ‘reality is determinate’ only means 
that perceptions are S1 and so mental states, here and now, automatic, causal, 
untestable (true-only) etc. while beliefs, like all dispositions are S2 and so not 
mental states, do not have a definite time, have reasons and not causes, are 
testable with COS etc. 
 
On p70 he notes that intentions in action of perception (IA1 in my terms) are 
part of the reflexive acts of S1 (A1 in my terms) which may originate in S2 acts 
which have become reflexive (S2A in my terminology). 
 
On the bottom of p74 onto p75, 500 msec is often taken as the approximate 
dividing line between seeing (S1) and seeing as (S2) which means S1 passes the 
percept to higher cortical centers of S2 where they can be deliberated upon and 
expressed in language. 
 
On p100-101 the ‘subjective visual field’ is S2 and ‘objective visual field’ is S1 
and ‘nothing is seen’ in S2 means we don’t play the language game of seeing in 
the same sense as for S1 and indeed philosophy and a good chunk of science 
(e.g., physics) would be different if people realized they were playing language 
games and not doing science. 
 
On p107 ‘perception is transparent’ because language is S2 and S1 has no 
language as it’s automatic and reflexive so when saying what I saw or to 
describe what I saw I can only say “I saw a cat”. Once again W pointed this out 
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long ago as showing the limits of language. 
 
P110 middle needs to be translated from SearleSpeak into TwoSystemsSpeak 
so that “Because presentational visual intentionality is a subspecies of 
representation, and because all representation is under aspects, the visual 
presentations will always present their conditions of satisfaction under some 
aspects and not others.” becomes “Because the percepts of S1 present their data 
to S2, which has public COS, we can speak of S1 as though it also has public 
COS”. On p111 the ‘condition’ refers to the public COS of S2, i.e., the events 
which make the statement true or false and ‘lower order’ and ‘higher order’ 
refer to S1 and S2. 
 
On p112 the basic action and basic perception are isomorphic because S1 feeds 
its data to S2, which can only generate actions by feeding back to S1 to contract 
muscles, and lower level perception and higher level perception can only be 
described in the same terms due to there being only one language to describe 
S1 and S2. On p117 bottom it would be much less mysterious if he would adopt 
the two systems framework, so that instead of “internal connection” with 
conditions of satisfaction (my COS1), a perception would just be noted as the 
automaticity of S1 which causes a mental state. 
 
On p120 the point is that ‘causal chains’ have no explanatory power because 
the language games of ‘cause’ only make sense in S1 or other non-psychological 
phenomena of nature, whereas semantics is S2 and we can only intelligibly 
speak of reasons for higher order human behavior. One way this manifests is 
‘meaning is not in the head’ which enmeshes us in other language games. 
 
On p121 to say it’s essential to a perception (S1) that it has COS1 (‘the 
experience’) merely describes the conditions of the language game of 
perception—it is an automatic causal mental state. 
 
On p 122 I think “First, for something to be red in the ontologically objective 
world is for it to be capable of causing ontologically subjective visual 
experiences like this.” is not coherent as there is nothing to which we can refer 
‘this’ so it should be stated as “First, for something to be red is just for it to 
incline me to call it ‘red’ ”—as usual, the jargon does not help at all and the rest 
of the paragraph is unnecessary as well. 
 
On p123 the ‘background disposition” is the automatic, causal, mental state of 
S1 and as I, in agreement with W, DMS and others have said many times these 
cannot intelligibly be called ‘presuppositions’ as they are unconsciously 
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activated ‘hinges’ that are the basis for presuppositions. 
 
Section VII and VIII (or the whole book or most of higher order behavior or 
most of philosophy in the narrow sense ) could be titled “The language games 
describing the interaction of the causal, automatic, nonlinguistic transient  
mental states of S1 with the reasoned, conscious, persistent linguistic thinking 
of S2” and the background is not suppositional nor can it be taken for granted 
but it is our axiomatic true-only psychology (the ‘hinges” or ‘ways of acting’ of 
W’s ‘On Certainty’) that underlie all suppositions. As is evident from my 
comments I think the whole section, lacking the two systems framework and 
W’s insights in OC is confused in supposing it presents an “explanation” of 
perception where it can at best only describe how the language of perception 
works in various contexts. We can only describe how the word ‘red’ is used 
and that’s the end of it and for the last sentence of this section we might say 
that for something to be a ‘red apple’ is only for it to normally result in the same 
words being used by everyone. 
 
Speaking of hinges, it is sad and a bit strange that Searle has not incorporated 
what many (e.g., DMS an eminent contemporary philosopher and leading W 
expert) regard as maybe the greatest discovery in modern philosophy—W’s 
revolutionizing of epistemology in his ‘On Certainty’ as nobody can do 
philosophy or psychology in the old way anymore without looking antiquated. 
And though Searle almost entirely ignored ‘On Certainty’ his whole career, in 
2009 (i.e., 6 years before publication of this book) he spoke at a symposium on 
it held by the British Wittgenstein Society and hosted by DMS, so he is certainly 
aware of the view that has revolutionized the very topics he is discussing here. 
I don’t think this meeting was published, but his lecture can be downloaded 
from Vimeo. It seems to be a case of an old dog who can’t learn new tricks. 
Though he has probably pioneered more new territory in the descriptive 
psychology of higher order behavior than anyone since Wittgenstein, once he 
has learned a path he tends to stay on it, as we all do. Like everyone, he uses 
the French word repertoire when there is an easier to pronounce and spell 
English word ‘repertory’ and the awkward ‘he/she’ or reverse sexist ‘she’ when 
one can always use ‘they’ or ‘them’. In spite of their higher intelligence and 
education, academics are sheep too. 
 
Section IX to the end of the chapter shows again the very opaque and awkward 
language games one is forced into when trying to describe (not explain as W 
made clear) the properties of S1 (i.e., to play the language games used to 
describe ’primary qualities’) and how these feed data into S2 (i.e., secondary 
qualities’), which then has to feed back to S1 to generate actions. It also shows 
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the errors one commits by failing to grasp Wittgenstein’s unique view of ‘hinge 
epistemology’ presented in “On Certainty”. To show how much clearer this is 
with the dual system terminology I would have to rewrite the whole chapter 
(and much of the book). Since I have rewritten sections here several times, and 
often in my reviews of Searle’s other books, I will only give a couple brief 
examples. 
 
The sentence on p129 “Reality is not dependent on experience, but conversely. 
The concept of the reality in question already involves the causal capacity to 
produce certain sorts of experiences. So, the reason that these experiences 
present red objects is that the very fact of being a red object involves a capacity 
to produce this sort of experience. Being a straight line involves the capacity to 
produce this other sort of experience. The upshot is that organisms cannot have 
these experiences without it seeming to them that they are seeing a red object 
or a straight line, and that “seeming to them” marks the intrinsic intentionality 
of the perceptual experience.” Can be rendered as “S1 provides the input for 
S2 and the way we use the word ‘red’ mandates it’s COS in each context, so 
using these words in a particular way is what it means to see red. In the normal 
case, it does not ‘seem’ to us that we see red, we just see red and we use ‘seem 
to” to describe cases where we are in doubt.” 
 
On p130 “Our question now is: Is there an essential connection between the 
character of things in the world and the character of our experience?” can be 
translated as “Are our public language games (S2) useful (consistent) in the 
description of perception (S1)?” 
 
The first paragraph of Section X ‘The Backward Road’ is perhaps the most 
important one in the book, as it is critical for all of philosophy to understand 
that there cannot be a precise 1:1 connection between or reduction of S2 to S1 
due to the many ways of describing in language a given event (mental state, 
i.e., percept, memory etc.). Hence the apparent impossibility of capturing 
behavior in algorithms (the hopelessness of ‘strong AI’) or of extrapolating 
from a given neuronal pattern in the brain to the multitudinous acts (language 
games) we use to describe it. The ‘Backward Road’ is the language (COS) of S2 
used to describe S1. Again, I think his failure to use the two systems framework 
renders this quite confusing if not opaque. Of course, he shares this failing with 
nearly everyone. Searle has commented on this before and so have others (e.g., 
Hacker) but it seems to have escaped most philosophers and almost all 
scientists. 
 
Again, Searle misses the point in Sect XI and X12 –we do not and cannot ‘seem 
113  
to see’ red or ‘seem’ to have a memory or ‘assume’ a relation between the 
experience and the word, but as with all the perceptions and memories that 
constitute the innate axiomatic true-only mental states of System 1, we just have 
the experience and “it” only becomes ‘red’ etc., when described in public 
language with this word in this context by System 2. We know it’s red as this 
is a hinge—an axiom of our psychology that is our automatic action and is the 
basis for assumptions or judgements or presuppositions and cannot intelligibly 
be judged, tested or altered. As W pointed out so many times, a mistake in S1 
is of an entirely different kind than one in S2. No explanations are possible—
we can only describe how it works and so there is no possibility of getting a 
nontrivial “explanation” of our psychology. As he always has, Searle makes the 
common and fatal mistake of thinking he understands behavior (language) 
better than Wittgenstein. After a decade reading W, S and many others I find 
that W’s ‘perspicuous examples’ , aphorisms and trialogues usually provide 
greater illumination than the wordy disquisitions of anyone else. 
 
“We may not advance any kind of theory, there must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and 
description alone must take it’s place.” (PI 109). 
 
On p135, one way to describe perception is that the event or object causes a 
pattern of neuronal activation (mental state) whose self-reflexive COS1 is that 
we see a red rose in front of us, and in appropriate contexts for a normal English 
speaking person, this leads us to activate muscle contractions which produces 
the words ‘I see a red rose’ whose COS2 is that there is a red rose there. Or 
simply, S1 produces S2 in appropriate contexts. So, on p136 we can say S1 leads 
to S2 which we express in this context by the word ‘smooth’ which describes 
(but never ‘explains’) how the language game of ‘smooth’ works in this context 
and we can translate “For basic actions and basic perceptions the intentional 
content is internally related to the conditions of satisfaction, even though it is 
characterized non- intentionalistically, because being the feature F perceived 
consists in the ability to cause experiences of that type. And in the case of action, 
experiences of that type consist in their ability to cause that sort of bodily 
movement.” as “Basic perceptions (S1) can lead automatically (internally) to 
basic reflex actions (A1) (i.e., burning a finger leads to withdrawing the arm) 
which only then enters awareness so that it can be reflected upon and described 
in language (S2). 
 
On p150, the point is that inferring, like knowing, judging, thinking, is an S2 
disposition expressed in language with public COS that are informational (true 
or false) while percepts are non-informational (see my review of Hutto and 
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Myin’s book) automated responses of S1 and there is no meaningful way to 
play a language game of inferring in S1. Trees and everything we see is S1 for 
a few hundred msec or so and then normally enter S2 where they get language 
attached (aspectual shape or seeing as). 
 
Regarding p151 et seq., it is sad that Searle, as part of his lack of attention to the 
later W, never seems to refer to what is probably the most penetrating analysis 
of color words in W’s “Remarks on Colour’, which is missing from nearly every 
discussion of the subject I have seen. The only issue is how do we play the game 
with color words and with ‘same’, ‘different’, ‘experience ‘etc. in this public 
linguistic context (true or false statements—COS2) because there is no language 
and no meaning in a private one (S1). So, it does not matter (except to 
neuroscientists) what happens in the mental states of S1 but only what we say 
about them when they enter S2. It’s clear as day that all 7.6 billion on earth have 
a slightly different pattern of neural activation every time they see red and that 
there is no possibility for a perfect correlation between S1 and S2. As I noted 
above it is absolutely critical for every philosopher and scientist to get this clear. 
 
Regarding the brain in a vat (p157), insofar as we disrupt or eliminate the 
normal relations of S1 and S2, we lose the language games of intentionality. 
The same applies to intelligent machines and W described this situation 
definitively over 80 years ago. 
 
"Only of a living being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being 
can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or 
unconscious.” (PI 281) 
 
Chapter 6: yes disjunctivism (like nearly all philosophical theses) is incoherent 
and the fact that this and other absurdities flourish in his own department and 
even among some of his former students who got top marks in his Philosophy 
of Mind classes shows perhaps that, like most, he stopped too soon in his 
Wittgenstein studies. 
On p188, yes veridical seeing and ‘knowing’ (i.e., K1) are the same since S1 is 
true-only- i.e., it is the fast, axiomatic, causally self-reflexive, automatic mental 
states which can only be described with the slow, deliberative public language 
games of S2. 
 
On p204 -5,,representation is always under an aspect since, like thinking, 
knowing etc., it is a disposition of S2 with public COS, which is infinitely 
variable. 
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Once again, I think the use of the two systems framework greatly simplifies the 
discussion. If one insists to use ‘representation’ for ‘presentations’ of S1 then 
one should say that R1 have COS1 which are transient neurophysiological 
mental states, and so totally different from R2, which have COS2 (aspectual 
shapes) that are public, linguistically expressible states of affairs, and the notion 
of unconscious mental states is illegitimate since such language games lack any 
clear sense. 
 
Sadly, on p211 Searle for maybe the tenth time in his writings (and endlessly in 
his lectures) says that ‘free will’ may be illusory, but as W from the 30’s on 
noted, one cannot coherently deny or judge the ‘hinges’ such as our having 
choice, nor that we see, hear, sleep, have hands etc., as these words express the 
true-only axioms of our psychology, our automatic behaviors that are the basis 
for action 
 
On p219 bottom and 222 top—it was W in his work, culminating in ‘On 
Certainty’ who pointed out that behavior cannot have an evidentiary basis and 
that its foundation is our animal certainty or way of behaving that is the basis 
of doubt and certainty and cannot be doubted (the hinges of S1). He also noted 
many times that a ‘mistake’ in our basic perceptions (S1) which has no public 
COS and cannot be tested (unlike those of S2), if it is major or persists, leads 
not to further testing but to insanity. 
 
Phenomenalism p227 top: See my extensive comments on Searle’s excellent 
essay ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ in my review of ‘Philosophy in a New 
Century’. There is not even any warrant for referring to one’s private 
experiences as ‘phenomena’, ‘seeing’ or anything else. As W famously showed 
us, language can only be a public testable activity (no private language). And 
on p230 the problem is not that the ‘theory’ ‘seems’ to be inadequate, but that 
(like most if not all philosophical theories) it is incoherent. It uses language that 
has no clear COS. As W insisted all we can do is describe—it is the scientists 
who can make theories. 
 
The bottom line is that this is classic Searle—superb and probably at least as 
good as anyone else can produce, but lacking understanding of the 
fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein, and with no grasp of the two 
systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant. 
 
Finally, permit me to again note that W posed an interesting resolution to some 
of these ‘puzzles’ by suggesting that some ‘mental phenomena’ (i.e., words for 
dispositions leading to public acts) may originate in chaotic processes in the 
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brain and that there is not anything corresponding to a memory trace, nor to a 
single brain process identifiable as a single intention or action--that the causal 
chain ends without a trace, and that ‘cause’, ‘event’ and ‘time’ cease to  be 
applicable (useful—having clear COS). Subsequently, many have made similar 
suggestions based on physics and the sciences of complexity and chaos.  One 
must however recall that ‘chaotic’ in the modern sense means determined by 
laws, but not predictable, and that the science of chaos did not exist until long 
after his death. 
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The Foundation Stone of Psychology and Philosophy-
-A Critical Review of 'On Certainty' by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1969) (1951). 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
A critical review of Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' which he wrote in 1950-51 
and was first published in 1969. Most of the review is spent presenting a 
modern framework for philosophy (the descriptive psychology of higher 
order thought) and positioning the work of Wittgenstein and John Searle in 
this framework and relative to the work of others. It is suggested that this 
book can be regarded as the foundation stone of psychology and philosophy 
as it was the first to describe the two systems of thought and shows how our 
unshakable grasp of the world derives from our innate axiomatic System 1 
and how this interacts with System 2. It was a revolution in epistemology 
since it showed that our actions rest not on judgements but on innate 
undoubtable axioms leading directly to action. I situate the work of 
Wittgenstein and Searle in the framework of the two systems of thought 
prominent in thinking and decision research, employing a new table of 
intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature.  
 
 Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or only 
those articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 
21st Century (2017) 
  
“If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid 
doubting whether the word ‘hand’ has any meaning? So that is something 
I seem to know, after all.” On Certainty p48 
 
 “But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it 
is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and 
false.” (OC p94). 
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“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of 
finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution 
something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already 
said everything. ---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the 
solution! …. This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an 
explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we 
give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not 
try to get beyond it.” Zettel p312-314 
 "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." "The Blue Book” p6 (1933) 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity 
(PI 126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give 
it epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a 
priori knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) 
as in sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s 
error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 
133) as in Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to make it more 
consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no 
attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions 
of personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
”-- Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’. 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been 
removed--yet no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has 
been explained or discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring 
one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of 
clarity, demystification and truth should be found satisfying enough” --
Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’. 
First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –
that ALL truly ‘philosophical’ problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments 
or data gathering) are the same—confusions about how to use language in a 
particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language 
can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of 
Satisfaction or COS) are clear. . The basic problem is that one can say anything 
but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and 
meaning is only possible in a very specific context. Thu,s W looks at 
perspicuous examples of the varying uses of the words ‘know’ and ‘certain’, 
often from his 3 typical perspectives of narrator, interlocutor and 
commentator, leaving the reader to decide the best use (clearest COS) of the 
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sentences in each context. One can only describe the uses of related sentences 
and that’s the end of it—no hidden depths, no metaphysical insights. It is truly 
sad that most philosophers continue to waste their time on the linguistic 
confusions peculiar to philosophy rather than turning their attention to those 
of the other behavioral disciplines and to physics, biology and mathematics, 
where it is desperately needed. 
W wrote this ‘book’ (not really a book but notes he made during the last two 
years of his life while dying of prostate cancer and barely able to work) 
because he realized that G.E. Moore’s simple efforts had focused attention on 
the very core of all philosophy--how it’s possible to mean, to believe, to know 
anything at all, and not to be able to doubt it. All anyone can do is to examine 
minutely the working of the language games of ‘know’ and ‘certain’ and 
‘doubt’ as they are used to describe the primitive automated prelinguistic 
system one (S1) functions of our brain (my K1, C1 and D1) and the advanced 
deliberative linguistic system two (S2) functions (my K2, C2 and D2). Of 
course, W does not use the two systems terminology, which only came to the 
fore in psychology some half century after his death, and has yet to penetrate 
philosophy, but he clearly grasped the two systems framework (the 
‘grammar’) in all of his work from the early 30’s on, and one can see clear 
foreshadowings in his very earliest writings. 
Much has been written on Moore and W and On Certainty (OC) recently, after 
half a century in relative oblivion. See e.g., Annalisa Coliva’s “Moore and 
Wittgenstein” (2010), “Extended Rationality” (2015), and The Varieties of Self-
Knowledge’(2016), Brice’s ‘Exploring Certainty’(2014), Andy Hamilton’s 
‘Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Wittgenstein and On Certainty’, and 
above all the many recent books and papers of  Daniele Moyal-Sharrock 
(DMS) and Peter Hacker (PH), including Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on 
Human Nature. For an excellent quick look at how various philosophers react 
to OC and how they go astray see McDougall’s ‘Critical Notice of Readings of 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty’, free on the net like most papers now. DMS and 
PH have been the leading scholars of the later W, each writing or editing half 
a dozen books (many reviewed by me) and many papers in the last decade. 
However, the difficulties of coming to grips with the basics of our higher 
order psychology, i.e., of how language (approximately the same as the mind, 
as W showed us) works are evidenced by Coliva, one of the most brilliant and 
prolific contemporary philosophers, who made remarks in a very recent 
article which show that after years of intensive work on the later W, she really 
does not quite get that he has solved the most basic problems of the 
description of human behavior. As DMS makes clear, one cannot even 
coherently state misgivings about the operations of our basic psychology (W’s 
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‘Hinges’ which I equate to S1) without lapsing into incoherence. DMS has 
noted the limitations of both of these workers (limitations shared by all 
students of behavior) in her recent articles, which (like those of Coliva and 
Hacker). 
As DMS puts it: “…the notes that make up On Certainty revolutionize the 
concept of basic beliefs and dissolve scepticism, making them a corrective, not 
only to Moore but also to Descartes, Hume, and all of epistemology. On 
Certainty shows Wittgenstein to have solved the problem he set out to solve – 
the problem that occupied Moore and plagued epistemology – that of the 
foundation of knowledge. 
Wittgenstein's revolutionary insight in On Certainty is that what philosophers 
have traditionally called 'basic beliefs' – those beliefs that all knowledge must 
ultimately be based on – cannot, on pain of infinite regress, themselves be 
based on further propositional beliefs. He comes to see that basic beliefs are 
really animal or unreflective ways of acting which, once formulated (e.g. by 
philosophers), look like (empirical) propositions. It is this misleading 
appearance that leads philosophers to believe that at the foundation of 
thought is yet more thought. Yet though they may often look like empirical 
conclusions, our basic certainties constitute the ungrounded, non-
propositional underpinning of knowledge, not its object. In thus situating the 
foundation of knowledge in nonreflective certainties that manifest themselves 
as ways of acting, Wittgenstein has found the place where justification comes 
to an end, and solved the regress problem of basic beliefs – and, in passing, 
shown the logical impossibility of hyperbolic scepticism. I believe that this is 
a groundbreaking achievement for philosophy – worthy of calling On 
Certainty Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'.” I reached the same general 
conclusions myself some years ago and stated it in my book reviews. 
She continues:” … this is precisely how Wittgenstein describes Moore-type 
hinge certainties in On Certainty: they 'have the form of empirical 
propositions', but are not empirical propositions. Granted, these certainties 
are not putative metaphysical propositions that appear to describe the 
necessary features of the world, but they are putative empirical propositions 
that appear to describe the contingent features of the world. And therein lies 
some of the novelty of On Certainty. On Certainty is continuous with all of 
Wittgenstein's earlier writings – including the Tractatus – in that it comes at 
the end of a long, unbroken attempt to elucidate the grammar of our 
language-games, to demarcate grammar from language in use. Baker and 
Hacker have superbly elucidated the second Wittgenstein's unmasking of the 
grammatical nature of metaphysical or super-empirical propositions; what 
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sets On Certainty apart is its further perspicuous distinction between some 
'empirical' propositions and others ('Our "empirical propositions" do not 
form a homogenous mass' (OC 213)): some apparently empirical and 
contingent propositions being in fact nothing but expressions of grammatical 
rules. The importance of this realization is that it leads to the unprecedented 
insight that basic beliefs – though they look like humdrum empirical and 
contingent propositions – are in fact ways of acting which, when 
conceptually elucidated, can be seen to function as rules of grammar: they 
underlie all thinking (OC 401). So that the hinge certainty 'The earth has 
existed for many years' underpins all thought and action, but not as a 
proposition that strikes us immediately as true; rather as a way of acting that 
underpins what we do (e.g., we research the age of the earth) and what we 
say (e.g., we speak of the earth in the past tense): Giving grounds, however, 
justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain 
propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on 
our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC 
204) 
The non-propositional nature of basic beliefs puts a stop to the regress that 
has plagued epistemology: we no longer need to posit untenable self-
justifying propositions at the basis of knowledge. In taking hinges to be true 
empirical propositions, Peter Hacker fails to acknowledge the ground-
breaking insight that our basic certainties are ways of acting, and not 'certain 
propositions striking us as true' (OC 204). If all Wittgenstein were doing in 
OC was to claim that our basic beliefs are true empirical propositions, why 
bother? He would be merely repeating what philosophers before him have 
been saying for centuries, all the while deploring an unsolvable infinite 
regress. Why not rather appreciate that Wittgenstein has stopped the 
regress?” (“Beyond Hacker’s Wittgenstein” (2013). 
It is amazing (and a sign of how deep the divide remains between philosophy 
and psychology) that (as I have noted many times in recent reviews) in a 
decade of intensive reading I have not seen one person make the obvious 
connection between W’s ‘grammar’ and the automatic reflexive functions of 
our brain which constitute System 1, and its extensions into the linguistic 
functions of System 2. For anyone familiar with the two systems framework 
for understanding behavior that has dominated various areas of psychology 
such as decision theory for the last several decades, it should be glaringly 
obvious that ‘basic beliefs’ (or as I call them B1) are the inherited automated 
true-only structure of S1 and that their extension with experience into true or 
false sentences (or as I call them B2) are what non-philosophers call ‘beliefs’. 
This may strike some as a mere terminological trifle, but I have used the two 
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systems view and its tabulation below as the logical structure of rationality 
for a decade and regard it as the single biggest advance in understanding 
higher order behavior, and hence of W or any philosophical or behavioral 
writing. In my view, the failure to grasp the fundamental importance of the 
automaticity of our behavior due to S1 and the consequent attribution of all 
social interaction (e.g., politics) to the superficialities of S2 is responsible for 
the inexorable collapse of industrial civilization. The almost universal 
oblivion to basic biology and psychology leads to endless fruitless attempts 
fix the world’s problems via politics, but only a drastic restructuring of society 
with understanding of the fundamental role of inclusive fitness as manifested 
via the automaticities of S1 has any chance to save the world. The oblivion to 
S1 has been called by Searle ‘The phenomenological Illusion’, by Pinker ‘The 
Blank Slate’ and by Tooby and Cosmides ‘The Standard Social Science Model’. 
OC shows W’s unique super-Socratic trialogue (narrator, interlocutor, 
commentator) in full bloom and better than anywhere else in his works. He 
realized by the late 20’s that the only way to make any progress was to look 
at how language actually works-otherwise one gets lost in the labyrinth of 
language from the very first sentences and there is not the slightest hope of 
finding one’s way out. The entire book looks at various uses of the word 
‘know’ which separate themselves out into ‘know’ as an intuitive ‘perceptual’ 
certainty that cannot meaningfully be questioned (my K1) and ‘know’ as a 
disposition to act (my K2), which functions the same as think, hope, judge, 
understand, imagine, remember, believe and many other dispositional words. 
As I have suggested in my various reviews of W and S, these two uses 
correspond to the modern two systems of thought framework that is so 
powerful in understanding behavior (mind, language), and this (and his other 
work) is the first significant effort to show how our fast, prelinguistic 
automatic ‘mental states’ are the unquestionable axiomatic basis (‘hinges’) for 
our later-evolved, slow, linguistic, deliberative dispositional psychology. As I 
have noted many times, neither W, nor anyone else to my knowledge, has 
ever stated this clearly. Undoubtedly, most who read OC go away with no 
clear idea of what he has done, which is the normal result of reading any of 
his work. 
 
On Certainty (OC) was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s 
death and has only recently begun to draw serious attention.  There are few 
references to it in Searle (W’s heir apparent and the most eminent living 
philosopher) and one sees whole books on W with barely a mention. There 
are however reasonably good books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and 
others and parts of many other books and articles, but the best is that of 
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Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and 
perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), 
psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) all analysis of W falls 
short of fully grasping his unique and revolutionary advances by failing to 
put behavior in its broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, 
which I will attempt here. Some may be disappointed that they don’t get a 
page by page explanation of OC but (as with any other book dealing with 
behavior-i.e., philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, law, 
politics, religion, literature etc.) we would not get past the first page, as all the 
issues discussed here arise immediately in any discussion of behavior. 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is 
now known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, cognitive 
psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just 
animal behavior. Sadly, few realize that his works are a vast and unique 
textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was 
written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral 
sciences and humanities, and even those few who have understood him have 
not realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and 
cognitive illusions (e.g., the two selves of fast and slow thinking—see below). 
John Searle (S), refers to him infrequently, but his work can be seen as a 
straightforward extension of W’s, though he does not seem to see this. W 
analysts such as Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Harre, Horwich, Stern, Hutto 
and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but stop short of putting him in the 
center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs. It should also be 
clear that insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of higher order 
behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought to translate easily 
into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes of “Embodied Mind” 
and “Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from and into W’s work (and 
they do). 
The failure of even the best thinkers to fully grasp W’s significance is partly 
due to the limited attention On Certainty (0C) and his other third period 
works have received until recently, but even more to the inability of many 
philosophers and others to understand how profoundly our view of 
philosophy (which I call the descriptive psychology of higher order thought-
DPHOT- or more precisely the study of the language used in DPHOT --which 
Searle calls the logical structure of rationality-LSR), anthropology, sociology, 
politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, aesthetics, literature and all of animal 
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behavior alters once we embrace the evolutionary framework. 
The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is 
the default of the ‘second self’ of slow thinking conscious system 2, which 
(without education) is oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all 
behavior lies in the unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of system 
1 (Searle’s ‘Phenomenological Illusion’). Searle summed this up in a very 
insightful recent article by noting that many logical features of intentionality 
are beyond the reach of phenomenology because the creation of 
meaningfulness (i.e., the COS of S2) out of meaninglessness (i.e., the reflexes 
of S1) is not consciously experienced. See Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) 
p115-117 and my review of it. 
Before remarking on this book, it is essential to grasp the W/S framework so I 
will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle 
(S), Wittgenstein (W), Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Hutto, Daniele Moyal- 
Sharrock(DMS) et. al. It will help to see my reviews of various books by Searle 
such as Philosophy in a New Century (PNC), and Making the Social World 
(MSW), the classics by W such as TLP, PI, and other books by and about these 
geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior not found 
in psychology books, that I will refer to as the Wittgenstein/Searle (W/S) 
framework. To say that Searle has carried on W’s work is not to imply that it 
is a direct result of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE human 
psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that 
anyone accurately describing behavior must be enunciating some variant or 
extension of what W said. 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms of S1 (which I equate with W’s 
‘hinges’) from the less mechanical linguistic dispositional behavior of S2. To 
rephrase: all study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart fast 
System 1 (S1) and slow System 2 (S2) thinking --e.g., perceptions and other 
automatisms vs. dispositions. Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order S2 social behavior including ‘we intentionality’, 
while the later W shows how S2 is based on true-only unconscious axioms of 
S1, which in evolution and in each of our personal histories developed into 
conscious dispositional propositional thinking (acting) of S2. 
Wittgenstein famously remarked that the confusion and barrenness of 
psychology is not to be explained by calling it a young science and that 
philosophers are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way 
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science does. He noted that this tendency is the real source of metaphysics 
and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. See BBB p18. Another 
notable comment was that if we are not concerned with “causes” the activities 
of the mind lie open before us –see BB p6 (1933). Likewise, the 20,000 pages 
of his nachlass demonstrated his famous dictum that the problem is not to 
find the solution but to recognize as the solution what appears to be only a 
preliminary. See his Zettel p312-314. And again, he noted 80 years ago that 
we ought to realize that we can only give descriptions of behavior and that 
these are not hints of explanations (BBB p125) 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language (mind, 
speech) is a window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even 
(Fodor’s LOT, Carruthers’ ISA, etc.) that there must be some other “Language 
of Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to 
show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicuous examples of 
language in action, that language is not a picture of but is itself thinking or 
the mind, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this 
idea.  Many have deconstructed the idea of a ‘language of thought’ but in my 
view, none better than W in BBB p37 — “if we keep in mind the possibility of 
a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, the 
interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For 
now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such 
a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it represents.” So, 
language issues direct from the brain and what could count as evidence for 
an intermediary? 
W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology 
and computation could reveal what his Top Down analysis of Language 
Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always 
in front of our eyes and to capture vagueness –i.e., “the greatest difficulty in 
these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness” (LWPP1, 347). 
And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) 
is not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed by 
acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the 
later evolved Language Games (LG’s) of the Second Self--the dispositions 
such as imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). Some of W’s 
favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the interdigitating 
mechanisms of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2), the irrelevance of our 
subjective ‘mental life’ to the functioning of language, and the impossibility 
of private language. The bedrock of our behavior is our involuntary, System 
1, fast thinking, true only, mental states- our perceptions and memories and 
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involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily later LG’s are voluntary, System 2, 
slow thinking, testable true or false dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. He 
recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper (e.g., in 
LWPP1—“the greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself”). 
W is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that 
our behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our 
psychology. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the 
rest are fascinating and powerful ways to describe and extend our innate 
axiomatic psychology, but all they can do is provide the physical basis for our 
behavior, multiply our language games, and extend S2. The true-only axioms 
of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and later Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, 
which we now call evolutionary psychology (EP), and which is traceable to 
the automated true-only reactions of bacteria, which evolved and operate by 
the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). See the recent works of Trivers for a 
popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb “Principles of Social Evolution” for a 
pro intro. The recent travesty of evolutionary thought by Nowak and Wilson 
in no way impacts the fact that IF is the prime mechanism of evolution by 
natural selection (see my review of 'The Social Conquest of Earth' (2012)). 
So, as W develops in OC, most of our shared public experience (culture) 
becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found 
‘mistaken’ without threatening our sanity—as he noted a ‘mistake’ in S1 (no 
test) has profoundly different consequences from one in S2 (testable). A 
corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense) cannot get a foothold, as “reality” is the result 
of involuntary ‘fast thinking’ axioms and not testable propositions (as I would 
put it). 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and especially in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking 
or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--
“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but neither he, nor anyone afaik, has any idea W 
laid out the framework over 50 years ago), which is involuntary and 
automatic and which corresponds to the mental states of perception, emotion 
and memory, as W notes over and over. One might call these “intracerebral 
reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the 
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brain). Our slow or reflective, more or less “conscious” (beware another 
network of language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what 
W characterized as “dispositions” or “inclinations”, which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states, are conscious, deliberate and 
propositional (true or false), and do not have any definite time of occurrence. 
As W notes, disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
mostly philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to 
the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., 
our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), originally 
termed Causally Self Referential (CSR) by Searle (but now Causally Self-
Reflexive) or reflexive or intransitive in W’s Blue and Brown Books (BBB), 
and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted 
out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they 
have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) in the strict sense, and are not CSR 
(called transitive in BBB). The equation of these terms from modern 
psychology with those used by W and S (and much else here) is my idea, so 
don’t expect to find it in the literature (except my reviews on Amazon, 
ViXra.org, philpapers.org, academia.edu). 
Though seldom touched upon by philosophers, the investigation of 
involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., 
Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like “cognitive 
illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course these 
too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways to use 
these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear, but of course he did not 
use this terminology), but presumably not ever of slow S2 dispositional 
thinking only, since any thought (intentional action) cannot occur without 
involving much of the intricate S1 network of the “cognitive modules”, 
“inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, “cognitive 
axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and Searle call our EP) which 
must use S1 to move muscles (action). 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary 
psychology, that `will', `self' and `consciousness' (which as Searle notes are 
presupposed by all discussion of intentionality) are axiomatic true-only 
elements of S1, composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes., and there 
is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their 
falsehood. As W made clear numerous times, they are the basis for 
judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology 
are not evidential. As he famously said in OC 94 — “but I did not get my 
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picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it 
because I am satisfied of its correctness. -no: it is the inherited background 
against which I distinguish between true and false.” 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid 
reflexive causal actions of S1, which typically give rise to the conscious slow 
thinking of S2, which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation of body and/or speech muscles by feedback into S1, causing 
actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall 
cognitive illusion (called by Searle `The Phenomenological Illusion', by 
Pinker`The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social 
Science Model') is that S2 has generated the action consciously for reasons of 
which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern 
biology and psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear Conditions 
of Satisfaction (COS), i.e., public truth conditions. Hence the comment from 
W: " When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my 
mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of 
thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I 
(honestly) say it is, as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus W's 
aphorisms (p132 in Budd’s lovely book on W) – “It is in language that wish 
and fulfillment meet and like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.” And one 
might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP or LSR 
(DPHOT—see table) and that, in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing) for which he is often incorrectly criticized by 
Searle), this is about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive 
psychology (philosophy) as one can find (as DMS also notes). 
W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, and Searle 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning—“speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction”-- which means to speak or write a well formed sentence 
expressing COS in a context that can be true or false, and this is an act and not 
a mental state. i.e., as Searle notes in Philosophy in a New Century p193 — 
“the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand 
in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations 
always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as 
anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
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intentionality is a matter of propositions.” --propositions being public events 
that can be true or false. Hence, the famous comment by W from PI p217— “If 
God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there 
whom we were speaking of”, and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in "that's Him" and “what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's 
summation (p140 Budd) –“what it always comes to in the end is that without 
any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should 
happen-and- the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is 
fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing 
does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my 
wish had been satisfied. Suppose it were asked -do I know what I long for 
before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know.” 
One of W’s recurring themes is now referred to as Theory of Mind, or as I 
prefer, Understanding of Agency (UA). Ian Apperly, who is carefully 
analyzing UA1 and UA2 (i.e., UA of S1 and S2) in experiments, has recently 
become aware of the work of Daniel Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a 
fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor representation can be involved in UA1--that 
being reserved for UA2—see my review of his book with Myin). However, 
like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this 
80 years ago. It is an easily defensible view that the core of the burgeoning 
literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is 
compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. In spite of the fact 
that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of a 
century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never seen anything 
approaching an adequate discussion in philosophy or other behavioral 
science texts, and commonly there is barely a mention. 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of 
Social Reality (the title of Searle’s well known book) and I will give some 
perspective. 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 
years ago had evolved to describe present events (perceptions, memory, 
reflexive actions with basic utterances that can be described as Primary 
Language Games (PLG’s) describing System 1—i.e., the fast unconscious 
automated System One, true-only mental states with a precise time and 
location).  We gradually developed the further ability to encompass 
displacements in space and time to describe memories, attitudes and 
potential events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or 
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fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions) with the Secondary 
Language Games (SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false 
propositional attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities 
and not mental states). Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic 
Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality 
Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional 
Attitudes, Appraisals, capacities, hypotheses. Emotions are Type 2 
Preferences (W   RPP2 p148).  “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime.  My first-
person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) while third 
person statements about others are true or false (see my review of Johnston 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’).  
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, 
reflexive acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein 
(W) in the 1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have 
commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a 
misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., 
are often not propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by 
Searle (e.g., Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer 
independent mental representations (as opposed to presentations or 
representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential 
acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily more primitive 
System One mental states of perceptions memories and reflexive actions are 
always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 and System 
3--the second and third major advances in vertebrate psychology after 
System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of them as occurring 
in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination 
supplementing cognition and volition). S1 are potential or unconscious 
mental states (Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as 
S1 or primary LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal 
case, no tests possible, so they can be true-only. Dispositions can be described 
as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted 
out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I know what I believe, think, 
feel until I act). Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as 
well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are not Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 
1981, Searle, Hutto, Read, Hacker etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the 
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founder of evolutionary psychology, contextualism, enactivism, and the two 
systems framework, and his work a unique investigation of the functioning 
of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with System 2. 
Though few have understood it well (and arguably nobody fully to this day) 
it was further developed by a few --above all by John Searle, who made a 
simpler version of the table below in his classic book Rationality in Action 
(2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary 
psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so 
beautifully laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). 
OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology 
(arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or the logical structure of Higher 
Order Thought (HOT), and in my view the single most important work in 
philosophy (descriptive psychology), and thus in the study of behavior. See 
my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and 
Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) and the recent work 
of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock.  
 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly 
Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Reflexive—Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no 
control is possible).  Emotions evolved to make a bridge between desires or 
intentions and actions.  Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions 
of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities--described in SLG’s-- in which 
the mind tries to fit the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our 
default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 
working and describe all actions as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion or 
TPI of Searle).  W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity 
with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his 
works. Reason has access to working memory and so we use consciously 
apparent but typically incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves 
of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions are thoughts which try to 
match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions 
are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA- Searle) 
plus acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind 
direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, p190). 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
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turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS).  
 
In accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the 
representations of S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this 
sense S1 such as perceptions do not have COS. In other writings S says they do 
but as noted in my other reviews I think it is then essential to refer to COS1 
(private presentations) and COS2 (public representations). To repeat this 
critical distinction, public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to 
by Searle and others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or 
COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as 
presentations by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
Likewise, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and 
his ‘Direction of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’.  System 1 is involuntary, 
reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and 
is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle).  
 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of 
minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about 
brain function). Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but 
I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest 
topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the 
pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown 
Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-
Sharrock, Read, Baker, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have 
created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows 
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show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems 
(dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can 
also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), of behavior 
(LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality 
(LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the 
Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology 
of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
I will make minimal comments here since those wishing further description 
may consult my articles and reviews of books by Wittgenstein, Searle and 
others on academia.edu, philpapers.org, vixra.org, researchgate.net, and on 
Amazon. 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
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described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one.  
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, 
perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are 
automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 2 is 
abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in conscious 
deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently 
repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). 
There is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep 
to full awareness.  Memory includes short term memory (working memory) 
of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would 
usually say they are successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is causally 
self-reflexive since the description of our perceptual experience-the 
presentation of our senses to consciousness, can only be described in the 
same words (as the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I 
prefer to call the percept or COS1 to distinguish it from the representation 
or public COS2 of S2. 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row 
will be True only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, 
will not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise 
duration, change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special 
quality, do not need language, are independent of general intelligence and 
working memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have 
voluntary content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language 
games) cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain 
(behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts (in sentences 
and in the world), and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher order 
behavior to a system of laws which would have to state all the possible 
contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. 
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About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and location) and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to 
describe displacements in space and time of events (the past and future and 
often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, 
transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction-Searle’s term for 
truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 
and public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 
representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all 
S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, 
Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated 
desires), Propositional Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the 
world and not to propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses.  Some 
Emotions are slowly developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W 
Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology V2 p148) while others are typical 
S1— automatic and fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they 
think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in 
spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding 
lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements about others are true or false –
i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and 
of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, 
reflexive acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) 
in the 1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have 
commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a 
misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are 
often not propositionsal nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by 
Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, 
observer independent public representations (as opposed to presentations or 
representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential 
acts displaced in time or space, while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 
perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now.  This is 
one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate 
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psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of 
them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of 
counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 
‘thoughts’ (my T1) are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- 
Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, 
NO TESTS possible so they can be True Only. Dispositions can be described 
as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted 
out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, 
feel until I act or some event occurs—see my reviews of Johnston and Budd. 
Note well that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or written as well 
as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein 
(mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, 
Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of 
evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the 
functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with 
System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the 
early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this 
table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001).  It expands on W’s survey 
of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his 
very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On 
Certainty’ (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior 
or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and 
pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view 
(shared e.g., by DMS) the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) -- 
the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no 
control is possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of 
slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities—that can be described in SLG’s-
- in which the mind tries to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the 
other confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise 
because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as SLG’s (The 
Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described 
it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) 
in action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so we use 
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consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two 
Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other 
Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the 
world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act 
(Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA-Searle) plus acts which try 
to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle 
e.g., C+L p145, 190). 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other 
dispositions. Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe 
mental states (‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities 
(agents as they act or might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called 
“Propositional Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate 
programs (cognitive modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to 
produce Dispositions—(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc.,-
actual or potential public acts (language, thought, mind) also called 
Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -
and there is no language (concept, thought) of private mental states for 
thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought or mind). Higher 
animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. 
 
Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature  
Memories:  Remembering (X was true) 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions (X might become True) : 
 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming , Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
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perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
We can think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: ( I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts) 
: Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting 
(Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using 
Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary 
and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior (The 
Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank Slate or the SSSM). 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the 
names of objects nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans 
are governed by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or 
schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference 
engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of 
preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or 
intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or only 
preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of 
cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including 
neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of 
the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive 
in evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions 
and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our 
psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding and increase 
our power by giving clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them 
(culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, 
logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them faster and more 
efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional 
probabilities which are algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
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aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human 
adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, 
require public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to 
increase our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility or Bayesian utility 
maximization. Bayesianism is highly questionable due to severe 
underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This 
occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire 
Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and 
DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions 
of Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relate thoughts to the world via public acts 
(muscle movements) producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. 
The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist 
Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings 
back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle 
beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I 
strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. 
Much of intentionality (e.g., our language games) admits of degrees. As W 
noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our 
templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some 
contexts as they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of 
using the dispositional verb “thinking“ )—nonrational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness (W), now described as the fast and slow 
thinking of S1 and S2.  It is useful to regard these as language games and not 
as mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or 
internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even 
for oneself and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. 
Thinking like all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike 
perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act or 
event such as in speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our 
perceptions and memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) 
only when they are manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, 
feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates 
S2. Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced 
humans to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for 
acts (gross contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is 
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much better called UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and 
UA2 for such functions in S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary 
Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production 
of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to 
actions by contracting muscles. Thus, “propositional attitude” is an incorrect 
term for normal intuitive deliberative S2D or automated S2A speech and 
action. We see that the efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, 
emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything 
more about how the mind (thought, language) works (as opposed to how the 
brain works) than we already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is 
already in full public view (W).  Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in 
neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or string 
theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is composed 
of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and 
chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is 
hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to 
view if we only examine carefully the workings of language. Language (mind, 
public speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social 
interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. Its 
grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions 
automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. 
Words and sentences have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and 
I eat have profoundly different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe 
and he believes.  The present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such 
as “I believe” normally describe my ability to predict my probable acts based 
on knowledge (i.e., S2) but can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be 
descriptive of my mental state and so not based on knowledge or information 
(W and see my review of the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 sense, 
it does not describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I 
believe it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first 
person present tense can be causally self-reflexive--they instantiate 
themselves but then they are not testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2).  However 
past or future tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he 
will believe’ contain or can be resolved by information that is true or false, as 
they describe public acts that are or can become verifiable.   Likewise, “I 
believe it’s raining” has no information apart from subsequent actions, even 
for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially 
verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information 
(or misinformation). 
Nonreflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
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(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words 
as Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in 
Philosophical Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are 
Non-Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them 
functions or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahnemann). Prior Intentions 
are stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one 
must separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions 
are the conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 
Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better 
called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional 
and NON-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our 
Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential reading 
for an understanding of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought 
are Searle, Coliva, Hutto, DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein and Read, who 
have posted most of their work free online at academia.edu. Baker & Hacker 
are found in their many joint works. The late Baker went overboard with a 
bizarre psychoanalytic and rather nihilistic interpretation that was ably 
refuted by Hacker whose “Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of 
Wittgenstein” is free on the net and a must read for any student of behavior. 
One can find endless metaphysical reductionist cartoon views of life due to 
the attempt to explain higher order thought of S2 in terms of the causal 
framework of S1 which Carruthers (C), Dennett, the Churchlands (3 of the 
current leaders of scientism, computationalism or materialist reductionism -- 
hereafter CDC—my acronym for the Centers for (Philosophical) Disease 
Control) and many others pursue. Scientism has been debunked frequently 
beginning with W in the BBB in the 30’s when he noted that –“philosophers 
constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency 
is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness”- and by Searle, Read, Hutto, Hacker and countless others since. The 
attempt to ‘explain’ (really only to describe as W made clear) S2 in causal terms 
is incoherent and even for S1 it is extremely complex and it is not clear that 
the highly diverse language games of “causality” can ever be made to apply-
even their application in physics and chemistry is variable and often obscure 
(was it gravity or the abscission layer or hormones or the wind or all of them 
that made the apple fall and when did the causes start and end)? But as W 
said-“now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, 
then the activities of the mind lie open before us”. 
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However, I suggest it is a major mistake to see W as taking either side as 
usually stated, as his views are much more subtle, more often than not 
leaving his trialogues unresolved. One might find it useful to start with my 
reviews of W, S etc., and then study as much of Read, Hutto, Horwich, DMS, 
Stern, etc. as feasible before digging into the literature of causality and the 
philosophy of science, and if one finds it uninteresting to do so then W has 
hit the mark. 
In spite of the efforts of W and others, it appears to me that most philosophers 
have little grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically 
different uses of ‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’), or of the 
nature of dispositions, and many (e.g., CDC) still base their ideas on such 
notions as private language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and 
computationalism, which W laid to rest ¾ of a century ago. 
Before I read any book, I go to the index and bibliography to see whom they 
cite. Often the authors most remarkable achievement is the complete or nearly 
complete omission of all the authors I cite here. W is easily the most widely 
discussed modern philosopher with about one new book and dozens of 
articles largely or wholely devoted to him every month. He has his own 
journal “Philosophical Investigations” and I expect his bibliography exceeds 
that of the next top 4 or 5 philosophers combined. Searle is perhaps next 
among moderns (and the only one with many lectures on YouTube—over 100, 
which unlike almost all other philosophy lectures are a delight to listen to) 
and Read, etc., are very prominent with dozens of books and hundreds of 
articles, talks and reviews. But CDC and other metaphysicians ignore them 
and the thousands who regard their work as critically important. 
Consequently, the powerful W/S framework (as well by and large of that of 
modern research in thinking) is totally absent and all the confusions it has 
cleared away are abundant. If you read my reviews and the works themselves, 
perhaps your view of most writing in this arena may be quite different. But as 
W insisted, one has to work the examples through oneself. As often noted, his 
supersocratic trialogues had a therapeutic intent. 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are 
noted in my other reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are 
as simple as pie—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and 
tests can only be external and public. He famously illustrated this with the 
‘Beetle in the Box’. If we all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. 
and call what is inside a ‘beetle’ then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in 
language, for every box could contain a different thing or even be empty. So, 
there is no private language that only I can know and no introspection of 
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‘inner speech’. If X is not publicly demonstrable it cannot be a word in our 
language. This shoots down Carruthers’ ISA theory of mind, as well as all the 
other ‘inner sense’ theories which he references. I have explained W’s 
dismantling of the notion of introspection and the functioning of 
dispositional language (‘propositional attitudes’) above and in my reviews of 
Budd, Johnston and several of Searle’s books. See Stern’s “Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations” (2004) for a nice explanation of Private 
Language and everything by Read et al for getting to the roots of these issues 
as few do. 
CDC eschew the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a ‘higher self’. The 
very act of writing, reading and all language and concepts (language games) 
of presuppose self, consciousness and will, so such accounts are self-
contradictory cartoons of life without any value whatsoever (and zero 
impact on the daily life of anyone). W/S and others have long noted that the 
first person point of view is just not intelligibly eliminable or reducible to a 
third person one, but absence of coherence is no problem for the cartoon 
views of life. Likewise, with the description of brain function or behavior as 
‘computational’, ‘information processing’ etc., -- well debunked countless 
times by W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker and many others. 
Writing that attempts to combine science with philosophy, with the meaning 
of many key terms varying almost at random without awareness, is schizoid 
and hopeless but there are thousands of science and philosophy books like 
this. There is the description (not explanation as W made clear) of our 
behavior and then the experiments of cognitive psychology. Many of these 
dealing with human behavior combine the conscious thinking of S2 with the 
unconscious automatisms of S1 (absorb psychology into physiology). We are 
often told that self, will, and consciousness are illusions, since they think they 
are showing us the ‘real’ meaning of these terms, and that the cartoon use is 
the valid one. That is, S2 is ‘unreal’ and must be subsumed by the scientific 
causal descriptions of S1. Hence the reason for the shift from the philosophy 
of language to the philosophy of mind. See e.g., my review of Carruthers’   
‘The Opacity of Mind’. 
If someone says that I can’t choose what to have for lunch he is plainly 
mistaken or if by choice he means something else such as that ‘choice’ can be 
described as having a ‘cause’ or that it’s not clear how to reduce ‘choice’ to 
‘cause’ so we must regard it as illusory, then that is trivially true (or 
incoherent), but irrelevant to how we use language and how we live, which 
should be regarded as the point from which to begin and end such 
discussions. 
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Perhaps one might regard it as relevant that it was W, along with Kant and 
Nietzsche (great intellects, but neither of them doing much to dissolve the 
problems of philosophy), who were voted the best of all time by 
philosophers-not Quine, Dummett, Putnam, Kripke or CDC. 
One can see the similarity in all philosophical questions (in the strict sense I 
consider here, keeping in mind W’s comment that not everything with the 
appearance of a question is one). We want to understand how the brain (or 
the universe) does it but S2 is not up to it. It’s all (or mostly) in the 
unconscious machinations of S1 via DNA. We don’t ‘know’ but our DNA 
does, courtesy of the death of countless trillions of organisms over some 3 
billion years. We can describe the world easily but often cannot agree on what 
an ‘explanation’ should look like. So we struggle with science and ever so 
slowly describe the mechanisms of mind. Even if we should arrive at 
“complete” knowledge of the brain, we would still just have a description of 
what neuronal pattern corresponds to seeing red, but it is not clear what it 
would mean (COS) to have an “explanation” of why it’s red (i.e., why qualia 
exist). As W said, explanations come to an end somewhere. 
For those who grasp the above, the philosophical parts of Carruthers’ 
“Opacity of Mind” (a major recent work of the CDC school) are comprised 
largely of the standard confusions that result from ignoring the work of W, S 
and hundreds of others. It can be called Scientism or Reductionism and 
denies the ‘reality’ of our higher order thought, will, self and consciousness, 
except as these are given a quite different and wholly incompatible use in 
science. We have e.g., no reasons for action, only a brain that causes action 
etc. They create imaginary problems by trying to answer questions that have 
no clear sense. It should strike us that these views have absolutely no impact 
on the daily life of those who spend most of their adult life promoting them. 
This situation is nicely summed up by Rupert Read in his article ‘The Hard 
Problem of Consciousness’—“the hardcore problem becomes more and more 
remote, the more we de- humanize aspects of the mind, such as information 
and perception and intentionality. The problem will only really be being 
faced if we face up to it as a ‘problem’ that has to do with whole human 
beings, embodied in a context (inextricably natural and social) at a given time, 
etc…then it can become perspicuous to one that there is no problem. Only 
when one starts, say, to ‘theorize’ information across human and non-human 
domains (supposedly using the non-human-the animal {usually thought of 
as mechanical} or the machine-as one’s paradigm, and thus getting things 
back to front), does it begin to look as if there is a problem…that all the ‘isms’ 
(cognitivism, reductionism (to the brain), behaviorism and so on)…push 
further and further from our reach…the very conceptualization of the problem is 
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the very thing which ensures that the ‘hard problem’ remains insoluble…no 
good reason has ever been given for us to think that there must be a science 
of something if it is to be regarded as real. There is no good reason to think 
that there should be a science of consciousness, or of mind or of society, any 
more than there need be a science of numbers, or of universes or of capital 
cities or of games or of constellations or of objects whose names start with the 
letter ‘b’…. We need to start with the idea of ourselves as embodied persons 
acting in a world, not with the idea of ourselves as brains with minds ‘located’ 
in them or ‘attached’ to them… There is no way that science can help us 
bootstrap into an ‘external’/’objective’ account of what consciousness really 
is and when it is really present. For it cannot help us when there is a conflict 
of criteria, when our machines come into conflict with ourselves, into conflict 
with us. For our machines are only calibrated by our reports in the first place. There 
can be no such thing as getting an external point of view… that isn’t 
because… the hard problem is insoluble, …Rather, we need not admit that a 
problem has even been defined…’transcendental naturalism’ …guarantees... the 
keeping alive indefinitely of the problem. It offers the extraordinary psychological 
satisfaction of both a humble (yet privileged) ‘scientific’ statement of limits to 
the understanding and, the knowingness of being part of a privileged elite, 
that in stating those limits, can see beyond them. It fails to see what 
Wittgenstein made clear in the preface to the Tractatus. The limit can… only 
be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be 
simply nonsense.” 
Many of W’s comments come to mind. He noted 85 years ago that ‘mysteries’ 
satisfy a longing for the transcendent, and because we think we can see the 
‘limits of human understanding’, we think we can also see beyond them, and 
that we should dwell on the fact that we see the limits of language (mind) in 
the fact that we cannot describe the facts which correspond to a sentence 
except by repeating the sentence (see p10 etc. in his Culture and Value, written 
in 1931). I also find it useful to repeat frequently his remark that “superstition 
is nothing but belief in the causal nexus” -- written a century ago in TLP 
5.1361. 
Also, apropos is his famous comment (PI p308) about the origin of the 
philosophical problems about mental processes (and all philosophical 
problems). "How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and 
states and about behaviorism arise? The first step is the one that altogether 
escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature 
undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them -- we think. 
But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. 
For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process 
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better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it 
was the very one that we thought quite innocent.) -- And now the analogy 
which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to 
deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And 
now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't 
want to deny them. Another seemingly trivial comment by W (PI p271) asked 
us to imagine a person who forgot what the word ‘pain’ meant but used it 
correctly –i.e., he used it as we do! Also relevant is W’s comment (TLP 6.52) 
that when all scientific questions have been answered, nothing is left to 
question, and that is itself the answer. And central to understanding the 
scientistic (i.e., due to scientism not science) failures of CDC et al is his 
observation that it is a very common mistake to think that something must 
make us do what we do, which leads to the confusion between cause and 
reason. “And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are 
inclined to make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the 
sentence “It is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, 
because there is an idea that “something must make us” do what we do. And 
this again joins onto the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no 
reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
He has also commented that the chain of causes has an end and that there 
is no reason in the general case for it to be meaningful to specify a cause. 
 
W saw in his own decades-long struggle the necessity of clarifying ‘grammar’ 
oneself by working out ‘perspicuous examples’ and the futility for many of 
being told the answers. Hence his famous comments about philosophy as 
therapy and ‘working on oneself’. 
Another striking thing about so many philosophy books (and the disguised 
philosophy throughout the behavioral sciences, physics and math) is that 
there is often no hint that there are other points of view— that many of the 
most prominent philosophers regard the scientistic view as incoherent. There 
is also the fact (seldom mentioned) that, provided of course we ignore its 
incoherence, reduction does not stop at the level of neurophysiology, but can 
easily be extended (and has often been) to the level of chemistry, physics, 
quantum mechanics, ‘mathematics’ or just ‘ideas’. What exactly should make 
neurophysiology privileged? The ancient Greeks generated the idea that 
nothing exists but ideas and Leibniz famously described the universe as a 
giant machine. Most recently Stephan Wolfram became a legend in the history 
of pseudoscience for his description of the universe as a computer automaton 
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in ‘A New Kind of Science’. Materialism, mechanism, idealism, reductionism, 
behaviorism and dualism in their many guises are hardly news and, to a 
Wittgensteinian, quite dead horses since W dictated the Blue and Brown 
books in the 30’s, or at least since the subsequent publication and extensive 
commentary on his nachlass. But convincing someone is a hopeless task. W 
realized one has to work on oneself—self therapy via long hard working 
through of ‘perspicuous examples’ of language (mind) in action. 
An (unknowing) expression of how axiomatic psychology rules, and how 
easy it is to change a word’s use without knowing it, was given by physicist 
Sir James Jeans long ago: “The Universe begins to look more like a great 
thought than like a great machine."   But ‘thought’, ‘machine’, ‘time’, ‘space’, 
‘cause’, ‘event’, ‘happen’, ‘occur’, ’continue’, etc. do not have the same 
meanings (uses) in science or philosophy as in daily life, or rather they have 
the old uses mixed in at random with many new ones so there is the 
appearance of sense without sense. Much of academic discussion of behavior, 
life and the universe is high comedy (as opposed to the low comedy of most 
politics, religion and mass media): i.e., “comedy dealing with polite society, 
characterized by sophisticated, witty dialogue and an intricate plot”-
(Dictionary.com). But philosophy is not a waste of time-done rightly, it is the 
best way to spend time. How else can we understand dispel the chaos in the 
behavioral sciences or describe our mental life and the higher order thought 
of System 2--the most intricate, wonderful and mysterious thing there is? 
Given this framework it should be easy to understand OC, to follow W’s 
examples describing how our innate psychology uses the reality testing of 
System 2 to build on the certainties of System 1, so that we as individuals and 
as societies acquire a world view of irrefutable interlocking experiences that 
build on the bedrock of our axiomatic genetically programmed reflexive 
perception and action to the amazing edifice of science and culture. The 
theory of evolution and the theory of relativity passed long ago from 
something that could be challenged to certainties that can only be modified, 
and at the other end of the spectrum, there is no possibility of finding out that 
there are no such things as Paris or Brontosaurs. The skeptical view is 
incoherent. We can say anything but we cannot mean anything. 
 
Thus, with DMS, I regard OC as a description of the foundation stone of 
human understanding and the most basic document on our psychology. 
Though written when in his 60’s, mentally and physically devastated by 
cancer, it is as brilliant as his other work and transforms our understanding 
of philosophy (the descriptive psychology of higher order thought), bringing 
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it at last into the light, after three thousand years in the cave. Metaphysics 
has been swept away from philosophy and from physics. 
 “The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. 
The truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we 
have got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our 
moves in the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this 
grammar is already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need 
not wait for the future.” (said in 1930) Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and the Vienna Circle (1979) p183 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W 
is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not 
obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear 
and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures 
possible. 
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Review of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy by Paul 
Horwich 248p (2013) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, 
but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in 
this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably 
Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial 
understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all 
complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, 
society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a 
sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will 
start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum 
considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human 
behavior. 
 
First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be 
suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. 
The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another 
irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the 
constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” 
etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. Likewise, the use 
of the French word 'repertoire' where the English 'repertory' will do quite well. 
The major deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to employ 
what I see as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and 
Searle’s framework which I have outlined above. This is especially poignant in 
the chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (especially in footnotes 2-7), where we 
swim in very muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, 
propositional dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the 
inner and the outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). 
Horwich however makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his 
summary of the import of W’s anti-theoretical stance on p65. He needs to give 
more emphasis to ‘On Certainty’, recently the subject of much effort by Daniele 
Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva and others and summarized in my recent articles. 
 
Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and 
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everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, 
Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to 
attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on 
academia.edu and philpapers.org, but for PMS Hacker see 
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. 
 
He gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding of 
Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) 
as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense 
logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or 
Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre 
hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is 
at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, 
difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to 
miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
Horwich gives a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is a leading W scholar, 
but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in 
this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably 
Searle also) then I don’t see how one could have more than a superficial 
understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all 
complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, 
society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a 
sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. 
I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the 
minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy 
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and human behavior. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway."  Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence 
and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a 
shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity 
with what it represents.” BBB p37 
 
“Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are 
obviously not aware of the many different usages of the word “proof; and that 
they are not clear about the differences between the uses of the word “kind”, 
when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word “kind” 
here meant the same thing as in the context “kinds of apples.” Or, we may say, 
they are not aware of the different meanings of the word “discovery” when in 
one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the 
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other case of the discovery of the South Pole.” BBB p29 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (HOT), 
which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I have 
never seen it clearly stated anywhere. 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: 
“Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our 
subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems 
about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship between 
thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and 
knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of 
mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy 
of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of 
insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of 
reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He 
undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of 
philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the 
conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--
'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively 
describe the two systems of thought -- fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the 
slow reflective linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is 
possible with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for 
judging and cannot be doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness, self, 
time and space are innate true-only axioms. He discussed many times what is 
now known as Theory of Mind, Framing and cognitive illusions. He frequently 
explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it 
generates behavior. He described the psychology behind what later became the 
Wason test--a fundamental measure used in EP research decades later. He 
noted the indeterminate nature of language and the game-like nature of social 
interaction. He examined in thousands of pages and hundreds of examples 
how our inner mental experiences are not describable in language, this being 
possible only for public behavior with a public language (the impossibility of 
private language). Thus, he can be viewed as the first evolutionary 
psychologist. 
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When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part 
of the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was 
a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only 
one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but 
became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years 
published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly garbled 
form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died 
in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in 
German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear 
relationship to sentences before or after; that he wrote in a Socratic style with 3 
distinct persons in the dialog—the narrator, the interlocutor and the 
commentator (usually W’s view) whose comments were blended together by 
most readers, thus completely vitiating the whole elucidatory and therapeutic 
thrust, that these were cut and pasted from other notebooks written years 
earlier with notes in the margins, under linings and crossed out words, so that 
many sentences have multiple variants; that his literary executives cut this 
indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling 
with the monstrous task of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which 
were conveying utterly novel views of how the universe works and that they 
then published this material with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a 
century) with prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; 
that he became as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all 
previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense, and that virtually nobody 
understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of thousands of 
papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work in which 
he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such 
extremely abstract and condensed form that it was difficult to decide what was 
being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles 
on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had only 
passing and usually erroneous references to him, and that many omitted him 
entirely; that to this day, over half a century after his death, there were only a 
handful of people who really grasped the monumental consequences of what 
he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Before remarking on this book, I will first offer some comments on philosophy 
and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in 
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the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see 
my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the 
Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these geniuses, who 
provide a clear description of higher order behavior not found in psychology 
books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. A major theme in all discussion 
of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically programmed 
automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is 
an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions 
and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into culture 
(S3). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order 
S2/S3 social behavior, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only 
unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional 
propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, prelinguistic mental 
states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 
Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, 
love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow 
thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, 
Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional 
(and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, 
knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., 
it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, 
atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). 
 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not 
a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is 
no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
 
“The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only 
from this can more complicated forms develop. Language--I want to say--is a 
refinement. ‘In the beginning was the deed.’” CV p31 
 
“Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ 
meant-so that he constantly called different things by that name-but 
nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and 
presuppositions of the word ‘pain’-in short he used it as we all do.” 
PI p271 
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“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. Is is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as 
from a reservoir.” BBB p143 
 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined 
to make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It 
is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an 
idea that “something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto 
the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the 
rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical 
use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self 
Referential (CSR)-called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), and the S2 use, which 
is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can 
become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, 
that `will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 
composed of perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W 
made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment 
and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall 
cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The 
Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') 
is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are 
fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
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psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It 
is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing 
COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental 
state. 
 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's 
Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," 
or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always 
comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what 
happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should 
not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked 
`Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do 
know." 
 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. 
He shows that behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms (see “On 
Certainty” for his final extended treatment of this idea) and that our conscious 
ratiocination emerges from unconscious machinations. His corpus can be seen 
as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the 
mind works and indeed must work. The “must” is entailed by the fact that all 
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brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one 
basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all 
higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, 
and that in humans this is extended into a personality based on throat muscle 
contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others. I suggest it will 
prove of the greatest value to consider W’s work and most of his examples as 
an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions vs 
dispositions-- see below), but nature and nurture. 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions.” PI 126 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 
 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake.  The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have 
got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in 
the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is 
already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the 
future.” (said in 1930) Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle 
(1979) p183 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations.  If we dwell upon it, and do not try to   get beyond it.”  Zettel 
p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
“For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply 
means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.” PI p133 
161  
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the 
Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of 
examples of language use in context, exposing the many varieties of language 
games and the relationships between the primary games of true-only 
unconscious, axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive 
emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical 
reptilian brain first-self functions), and the later evolved higher cortical 
dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that 
constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of slow 
thinking that include the network of cognitive illusions that constitute the basis 
of our second-self personality. He dissects hundreds of language games 
showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of 
system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and understanding of 
system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also address the 
nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his later 
works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current 
and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find 
that this evolutionary two systems view is the best. To paraphrase 
Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes sense except 
in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other “Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually 
reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is not 
just the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, 
but speech is the mind, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the 
development of this idea. He rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches 
of physiology, experimental psychology and computation (Computational 
Theory of Mind, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, functionalism, etc.) 
could reveal what his analyses of Language Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties 
he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture 
vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of 
representing vagueness” LWPP1, 347). 
 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon 
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the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger 
here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology 
is essential to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody 
else, points out). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer.”  TLP 6.52 
 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
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Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic 
EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A 
corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a 
foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true 
or false propositions. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of 
course these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 
1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not 
ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought 
or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and 
later Searle call our EP). One of W’s recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer 
UA (Understanding of Agency). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 
and UA2 in experiments, has recently become aware of Hutto, who has 
characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor representation involved in 
UA1--that being reserved for UA2—see my review of his book with Myin). 
However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the 
groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily defensible view that the core 
of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher 
order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. In 
spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never 
seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts 
and commonly there is barely a mention. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
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offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
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described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one.  
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, 
perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are 
automated and generally happening in less than 500msec, while System 2 are 
abilities to perform slow deliberative actions tha t are represented in 
consciousness (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently 
repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There 
is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 
2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they 
are successful   or not, rather than T or F. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.G., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will 
be True only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause originates in 
the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in 
intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need 
language, are independent of general intelligence and working memory, are 
not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will 
not have public  conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words cannot precisely match the 
actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial 
explosion of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and this is why it’s not 
possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws which would have 
to   state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against 
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theories. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions and some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast,automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and location) and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical S2 with the further ability to describe 
displacements in space and time (conditionals, hypotheticals or fictionals) of 
potential events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or 
fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions -the Secondary or 
Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 slow, cortical, conscious, 
information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction-
Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 
for private S1 and public S2), representational—which I again divide into R1 
for S1 representations and R2 for S2) ,true or false propositional attitudinal 
thinking, with all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and 
not mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic 
Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, 
Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, 
Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly developing and 
changing results of S2 dispositions (W RPP2 148) while others are typical S1—
fast and automatic to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they 
think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. 
My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. 
S1, while third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my 
reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the   
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase 
since believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not 
propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf. 
Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent 
public representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53).  They are potential acts displaced in 
time or space while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories 
and reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize 
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System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—
the ability to represent events and to think of them as occurring in another place 
or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing 
cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ are potential or unconscious mental 
states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45- 66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 
or primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, 
NO TESTS possible so they can be True Only. 
 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the 
dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I 
KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or some event occurs—see my 
reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and Budd 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). Note well that Dispositions also 
become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out in other 
ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). 
 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and 
his work a unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 
psychology and its interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the 
groundwork for the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the 
Blue and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who 
made a simpler version of this table in his classic book Rationality in Action 
(2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary 
psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully 
laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51).  OC is the 
foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the 
same), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view the 
single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus 
in the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion 
are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be 
described in PL G’s, in which the mind automatically fits the world (is Causally 
Self Referential--Searle) --the unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of 
rationality over which no control is possible). Preferences, Desires, and 
Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities—
that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit the world. 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions 
as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion— TPI—Searle). W understood this 
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and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of 
language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to 
memory and so we use consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to 
explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). 
Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match 
the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are 
intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA-Searle) plus 
acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of 
fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L   p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states 
(‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they 
act or might act - ‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive 
modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions 
— (believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential 
PUBLIC ACTS (language, thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, 
Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language 
(concept, thought) of PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no 
private language, thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and 
to that extent they have a public psychology. 
 
Perceptions: (“X” is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature 
Memories:  Remembering, Dreaming? 
 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions (X might become True) : 
 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
expecting, wishing, wanting, hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
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S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my 
thoughts): Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, 
obliged to do INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, 
Asserting(describing, teaching, predicting, reporting), Promising , Making or 
Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs –these are Public and 
Voluntary and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the 
Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of  
behavior. 
 
WORDS EXPRESS POTENTIAL ACTIONS HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE AND 
ARE NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT. 
 
The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—
roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of 
neurons organized into inference engines), which, with perceptions and 
memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to intentions and 
then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all 
these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense 
is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when 
including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of 
the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive 
in evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions 
and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our 
psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding by giving 
clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, 
psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and 
computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) 
gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are 
algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self and in normal human 
adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require 
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public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase 
our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility--Bayesian utility 
maximization but Bayesianism is highly questionable) via dominance and 
reciprocal altruism (Desire Independent Reasons for Action-Searle- which I 
divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and impose Conditions of 
Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction -Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts to the 
world via public acts ( muscle movements –i.e., math, language, art, music, sex, 
sports etc.). The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural 
psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear 
foreshadowings back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by 
John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological 
phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 
p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (i.e., of our language games) admits of 
degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. 
All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in 
some contexts as they must to be useful. There are at least two types of thinking 
(i.e., two language games or ways of using the dispositional verb “thinking“) 
— nonrational without awareness and rational with partial awareness(W), now 
described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these 
as language games and not as mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental 
phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack 
criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no role in 
communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions (inclinations, 
propositional attitudes) lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions 
of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act in speech, 
writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories can 
have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are manifested 
in public actions, for    only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning 
(consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
(Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon). Developing 
language means manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. 
TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called UA-Understanding of Agency –
my term-and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in S1 and S2) –and can also be 
called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically 
programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to 
intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles.  Thus, “propositional 
attitude” is a confusing term for normal intuitive rational S2D or nonrational 
automated S2A speech and action. We see that the efforts of cognitive science 
to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not 
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going to tell us anything more about how the mind (thought, language) works 
(as opposed to how the BRAIN works) than we already know, because “mind” 
(thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any phenomena that are 
hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or 
string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is 
composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and 
chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. 
Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we 
only examine carefully the workings of language. Language (mind, public 
speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social 
interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. It’s 
grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions 
automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and 
sentences have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have 
profoundly different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he 
believes. The present tense first person expressive use of inclinational verbs 
such as “I believe” describe my ability to predict my probable acts and are not 
descriptive of my mental state nor based on knowledge or information in the 
usual sense of those words (W).  It does not describe a truth but makes itself 
true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, 
disposition verbs used in first person present tense are causally self-referential-
-they instantiate themselves but as descriptions of possible states they are not 
testable (i.e., not T or F). However past or future tense or third person use--“I 
believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain information that is true 
or false as they describe public acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, 
“I believe it’s raining” has no information apart from subsequent actions, even 
for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially 
verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information 
(or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000) Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are 
Non-Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them 
functions or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahnemann). Prior Intentions 
are stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1 but again I think one must 
separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the 
conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., 
some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 
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and are automatic, nonreflective, NON -Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology 
(Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Now for some comments on Horwich’s “Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy”. 
After the above and my many reviews of books by and about W, S, H, DMS 
etc., it should be clear what W is doing and what a contemporary account of 
behavior should include, so I’ll make just a few comments. 
 
First one might note that putting “meta” in front of any word should be 
suspect. W remarked e.g., that metamathematics is mathematics like any other. 
The notion that we can step outside philosophy (i.e., the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought) is itself a profound confusion. Another 
irritation here (and throughout academic writing for the last 4 decades) is the 
constant reverse linguistic sexism of “her” and “hers” and “she” or “he/she” 
etc., where “they” and “theirs” and “them” would do nicely. The major 
deficiency is the complete failure (though very common) to employ what I see 
as the hugely powerful and intuitive two systems view of HOT and Searle’s 
framework which I have outlined above. This is especially poignant in the 
chapter on meaning p111 et seq. (esp. in footnotes 2-7), where we swim in very 
muddy water without the framework of automated true only S1, propositional 
dispositional S2, COS etc. One can also get a better view of the inner and the 
outer by reading e.g., Johnston or Budd (see my reviews). Horwich however 
makes many incisive comments. I especially liked his summary of the import 
of W’s antitheoretical stance on p65. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) 
as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense 
logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or 
Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre 
hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
For me, the high points of all writing on W are nearly always the quotes from 
the master himself and this is again true here. His quote (p101) from TLP shows 
W’s early grasp of EP which he later termed the 
‘background’ or ‘bedrock’. 
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“Thought is surrounded by a halo. Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact 
the a priori order of the world: that is the order of possibilities, which must be 
common to both world and thought. But this order, it seems, must be utterly 
simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no 
empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it. It must rather 
be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but 
as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were, the hardest 
thing there is. (TLP # 5, 5563, PI 97).” 
 
There are many good points in the chapter on Kripke but some confusions as 
well. The discussion of W’s refutation of private language on p165-6 seems a 
bit unclear be on p 196-7 he states it again—and this notion is not only central 
to W but to all understanding of HOT. Stern has perhaps the best discussion of 
it I have seen in his “Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations”. Kripke, in 
spite of all the noise he made, is now generally understood to have totally 
misconstrued W, merely repeating the classic skeptical metaphysical blunders. 
Those who want to dig into ‘Kripkenstein’, or philosophy generally, should 
read “Kripke’s Conjuring Trick” by Read and Sharrock—a superb 
deconstruction of skepticism that is readily available on the net. 
 
I find the chapter on consciousness very good, especially p190 et. seq. on 
private language, qualia, inverted spectra and the umpteenth refutation of the 
idea that W is a behaviorist. 
 
It is worth repeating his final remark. “What sort of progress is this—the 
fascinating mystery has been removed-- yet no depths have been plumbed in 
consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered or reconceived. How 
tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, 
the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should be found satisfying 
enough.” 
 
Horwich is first rate and his work well worth the effort. One hopes that he (and 
everyone) will study Searle and some modern psychology as well as Hutto, 
Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker and Baker etc. to 
attain a broad modern view of behavior. Most of their papers are on 
academia.edu but for PMS Hacker see      
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is 
at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, 
difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to 
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miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
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Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations by David Stern (2004) 
 
Michael Starks  
ABSTRACT 
 
Overall Stern does a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is one of the top 
W scholars, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I 
explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand 
W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more 
than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought 
and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
history, literature, society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you 
have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing 
more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think 
are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, 
philosophy and human behavior. 
As Stern is aware, throughout W’s works, understanding is bedeviled by 
possible alternative and consequently often infelicitous translations from 
often unedited and handwritten German notes, with “Satz” being 
frequently incorrectly rendered as “proposition” (which is a testable or 
falsifiable statement) when referring to our non-falsifiable psychological 
axioms, as opposed to the correct “sentence”, which CAN be applied to our 
axiomatic true-only statements such as “these are my hands” or 
“Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived about 50 million 
years ago”. -/- Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have 
encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and 
psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, 
profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest 
intellectual adventures possible. 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
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Overall Stern does a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is one of the top 
W scholars, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I 
explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand 
W (and preferably Searle also) then I don’t see how one could have more 
than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought 
and thus of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
history, literature, society) . In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you 
have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing 
more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think 
are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, 
philosophy and human behavior. 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for 
instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of 
mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods 
and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and 
methods of proof). The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem 
and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" 
p6 (1933) 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false." 
Wittgenstein OC 94 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has 
no similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the 
sentence and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as 
such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest 
similarity with what it represents.” BBB p37 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
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reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate 
phenomenological reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of 
meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... 
the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then 
no questions left, and this itself is the answer.” TLP 6.52 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of 
simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are 
neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is 
possible before all new discoveries and inventions.” PI 126 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in 
mind that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought 
(HOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –
i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: 
“Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our 
subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, 
problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about the 
relationship between thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, 
self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of 
necessary truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil 
of European philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and 
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immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He 
attempted to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics 
and mathematical truth. He undermined foundationalist epistemology. 
And he bequeathed us a vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human 
knowledge, but to human understanding – understanding of the forms of 
our thought and of the conceptual confusions into which we are liable to 
fall.”—Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively 
describe the two systems of thought -- fast automatic proto-linguistic S1 and 
the slow reflective linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior 
only is possible with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis 
for judging and cannot be doubted or judged. Will (choice), consciousness, 
self, time and space are innate true-only axioms. He discussed many times 
what is now known as Theory of Mind, Framing and cognitive illusions. He 
frequently explained the necessity of the innate background and 
demonstrated how it generates behavior. He described the psychology 
behind what later became the Wason test--a fundamental measure used in 
EP research decades later. He noted the indeterminate nature of language 
and the game-like nature of social interaction. He examined in thousands of 
pages and hundreds of examples how our inner mental experiences are not 
describable in language, this being possible only for public behavior with a 
public language (the impossibility of private language). Thus, he can be 
viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist. 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor 
like him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like 
not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part 
of the world, and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein 
was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published 
only one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, 
but became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 
years published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly 
garbled form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; 
that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten 
scribblings in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, 
often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; that he wrote in a 
Socratic style with 3 distinct persons in the dialog—the narrator, the 
interlocutor and the commentator (usually W’s view), whose comments were 
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blended together by most readers, thus completely vitiating the whole 
elucidatory and therapeutic thrust, that these were cut and pasted from other 
notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings and 
crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his 
literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what 
they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct 
meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the 
universe{mind} works and that they then published this material with 
agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that 
contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he became as much 
notorious as famous due to many statements that all previous 
physics{philosophy} was a mistake and even nonsense, and that few 
understood his work well, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of 
thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists{philosophers} knew 
only his early work in which he had made a definitive summation of 
Newtonian physics {classical philosophy} stated in such extremely abstract 
and condensed form that it was difficult to decide what was being said; that 
he was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature 
of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics{philosophy} had only 
passing and usually erroneous references to him, and that many omitted him 
entirely and that to this day, over half a century after his death, there were 
only a handful of people who really grasped the monumental consequences 
of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with 
Wittgenstein. 
 
Before remarking on this book, I will first offer some comments on 
philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as 
exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Baker and Hacker 
(H), Read etc. al.  It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New 
Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by 
and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order 
behavior not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS 
framework. A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need 
to separate the genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of 
culture. All study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only 
fast S1 and slow S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. 
dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work as a 
whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, 
while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of 
S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
182  
 
On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death 
and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. I cannot recall a single 
reference to it in all of Searle and one see’s whole books on W with barely a 
mention. There are however xlnt books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and 
others and parts of many other books and articles, but hands down the best is 
that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and 
perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), 
psychology, philosophy and life. Recently she has produced a half dozen 
superb articles that show how OC revolutionized epistemology by describing 
how action issues directly from certain understandings (hinges) that require 
no judgements. Also, some excellent work has appeared from Coliva and 
Andy Hamilton. However (in my view) all analysis of W falls short of 
grasping his unique and revolutionary advances by failing to put behavior in 
its broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which I will 
attempt here. 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet 
no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and 
truth should be found satisfying enough.” Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’.  Horwich also gives there one of the most beautiful 
summaries of where an understanding of Wittgenstein leads us that I have 
ever seen. 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 
126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in 
sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory 
or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in 
Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 
132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to  make 
it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity 
for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
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sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is 
not a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading 
lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
“The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only 
from this can more complicated forms develop. Language--I want to say--is a 
refinement. ‘In the beginning was the deed.’” CV p31 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human 
behavior and this is his last work and crowning achievement. It belongs to 
his third and final period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it 
shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that 
our conscious ratiocination issues from unconscious automatisms), but the 
foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind 
works and indeed must work. The “must” is entailed by the fact that all 
brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one 
basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all 
higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive 
fitness, and in humans this is extended into a personality based on throat 
muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others (with 
variations that can be regarded as trivial). This book, and arguably all of W’s 
work and all useful discussion of behavior is a development of or variation 
on these ideas. Another major theme here and of course in all discussion of 
human behavior is the need to separate the effects of culture from those of 
genetics and though few philosophers explicitly discuss this, it can be seen 
as one of the major problems they are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of 
the greatest value to consider W’s work and most of his examples as an effort 
to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (see below), but nature and 
nurture. 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is 
now known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, cognitive 
psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just 
animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a 
vast and unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as 
the day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and 
other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few in philosophy 
who have more or less understood him have not carried the analysis to its 
logical (psychological) conclusion nor realized the extent of his anticipation of 
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the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (the two selves of fast and slow 
thinking—see below). His heir apparent, John Searle, refers to him 
periodically and his work can be seen as a straightforward extension of W’s, 
but he does not really get that this is what he is doing. Other leading W 
analysts such as Read, Harre, Horwich, Stern, Hutto and Moyal-Sharrock do 
marvelously but (in my view) stop short of putting him in the center of current 
psychology, where he certainly belongs. I eventually came to understand 
much of W by regarding his corpus as the pioneering effort in EP, seeing that 
he was describing the two selves and the multifarious language games of fast 
and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3rd period works and reading 
backwards to the proto-Tractatus. It has been extremely revealing to alternate 
W with the writings of hundreds of other philosophers and evolutionary 
psychologists (as I regard all psychologists and in fact all behavioral scientists, 
cognitive linguists and others). It should also be clear that insofar as they are 
coherent and correct, all accounts of behavior are describing the same 
phenomena and ought to translate easily into one another. Thus, the recently 
fashionable themes of “Embodied Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” should 
flow directly from and into W’s work. However, few seem able to follow his 
example of avoiding jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, so even the 
redoubtable Read and Hutto (see below) have to be heavily filtered to see that 
this is true and even they do not get how completely W has anticipated the 
latest work in fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking (acting). 
“People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really progress, that we 
are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the 
Greeks… at something which no explanation seems capable of clearing 
up…And what’s more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because 
in so far as people think they can see the ‘limits of human understanding’, 
they believe of course that they can see beyond these. - CV (1931) 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states 
and about behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether 
escapes notice. We talk about processes and states and leave their nature 
undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them-we think. 
But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. 
For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process 
better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it 
was the very one we thought quite innocent). —And now the analogy which 
was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny 
the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now 
it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t 
want to deny them.   PI p308 
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“Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ 
meant-so that he constantly called different things by that name-but 
nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and 
presuppositions of the word ‘pain’-in short he used it as we all do.” PI p271 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
The failure (in my view) of even the best thinkers (with a few possible 
exceptions) to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to the limited 
attention On Certainty (OC) and his other 3rd period works have received, 
but even more to the inability to understand how profoundly our view of 
philosophy, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, politics, law, morals, ethics, 
religion, aesthetics, literature (all of them being descriptive psychology), 
alters once we accept this evolutionary point of view. The dead hand of the 
blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the default of the second 
self of slow thinking conscious system 2, which is oblivious to the fact that 
the groundwork for all behavior lies in the unconscious, fast thinking 
axiomatic structure of system 1 (Searle’s ‘Phenomenological Illusion’). Steven 
Pinker’s brilliant ‘The Blank Slate: the modern denial of human nature’ is 
highly recommended preparation, even though it is now dated and he has no 
clue about Wittgenstein, and hence of what can be regarded as the first and 
best really deep investigation into the foundations of human nature. He 
seems not to grasp that the Blank Slate is an expression of the cognitive 
illusions that constitute our mental life. 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other “Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually 
reanalyzed perspicuous examples of language in action, that language is the 
best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, and 
his whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. He 
rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology 
and computation could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of 
Language Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand 
what is always in front of our eyes and to capture vagueness (“The greatest 
difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness” 
LWPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way 
we can interact) is not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which 
is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our 
speech using the later evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of the 
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Second Self--the dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, 
intending etc.). Some of W’s favorite topics in his later second and his third 
periods are the interdigitating mechanisms of fast and slow thinking (system 
1 and 2), the irrelevance of our mental life to the functioning of language and 
the impossibility of private language. The bedrock of our behavior is our 
involuntary, system 1, fast thinking, true only, mental states- our perceptions 
and memories and involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily later SLG’s are 
descriptions of voluntary, system 2, slow thinking, testable true or false 
dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
thinking, knowing, believing etc. He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—
i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions 
are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the 
answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to 
stop trying to look deeper (e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting observe 
oneself” LWPP1, 459). 
 
W makes these points throughout his works in countless examples and again 
his whole corpus can be regarded as the effort to make this clear. After all, 
what exactly is the alternative? W showed over and over that standard ways 
of describing behavior (i.e., most of philosophy, and much of descriptive 
psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, etc.) are either demonstrably 
false or incoherent. Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of 
regarding “language philosophy” as a separate study apart from other areas 
of behavior, since language is just another name for the mind. And, when W 
says (as he does many times) that understanding behavior is in no way 
dependent on the progress of psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion “The 
confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
‘young science’ --but cf. another comment that I have never seen quoted “Is 
scientific progress useful to philosophy? Certainly. The realities that are 
discovered lighten the philosophers task. Imagining possibilities.” (LWPP1, 
807). So, he is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact 
that our behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our 
psychology. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the 
rest are fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic 
psychology, but all they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, 
facilitate our analysis of language games, and extend our EP, which remains 
unchanged (unless genetic engineering is unleashed to change our EP—but 
then it won’t be us anymore). The true-only axioms of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s 
(and later Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, which we now call 
evolutionary psychology (EP), and which is traceable to the automated true-
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only reactions of bacteria, which evolved and operates by the mechanism of 
inclusive fitness (IF). See the recent works of Trivers and others for a popular 
intro to IF or Bourke’s superb “Principles of Social Evolution” for a pro intro. 
“Thought is surrounded by a halo. Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact 
the a priori order of the world: that is the order of possibilities, which must be 
common to both world and thought. But this order, it seems, must be utterly 
simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no 
empirical cloudiness or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it. It must rather 
be of the purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but 
as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were, the hardest 
thing there is. (TLP # 5, 5563, PI 97).” 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as 
from a reservoir.” BBB p143 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined 
to make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence 
“It is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is 
an idea that “something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins 
onto the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow 
the rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
Beginning with their innate true-only, nonempirical (nontestable) responses 
to the world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions 
into further true only understandings (“theorems” as we might call them,but 
of course, like many words, this is a complex language game even in the 
context of mathematics). Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as 
unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands or our breathing. This 
totally changes one’s view of human nature.  Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a 
theory at all but a group of true-only Understandings of Agency (UOA a term 
I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies and worms if 
UOA is suitably defined) have and subsequently extend greatly (in higher 
eukaryotes). Likewise, the Theory of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any 
normal, rational, intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and for 
Darwin at least half a century earlier. One cannot help but incorporate T. rex 
and all that is relevant to it into our innate background via the inexorable 
workings of EP. Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it 
is truly stupefying that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this 
most basic fact of human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few 
others). And incidentally, the equation of logic and our axiomatic psychology 
is essential to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody 
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else, points out). 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only 
extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without 
threatening our sanity. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated 
in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world 
and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense) cannot really get a 
foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary fast thinking axioms and not 
testable propositional attitudes. 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC, are equivalent to the fast 
thinking or System One that is at the center of current research (e.g., see 
Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but he has no idea W laid out the 
framework over 50 years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and 
which corresponds to the mental states of perception, emotion and memory, 
as W notes over and over. One might call these “intracerebral reflexes” 
(maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). 
Our slow or reflective, more or less “conscious” (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as “dispositions” or “inclinations”, which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states, and do not have any definite time of 
occurrence. But disposition words like “knowing”, “understanding”, 
“thinking”, “believing”, which W discussed extensively. 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the 
true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are 
Causally Self Reflexive (CSR)-(called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), and the 
S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and 
which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have 
Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR (called transitive in BBB). 
The equation of these terms and much else here is my idea so don’t expect to 
find it in the literature. 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized 
psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines 
under names like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” 
and “biases”. 
Of course, these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful 
ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” 
System One to combinations of One and Two (the norm as W made clear), 
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but presumably not ever of slow System Two dispositional thinking only, 
since any thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much 
of the intricate network of the “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, 
“intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” 
or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life 
is epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not describe nor determine how we 
act (speak). It is an obvious corollary of his descriptive psychology that it is 
the unconscious automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe 
behavior and that the later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, 
remembering, loving, desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake. 
This is most strikingly borne out by the latest experimental psychology, 
which is nicely summarized by Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the 
chapter ‘Two Selves’, but of course there is a huge volume of recent work he 
does not cite). It is an easily defensible view that the generalities of most of 
the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions is wholly compatible with 
and straightforwardly deducible from W. 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary 
psychology, that `will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only 
elements of S1 composed of perceptions and reflexes., and there is no 
possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their 
falsehood. As W made clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment 
and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid 
reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow 
thinking of S2 (often modified into the cultural extensions), which produces 
reasons for action that often result in activation of body and/or speech 
muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both 
neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of 
the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological 
Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The 
Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has generated the action 
consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but 
anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view 
is not credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
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verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I 
think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as 
there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 
Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing 
COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental 
state. Hence, the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he 
would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" 
and his comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in 
"that's Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on 
which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that 
"What it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he 
calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question 
whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And 
the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been 
satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If 
I have learned to talk, then I do know." 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—
the Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis 
of examples of language use in context, exposing the many varieties of 
language games and the relationships between the primary games of true-
only unconscious, axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and 
reflexive emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive 
cortical reptilian brain first-self functions), and the later evolved higher 
cortical dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. 
that constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of 
slow thinking that include the network of cognitive illusions that constitute 
the basis of our second-self personality. He dissects hundreds of language 
games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive 
actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
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understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples 
also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary 
perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature 
that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have 
heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems view is the best. 
To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy 
makes sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic 
was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI p107 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations.  If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel 
p312-314 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
“For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this 
simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.” 
PI p133 
One of W’s recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer UA (Understanding of 
Agency). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 and UA2 (i.e., UA of 
S1 and S2) in experiments, has recently become aware of Hutto, who has 
characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor representation involved 
in UA1--that being reserved for UA2— see my review of his book with Myin). 
However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the 
groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily defensible view that the core 
of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher 
order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. In 
spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never 
seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts 
and commonly there is barely a mention. 
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INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the construction of 
Social Reality (the title of Searle’s well known book) and I will give some 
perspective. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 
years ago had evolved to describe present events (perceptions, memory, 
reflexive actions with basic utterances that can be described as Primary 
Language Games (PLG’s) describing System 1—i.e., the fast unconscious 
automated System One, true-only mental states with a precise time and 
location). We gradually developed the further ability to encompass 
displacements in space and time to describe memories, attitudes and potential 
events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional 
preferences, inclinations or dispositions) with the Secondary Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false propositional attitudinal 
thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities and not mental states). 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, 
Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, 
Appraisals, 
capacities, hypotheses. Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W RPP2 p148). “I 
believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts 
typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are 
true-only (excluding lying) while third person statements about others are 
true or false (see my review of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase 
since believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not 
propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., 
Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent 
mental representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in 
time or space while the evolutionarily more primitive System One mental 
states of perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now. 
This is one way to characterize System 2 and System 3--the second and third 
193  
major advances in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to 
represent events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time 
(Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition 
and volition). S1 are potential or unconscious mental states (Searle-- Phil Issues 
1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as 
S1 or primary LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal 
case, no tests possible, so they can be true-only. Dispositions can be described 
as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted 
out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I know what I believe, think, feel 
until I act). Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as well 
as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein 
(mid 1930’s) and are not Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, 
Hutto, Read, Hacker etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of 
evolutionary psychology, contextualism, enactivism, and the two systems 
framework, and his work a unique investigation of the functioning of our 
axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with System 2. Though few 
have understood it well (and arguably nobody fully to this day) it was further 
developed by a few --above all by John Searle, who made a simpler version 
of the table below in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands 
on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology 
developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in 
his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation 
stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), 
cognitive linguistics or the logical structure of Higher Order Thought (HOT), 
and in my view the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive 
psychology), and thus in the study of behavior. See my article The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) and the recent work of Daniele Moyal-
Sharrock. 
 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly 
Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Referential--Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control 
is possible). Emotions evolved to make a bridge between desires or intentions 
and actions. Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow 
thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities--described in SLG’s-- in which the 
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mind tries to fit the world. 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive 
psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe 
all actions as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion or TPI of Searle). W 
understood this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of 
examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has 
access to working memory and so we use consciously apparent but typically 
incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves of current research). 
Beliefs and other Dispositions are thoughts which try to match the facts of the 
world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act 
(Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA- Searle) plus acts which try 
to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle 
e.g., C+L p145, p190). 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at 
the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which 
in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting 
to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human 
Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more 
complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final 
or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with 
hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps 
all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction 
between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between 
feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W 
demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several 
utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
In accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the 
representations of S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this 
sense S1 such as perceptions do not have COS. In other writings S says they 
do but as noted in my other reviews I think it is then essential to refer to COS1 
(private presentations) and COS2 (public representations). To repeat this 
critical distinction, public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred 
to by Searle and others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or 
COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as 
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presentations by others (or COS1 by myself). 
Likewise, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and 
his ‘Direction of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’. System 1 is involuntary, 
reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps 
and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps 
(see Searle). 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of 
minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking 
about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in certain 
contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of 
Mind (LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure 
of Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the 
Logical Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of 
Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order 
Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/Rule 
Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal Facilitates 
or Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****       Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******    (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
*******  Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
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of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, 
perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are 
automated and generally happening in less than 500msec, while System 2 are 
abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in 
consciousness (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently 
repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There 
is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 
2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they 
are successful or not, rather than T or F. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.G., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will 
be True only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause originates in 
the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in 
intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need 
language, are independent of general intelligence and working memory, are 
not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will 
not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words cannot precisely match the 
actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial 
explosion of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and this is why it’s not 
possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws which would have 
to state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against 
theories. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
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muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions and some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and location) and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical S2 with the further ability to describe 
displacements in space and time (conditionals, hypotheticals or fictionals) of 
potential events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or 
fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or 
Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 slow, cortical, conscious, 
information containing, transitive(having public Conditions of Satisfaction-
Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 
for private S1 and public S2), representational—which I again divide into R1 
for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional attitudinal 
thinking, with all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and 
not mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic 
Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, 
Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, 
Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly developing and 
changing results of S2 dispositions (W RPP2 148) while others are typical S1—
fast and automatic to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they 
think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. 
My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. 
S1, while third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my 
reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase 
since believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not 
propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf 
Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent 
public representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). 
 
They are potential acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily more 
primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and 
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now. This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance in 
vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and to 
think of them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of 
counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 
‘thoughts’ are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 
1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 
or primary LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, 
NO TESTS possible so they can be True Only. Dispositions can be described as 
secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, 
even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel 
until I act or some event occurs—see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ and Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
Note well that Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as 
well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 
1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder 
of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the 
functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with 
System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 
30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table 
in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the 
axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) 
(written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology 
and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order 
Thought, and in my view the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Reflexive-- Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control 
is possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow 
thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities—that can be described in SLG’s-- in 
which the mind tries to fit the world.  Behaviorism and all the other confusions 
of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see 
S1 working and describe all actions as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion—
TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity with 
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hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. 
Reason has access to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often 
incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes 
of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as 
thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of 
fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In 
Action--IAA--Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—
world to mind direction of fit— cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states 
(‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they 
act or might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. 
 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions — 
(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential PUBLIC 
ACTS (language, thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, 
Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language 
(concept, thought) of PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no 
private language, thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and 
to that extent they have a public psychology. 
Perceptions: (“X” is True):  Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature 
Memories:  Remembering, Dreaming? 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions (X might become True): 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
expecting, wishing, wanting, hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming , Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
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S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my 
thoughts): Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, 
obliged to do 
INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True) Intending 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, 
Asserting(describing, teaching, predicting, reporting), Promising , Making or 
Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and 
Voluntary and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the 
Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of 
behavior. 
 
WORDS EXPRESS POTENTIAL ACTIONS HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE AND 
ARE NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT. 
 The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—
roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of 
neurons organized into inference engines), which, with perceptions and 
memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to intentions and 
then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all 
these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense 
is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when 
including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of 
the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive 
in evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions 
and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our 
psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding by giving clear 
descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, 
psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and 
computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) 
gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are 
algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self and in normal human 
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adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require 
public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase 
our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility--Bayesian utility 
maximization but Bayesianism is highly questionable) via dominance and 
reciprocal altruism (Desire Independent Reasons for Action-Searle- which I 
divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and impose Conditions of 
Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction -Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts to the 
world via public acts ( muscle movements –i.e., math, language, art, music, sex, 
sports etc.). The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural 
psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear 
foreshadowings back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by 
John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological 
phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 
p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (i.e., of our language games) admits of 
degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. 
All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in 
some contexts as they must to be useful. There are at least two types of thinking 
(i.e., two language games or ways of using the dispositional verb “thinking“)—
nonrational without awareness and rational with partial awareness(W), now 
described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these 
as language games and not as mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental 
phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack 
criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no role in 
communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions (inclinations, 
propositional attitudes) lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions 
of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act in speech, 
writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories can 
have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are manifested 
in public actions, for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning 
(consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
(Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon). Developing 
language means manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. 
TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called UA-Understanding of Agency –
my term-and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in S1 and S2) –and can also be 
called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically 
programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to 
intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles. Thus, “propositional 
attitude” is a confusing term for normal intuitive rational S2D or non-rational 
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automated S2A speech and action.   We see that the efforts of cognitive science 
to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not 
going to tell us anything more about how the mind (thought, language) works 
(as opposed to how the BRAIN works) than we already know, because “mind” 
(thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any phenomena that are 
hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or 
string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is 
composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and 
chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. 
Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we 
only examine carefully the workings of language.  Language (mind, public 
speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social 
interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. Its 
grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions 
automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and 
sentences have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have 
profoundly different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he 
believes. The present tense first person expressive use of inclinational verbs 
such as “I believe” describe my ability to predict my probable acts and are not 
descriptive of my mental state nor based on knowledge or information in the 
usual sense of those words (W).  It does not describe a truth but makes itself 
true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, 
disposition verbs used in first person present tense are causally self-referential-
-they instantiate themselves but as descriptions of possible states they are not 
testable (i.e., not T or F). However past or future tense or third person use--“I 
believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain information that is true 
or false as they describe public acts that are or can become verifiable.  Likewise, 
“I believe it’s raining” has no information apart from subsequent actions, even 
for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially 
verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information 
(or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000) Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are 
Non-Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them 
functions or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahneman). Prior Intentions 
are stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1 but again I think one must 
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separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the 
conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., 
some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 
and are automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology 
(Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential reading 
for an understanding of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought are 
Hutto, DMS, Stern, Finkelstein, Moyal-Sharrock and Read who, unlike many 
scholars, have posted most of their work free online at www.academia.edu and 
the leading W scholar PMS  Hacker 
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. 
 
In OC, as throughout W’s works, understanding is bedeviled by possible 
alternative and consequently often infelicitous translations from often unedited 
and handwritten German notes, with “Satz” being frequently incorrectly 
rendered as “proposition” (which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when 
referring to our non-falsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct 
“sentence”, which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such 
as “these are my hands” or “Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs 
that lived about 50 million years ago”. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is 
at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, 
difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to 
miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
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Review of Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty 
by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock Ed. (2007) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death 
and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. I cannot recall a single 
reference to it in all of Searle and one sees whole books on W with barely a 
mention. There are however xlnt books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and 
others and parts of many other books and articles, but hands down the best is 
that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and 
perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), 
psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) like all analysis of W, 
they fall short of grasping his unique and revolutionary advance in describing 
behavior, suffering from the near universal tunnel vision and failing to put 
behavior in its broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which 
I will attempt in skeletal form here. After doing this I will give brief comments 
on each article in this book of varied perspectives on W’s work. 
 
 Since this review appeared, DMS has written brilliant articles on 
Wittgenstein’s OC which are mandatory reading. Also, a mostly excellent 
volume by Hamilton “Wittgenstein and On Certainty” *2014) has been 
published.  
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
“But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false.” (OC 94) 
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On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death 
and has only recently begun to draw serious attention.  I cannot recall a single 
reference to it in all of Searle and one sees whole books on W with barely a 
mention. There are however xlnt books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and 
others and parts of many other books and articles, but hands down the best is 
that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding 
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and 
perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), 
psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) like all analysis of W 
(excepting the most recent work by DMS), they fall far short of grasping his 
unique and revolutionary advance in describing behavior, suffering from the 
near universal tunnel vision and failing to put behavior in its broad 
evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt in 
skeletal form here. After doing this I will give brief comments on each article 
in this book of varied perspectives on W’s work. 
 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior 
of all time and this is his last work and crowning achievement. It belongs to his 
third and final period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it shows that 
all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious 
ratiocination is but a gloss on unconscious machinations), but the foundation 
for all description of animal behavior- revealing how the mind works and 
indeed must work. The “must” is entailed by the fact that all brains share a 
common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way they 
work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals 
share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and in humans 
this is extended into a personality based on throat muscle contractions 
(language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be 
regarded as trivial). This book, and arguably all of W’s work and all useful 
discussion of behavior is a development of or variation on these ideas. Another 
major theme here and of course in all discussion of human behavior is the need 
to separate the effects of culture from those of genetics and though few 
philosophers explicitly discuss this, it can be seen as the major problem they 
are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider W’s 
work and most of his examples as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow 
thinking (see below), but nature and nurture. 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
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throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is 
now known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, 
cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal 
behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a vast and 
unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it 
was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other 
behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few in philosophy who 
have more or less understood him have not carried the analysis to its logical 
(psychological) conclusion nor realized the extent of his anticipation of the 
latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (the two selves of fast and slow 
thinking—see below). His heir apparent, John Searle, refers to him periodically 
and his work can be seen as a straightforward extension of W’s, but he does not 
really get that this is what he is doing. Other leading W analysts such as Hutto 
and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but (in my view) stop short of putting him 
in the center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs. I eventually 
came to understand much of W by regarding his corpus as the pioneering effort 
in EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves and the multifarious 
language games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3
rd period 
works and reading backwards to the proto-Tractatus. It has been extremely 
revealing to alternate W with the writings of hundreds of other philosophers 
and evolutionary psychologists (as I regard all psychologists and in fact all 
behavioral scientists, cognitive linguists and others). It should also be clear that 
insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of behavior are describing 
the same phenomena and ought to translate easily into one another. Thus, the 
recently fashionable themes of “Embodied Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” 
should flow directly from and into W’s work. However, few seem able to 
follow his example of avoiding jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, 
so even the redoubtable Hutto (see below) has to be heavily filtered to see that 
this is true. However, even Hutto does not get how completely W has 
anticipated the latest work in fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking 
(acting). 
 
W should be regarded as the pioneer of evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the 
Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of 
examples of language use in context, to expose the many varieties of language 
games and the relationships between the primary games of the true-only 
unconscious, axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive 
emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical 
reptilian brain first-self functions), and the later evolved higher cortical 
dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that 
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constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of slow 
thinking and the network of cognitive illusions that constitute the second-self 
personality. He dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-
only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of system one grade into the 
thinking, remembering, and understanding of system two dispositions and 
many of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue. With this 
evolutionary perspective, his works are a breathtaking revelation of human 
nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives 
have heuristic value, but I find this one not only lets me understand W, but cuts 
like a hot knife through the frozen butter of discussions of behavior. To repeat 
Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in biology makes sense except in 
the light of evolution.” 
 
The failure (in my view) of even the best thinkers (with a few possible 
exceptions) to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to the limited attention 
On Certainty (OC) and his other 3
rd period works have received, but even more 
to the inability to understand how profoundly our view of philosophy, 
anthropology, sociology, linguistics, politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, 
aesthetics, literature (all of them being descriptive psychology), alters once we 
accept this evolutionary point of view. The dead hand of the blank slate view 
of behavior still rests heavily on most people, pro or amateur and is the default 
of the second self of slow thinking conscious system 2, which is oblivious to the 
fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the unconscious, fast thinking 
axiomatic structure of system 1. 
 
Steven Pinker’s brilliant ‘The Blank Slate: the modern denial of human nature’ 
is highly recommended preparation, even though it is now dated and he has 
no clue about Wittgenstein, and hence of what can be regarded as the first and 
best really deep investigation into the foundations of human nature. He seems 
not to fully grasp that the Blank Slate is an expression of the cognitive illusions 
that constitute our mental life. 
 
To say that Searle has carried on W’s work is not to imply that it is a direct 
result of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology 
(for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone 
accurately describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of 
what W said. I find most of Searle foreshadowed in W, including versions of 
the famous Chinese room argument against Strong AI. Incidentally if the 
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Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor Rodych’s xlnt, but 
virtually unknown, supplement on the CR — “Searle Freed of Every Flaw”. 
Rodych has also written a series of superb papers on W’s philosophy of 
mathematics (i.e., the EP of the axiomatic system 1 Primary Language Games 
(PLG’s) of counting as extended into the endless Language Games of math). 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other “Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually 
reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is the 
best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, and his 
whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. He rejected the 
idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology and 
computation could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of Language 
Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always 
in front of our eyes and to capture vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in these 
investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness” LWPP1, 347). And 
so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we can interact) is 
not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed by 
acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the 
later evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of the Second Self--the 
dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). Some 
of W’s favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the different 
(but interdigitating) LG’s of fast and slow thinking (system 1 and 2 or PLG’s 
and SLG’s), the epiphenomenality of our second self and mental life and the 
impossibility of private language.  The PLG’s are utterances of and descriptions 
of our involuntary, system 1, fast thinking, true only, untestable mental states- 
our perceptions and memories and involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily 
later SLG’s are descriptions of voluntary, system 2, slow thinking, testable true 
or false dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, 
intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. He recognized that ‘Nothing is 
Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical 
questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find 
the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have 
to stop trying to look deeper (e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to 
observe oneself” LWPP1, 459). 
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W makes these points throughout his works in countless examples and again 
his whole corpus can be regarded as the effort to make this clear. After all, what 
exactly is the alternative? W showed over and over that standard ways of 
describing behavior (i.e., most of philosophy, and much of descriptive 
psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, etc.) are either demonstrably 
false or incoherent. Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of 
regarding “language philosophy” as a separate study apart from other areas of 
behavior, since language is just another name for the mind.  And, when W says 
(as he does many times) that understanding behavior is in no way dependent 
on the progress of psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion “The confusion 
and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a ‘young 
science’ --but cf. another comment that I have never seen quoted “Is scientific 
progress useful to philosophy? Certainly. The realities that are discovered 
lighten the philosophers task. Imagining possibilities.” (LWPP1, 807). So, he is 
not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that our 
behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology. 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, but 
all they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, facilitate our 
analysis of language games, and extend our EP, which remains unchanged 
(unless genetic engineering is unleashed to change our EP—but then it won’t 
be us anymore). The true-only axioms of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and later 
Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, which we now call evolutionary 
psychology (EP), and which is traceable to the automated true-only reactions 
of bacteria, which evolved and operates by the mechanism of inclusive fitness 
(IF). See the recent works of Trivers and others for a popular intro to IF or 
Bourke’s superb “Principles of Social Evolution” for a pro intro. 
 
Beginning with their innate true-only, non-empirical (non-testable) responses 
to the world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into 
further true only understandings (“theorems” as we might call them, but of 
course like many words, this is a complex language game even in the context 
of mathematics). Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the 
existence of our two hands or our breathing. This totally changes one’s view of 
human nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-
only Understandings of Agency (UOA a term I devised 10 years ago) which 
newborn animals (including flies and worms if UOA is suitably defined) have 
and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). Likewise, the Theory 
of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, intelligent person 
before the end of the 19
th century and for Darwin at least half a century earlier. 
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One CANNOT help but incorporate T. rex and all that is relevant to it into our 
innate background via the inexorable workings of EP. Once one gets the logical 
(psychological) necessity of this it is truly stupefying that even the brightest 
and the best seem not to grasp this most basic fact of human life (with a tip of 
the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others). And incidentally, the equation of logic 
and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human 
nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only 
extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without 
threatening our sanity. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in 
his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and 
other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense) cannot really get a foothold, 
as “reality” is the result of involuntary fast thinking axioms and not testable 
propositional attitudes. 
 
It became clear to me recently that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied 
with throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC, are equivalent to the 
fast thinking or System One that is at the center of current research (e.g., see 
Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but he has no idea W laid out the 
framework over 50 years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and 
which corresponds to the mental states of perception and memory, as W notes 
over and over in endless examples. One might call these “intracerebral 
reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the 
brain). 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less “conscious” (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as “dispositions” or “inclinations”, which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states, and do not have any definite time of 
occurrence. But disposition words like “knowing”, “understanding”, 
“thinking”, “believing”, which W discussed extensively, have at least two basic 
uses (or, one might say, one major use and one abuse) or language games—a 
peculiar philosophical use by exemplified by Moore (whose papers inspired W 
to write OC) which refers to the true-only sentences based on direct perceptions 
and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic psychology (‘I know these are my 
hands’), and their normal use as dispositions, which are acted out and which 
can become true or false (‘I know my way home’). 
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It was the genetic capture of suitable axioms that enabled our ancestors to avoid 
underdetermination and combinatorial explosion—quadrillions of organisms 
failed to solve this problem and their corpses make up oil and natural gas and 
they have no descendants. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 
One to combinations of One and Two (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System Two dispositional thinking only, since any 
thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the 
intricate network of the “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, 
“intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, “cognitive axioms” or “background” 
or “bedrock” (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
 
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is 
epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not describe nor determine how we act. 
It is an obvious corollary of his descriptive psychology that it is the unconscious 
automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior and that the 
later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, desiring, 
regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake.  This is most strikingly borne out by 
the latest experimental psychology, which is nicely summarized by Kahneman 
in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter ‘Two Selves’, but of course there is a huge 
volume of recent work he does not cite). It is an easily defensible view that most 
of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions is wholly compatible with 
and straightforwardly deducible from W. 
 
Probably the leading exponent of W’s ideas on the language games of inner 
and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our personality or intentionality or EP 
etc.) is the prolific Daniel Hutto (DH), who teaches at the same University as 
DMS. His approach is called ‘Radical Enactivism’ and is well explained in 
numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the 
Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon it is a 
straightforward extension of W’s 2nd and 3rd period writings. 
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He is also author of the best deconstruction I know of Dennett’s preposterous 
claim to be following in W’s footsteps (in fact he is just repeating most of the 
classic mistakes in grandiose fashion and hasn’t a clue about W). But of course, 
one must read Searle too and the title of his famous review of Dennett’s book 
says it well “Consciousness Explained Away”. Incidentally, unlike most 
philosophers and other scholars, who make little or no effort to give the general 
public access to their papers, Hutto has put nearly every paper (though of 
course often just proofs and not the final paper) free online at academia.edu. 
and philpapers.org. 
 
Here, as throughout W’s works, understanding is bedeviled by possible 
alternative and consequently often infelicitous translations from often unedited 
and handwritten German notes, with “Satz” being frequently incorrectly 
rendered as “proposition”(which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when 
referring to our nonfalsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct 
“sentence”, which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such 
as “these are my hands” or “Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs 
that lived about 50 million years ago”(and since this is an unavoidable 
extension of our psychology, what does this imply about creationists?). 
 
Incidentally, regarding the view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems 
nobody has noticed that he very clearly explained several times specifically and 
many times in passing, the psychology behind what later became known as the 
Wason Test--long a mainstay of EP research. 
 
The view that even the brightest philosophers do not really grasp the context 
in which they are operating is perhaps most strikingly illustrated when they 
attempt to define philosophy. In recent years, I have seen such definitions by 
two of those I hold in highest regard—Graham Priest and John Searle, and of 
course they mention truth, language, reality etc., but not a word to suggest it is 
a description of our innate universal axiomatic psychology and its extensions. 
Priest, by the way, has noted that W was the first to predict the emergence of 
paraconsistent logic. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
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over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
*            Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**            Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***          Searle’s Intention In Action 
****         Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****       Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
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******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one.  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language 
as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
Like all of us, the various writers in “Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” 
have a difficult time keeping nature and nurture distinct and none are even 
close to the evolutionary analysis given above. 
Here, as throughout descriptive psychology (philosophy) you see virtually no 
reference to “cognitive modules”, “fast thinking”, “The Handbook of 
Evolutionary Psychology”, “Tooby and Cosmides”, “Pinker”, or even John 
Searle. The editors do note the equivalence of “transcendental” with grammar 
on p3 but fail to equate “grammar” with “logic” and with EP as W did. There 
is much discussion of W’s use of the term “hinges” (the translators English 
term, not the original German) but nobody seems to see that these are the 
axioms of System 1 and that “believe and know”, when referring to fast 
thinking, have a similar sense if used in referring to behavior as they would if 
one said of the heart that it “believes” and “knows” that it pumps blood. They 
are unconscious automatisms in either case. 
 
I found Phillips article (like his other writings) of little interest. One only needs 
to note that the “missing propositions” are the axioms of our EP.   In sharp 
contrast is that of Stroll, which is very clear and near the bone all through with 
some unfortunate slips. In mid-page 34 he says what stands fast is neither true 
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nor false whereas it is crystal clear that the hinges are true only. Also, I would 
strongly disagree with his comment on p41 that OC is “only tangentially about 
knowledge” since it is only by extending the axioms via slow thinking that we 
have any at all. 
 
Williams’ article is full of errors but he is very bright and fluent so it could be 
useful as a teaching tool. Schulte is also very bright and thorough as usual, but 
he needs to refine his awkward prose and take the evolutionary view so he can 
drop the “hinges” and “riverbed” in favor of axiomatic EP. I find the definition 
in DMS’s article of two categories of certainty to be unhelpful and confused—
one only needs to refer to our axioms and their extensions—and the use here 
(and everywhere) of “beliefs” when referring to true only axioms is to be 
avoided. 
 
I am not a fan of Mounce and the jargon filled generalities that constitute his 
kind of philosophy. W not only warned frequently against the craving for 
generality but his whole corpus is an example of how to avoid it. 
 
The only good thing about Brenner’s article is the quote from W (an experience 
I have had countless times). “The limit of language is shown by it’s being 
impossible to describe the fact which corresponds to (is the translation of) a 
sentence, without simply repeating the sentence. (This has to do with the 
Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy).” (CV10). This quote sums up 
most of his philosophy in his typical brilliant aphoristic fashion.  It is certainly 
not the case that W got his ideas from Kant or anyone else but it points to his 
realization that Kant understood that our psychology was axiomatic. 
 
Rudd’s article is again of use primarily for illustrating pitfalls for the unwary, 
with the incessant abuse of context free language that W (almost uniquely) 
avoided. At times (e.g., the end of section 3) he almost seems to understand, 
but elsewhere shows he does not get that W explains how our axiomatic EP is 
not a test of skepticism but rather excludes tests and that the metaphysical use 
of language is not abnormal (as it is universal), but senseless. Nor does he get 
that W’s description of behavior is no more a theory than description of 
evolutionary biology is a theory, and for the same reason. If he and the skeptic 
understood just one sentence “A doubt without an end is not even a doubt” 
(OC 625) –i.e., no test then no doubt—it would end skepticism for them. And 
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far from just hinting that “Kantian transcendentalism” (axiomatic EP in this 
context) refutes skepticism (and describes the basis of behavior), W has made 
it the focus of OC. It is however quite clear that it is Kantian or Heideggerian 
only by a very stretched analogy and not by origin. Our EP emerges easily and 
unavoidably from W, but only by the most tortuous routes from K or H. 
 
Morawetz is mostly excellent but there are grave mistakes, and like most he is 
much too eager to call W confused. He seems to have no understanding of the 
two selves and the use of “know” and “believe” dispositionally vs 
axiomatically. Nor does he grasp that hinges are axiomatic EP (cognitive 
modules, templates etc.) and not propositions which are the results of their use. 
Pritchard’s essay is depressing as it shows he has absolutely no grasp of W but 
at least it takes him a page or two while many show this in the first sentence or 
even the title. 
 
Kober seems unaware of the difference between spirituality and religion—W 
embraced the former but not the latter. Like most who write on this topic he 
needs to read Boyer and Atran before embarking on further essays on religion. 
 
Minar has some good sections but again the basic thrust of W’s description of 
the axiomatic basis of behavior and the two realms of “belief” escapes him.  W’s 
therapy was to help us see how the mind (language, the world, EP etc.) works 
but even the best Wittgensteinians have gone astray here—recall Gordon 
Baker’s hallucinatory writings at the end of his career! 
 
Crary writes well on the unclarity of doubt out of context but shows no general 
understanding of W’s thrust and so of EP, IP, axiomatic psychology, Searle etc., 
and then proceeds (like nearly everyone) to do exactly what W warned about 
incessantly (and showed how to avoid on nearly every page he ever wrote in 
his later years) by failing to stick to perspicuous examples and by employing a 
dense and jargon laden prose that is utterly un-Wittgensteinian. Maybe the best 
part is her opening quote from Cavell who, though not really getting to the 
bottom of things either, is brilliant and intuitive here in seeing (as we now 
ought to frame it) that ethics is based in our axiomatic EP, upon which system 
two makes just the most minimal glosses. 
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Finally, we come to Read who is quite correct that it is possible to interpret the 
TLP in ways that show its continuity to PI, but then wastes much effort trying 
to discern whether W can be seen as a Carnapian or a Realist—who cares? 
There are ever so many much bigger fish to fry! Once again (as with all writers) 
I find his opening quote from W more penetrating than anything he writes — 
“Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be 
described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it.” 
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Review of Meaning and the Growth of 
Understanding Wittgenstein's Significance for 
Developmental Psychology -- Chapman and Dixon 
Eds. (1987) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
Although now over 25 years old, many of the essays are quite contemporary. 
As expected, none of the authors grasp the full relevance of W for the 
description of behavior, missing most of the points made in my comments 
above, his many examples of how S1becomes S2, his role as a pioneer in EP, 
and his attempts to separate nature from nurture. Brose has many good points 
and is aware of the foundational nature of On Certainty, but is too scattered 
and does not clearly describe W’s analysis of how our innate automatic 
unconscious S1 is the axiomatic basis for all behavior (but with a few exceptions 
nobody else to this day has either). Russell’s article is excellent, especially the 
first part dealing with Kripke’s famously distorted view of W. For a more 
recent and superb deconstruction of Kripke’s W that is of very general 
application, see “Kripke’s conjuring Trick” by Read and Sharrock, available on 
the net. 
I also found Coulter’s article quite good and like Margolis and Harre, he has 
continued his work to the present day and published widely. Margolis is very 
bright and well-read but his precious prose and attempt to include as many 
references as possible results in a lack of clarity and focus. Rosch makes the 
best effort to apply W to real research but also lacks the broad understanding 
of him that could transform the view of higher order thought. Harre has since 
become a major W scholar but has little to say here, so those interested should 
see my review of his “Wittgenstein and Psychology”. Overall, considering that 
this book was written over 25 years ago and most of the authors were not 
philosophers they did a good job and the volume is still worth reading. 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 (2017). 
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"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false. "Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not 
a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is 
no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
 
“The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only 
from this can more complicated forms develop. Language--I want to say--is a 
refinement. ‘In the beginning was the deed.’” CV p31 
 
“Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ meant-
so that he constantly called different things by that name-but nevertheless used 
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the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of 
the word ‘pain’-in short he used it as we all do.” PI p271 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. Is is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as 
from a reservoir.” BBB p143 
 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined 
to make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It 
is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an 
idea that “something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto 
the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule 
as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence 
and reality loses all point. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a 
shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity 
with what it represents.” BBB p37 
 
“Thus we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are 
obviously not aware of the many different usages of the word “proof; and that 
they are not clear about the differences between the uses of the word “kind”, 
when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word “kind” 
here meant the same thing as in the context “kinds of apples.” Or, we may say, 
they are not aware of the different meanings of the word “discovery” when in 
one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the 
other case of the discovery of the South Pole.” BBB p29 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
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illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched.  Of course, there are then 
no questions left, and this itself is the answer.”  TLP 6.52 
 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions.”  PI 126 
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“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 
 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have 
got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in 
the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is 
already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the 
future.” (said in 1930) Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle 
(1979) p183 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything.---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution!….This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations.  If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel 
p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
“For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply 
means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.” PI p133 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (HOT), 
which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I have 
never seen it clearly stated anywhere. 
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Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: 
“Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our 
subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems 
about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship between 
thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and 
knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of 
mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy 
of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of 
insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of 
reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He 
undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of 
philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the 
conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--
'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively 
describe the two systems of thought -- fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the 
slow reflective linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is 
possible with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for 
judging and cannot be doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness, self, 
time and space are innate true-only axioms. He discussed many times what is 
now known as Theory of Mind, Framing and cognitive illusions. He frequently 
explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it 
generates behavior. He described the psychology behind what later became the 
Wason test--a fundamental measure used in EP research decades later. He 
noted the indeterminate nature of language and the game-like nature of social 
interaction. He examined in thousands of pages and hundreds of examples 
how our inner mental experiences are not describable in language, this being 
possible only for public behavior with a public language (the impossibility of 
private language). Thus, he can be viewed as the first evolutionary 
psychologist. 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part 
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of the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was 
a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only 
one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but 
became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years 
published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly garbled 
form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died 
in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in 
German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear 
relationship to sentences before or after; that he wrote in a Socratic style with 3 
distinct persons in the dialog—the narrator, the interlocutor and the 
commentator (usually W’s view) whose comments were blended together by 
most readers, thus completely vitiating the whole elucidatory and therapeutic 
thrust, that these were cut and pasted from other notebooks written years 
earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings and crossed out words, so that 
many sentences have multiple variants; that his literary executives cut this 
indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling 
with the monstrous task of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which 
were conveying utterly novel views of how the universe works and that they 
then published this material with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a 
century) with prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; 
that he became as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all 
previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense, and that virtually nobody 
understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of thousands of 
papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work in which 
he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such 
extremely abstract and condensed form that it was difficult to decide what was 
being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles 
on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had only 
passing and usually erroneous references to him, and that many omitted him 
entirely; that to this day, over half a century after his death, there were only a 
handful of people who really grasped the monumental consequences of what 
he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Before remarking on “Meaning and the Growth of Understanding” (MGU), I 
will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), 
Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC 
(Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) 
and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description 
of higher order behavior not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as 
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the WS framework. A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the 
need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of 
culture. All study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only 
fast S1 and slow S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. 
dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work as a whole 
provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while 
the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which 
evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, prelinguistic mental 
states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 
Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, 
love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow 
thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, 
Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional 
(and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, 
knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., 
it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, 
atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical 
use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self 
Referential (CSR)-called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), and the S2 use, which 
is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can 
become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, 
that `will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 
composed of perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W 
made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment 
and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. 
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Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall 
cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The 
Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') 
is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are 
fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It 
is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find. 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing 
COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental 
state. 
 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's 
Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," 
or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always 
comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what 
happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should 
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not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked 
`Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do 
know." 
 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. 
He shows that behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms (see “On 
Certainty” for his final extended treatment of this idea) and that our conscious 
ratiocination emerges from unconscious machinations. His corpus can be seen 
as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the 
mind works and indeed must work. The “must” is entailed by the fact that all 
brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one 
basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all 
higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, 
and that in humans this is extended into a personality based on throat muscle 
contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others. I suggest it will 
prove of the greatest value to consider W’s work and most of his examples as 
an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions vs 
dispositions-- see below), but nature and nurture. 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the 
Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of 
examples of language use in context, exposing the many varieties of language 
games and the relationships between the primary games of true-only 
unconscious, axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive 
emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical 
reptilian brain first-self functions), and the later evolved higher cortical 
dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that 
constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of slow 
thinking that include the network of cognitive illusions that constitute the basis 
of our second-self personality. He dissects hundreds of language games 
showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of 
system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and understanding of 
system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also address the 
nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his later 
works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current 
and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find 
that this evolutionary two systems view is the best. To paraphrase 
Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes sense except 
in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
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The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking  or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other “Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually 
reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is not 
just the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, 
but speech is the mind, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the 
development of this idea. He rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches 
of physiology, experimental psychology and computation (Computational 
Theory of Mind, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, functionalism, etc.) 
could reveal what his analyses of Language Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties 
he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture 
vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of 
representing vagueness” LWPP1, 347). 
 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon 
the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger 
here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology 
is essential to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody 
else, points out). 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic 
EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A 
corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a 
foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true 
or false propositions. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
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economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of 
course these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 
1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not 
ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought 
or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and 
later Searle call our EP). One of W’s recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer 
UA (Understanding of Agency). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 
and UA2 in experiments, has recently become aware of Hutto, who has 
characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor representation involved in 
UA1--that being reserved for UA2—see my review of his book with Myin). 
However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the 
groundwork for this 80 years ago. It is an easily defensible view that the core 
of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher 
order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. In 
spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never 
seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts 
and commonly there is barely a mention. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
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but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of 
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Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its 
interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further 
away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined 
in its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and 
charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language 
as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
Now for some comments on MGU. 
 
After the above and my many reviews of books by and about W, S, H etc, it 
should be clear what W is doing so I’ll make just a few comments. 
 
Although now over 25 years old, many of the essays are quite contemporary. 
As expected, none of the authors grasp the full relevance of W for the 
description of behavior, missing most of the points made in my comments 
above, his many examples of how S1becomes S2, his role as a pioneer in EP, 
and his attempts to separate nature from nurture. Brose has many good points 
and is aware of the foundational nature of On Certainty, but is too scattered 
and does not clearly describe W’s analysis of how our innate automatic 
unconscious S1 is the axiomatic basis for all behavior (but with a few exceptions 
nobody else to this day has either). Russell’s article is excellent, especially the 
first part dealing with Kripke’s famously distorted view of W. For a more 
recent and superb deconstruction of Kripke’s W that is of very general 
application, see “Kripke’s conjuring Trick” by Read and Sharrock, available on 
the net. 
 
I also found Coulter’s article quite good and like Margolis and Harre, he has 
continued his work to the present day and published widely. Margolis is very 
bright and well-read but his precious prose and attempt to include as many 
references as possible results in a lack of clarity and focus. Rosch makes the 
best effort to apply W to real research but also lacks the broad understanding 
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of him that could transform the view of higher order thought. Harre has since 
become a major W scholar but has little to say here, so those interested should 
see my review of his “Wittgenstein and Psychology”. Overall, considering that 
this book was written over 25 years ago and most of the authors were not 
philosophers they did a good job and the volume is still worth reading. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is 
to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
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Review of Wittgenstein -- Rethinking the Inner by 
Paul Johnston (1993) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Overall Johnston has done a phenomenal job and this book should be required 
reading for all those interested in behavior. 
 
It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study 
of behavior—linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, 
politics, sociology, and art, he is not even mentioned in most books and articles, 
with even the exceptions having little to say, and most of that distorted or flat 
wrong. There is a flurry of recent interest, at least in philosophy, and possibly 
this preposterous situation will change, especially due to the continuing efforts 
of Peter Hacker and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. I will first offer some comments 
on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and 
Wittgenstein from the modern two systems of thought perspective as W did 60 
years ago. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
" But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and 
false."Wittgenstein-OC94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" 
p6(1933) 
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"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of 
philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 “…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize  a reason for action…these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The general 
point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the phenomenological 
illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness 
has no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the 
underlying neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to ontological 
reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and therefore it cannot 
be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, something that exists 
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independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
Before commenting in detail on Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner (WRTI) I 
will first offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the 
works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to 
place any commentator on W and behavior in proper perspective.  
 
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. His 
work as a whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only 
axioms and that our conscious ratiocination (System 2) (S2) emerges from 
unconscious machinations (System 1) (S1). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his final 
extended treatment of this idea-and my review thereof for preparation. His 
corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, 
revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed 
by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so 
there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic 
structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on 
inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended into a personality (a 
cognitive or phenomenological illusion) based on throat muscle contractions 
(language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be 
regarded as trivial). 
 
Arguably, all of W's and S’s work and indeed all of philosophy is a 
development of or variation on these ideas. Another major theme here, and of 
course in all discussion of human behavior, is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms, which underlie all behavior, from the 
effects of culture. Though few philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, 
sociologists etc., explicitly discuss this in a comprehensive way, it can be seen 
as the major problem they are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the 
greatest value to consider all study of higher order behavior as an effort to tease 
apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms 
vs. dispositions- S1 and S2--see below), but nature and nurture. 
 
What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less 
clear way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you 
prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought 
or just animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works 
are a unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the 
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day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other 
behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or less 
understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest 
work on EP and cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two selves of 
fast and slow thinking etc., --see below). Searle’s work expands upon this and 
provides a stunning description of higher order social behavior that is possible 
because of the recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while the 
later W shows how it is based on true only unconscious axioms of S1 which 
evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
I suggest the key to W is to regard his corpus as the pioneering effort in 
deciphering our EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves of S1 and S2 
and the multifarious language games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting 
from his 3rd period works and reading backwards to the Proto-Tractatus. It 
should also be clear that insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts 
of behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought to translate easily 
into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes of "Embodied Mind" 
and "Radical Enactivism" should flow directly from and into W's work (and 
they do). However, almost nobody is able to follow his example of avoiding 
jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, so even the redoubtable Searle 
has to be filtered and translated to see that this is true, and even he does not get 
how completely W has anticipated the latest work in fast and slow, two-self 
embodied thinking (writing, speaking, acting). 
 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—
which can be regarded as the Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution 
via the careful analysis of examples of language use in context. He exposes the 
many varieties of language games and the relationships between the primary 
games of the true-only unconscious, pre or proto-linguistic axiomatic fast 
thinking of perception, memory and reflexive thinking, emotions and acts 
(often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain first-
self, mirror neuron functions), and the later evolved higher cortical 
dispositional linguistic conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. 
that constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of 
slow thinking that are the network of cognitive illusions that constitute the 
second-self personality of which we are so enamored. W dissects hundreds of 
language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and 
reflexive actions of S1 grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of S2 dispositions, and many of his examples also address the 
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nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his later 
works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current 
and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find 
that this evolutionary two systems perspective illuminates all higher behavior. 
Dobzhansky famously commented: "Nothing in biology makes sense except in 
the light of evolution." And nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the 
light of evolutionary psychology. 
 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker's books "The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature") that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other "Language of Thought" of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W (and likewise by S), who tried to show, with hundreds of 
continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that 
language is the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human 
nature, and W's whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. 
Long before Searle, he rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of 
physiology, experimental psychology and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, 
Functionalism, Strong AI, DST, CTM, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down 
deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties he 
noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes (we can now see 
this as obliviousness to System 1 (roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological 
illusion’) and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these 
investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). And 
so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a 
window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic 
blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later 
evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Second Self--the 
dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.).    
 
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s comment 
that even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we are 
thinking--this should be the 
motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes clear, of Cognitive Psychology. 
But God could see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive 
thinking, since these S1 functions are always causal mental states while S2 
dispositions are only potentially CMS. This is not a theory but a fact about our 
grammar and our physiology. S muddies the waters here because he refers to 
dispositions as mental states as well, but as W did long ago, he shows that the 
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language of causality just does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 
descriptions—again not a theory but a description about how language 
(thinking) works. This brings up another point that is prominent in W but 
denied by S, that all we can do is give descriptions and not a theory. S insists 
he is providing theories but of course “theory” and “description” are language 
games too and it seems to me S’s theory is usually W’s description—a rose by 
any other name….  W’s point was that by sticking to perspicacious examples 
that we all know to be true accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand 
of theories that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while 
S wants to generalize and inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of 
his own mistakes in PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their theories to 
account for the multifarious language games they get closer and closer to 
describing behavior by way of numerous examples as did W. 
 
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the 
different (but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or 
roughly Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language Games 
(SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer and the impossibility of private language 
and the axiomatic structure of all behavior. Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first 
described S1 functions but as S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, 
leading to the whole mythology of inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to 
imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the brain.  The PLG's are 
utterances by and descriptions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true only, non-propositional, mental states- our perceptions 
and memories and involuntary acts (including System 1 Truths and UOA1 
(Understanding of Agency 1) and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which 
can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later SLG's are expressions 
or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, 
testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UOA2 and Emotions2- 
joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can 
only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to 
describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, 
just make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle for good disquisitions 
on this). 
  
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons 
(e.g., ` I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms 
of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is 
meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make sense 
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in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never. 
 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 
1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and 
Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical 
extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). 
W recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper. 
 
Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of regarding "language 
philosophy" as a separate study apart from other areas of behavior, since 
language is just another name for the mind. And, when W says that 
understanding behavior is in no way dependent on the progress of psychology 
(e.g., his oft-quoted assertion "The confusion and barrenness of psychology is 
not to be explained by calling it a `young science' --but cf. another comment 
that I have never seen quoted-- "Is scientific progress useful to philosophy? 
Certainly. The realities that are discovered lighten the philosophers task. 
Imagining possibilities." (LWPP1, 807). So, he is not legislating the boundaries 
of science but pointing out that our behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest 
picture possible of our psychology and that all discussions of higher order 
behavior are plagued by conceptual confusions. 
 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, to 
provide the physical basis for our behavior and facilitate our analysis of 
language games which nevertheless remain unexplainable--EP just is this way-
- and unchanged. The true-only axioms, most thoroughly explored in 'On 
Certainty', are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the automated true-only 
reactions of bacteria and their descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and 
operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb 
"Principles of Social Evolution". 
 
W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions 
rather than 
explanations, but of course these too are complex language games and one 
person's description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their innate true-
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only, nonempirical (automated and nonchangeable) responses to the world, 
animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into further true 
only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but this is a complex 
language game even in the context of mathematics). Tyrannosaurs and mesons 
become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands or our breathing. 
This dramatically changes one’s view of human nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) 
is not a theory at all but a group of true-only Understandings of Agency (UOA 
a term I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies and 
worms if UOA is suitably defined) have and subsequently extend greatly (in 
higher eukaryotes). However, as I note here, W made it very clear that for much 
of intentionality there are System 1 and System 2 versions (language games)-
the fast unconscious UOA1 and the Slow conscious UOA2 and of course these 
are heuristics for multifaceted phenomena. Although the raw material for S2 is 
S1, S2 also feeds back into S1— higher cortical feedback to the lowest levels of 
perception, memory, reflexive thinking that is a fundamental of psychology. 
Many of W’s examples explore this two way street (e.g., see the discussions of 
the duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ in Johnston).  
 
The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, 
intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least 
half a century earlier. One CANNOT help but incorporate T. rex and all that is 
relevant to it into our true only background via the inexorable workings of EP. 
Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is truly stupefying 
that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most basic fact of 
human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others) which was 
laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation of logic and 
our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature 
(as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only 
extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without 
threatening our sanity. Football or Britney Spears cannot just vanish from my 
or our memory and vocabulary as these concepts, ideas, events, developed out 
of and are tied to countless others in the true only network that begins with 
birth and extends in all directions to encompass much of our awareness and 
memory. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own 
unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other 
minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot 
really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of involuntary fast thinking 
axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
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I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work `On 
Certainty'), are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center 
of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has 
no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and 
unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UOA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over 
in endless examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes" (maybe 99% 
of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not 
have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words 
like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed 
extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) exemplified by Moore (whose papers 
inspired W to write OC), which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from 
direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I 
know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which is their normal use as 
dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home'). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 
1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not 
ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought 
or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later 
Searle call our EP). 
 
One of W's recurring themes was what is now called Theory of Mind (TOM), 
or as I prefer Understanding of Agency (UOA), but of course he did not use 
these terms, which is the subject of major research efforts now. I recommend 
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consulting the work of Ian Apperly, who is carefully dissecting UOA1 and 2 
and who has recently become aware of one of the leading Wittgensteinian 
philosophers Daniel Hutto, since Hutto has now characterized UOA1 as a 
fantasy (or rather insists that there is no `Theory' nor representation involved 
in UOA1--that being reserved for UOA2). However, like other psychologists, 
Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this between 60 and 80 years 
ago. 
 
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is 
epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not accurately describe nor determine 
how we act—now a pillar of the behavioral sciences. See ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion’ in Searle’s ‘Philosophy in a New Century’ (PNC) 
for a grand example from philosophy. It is an obvious corollary of W’s and S’s 
descriptive psychology that it is the unconscious automatisms of System 1 that 
dominate and describe behavior and that the later evolved conscious 
dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, desiring, regretting etc.) are mere 
icing on the cake. This is most strikingly borne out by the latest experimental 
psychology, some of which is nicely summarized by Kahneman in the book 
cited (see e.g., the chapter `Two Selves', but of course there is a huge volume of 
recent work he does not cite and an endless stream of pop and pro books 
issuing). It is an easily defensible view that most of the burgeoning literature 
on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is wholly 
compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. 
 
Regarding my view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems nobody has 
noticed that he very clearly explained several times specifically and many times 
in passing, the psychology behind what later became known as the Wason Test-
-long a mainstay of EP research. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and 
that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting 
the true-only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and 
thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged.  
Sometimes “certainty” is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might 
call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and non-revisable 
certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is 
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propositional (true or false).  This is of course a classic example of the “battle 
against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” which W 
demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or many) distinct uses.  
 
Again, ‘consciousness’ is the result of automated System 1 functioning that is 
‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the normal case, a 
matter of evidence but a true-only understanding in our own case and a true-
only perception in the case of others. 
 
We again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy and life) of identical 
words glossing over the huge differences in LG’s of ‘belief’, ‘seeing’ etc., as 
applied to S1 which is composed of mental states in the present only, and S2 
which is not. From an evolutionary or Wittgensteinian perspective, is the 
automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are 
inexorably and universally expanded during personal development into a 
wide array of automatic unconscious deontic relationships with others, and 
arbitrarily into cultural variations on them.  
 
To put it in my terms, S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, 
automatic, non-propositional, true only mental states –roughly the domain of 
the Inner, while slow S2 can only coherently be described in terms of reasons 
for actions that are more or less conscious dispositions to behavior (potential 
actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F)—roughly the domain of 
the Outer.  
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind 
exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of 
our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious.  
 
However, it is true that most of behavior is mechanical and that The 
Phenomenological Illusion is of vastly greater reach than Searle describes. It is 
most striking to me when driving a car on the freeway and suddenly snapping 
back to S2 awareness startled to realize I have just driven for several minutes 
with no conscious awareness at all. On reflection, this automatism can be seen 
to account for almost all of our behavior with just minimal supervision and 
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awareness from S2.  I am writing this page and have to think about what to say, 
but then it just flows out into my hands which type it and by and large it’s a 
surprise to me except when I think of changing a specific sentence. And you 
read it giving commands to your body to sit still and look at this part of the 
page but the words just flow into you and some kind of understanding and 
memory happen but unless you concentrate on a sentence there is only a vague 
sense of doing anything. A soccer player runs down the field and kicks the ball 
and thousands of nerve impulses and muscle contractions deftly coordinated 
with eye movements, and feedback from proprioceptive and balance organs 
have occurred, but there is only a vague feeling of control and high level 
awareness of the results. S2 is the Chief of Police who sits in his office while S1 
has thousands of officers doing the actual work according to laws that he 
mostly does not even know.  Reading, writing or soccer are voluntary acts A2 
seen from above but composed of thousands of automatic acts A1 seen from 
below. 
 
It is a good idea to read at least Chapter 6 of PNC, “The Phenomenological 
Illusion” (TPI). It is clear as crystal that TPI is due to obliviousness to the 
automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow conscious thinking of S2 as not only 
primary but as all there is. This is classic Blank Slate blindness. It is also clear 
that W showed this some 60 years earlier and also gave the reason for it in the 
primacy of the true-only unconscious automatic axiomatic network of our 
innate System 1 which is the source of the Inner. Very roughly, regarding 
‘observer independent’ features of the world as S1 or The Inner, and ‘observer 
dependent’ features as S2 or The Outer should prove very revealing. As S notes, 
the Phenomenologists have the ontology exactly backwards, but of course so 
does almost everyone due to the defaults of their EP.   
 
Though he was writing in the early 90’s when most of the above ideas from 
Searle and the recent work in psychology were not yet published, Johnston’s 
WRTI does a brilliant job of showing how W disposed of the myth of the Inner 
via careful examples of language in action.  Central to this is one of W’s brilliant 
insights—the impossibility of a private language --and Johnston (J) explains 
and expands on W’s view of this quite well. There cannot be any test for the 
correctness of our private ‘Inner’ phenomena, only for Outer public behavior.  
Our Inner S1 phenomenology (sensations, perceptions, memories etc.) only has 
a description because, during growth, we generate a language in our more 
recently evolved higher cortical S2 regions for describing Outer behavior.  The 
language of publicly viewable behaviors of feeling, thinking, knowing etc., are 
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then applied as we grew up as a species and as individuals (ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny) to represent our Inner life. However, its only 
connection with the Inner is the behavior we can see.  “Pain” is the inner S1 
primitive that we learn to describe with many S2 terms— “My arm is 
throbbing”, “It hurts just to think of it” etc.  
J notes that some will object that if our reports and memories are really 
untestable they would have no value but “This objection misses the whole 
point of W’s argument, for it assumes that what actually happened, and what 
the individual says happened, are two distinct things. As we have seen, 
however, the grammar of psychological statements means that the latter 
constitutes the criteria for the former. If we see someone with a concentrated 
expression on her face and want to know ‘what is going on inside her’, then her 
sincerely telling us that she is trying to work out the answer to a complicated 
sum tells us exactly what we want to know. The question of whether, despite 
her sincerity, her statement might be an inaccurate description of what she is 
(or was) doing does not arise. The source of confusion here is the failure to 
recognize that psychological concepts have a different grammar from that of 
concepts used to describe outer events. What makes the inner seem so 
mysterious is the misguided attempt to understand one concept in terms of 
another. In fact, our concept of the Inner, what we mean when we talk of ‘what 
was going on inside her’ is linked not to mysterious inner processes, but to the 
account which the individual offers of her experience…As processes or events, 
what goes on inside the individual is of no interest, or rather is of a purely 
medical or scientific interest (p13-14).  
 
“W’s attack on the notion of inner processes does not imply that only the Outer 
matters, on the contrary; by bringing out the true nature of utterances, he 
underlines the fact that we aren’t just interested in behavior.  We don’t just 
want to know that the person’s body was in such and such a position and that 
her features arranged in such and such a way. Rather we are interested in her 
account of what lay behind this behavior…” (p16-17) 
 
In laying out W’s reasoning on the impossibility of private rules or a private 
language, he notes that “The real problem however is not simply that she fails 
to lay down rules, but that in principle she could not do so…The point is that 
without publicly checkable procedures, she could not distinguish between 
following the rule and merely thinking she is following the rule.” 
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He then quotes one of W’s most famous passages which makes this issue 
crystal clear: “Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 
‘beetle’. No one can look into anyone else’s box and everyone says he knows 
what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. -Here it would be quite possible 
for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imaging 
such a thing constantly changing. -But suppose the word ‘beetle’ had a use in 
these people’s language? If so, it would not be used as the name of a thing. The 
thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all, not even as a 
something: for the box might even be empty. No, one can ‘divide through’ by 
the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is” (PI P293). 
 
And J nicely sums it up “This approach to the Inner involves a completely new 
way of understanding our psychological concepts. It also involves rejecting the 
confusing picture which treats the Inner as though it were a substance whose 
changes, states and motions the individual observes and reports on. In contrast, 
W’s approach emphasizes that what interests us is the attitudes and behavior 
of human beings.” (p27). 
 
The mythology of the Inner can be seen as another instance of the 
Phenomenological Illusion so nicely deconstructed by Searle.  Oblivious to the 
automaticity of the Inner System 1, we try, like the Phenomenologists, to 
explain the fast-automatic unconscious behaviors of S1 in terms of the slow, 
conscious behaviors of S2 and so we use the S2 dispositional language. ‘I think 
I’ll go out now’ comes out without a thought but it can also come out after 
thought. 
 
His next chapter “The World of the Senses” discusses the various language 
games of “seeing” and “seeing as”.  Though generally quite good he fails to 
make clear enough to suit me, W’s distinction between the true only S1 game 
of ‘seeing’ as a mental state with clear duration and the S2 game of “seeing as” 
that lacks clear duration and which is not really a mental state in the same 
sense. The perception becomes an object of reflection (slow thinking) in seconds 
and so is ‘seen’ and ‘seen as’ essentially simultaneously by S1 and S2 which 
feed into each other. His quote shows that W understood this well: “This makes 
this object into a chimera; a queerly shifting construction. For the similarity to 
a picture is now impaired.” (PI p196), and of course hundreds of pages from 
W’s third period discuss the relations between S1 and S2. 
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On p55 J makes the point with respect to vision (which has been made many 
times by W and S in this and other contexts) that the discussion of the Outer is 
entirely dependent for its very intelligibility on the unchallengeable nature of 
our direct first person experience of the Inner. The System 2 sceptical doubts 
concerning mind, will, senses, world, cannot get a foothold without the true 
only certainties of System 1 and the certainty that you are reading these words 
now is the basis for judgment, not a thing that can itself be judged.  This mistake 
is one of the most basic and common in all philosophy.  
 
On p81 he makes the point that the impossibility, in the normal case, of 
checking your statements concerning your dispositions (often but confusingly 
called ‘propositional attitudes’) such as what you thought or are feeling far 
from being a defect of our psychology is exactly what gives these statements 
interest.  “I am tired” tells us how you are feeling rather than giving us another 
bit of data about the Outer such as your slow movements or the shadows under 
your eyes.   
 
He then does an excellent job of explaining W’s debunking of the idea that 
meaning or understanding (and all dispositions) are experiences that 
accompany speech.  As W pointed out, just consider the case where you think 
you understand, and then find out you did not, to see the irrelevance of any 
inner experience to meaning, understanding, thinking, believing, knowing etc.  
The experience which counts is the awareness of the public language game we 
participate in.  Similar considerations dissolve the problem of the ‘lightning 
speed of thought’.  “The key is to recognize that thinking is not a process or a 
succession of experiences but an aspect of the lives of conscious beings. What 
corresponds to the lightning speed of thought is the individual’s ability to 
explain at any point what she is doing or saying.” (p86). And as W says “Or, if 
one calls the beginning and the end of the sentence the beginning and end of 
the thought, then it is not clear whether one should say of the experience of 
thinking that it is uniform during this time or whether it is a process like 
speaking the sentence itself” (RPP2 p237). 
 
Again: “The individuals account of what she thought has the same grammar 
as her account of what she intended and of what she meant. What we are 
interested in is the account of the past she is inclined to give and the assumption 
that she will be able to give an account is part of what is involved in seeing her 
as conscious” (p 91). That is, all these disposition verbs are part of our 
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conscious, voluntary S2 psychology.   
 
In “The Complexity of the Inner”, he notes that it is ironic that our best way to 
communicate the Inner is to refer to the Outer but I would say it is both natural 
and unavoidable. Since there is no private language and no telepathy, we can 
only contract muscles and by far the most efficient and deep communication is 
by contracting oral muscles (speech). As W commented in several contexts, it 
is in plays (or now in TV and films) that we see language (thought) in its purest 
form. 
 
Dispositions like intending continue as long as we don’t change or forget them 
and thus lack a precise duration, as well as levels of intensity and the content 
is a decision and so it not a precise mental state so in all these respects they are 
quite different from S1 perceptions, memories and reflexive responses like S1 
emotions.   
 
The difference between S1 and S2 (as I put - this was not a terminology 
available to J or W) also is seen in the asymmetry of the disposition verbs, with 
the first person use of ‘I believe’ etc., being (in the normal case of sincere 
utterance) true-only sentences vs the third person use ‘he believes’ etc., being 
true or false evidence-based propositions. One cannot say “I believe it is raining 
and it isn’t” but other tenses such as “I believed it was raining and it wasn’t” 
or the third person “He believes it is raining and it isn’t” are OK. As J says: 
“The general issue at the heart of the problem here is whether the individual 
can observe her own dispositions…The key to clarifying this paradox is to note 
that the individuals description of her own state of mind is also indirectly the 
description of a state of affairs…In other words, someone who says she believes 
P is thereby committed to asserting P itself…The reason therefor that the 
individual cannot observe her belief is that by adopting a neutral or evaluatory 
stance towards it, she undermines it. Someone who said “I believe it’s raining 
but it isn’t” would thereby undermine her own assertion. As W notes, there can 
be no first person equivalent of the third person use of the verb for the same 
reason that a verb meaning to believe falsely would lack a first person present 
indicative...the two propositions are not independent, for ‘the assertion that this 
is going on inside me asserts: this is going on outside me’ (RPP1 p490)” (p154-
56).  Though not commented on by W or J, the fact that children never make 
such mistakes as “I want the candy but I don’t believe I want it” etc., shows 
that such constructions are built into our grammar (into our genes) and not 
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cultural add-ons. 
 
He then looks at this from another viewpoint by citing W “What would be the 
point of my drawing conclusions from my own words to my behavior, when 
in any case I know what I believe? And what is the manifestation of my 
knowing what I believe? Is it not manifested precisely in this-that I do not infer 
my behaviour from my words?  That is the fact.” (RPP1 p744).  Another way to 
say this is that S1 is the axiomatic true-only basis for cognition and as the non-
propositional substrate for determining truth and falsity cannot be intelligibly 
judged.  
 
He ends the chapter with important comments on the variability within the 
LG’s (within our psychology) and I suggest it be read carefully. 
 
J continues the discussion in “The Inner/Outer Picture” much of which is 
summed up in his quote from W. “The inner is hidden from us means that it is 
hidden from us in a sense that it is not hidden from him. And it is not hidden 
from the owner in the sense that he gives expression to it, and we, under certain 
conditions, believe his expression and there error has no place. And this 
asymmetry in the game is expressed in the sentence that the Inner is hidden 
from other people.” (LWPP2 p36). J goes on: “The problem is not that that inner 
is hidden but that the language game it involves is very different from those 
where we normally talk about knowledge.”  And then he enters into one of W’s 
major themes throughout his life—the difference between man and machine. 
“But with a human being the assumption is that it is impossible to gain an insight 
into the mechanism. Thus, indeterminacy is postulated…I believe 
unpredictability must be an essential characteristic of the Inner. As also is the 
endless diversity of expressions.” (RPP2 p645 and LWPP2 p65). Again, W 
probes the difference between animals and computers. 
 
J notes that the uncertainties in our LG’s are not defects but critical to our 
humanity. Again W: “[What matters is] not that the evidence makes the feeling 
(and so the Inner) merely probable, but that we treat this as evidence for 
something important, that we base a judgement on this involved sort of 
evidence, and so that such evidence has a special importance in our lives and 
is made prominent by a concept.” (Z p554). 
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J sees three aspects of this uncertainty as the lack of fixed criteria or fine shades 
of meaning, the absence of rigid determination of the consequences of inner 
states and the lack of  fixed relationships between our concepts and experience. 
W: ”One can’t say what the essential observable consequences of an inner state 
are. When, for example, he really is pleased, what is then to be expected of him, 
and what not? There are of course such characteristic consequences, but they 
can’t be described in the same way as reactions which characterize the state of 
a physical object.” (LWPP2 p90).  J “Here her inner state is not something we 
cannot know because we cannot penetrate the veil of the Outer. Rather there is 
nothing determinate to know.” (p195).   
 
In his final chapter, he notes that our LG’s are not likely to change regardless 
of scientific progress. “Although it is conceivable that the study of brain activity 
might turn out to be a more reliable predictor of human behavior, the sort of 
understanding of human action it gave would not be the same as that involved 
in the language game on intentions. Whatever the value of the scientists’ 
discovery, it could not be said to have revealed what intentions really are.” 
(p213).  
 
This indeterminateness leads to the notion that correlation of brain states with 
dispositions seems unlikely. “The difficulty here is that the notion of one 
thought is a highly artificial concept. How many thoughts are there in the 
Tractatus? And when the basic idea for it struck W, was that one thought or a 
rash of them? The notion of intentions creates similar problems…These 
subsequent statements can all be seen as amplifications or explanations of the 
original thought, but how are we to suppose this relates to the brain state? Are 
we to imagine that it too will contain the answer to every possible question 
about the thought?... we would have to allow that two significantly different 
thoughts are correlated with the same brain state…words may in one sense be 
interchangeable and in another sense not. This creates problems for the attempt 
to correlate brain states and thoughts…two thoughts may be the same in one 
sense and different in another…Thus the notion of one thought is a fragile and 
artificial one and for that reason it is hard to see what sense it could make to 
talk of a one to one correlation with brain states.” (p218-219).   
Likewise, W denies that memory consists of traces in the nervous system. 
“Here the postulated trace is like the inner clock, for we no more infer what 
happened from a trace than we consult an inner clock to guess the time.” He 
then notes an example from W (RPP1 p908) of a man jotting marks while he 
reads and who cannot repeat the text without the marks but they don’t relate 
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to the text by rules …  ”The text would not be stored up in the jottings. And why 
should it be stored up in our nervous system?” and also “…nothing seems 
more plausible to me than that people will some day come to the definite 
opinion that there is no copy in either the physiological or the nervous systems 
which corresponds to a particular thought or a particular idea of memory” 
(LWPP1 p504). This implies that there can be psychological regularities to 
which no physiological regularities correspond; and as W provocatively adds 
‘If this upsets our concepts of causality, then it is high time they were upset.’” 
(RPP1 p905) … ’Why should not the initial and the terminal states of a system 
be connected by a natural law which does not cover the intermediary state? 
(RPP1 p909) ... [It is quite likely that] there is no process in the brain correlated 
with associating or with thinking, so that it would be impossible to read off 
thought processes from brain processes…Why should this order, so to speak, 
not proceed out of chaos? ... as it were, causelessly; and there is no reason why 
this should not really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talking and 
writing.’(RPP1 p903)…But must there be a physiological explanation here? 
Why don’t we just leave explaining alone? -but you would never talk like that 
if you were examining the behavior of a machine! –Well who says that a living 
creature, an animal body, is a machine in this sense?’”  (RPPI p918) (p 220-21). 
 
Of course, one can take these comments variously, but one way is that W 
anticipates the rise of chaos theory, embodied mind and self-organization in 
biology. Since uncertainty, chaos and unpredictability are standard doctrine 
now, from subatomic to molecular scale, and in planetary dynamics (weather 
etc.,) and cosmology, why should the brain be an exception? 
 
J’s final section on Freud is ok but not especially interesting and the appendix 
on Seeing As and Perception likewise. I feel that there is a great advantage in 
treating these topics from the modern two systems perspective and that this is 
basically what W did 60 years ago. Overall J has done a phenomenal job and 
this book should be required reading for all those interested in behavior.  
It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study 
of behavior—linguistics, philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, 
politics, sociology, and art, he is not even mentioned in most books and articles, 
with even the exceptions having little to say, and most of that distorted or flat 
wrong. There is a flurry of recent interest, at least in philosophy, and possibly 
this preposterous situation will change, but probably not much.  
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To show this framework and how it relates to a contemporary view of 
intentionality I have produced the following table. Those wishing a 
comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of 
behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed 
in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) from which it is taken. 
 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems 
(dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can 
also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of 
behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of 
reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the 
Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology 
of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler 
table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three 
recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker.  The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology 
by Malcolm Budd 203p (1989) 
 
 Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A superb effort but in my view Wittgenstein (i.e., philosophy or the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought) is not completely understood by anyone, 
so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s, without the modern 
dual systems of thought view and no comprehensive logical structure of 
rationality to have grasped him completely. Like everyone, he does not get that 
W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to our innate Evolutionary Psychology 
and the general framework of Wittgenstein’s and Searle’s work since laid out 
(e.g., in my recent articles) was unavailable to him. Nevertheless, he does a 
good job and nicely complements the work by Johnston (Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner) which I have also reviewed. Budd’s summary is a fitting 
end to the book(p165). “The repudiation of the model of ‘object and 
designation’ for everyday psychological words—the denial that the picture of 
the inner process provides a correct representation of the grammar of such 
words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility to the use of 
introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate 
foundation.” 
 
An excellent study, but in my view, like them all, it falls short of a full 
appreciation of W as I explain here and in my other reviews. 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
262  
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 
(1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has 
doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of 
philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent's desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ... The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's 
guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations...the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
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matters of deontic powers...to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action...these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action...The general 
point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"So status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by 
collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers...With 
the important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality and 
therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts that have 
the logical form of Declarations...all of human institutional reality is created 
and maintained in existence by (representations that have the same logical 
form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not speech 
acts in the explicit form of Declarations." Searle MSW p11-13 
 
"Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the 
upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like 
statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in that 
sense they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world direction 
of fit. The conative-volitional states such as desires, prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. 
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They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we would like 
them to be or how we intend to make them be...In addition to these two 
faculties, there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional content is not 
supposed to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents of cognition 
and volition are supposed to fit...the world-relating commitment is abandoned 
and we have a propositional content without any commitment that it represent 
with either direction of fit." Searle MSW p15 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
 
"But there is no pre-linguistic analog for the Declarations. Pre-linguistic 
intentional states cannot create facts in the world by representing those facts as 
already existing. This remarkable feat requires a language" MSW p69 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions 
of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive 
capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way that is 
essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker intentionally 
produces a physical utterance, but at another level the utterance represents 
something. And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level it is a 
physical object like any other. At another level it has a meaning: it represents a 
type of a state of affairs" MSW p74 
 
"...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according 
to the conventions of a language without creating commitments. This is true 
not just for statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior from our two greatest descriptive 
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psychologists. 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to 
contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) 
and Wittgenstein (W). It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a 
New Century), TLP, PI, OC, WRTI and other books by these two geniuses. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the 
logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking 
of S2. 
 
Some of W's frequent topics in his 3rd period were the Inner and the Outer--
see e.g., Johnston-`Wittgenstein: 
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Rethinking the Inner' (WRTI) on how confusing the two is a major industry in 
philosophy and psychology) -- the impossibility of private language and the 
axiomatic structure of all behavior. Verbs like ` thinking', ` seeing' first described 
S1 functions but as S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, leading to 
the whole mythology of the inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to 
imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the brain. S1 is the simple 
automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror 
neuron, true-only, non- propositional, mental states- our perceptions and 
memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UOA1 
 
--Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which 
can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are 
expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing 
neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UOA2 and 
Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating-- the dispositional (and often 
counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, 
believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a 
fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic 
physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle and 
Hacker (Human Nature)for good disquisitions on this). 
 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-
propositional, true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be 
described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become 
propositional (T or F). It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the 
mechanical view of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior--it is 
the default operation of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we 
can deliberately think through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of 
which we mostly remain oblivious--called by S in PNC ` The Phenomenological 
Illusion' (TPI). TPI is not a harmless philosophical error but a universal 
obliviousness to our biology which produces the illusion that we control our 
life and the consequences are almost certain collapse of civilization during the 
next 150 years. 
 
I find W's description of our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions 
in his OC and other 3rd period works to be deeper than S's (or anyone's). 
 
267  
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking of System 1 has revolutionized 
psychology, economics and other disciplines under names like "cognitive 
illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too 
are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these 
words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever 
of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later 
Searle call our EP). 
 
Though W warned frequently against theorizing and produced more revealing 
examples of language in action than anyone, one might say that his aggregate 
aphorisms illustrated by examples constitute the most comprehensive "theory" 
of behavior ever penned. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and that to miss him is 
to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. I have had to cut 
the background info to a minimum, so those wishing for more please consult 
my many other reviews on W, S, Hutto, Johnston, etc. 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic 
relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of 
behavior. 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or 
dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term `propositional 
attitudes' by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of 
PNC: "Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of 
satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of 
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satisfaction." As S states it in PNC, "A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction...and a condition of satisfaction... is that 
such and such is the case." Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have 
been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. Regarding 
intentions, "In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function causally 
in the production of the action."(MSWp34). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates 
the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat 
muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, 
which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over pre-linguistic or 
proto-linguistic interactions in which only gross muscle movements were able 
to convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W's "On Certainty" or "RPP1 and 2" or 
DMS's two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference 
between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions 
describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S's taking S1 
perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they can 
only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them in MSW) after one begins thinking 
about them in S2. 
 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of 
one event so for IAA "We have different levels of description where one level 
is constituted by the behavior at the lower level...in addition to the constitutive 
by way of relation, we also have the causal by means of relation."(p37 MSW). 
 
"The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and 
intentions-in-action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are 
strikingly different."(p35 MSW). The COS of PI need a whole action while those 
of IAA only a partial one. He makes clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions (PI) 
are mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result in intentions-in-
action(IAA) which are conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally self-
referential (CSR). The critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs 
and desires) it is essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. These 
descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1, which 
Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended one I have 
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created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern psychological 
research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W's true-only vs propositional 
(dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-only perception, 
memory and intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as belief and desire. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal 
(e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change 
the paragraphs from MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on p 40 with 
"conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (`will') are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior 
intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire things to be 
with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination-
-desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their COS in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- 
only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or 
blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the 
causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time shifted, as they represent the 
past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. The two systems 
feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by the learned 
deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions 
that dominate our life S has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion.' 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 
just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully 
clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. 
The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
His summary of deontics (rights and obligations) on p50 of MSW needs 
translation. Thus "You have to have a pre-linguistic form of collective 
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intentionality, on which the linguistic forms are built, and you have to have the 
collective intentionality of the conversation in order to make the commitment" 
is much clearer (once you get used to my terminology) as "The prelinguistic 
axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic dispositions of S2 (i.e., our EP) which 
evolve during our maturation into their cultural manifestations in S3." 
 
It is critical to understand the notion of `function' that is relevant here. "A 
function is a cause that serves a purpose...In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent...status functions... 
require... collective imposition and recognition of a status"(p59 MSW). 
 
Again, I suggest the translation of "The intentionality of language is created by 
the intrinsic, or mind-independent intentionality of human beings" (p66 MSW) 
as "The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the 
unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1". That is, one must keep in 
mind that behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
S states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has 
a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many 
times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to 
understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and 
true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, 
axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional 
in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that 
was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be 
possible. As W showed countless times and biology shows so clearly, life must 
be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that 
always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no 
philosophy. 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations 
of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than 
contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of 
magnitude higher for visual information. 
 
S1 and S2 are critical parts of human EP and are the results, respectively of 
billions and hundreds of millions of years of natural selections by inclusive 
fitness. They facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of 
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Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally 
bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk in S’s MSW (e.g., p114) about `extra-
linguistic conventions' and `extra semantical semantics' is in fact referring to 
EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which are the basis for 
all behavior. As W said many times, the most familiar is for that reason 
invisible. 
 
Thinking is propositional and so deals with true or false statements, which 
means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the 
true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. Or you can say that spontaneous 
utterances and actions are the primitive reflexes of S1, while representations 
are the dispositional Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of S2. It sounds trivial 
and indeed it is, but this is the most basic statement of how behavior works and 
hardly anyone has ever understood it. 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified by the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall 
cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The 
Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') 
is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are 
fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology who thinks a bit can see that this view is not credible. 
 
Here is my summary (following S in MSW) of how practical reason operates: 
We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space 
and time, often for reciprocal altruism--RA), which produce dispositions to 
behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve 
our inclusive fitness-IF (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those 
closely related). 
 
I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in higher animals and not at all 
unique to humans (think mother hen defending her brood from a fox) if we 
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include the automated pre-linguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but certainly 
the higher order DIRA of S2/3 or DIRA2 that require language are uniquely 
human. The paradox of how we can voluntarily carry out DIRA2/3 (i.e., the S2 
acts and their S3 extension that are desire independent) is that the unconscious 
DIRA1, serving long term inclusive fitness, generate the conscious DIRA2 
which often override the short term personal immediate desires. Agents do 
indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very 
restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
 
On the contrary, following W, it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic 
S1 true-only reflexive actions and cannot be questioned without contradiction 
as S1 is the basis for questioning. You cannot doubt you are reading this page 
as your awareness of it is the basis for doubting. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
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Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only an highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
 
Now for some comments on Budd's WPP. 
 
As with all commentary on W, one must keep in mind when it was written and 
what works were consulted. On his death in 1951 W left behind a scattered 
collection of some 20,000 pages. Apart from the Tractatus, they were 
unpublished and largely unknown, although some were widely circulated and 
read (as were notes taken in his classes), leading to extensive but largely 
unacknowledged influences.  Some works are known to have been lost and 
many others W had destroyed.  Most of this Nachlass was microfilmed in 1968 
by Cornell University and copies were bought by a very few libraries. Budd, 
like most W commentators of the period, does not reference the microfilm. 
Although much of the Nachlass is repetitive and appears in some form in his 
subsequently published works (which are referenced by Budd), many variant 
texts are of great interest and there is substantial material that has never been 
translated from the original German nor published in book form. In 1998 the 
Bergen CD of the complete Nachlass appeared -- Wittgenstein's Nachlass: Text 
and Facsimile Version: The Bergen Electronic Edition 
 
$2500 ISBN 10: 0192686917. It is available through interlibrary loan and 
apparently free on the net as well. Like the other CDs of W’s work, it is available 
from Intelex (www.nlx.com). It is indexed and searchable and the prime W 
resource. However, my extensive readings of the W literature show that very 
few people have bothered to consult it and thus their works are lacking a 
critical element. One can see Rodych’s papers on W’s remarks on Godel for one 
notable exception. 
 
One major work dating from W’s middle period (1933) that was published as a 
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book in 2000 is the famous Big Typescript. Since Budd finished this book in 
1989, neither this nor the Bergen CD was available to him and he neglected the 
Cornell microfilm. Nevertheless, by far the most important works date from 
W’s 3
rd period (ca. 1935 to 1951) and these were all used by Budd. 
 
In addition, there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century 
Viennese German into modern English. One must be a master of English, 
German, and W in order to do this and very few are up to it. All of his works 
suffer from clear translation errors and there are more subtle questions where 
one has to understand the whole thrust of his later philosophy in order to 
translate. Since, in my view, nobody has grasped the full import of his later 
works, one can see why W has yet to be fully appreciated. Even the more or 
less well known critical difference e.g., between understanding ‘Satz’ as 
‘sentence’ (i.e., an S1 utterance) vs ‘proposition’ (i.e., an S2 utterance) in various 
contexts has never been fully understood (see my review of OC). 
 
 
The above comments seem to me to be as good a description of higher order 
behavior as one can find but of course it is not completely understood by 
anyone so we can hardly expect Budd, writing in the mid 80’s to have grasped 
it. Like everyone he does not get that W’s use of the word ‘grammar’ refers to 
our EP and the whole framework of W’s and S’s work laid out above was 
unavailable to him. Nevertheless, he does a good job and nicely complements 
the work by Johnston (Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner) which I have also 
reviewed. 
 
Inevitably, W’s famous demonstrations of the uselessness of introspection and 
the impossibility of a truly private language pop up repeatedly 
(“…introspection can never lead to a definition…” p8). The basics of this 
argument are extremely simple—no test, no language and a test can only be 
public. If I grow up alone on a desert island with no books and one day decide 
to call the round things on the trees ‘coconut’ and then next day I see one and 
say ‘coconut’ again it seems like I have started on a language. But suppose what 
I say (since there is no person or dictionary to correct me) is ‘coca’ or even 
‘apple’ and the next day something else? Memory is notoriously fallible and 
we have great trouble keeping things straight even with constant correction 
from others and with incessant input from media. This may seem like a trivial 
point but it is central to the whole issue of the Inner and the Outer— i.e., our 
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true-only untestable statements of our experience vs the true or false testable 
statements regarding everything in the world, including our own behavior. 
Though W explained this with many examples beginning over ¾ of a century 
ago, it has rarely been understood and it is impossible to go very far with any 
discussion of behavior unless one does. As W, S, Hutto, Budd, Johnston and 
others have explained, anyone who thinks W has an affinity with Skinner, 
Quine, Dennett, Functionalism or any other behaviorist excretions that deny 
our inner life needs to go back to the beginning. 
 
On p21 he begins discussing dispositions (i.e., S2 abilities such as thinking, 
knowing, believing) which seem like they refer to mental states (i.e., to S1 
automatisms), another major confusion which W was the first to set straight. 
Thus, on p28 ‘reading’ must be understood as another dispositional ability that 
is not a mental state and has no definite duration like thinking, understanding, 
believing etc. 
 
Few notice (Budd p29-32 and Moyal-Sharrock recently are rare exceptions) that 
W presciently (decades before chaos and complexity science came into being) 
suggested that some mental phenomena may originate in chaotic processes in 
the brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding to a memory trace. He 
also suggested several times that the causal chain has an end and this could 
mean both that it is just not possible (regardless of the state of science) to trace 
it any further and that the concept of `cause' ceases to be applicable beyond a 
certain point (p34). Subsequently, many have made similar suggestions 
without any idea that W anticipated them by decades (in fact over a century 
now in a few instances). On p32 the “counter-factual conditionals” refer again 
to dispositions such as “may think it’s raining” which are possible states of 
affairs (or potential actions—S’s conditions of satisfaction) which may arise in 
chaos. It may be useful to tie this to S’s 3 gaps of intentionality which he finds 
critically necessary. 
 
Budd notes W’s famous comment on p33 -- “The mistake is to say that there is 
anything that meaning something consists in.” Though W is correct that there 
is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes (as quoted above) that there 
is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the 
imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” which is 
an act and not a mental state. As Budd notes on p35 this can be seen as another 
statement of his argument against private language (personal interpretations 
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vs publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule following and interpretation on 
p36 -41—they can only be publicly checkable acts--no private rules or private 
interpretations either. And one must note here it is that many (most famously 
Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled by W’s frequent referrals to 
community practice into thinking it’s just arbitrary public practice that 
underlies language and social conventions. W makes clear many times that 
such conventions are only possible given an innate shared psychology which 
he often calls the background. Budd correctly rejects this as W’s idea several 
times (e.g., p58). 
 
In his next chapter, he deals with sensations which in my terms (and in modern 
psychology) is S1 and in W’s terms the true-only undoubtable and untestable 
background. His comment (p47)  ”that our beliefs about our present sensations 
rest upon an absolutely secure foundation- the “myth of the given” is one of 
the principal objects of Wittgenstein’s attack...” can easily be misunderstood. 
Firstly, he makes the universal mistake of calling these ‘beliefs’, but it is better 
to reserve this word for S2 true or false dispositions. As W made very clear, the 
sensations, memories and reflexive acts of S1 are axiomatic and not subject to 
belief in the usual sense but are better called understandings. Unlike our beliefs 
(including those in other people’s S1 experiences), there is no mechanism for 
doubt. Budd explains this well, as on p52 where he notes that there is no 
possible justification for saying one is in pain. That is, justifying means testing 
and that is possible with S2 dispositional slow conscious thinking, not S1 
reflexive fast unconscious processing. His discussion of this on p52-56 is 
excellent but in my view, like everyone who discusses W on rules, private 
language and the inner, all he needs to do is say that in S1 there is no possible 
test and this is the meaning of W’s famous the ‘inner process’ stands in need of 
outward criteria’. 
 
Budd’s footnote 21 confuses the true only causal experiences of S1 and the 
reasoned dispositions of S2. 
The point of the next few pages on names for ‘internal objects’ (pains, beliefs, 
thoughts etc.) is again that they have their use (meaning) and it is the 
designation of dispositions to act, or in S’s terms, the specification of 
Conditions of Satisfaction which make the utterance true. 
 
Again, his discussion of “Sensations and Causation” is wrong in stating that 
we ‘self-ascribe’ or ‘believe’ in our sensations or ‘take a stance’ (Dennett) that 
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we have a pain or see a horse, but rather we have no choice—S1 is true-only 
and a mistake is a rare and bizarre occurrence and of an entirely different kind 
than a mistake in S2. And S1 is causal as opposed to S2, which concerns reasons, 
and that is why seeing the horse or feeling the pain or jumping out of the way 
of a speeding car is not subject to judgments or mistakes. But he gets in right 
again — “So the infallibility of non-inferential self-ascriptions of pain is 
compatible with the thesis that a true self-ascription of pain must be caused by 
a physical event in the subject’s body, which is identical with the pain he 
experiences (p67).” I do not accept his following statement that W would not 
accept this based on one or two comments in his entire corpus, since in his later 
work (notably OC) he spends hundreds of pages describing the causal 
automated nature of S1 and how it feeds into (causes) S2 which then feeds back 
to S1 to cause muscle movements (including speech). Animals survive only 
because their life is totally directed by the phenomena around them which are 
highly predictable (dogs may jump but they never fly). 
The next chapter on Seeing Aspects describes W’s extensive comments on how 
S1 and S2 interact and where our language is ambiguous in what we may mean 
by ‘seeing’. In general, it’s clear that ‘seeing as’ or aspectual seeing is part of the 
slow S2 brain actions while just seeing is the true-only S1 automatisms, but they 
are so well integrated that it is often possible to describe a situation in multiple 
ways which explains W’s comment on p97.He notes that W is exclusively 
interested in what I have elsewhere called ‘Seeing2’ or ‘Concepts2’—i.e., 
aspectual or S2 higher order processing of images. 
 
Here, as throughout this book and indeed in any discussion of W or of 
behavior, it is of great value to refer to Johnston’s book and especially to his 
discussions of the indeterminate nature of language. 
 
In chapter 5 we again deal with a major preoccupation of W’s later work—the 
relations between S1 and S2. As I have noted in my other reviews, few if any 
have fully understood the later W and, lacking the S1, S2, framework it is not 
surprising. Thus, Budd’s discussion of seeing (unconscious S1) vs visualizing 
(conscious S2 which is subject to the will) is severely hampered. Thus, one can 
understand why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the domination 
of S2 by S1 (p110). And on p115 it is the familiar issue of there being no test for 
my inner experiences, so whatever comes to mind when I imagine Jack’s face 
is the image of Jack. Similarly, with reading and calculation which can refer to 
S1, S2 or a combination and there is the constant temptation to apply S2 terms 
to S1 processes where that lack of any test makes them inapplicable. On p120 
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et seq. he mentions two of W’s famous examples used for combatting this 
temptation—playing tennis without a ball (‘S1 tennis’), and a tribe that had 
only S2 calculation so ‘calculating in the head (‘S1 calculating’) was not 
possible. ‘Playing’ and ‘calculating’ describe actual or potential acts—i.e., they 
are disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said 
before one really ought to keep them straight by writing ‘playing1’ and 
‘playing2’ etc. But we are not taught to do this and so we want to either dismiss 
‘calculating1’ as a fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature undecided until 
later. 
 
Hence W’s famous comment (p120)— “The decisive movement in the 
conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite 
innocent.” 
 
Chapter 6 explains another frequent topic of W’s—that when we speak, the 
speech itself is our thought and there is not some other prior mental process 
and this can be seen as another version of the private language argument for 
there are no such things as ‘inner criteria’ which enable us to tell what we 
thought before we act (speak). 
 
The point of W’s comments (p125) about other imaginable ways to use the verb 
‘intend’ is that they would not be the same as our ‘intend’—i.e., the name of a 
potential event (PE) and in fact it is not clear what it would mean. “I intend to 
eat” has the COS of eating but if it meant (COS is) eating then it wouldn’t 
describe an intention but an action and if it meant saying the words (COS is 
speech) then it wouldn’t have any further COS and how could it function in 
either case? 
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To the question on p127 as to when a sentence expresses a thought (has a 
meaning), we can say ‘When it has clear COS’ and this means has public truth 
conditions. Hence the quote from W: ” When I think in language, there aren’t 
‘meanings’ going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought.” And, if I think with or without words, 
the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible 
criterion (COS). Thus, W’s lovely aphorisms (p132) “It is in language that wish 
and fulfillment meet” and “Like everything metaphysical, the harmony 
between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.” 
And one might note here that ‘grammar’ in W can usually be translated as ‘EP’ 
and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, 
this is about as broad a characterization of philosophy and higher order 
descriptive psychology as one can find. 
 
It helps greatly in this section on the harmony of thought with reality (i.e., of 
how dispositions like expecting, thinking, imagining work-- what it means to 
utter them) to state them in terms of S’s COS which are the PE (possible events) 
which make them true. If I say I expect Jack to come then the COS (PE) which 
makes it true is that Jack arrives and my mental states or physical behavior 
(pacing the room, imagining Jack) are irrelevant. The harmony of thought and 
reality is that jack arrives regardless of my prior or subsequent behavior or any 
mental states I may have and Budd is confused or at least confusing when he 
states (p132 bottom) that there must be an internal description of a mental state 
that can agree with reality and that this is the content of a thought, as these 
terms should be restricted to the automatisms of S1 only and never used for the 
conscious functions of S2. The content (meaning) of the thought that Jack will 
come is the outer (public) event that he comes and not any inner mental event 
or state, which the private language argument shows is impossible to connect 
to the outer events. 
 
We have very clear verification for the outer event but none at all for ‘inner 
events’. And as W and S have beautifully demonstrated many times, the speech 
act of uttering the sentence ‘I expect Jack to come’ just is the thought that Jack 
will come and the COS is the same—that Jack does come. And so, the answer 
to the two questions on p133 and the import of W’s comment on p 135 should 
now be crystal clear — “In virtue of what is it true that my expectation does 
have that content?” and “What has become now of the hollow space and the 
corresponding solid?” as well as “…the interpolation of a shadow between the 
sentence and reality loses all point. 
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For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow.” And thus, it should 
also be quite clear what Budd is referring to as to what makes it “possible for 
there to be the required harmony (or lack of harmony) with reality.” 
 
Likewise, with the question in the next section-- what makes it true that my 
image of Jack is an image of him? Imagining is another disposition and the COS 
is that the image I have in my head is Jack and that’s why I will say ‘YES’ if 
shown his picture and ‘NO’ if shown one of someone else. The test here is not 
that the photo matches the vague image I had but that I intended it (had the 
COS that) to be an image of him. Hence the famous quote from W: “If God had 
looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were 
speaking of (PI p217)” and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in “that’s Him” and “…what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies.” Hence W’s summation (p140) that 
“What it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he 
calls what happened the wish that that should happen” … the question whether 
I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact 
that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I 
should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied” … Suppose it 
were asked ‘Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, 
then I do know.” Disposition words refer to PE’s which I accept as fulfilling the 
COS and my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc., have no bearing 
on the way dispositions function. 
 
As Budd rightly notes, I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, 
desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be-- on the COS that I 
express. Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be 
expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
W never devoted as much time to emotions as he did to dispositions so there 
is less substance to chapter 7. He notes that typically the object and cause are 
the same—i.e., they are causally self-referential—a concept further developed 
by S. If one looks at my table it is clear they have much more in common with 
the fast, true-only automatisms of S1 than with the slow, true or false thinking 
of S2 but of course S1 feeds S2 and in turn is often fed by it. 
Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the 
model of ‘object and designation’ for everyday psychological words—the 
denial that the picture of the inner process provides a correct representation of 
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the grammar of such words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s hostility 
to the use of introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate 
foundation.” 
 
An excellent study, but in my view, like them all, it falls short of a full 
appreciation of W as I have explained above and in my other reviews. 
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Review of Wittgenstein-a critical reader Hans-
Johann Glock (ed.)   (2001) 
      
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of the 17 original papers here is to summarize and analyze 
Wittgenstein's thought. At the time these were being written, the 
Oxford/Intelex CDROM ($2040 on Amazon but available thru interlibrary 
loan and steeply discounted on the net) with 20,000 some pages of W's 
nachlass was not yet available, and only those fluent in German and willing 
to find and slog thru the incomplete Cornell microfilm were able to examine 
it. To this day, much of it remains untranslated from the German 
typescripts and handwritten manuscripts. I note this at the outset as W's 
untranslated or unpublished writings often shed crucial light on his 
thought and few to this day have made substantial use of them. In addition, 
there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century Viennese 
German into modern English. One must be a master of English, German, 
and Wittgenstein in order to do this and very few are up to it. Several of the 
current authors note unfortunate translation errors in the only available 
English editions and I have seen similar comments countless times.  
 
As is well known, W's thought changed dramatically between the 
publication of the Tractatus (TLP) in 1922 and the Philosophical 
Investigations (1953). The continuity or lack thereof between his early and 
late work is the subject of a vast literature and is taken up here by several 
authors. Ishiguro on the picture theory and Mounce on the logical system 
in TLP are good, but for me the endless discussions of exactly how he was 
mistaken in his early work is of as little interest as the mistakes in most 
previous philosophy. Ammereller on Intentionality is a good, if prosaic, 
summary of (mostly) the early and middle W on belief and interpretation 
which, like virtually everyone, totally fails to give an adequate overview of 
W's pioneering work. In giving the general outline of our innate 
evolutionary psychology (i.e., roughly our personality) and showing how 
this describes behavior, W represents a major milestone in human thought. 
There are unmistakeable indications of this even in his early writings (e.g., 
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see p 40, 49-58 here) and it has been documented by Hacker (e.g., see his 
paper in The New Wittgenstein) and others but without any 
comprehensive account in book form to date (but watch for a new book by 
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock in 2017). Overall a good book for introducing W 
to a general philosophical audience but now very dated by the recent work 
of Hacker, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva, Hutto, Read and others.   
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
The aim of the 17 original papers here is to summarize and analyze 
Wittgenstein’s thought. 
 
At the time these were being written, the Oxford/Intelex CDROM ($2040 on 
Amazon but available thru interlibrary loan and steeply discounted on the 
net) with 20,000 some pages of W’s nachlass was not yet available, and only 
those fluent in German and willing to find and slog thru the incomplete 
Cornell microfilm were able to examine it. To this day, much of it remains 
untranslated from the German typescripts and handwritten manuscripts. I 
note this at the outset as W’s untranslated or unpublished writings often 
shed crucial light on his thought and few to this day (2008) have made 
substantial use of them. In addition, there are huge problems with 
translation of his early 20
th 
century Viennese German into modern English. 
One must be a master of English, German, and Wittgenstein in order to do 
this and very few are up to it. Several of the current authors note unfortunate 
translation errors in the only available English editions and I have seen 
similar comments countless times. 
 
As is well known, W’s thought changed dramatically between the 
publication of the Tractatus (TLP) in 1922 and the Philosophical 
Investigations (1953). The continuity or lack thereof between his early and 
late work is the subject of a vast literature and is taken up here by several 
authors. Ishiguro on the picture theory and Mounce on the logical system 
in TLP are good, but for me the endless discussions of exactly how he was 
mistaken in his early work is of as little interest as the mistakes in most 
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previous philosophy. 
 
Ammereller on Intentionality is a good, if prosaic, summary of (mostly) the 
early and middle W on belief and interpretation which, like virtually 
everyone, totally fails to give an adequate overview of W’s pioneering work. 
In giving the general outline of our innate evolutionary psychology (i.e., 
roughly our personality) and showing how this describes behavior, W 
represents a major milestone in human thought. There are unmistakeable 
indications of this even in his early writings (e.g., see p 40, 49-58 here) and 
it has been documented by Hacker (e.g., see his paper in The New 
Wittgenstein) and others but without any comprehensive account to date. 
 
Rundle’s contribution on meaning and understanding, which W classed as 
dispositions or inclinations and are now commonly called propositional 
attitudes, is mostly pedestrian and completely misses W’s major point that, 
like most of our psychology, these are public phenomena and not private 
mental states. Of course, he can be forgiven since hardly anyone interested 
in behavior (which can be taken to include everyone) has realized this, nor 
noted that W was the first to discuss it some 75 years ago. 
 
Arrington gives an adequate, if standard, account of W on rule following 
and Hanfling an exceptional summary of W on thinking. He makes it very 
clear that W showed dispositions are activities (or potential activities in 
some uses of the words) which are necessarily public, shared acts—a crucial 
basic fact rarely understood even by the brightest and the best (see e.g., 
Chomsky’s insistence--- in his more recent writings-- on the internal nature 
of language). Candlish follows with the best concise account I have seen of 
W’s thoughts on willing. 
 
Schroeder provides a good article on another of W’s major advances in 
understanding how the mind works—the impossibility of private language 
and private experience—i.e., just what Chomsky and millions of others 
have missed. However, he falters in midarticle by failing to get the 
difference between dispositions (thoughts, beliefs, meanings etc.) which 
cannot be true or false and carry no information, and judgements of 
empirical facts which do, and thus fails to fully grasp the private language 
argument. There is no test for beliefs, thoughts, desires, intentions etc., even 
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for oneself, until they are acted out in the public arena. Anything which is 
truly private is of no consequence in our social life or our language 
(thought). 
 
Ter Hark, who has written a book on W’s philosophy of psychology 
(though all of philosophy is psychology) contributes an adequate survey on 
“The Inner and The Outer” but is not really clear about how our psychology 
rests on innate, unquestionable axioms and how this is related to the axioms 
of mathematics. 
 
Bakhurst’s review of W on personal identity is barely adequate and shows 
little grasp of W’s overall contributions to psychology. Likewise, with 
Mulhall’s “Seeing Aspects.” 
 
Frascolla, who has written a rather good book on W’s Philosophy of 
Mathematics provides a good but hurried article that will be of little use to 
those not versed in this topic already. 
 
I found Schwyzer’s article on Autonomy to be entirely useless—an amazing 
but common achievement when writing about the greatest contributor to 
our most fascinating subject—how the mind works. 
 
Grayling does a careful dissection of W’s last great work On Certainty but 
misses the fact (as W noted many, many times) that all the skeptical views 
of knowing and certainty are incoherent, depending, as they must, on our 
innate axiomatic psychology to even state them. 
 
The world’s leading W scholar, PMS Hacker gives a good summary of W’s 
views on the nature of philosophy, but even he seems to have no clear grasp 
of the fact that W’s “grammar” refers to our inherited intentional 
psychology. 
 
The late DZ Phillips contributes one his many articles on faith and ethics in 
W and I found this one as dull as the rest. Like most who write on W, he 
passes up a gold mine by failing to consider the relevance of W’s many 
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penetrating comments on machines, animals and alien tribes. 
 
In order to place these articles in the context of current philosophy and 
psychology I include the table of intentionailty from my recent (2016) work on 
the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive Psychology of Higher 
Order Thought). It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn 
owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables 
being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes 
which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare 
it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this 
table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and 
useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one.  
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A Review of ‘The Blue and Brown Books’ by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein 208p (1958) (1933-1935) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This work can be regarded as an outline of behavior (human nature) from our 
greatest descriptive psychologist. In considering these matters we must keep 
in mind that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought 
(HOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I 
have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. Sadly, Wittgenstein's brilliant 
exposition of behavior is still understood well by only a handful. 
 
Much of the work is aimed at undermining the idea of introspection and 
private language via clever examples and of course there is a mountain of 
literature on this topic since but neither W nor anyone else ever makes it clear 
that the basic argument is trivial—if you don’t have a test that distinguishes 
between two words they cannot have a role in language and there cannot be 
any such test for private mental phenomena. In between he is describing how 
System 1 (the automatic functions of the brain) is described by intransitive uses 
of verbs such as seeing, remembering (i.e., they are Causally Self Reflexive) and 
differs from and blends into System 2- the deliberative linguistic system (e.g. 
p101, 161, 166 etc.). He spends much time showing that disposition words (S2) 
such as thinking, meaning, judging, interpreting, knowing, understanding, 
believing, intending, reading, calculating, recognizing, comparing, deciding, 
counting, imaging etc. are not mental states with a precise duration but that 
their use depends on their having a clear public outcome-i.e., being transitive 
verbs (i.e., having Conditions of Satisfaction, which is the phrase Searle 
invented decades later). They are abilities to act. 
 
I suggest that with the perspective I propose, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is 
to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
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articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
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"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not 
a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is 
no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as 
from a reservoir.” BBB p143 
 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined 
to make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It 
is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an 
idea that “something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto 
the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule 
as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence 
and reality loses all point. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a 
shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity 
with what it represents.” BBB p37 
 
“Thus we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are 
obviously not aware of the many different usages of the word “proof; and that 
they are not clear about the differences between the uses of the word “kind”, 
when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word “kind” 
here meant the same thing as in the context “kinds of apples.” Or, we may say, 
they are not aware of the different meanings of the word “discovery” when in 
one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the 
other case of the discovery of the South Pole.” BBB p29 
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"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched.  Of course, there are then 
no questions left, and this itself is the answer.”  TLP 6.52 
 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
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“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions.” PI 126 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107 
 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have 
got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in 
the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is 
already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the 
future.” (said in 1930) Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle 
(1979) p183 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! ….This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations.  If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.” Zettel 
p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (HOT), 
which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I have 
never seen it clearly stated anywhere. 
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The book originates in two sets of notes taken at his lectures between 1933 and 
1935 which were circulated as mimeographed copies. Those from 1933–4 were 
bound in blue while those from 1934–5 were bound in brown and they were 
published in 1958 as ‘Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations’. 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: 
“Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our 
subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems 
about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship between 
thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and 
knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of 
mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy 
of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of 
insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of 
reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He 
undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of 
philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the 
conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--
'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively 
describe the two systems of thought -- fast automatic pre-linguistic S1 and the 
slow reflective linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is 
possible with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for 
judging and cannot be doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness, self, 
time and space are innate true-only axioms. He discussed many times what is 
now known as Theory of Mind, Framing and cognitive illusions. He frequently 
explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it 
generates behavior. He described the psychology behind what later became the 
Wason test--a fundamental measure used in EP research decades later. He 
noted the indeterminate nature of language and the game-like nature of social 
interaction. He examined in thousands of pages and hundreds of examples 
how our inner mental experiences are not describable in language, this being 
possible only for public behavior with a public language (the impossibility of 
private language). Thus, he can be viewed as the first evolutionary 
psychologist. 
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He patented helicopter designs which anticipated by three decades the use of 
blade-tip jets to drive the rotors and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-
flow gas turbine engine, designed a heart-beat monitor, designed and 
supervised the building of a modernist house, and sketched a proof of Euler's 
Theorem, subsequently completed by others. 
 
He described and refuted the notions of the mind as machine and the 
computational theory of mind, long before practical computers. He invented 
truth tables and predicted paraconsistent logic. He decisively laid to rest 
skepticism and metaphysics. He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the 
activities of the mind lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since. 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part 
of the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was 
a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only 
one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but 
became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years 
published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly garbled 
form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died 
in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in 
German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear 
relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted from 
other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings 
and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his 
literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they 
wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct 
meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the 
universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing 
slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real 
explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous 
due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even 
nonsense, and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds 
of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists 
knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive summation of 
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Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and condensed form that 
it was difficult to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually 
forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the 
diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous 
references to him, and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, over 
half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who really 
grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is 
precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Before remarking on “The Blue and Brown Books”, I will first offer some 
comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological 
research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) 
et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), 
TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about 
these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior not 
found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. To serve 
as an heuristic, I have generated a table of INTENTIONALITY based on a much 
simpler one from S and which owes much to W, but no space here so please see 
it in some other reviews such as that of Shoemaker’s ‘Physical Realization’. It 
should prove stimulating to compare this table with the various charts in 
Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the 
extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only 
unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional 
propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, prelinguistic mental 
states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 
Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, 
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love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow 
thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, 
Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional 
(and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, 
knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., 
it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, 
atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical 
use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Reflexive 
(CSR)-called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), and the S2 use, which is their 
normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true 
or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) and are not CSR (called transitive in BBB). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic cultural deontic 
relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of 
behavior. 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, 
that `will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 
composed of perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W 
made so wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment 
and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall 
cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The 
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Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') 
is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are 
fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It 
is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing 
COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental 
state. 
 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's 
Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," 
or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always 
comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what 
happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should 
not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked 
`Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do 
know." 
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Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. 
He shows that behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms (see “On 
Certainty” for his final extended treatment of this idea) and that our conscious 
ratiocination emerges from unconscious machinations. His corpus can be seen 
as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the 
mind works and indeed must work. The “must” is entailed by the fact that all 
brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one 
basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all 
higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, 
and that in humans this is extended into a personality based on throat muscle 
contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others. I suggest it will 
prove of the greatest value to consider W’s work and most of his examples as 
an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions vs 
dispositions-- see below), but nature and nurture. 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the 
Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of 
examples of language use in context, exposing the many varieties of language 
games and the relationships between the primary games of true-only 
unconscious, axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive 
emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical 
reptilian brain first-self functions), and the later evolved higher cortical 
dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that 
constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of slow 
thinking that include the network of cognitive illusions that constitute the basis 
of our second-self personality. He dissects hundreds of language games 
showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of 
system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and understanding of 
system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also address the 
nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his later 
works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current 
and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find 
that this evolutionary two systems view is the best. To paraphrase 
Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes sense except 
in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other “Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually 
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reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is not 
just the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, 
but speech is the mind, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the 
development of this idea. He rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches 
of physiology, experimental psychology and computation (Computational 
Theory of Mind, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, functionalism, etc.) 
could reveal what his analyses of Language Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties 
he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture 
vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of 
representing vagueness” LWPP1, 347). And so, speech is the mind, which is 
expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech 
using the later evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of the Second Self-
-the dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). As 
with his other aphorisms I suggest one should take seriously his comment that 
even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we are thinking—
this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind. 
 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon 
the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger 
here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology 
is essential to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody 
else, points out). 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic 
EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A 
corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a 
foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true 
or false propositions. 
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I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work), are 
equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current 
research (e.g., see Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but nobody notices 
that W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and 
unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UA1) and memory and reflexive acts, as W notes in many examples.  
One might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our cerebration 
if measured by energy use in the brain). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of 
course these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 
1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not 
ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought 
or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”,“intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and 
later Searle call our EP). 
 
One of W’s recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer UA. Ian Apperly, who is 
carefully analyzing UA1 and UA2 in experiments, has recently become aware 
of Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor 
representation involved in UA1--that being reserved for UA2—see my review 
of his book with Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea 
W laid the groundwork for this 80 years ago. 
 
It is an easily defensible view that the core of the burgeoning literature on 
cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is compatible with 
and straightforwardly deducible from W. 
 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never 
seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts 
and commonly there is barely a mention. 
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Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of 
Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its 
interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further 
away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly 
simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined 
in its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and 
charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
Now for some comments on “The Blue and Brown Books” (BBB). 
 
These two volumes were dictated to his students during 1933-35 and were 
mimeographed and circulated until their publication in book form in 1958. 
Although very few understood much of what W was saying, his ideas began 
appearing in distorted and watered down versions, often without ascription or 
even knowledge of their origin (i.e., the same as today).   These volumes are 
unique in being almost continuous essay type prose, unlike nearly all of the 
other 20,000 pages in his nachlass, which seem to be disjointed notes in 
telegraphic style, having little connection with one another.  Partly this is due 
to the fact that most of them received little or no editing, with much crossing 
out, marginal notation and multiple versions all jumbled together in their 
original German, with numerous infelicitous translations into English.  The 
BBB show us his power and beauty in original English and is the only extended 
account he ever gave of his view of the nature of and solution to philosophical 
problems, via the clear description of higher order thought, as revealed in our 
language, which is its only possible expression. 
 
After the above and my many reviews of books by and about W, S, H etc, it 
should be clear what W is doing here (and everywhere) so I’ll make just a few 
comments. 
 
Much of the work is aimed at undermining the idea of introspection and 
private language via clever examples and of course there is a mountain of 
literature on this topic since but afaik neither W nor anyone else ever makes it 
clear that the basic argument is trivial—if you don’t have a test that 
distinguishes between two words they cannot have a role in language and there 
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cannot be any such test for private mental phenomena. In between he is 
describing how S1 is described by intransitive uses of verbs such as seeing, 
remembering (i.e., they are CSR) and differs from and blends into S2 (e.g. p101, 
161, 166 etc). He spends much time showing that disposition words (S2) such 
as thinking, meaning, judging, interpreting, knowing, understanding, 
believing, intending, reading, calculating, recognizing, comparing, deciding, 
counting, imaging etc. are not mental states with a precise duration but that 
their use depends on their having a clear public outcome-i.e., being transitive 
verbs (i.e., having COS which is the phrase Searle invented decades later). They 
are abilities to act. 
 
On p6 (cf. p18) is one of the most revolutionary statements in the history of 
philosophy and psychology--"Now if it is not the causal connections which we 
are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." This is 
probably his earliest clear statement of the futility of science envy. Sadly, few 
have understood his rejection of Descartes and duality, and afaik none of the 
leading lights of contemporary cognitive science are among them. 
 
On p9 he discusses the diviner who “feels” the water, raising both the private 
language issue and the correct description of “feeling”, followed by 
“imagining” on p12, both being dispositions which can only function via their 
COS and not by introspection of “mental images”. Incisive comments on the 
differences between “cause” and “reason” follow on p15 and here as 
everywhere in W one can consult the many books of Hacker et al for exegesis. 
 
On p18 he returns to science envy and makes another seeming trivial but 
profound comment—on our contempt for the particular case. Why indeed 
should the commonality between finite and transfinite numbers impress us 
more than their differences—which, like any of his examples, can take us deep 
into psychology, philosophy, language, and math. 
 
Pain sensations (p24) constitute one of his favorite examples of how language 
(an S2 function expressed by oral and finger muscles) originates in the 
spontaneous pre-linguistic S1 functions. 
 
And please don’t miss the brilliant discussion of the dispositions of wishing, 
imagining, knowing, etc on p37 et seq., and above all p42, where he once again 
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kills the idea that they are mental states (and the notion that he is a behaviorist), 
which all students of behavior should be required to memorize. 
 
The Brown Book is again principally aimed at exorcising the idea of mental 
states from the dispositions while comparing S2 and S1. It may seem that W 
spends far too much time on this but it is at the core of all the confusion about 
mind/body duality (Descarte’s error). It may help to reflect on two comments 
in the BB p72, p74. “The Kernel of our proposition that that which has pains or 
sees or thinks is of a mental nature is only, that the word “I” in “I have pains” 
does not denote a particular body, for we can’t substitute for “I” a description 
of a body.” “The philosopher who thinks it makes sense to say to himself “I am 
here” takes the verbal expression from the sentence in which “here” is a place 
in common space and thinks of “here” as the here in visual space. He therefore 
really says something like “Here is here”. 
 
On p90 he begins on the LG’s of math which were to blossom forth soon after 
into many remarks that later were later published in Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics and Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. 
The nature of the confusions in math and logic are shown to be the same as in 
language, which should not be surprising. 
 
For discussions of W’s analysis of reading (p118 et seq.) see e.g., Hacker’s books 
and Harre and Tissaw’s WAP. On p127 he returns to the dissection of 
dispositions like recognizing, seeing as, knowing etc and of rule following. 
Since S1 provides the fuel for S2, they normally merge instantly but have 
different functions and language to describe them. W discusses many times the 
nature of the perception “seeing” vs that of the disposition of “seeing as”. I 
think very few have realized that rule following, reading, seeing, meaning, 
proving, experiencing, intending, knowing etc., are also essentially 
dispositional in nature. 
 
P143 is another one to memorize—oceans of confusion dispelled by a few drops 
of wisdom. Likewise, the discussion on p161-2 of reflexive verbs- i.e., the CSR 
intransitive nature of S1 vs the transitive COS of S2. On 161 and 175 he 
foreshadows his later development of the axiomatic true only nature of our 
mind (our language) that was to reach its climax in his last work On Certainty-
- in my view his most important and least appreciated work and the foundation 
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stone of all study of behavior. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is 
to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
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Review of Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's 
Philosophy by David Pears (2006) 
      
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Pears is an eminent philosopher, notable among W scholars for his “The False 
Prison: a study of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy” in 2 volumes 
published 20 years ago. Based on these facts I expected some deep insights into 
W in the current volume. There were certainly some good points but overall it 
was profoundly disappointing. All of behavioral science is about our innate 
human nature and since W was the first to elucidate the axioms of our universal 
psychology, I expected this to be front and center in a work written during the 
golden age of evolutionary and cognitive psychology and with much good 
recent work on W appearing. However, one would never guess from this book 
that W or philosophy had any connection with psychology or indeed that there 
is such a thing as evolutionary psychology.  Hence, I cannot recommend Pears 
works and recommend a framework for rationality totally lacking in Pears (and 
most writing on human behavior).  
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
Reflecting on Wittgenstein (W) brings to mind a comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor 
like him) which ran something like ‘Not offering the chair of philosophy to 
Wittgenstein would be like not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!” I 
think of Wittgenstein as the Einstein of intuitive psychology. Though born 
ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the nature of reality at 
nearly the same time and in the same part of the world and like Einstein 
nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual 
recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early version of 
his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world 
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famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published 
nothing more, and knowledge of his new work in mostly garbled form 
diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died in 
1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings 
in German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear 
relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted 
from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, 
underlinings and crossed out words so that many sentences have multiple 
variants; that his literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, 
leaving out what they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of 
capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly 
novel views of how the universe works and that they then published this 
material with agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) with 
prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it was about; that he 
became as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all 
previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense and that virtually 
nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of 
thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early 
work in which he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics 
stated in such extremely abstract and condensed form that it was impossible 
to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and that 
most books and articles on the nature of the world and the diverse topics 
of modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous references to 
him and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, half a century after 
his death, there were only a handful of people who really grasped the 
monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely 
the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Pears is an eminent philosopher, notable among W scholars for his “The 
False Prison: a study of the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy” in 
2 volumes published 20 years ago. Based on these facts I expected some 
deep insights into W in the current volume. 
There were certainly some good points but overall it was profoundly 
disappointing.  All of behavioral science is about our innate human nature 
and since W was the first to elucidate the axioms of our universal 
psychology, I expected this to be front and center in a work written during 
the golden age of evolutionary and cognitive psychology and with much 
good recent work on W appearing.  However, one would never guess from 
this book that W or philosophy had any connection with psychology or 
indeed that there is such a thing as evolutionary psychology. If we 
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understand that our brain, like our heart is governed by genes and functions 
automatically according to its evolved axioms, W and all psychology make 
sense. If not, then animal behavior is, to paraphrase Toynbee, just one damn 
thing after another. But Pears does not have a clue. He starts (page ix) by 
saying “How can our thought and language possibly have internal 
standards of correctness” and claiming that “This is the central paradox of 
Wittgenstein’s later Philosophy.” Of course, everything in our body runs 
on “internal standards” (genes) and the paradox is that 150 years after 
Darwin, and with our every thought and action manifesting this, there are 
still people who do not get it. He tells us the writings of our greatest natural 
psychologist (which at age 76 and after reading countless hundreds of 
books and thousands of papers I still find some of the most exhilarating and 
brilliant prose I have ever seen) are “flat and platitudinous”!! What this 
means is that, like most who read W, most of the time he just does not really 
get the point. 
 
He starts with W’s early work, which, as all know, W later rejected. If you 
understand that it contains W’s first attempts to lay bare the foundations of 
our intentional psychology, and know his later work, the Tractatus mostly 
makes good sense, but if like Pears (and just about everyone else) you do 
not, then it seems bombastic nonsense. 
 
He tells us (p18) that it is very difficult to say what W’s answer to the 
question of linguistic regularity is, but I claim that it is totally transparent—
our evolved intentional psychology, which W outlined with the greatest 
detail and clarity in over 20,000 pages included in his nachlass, most of it 
now translated and published in some 20 books and several searchable 
CDROM’s, all available on Amazon and p2p. In fact, at the bottom of the 
same page he has a long quote which ends “What this shows is that there 
is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual 
cases.” (PI 1 S201). It’s not an interpretation but regularity due to innate 
rules and W makes this point in countless ways throughout his corpus. 
Pears then says that the extra resource is “vaguely human nature” but there 
is nothing more vague about this than about the fact that our blood is 
pumped by the heart. 
 
On the next page, he says we impose regularities on our thoughts to 
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understand the world but our innate psychology is automatic and the 
cultural extensions are trivial (agency, causality, space and time, ontology 
etc are not modifiable). And so it goes throughout the book—obliviousness 
to the overweening dominance of our evolutionary psychology and 
conflation of it with our learned extensions.  This is of course the almost 
universal mistake of regarding humans as blank slates.  Wittgenstein 
refutes it on nearly every page, if you know how to read him. The best 
recent refutation of blank slateism is Pinker’s ‘The Blank Slate.’  
 
On p27 he says W rejects the a priori as the source of regularity, citing the 
above passage in PI, but this is clearly wrong in this case and shows a total 
(but extremely common) failure to get W’s constantly repeated point. At 
the bottom of pg 30 he quotes a passage he thinks is “cryptic” but it’s quite 
clear to me. W explains that we are hypnotized by the vague words 
“grasped in a flash,” which have various uses but we know perfectly well 
what they mean (ie, how they are used in a given context) and that is the 
end of it. As he says many places, the problem is not to find the answer but 
to recognize it as the answer. 
 
Though there is much of value here as Pears has extensive quotes and good 
discussion, he ultimately always wanders off the path. In his discussion of 
private language, after noting W’s demolition of the concept of the private 
object, he says it’s too far reaching as it could be used to eliminate 
something that “actually did occur” in the mind.  He just does not get that 
there is no test for “actually did occur” in the absence of a public language. 
Again, on the next page (57) he does not understand W’s famous 
manometer example which repeats this same point. Again, he correctly 
states (p41) that “His leading idea is that the language in which we report 
sensations owes its meaning to their connections with the physical world 
and cannot survive separation from it.” But, he does not tell us that this 
applies to all language about “inner processes” (i.e., thinking, believing, 
intending, imagining, etc.) and that the connections are the public criteria, 
without which we have no way to decide when a term is correctly applied. 
On p42 he says Stroud made a new interpretation of W’s objection, namely 
that we could not give ourselves an ostensive definition (i.e., point to an 
apple to remind ourself of the word for it) but this seems to me to be just 
another way to state his objection. Isn’t this just the same as saying we have 
no criteria since there is still no test unless it’s shared (e.g., how do we know 
that we remember the word correctly—we could have some mental quirk 
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or get hit on the head and not use the right word or use several –this after 
all happens quite normally in our life and the cure is to ask someone or look 
in a dictionary etc.). 
 
Such mistakes are repeated thoughout the book and forces us to classify 
this as another contribution to the mountain of literature which gravely 
misrepresents W and by so doing, misunderstands our evolved 
psychology. 
 
Likewise Chap 4 on W’s treatment of logical necessity shows a near total 
failure to understand him. W commented in great detail from many 
different perspectives and made it very clear that logic, like language, math, 
music and games is an extension of our innate psychological axioms and 
he explained via long explications of examples how this works and how 
easily we are misled. Nevertheless, like most, Pears manages to badly 
confuse the situation time and again. Though W was not entirely consistent 
and clear (we are after all looking at unpublished and largely unedited 
notes) he spoke many, many times of the innate nature of our psychology 
(and logic) and definitely did not believe we “create” it (Pears p67). He 
pointed out with countless examples how we must be born with all the 
basic capacities of logic, math and language (thought) in order to create its 
myriad extensions. On p71 Pears says we can have no conception of reality 
in its “raw unconceptualized state” which happens if we “subtract our own 
intellectual contribution”, but it was W’s constantly made point that this 
sort of language lacks sense—lacks any clearly defined use in our life (e.g., 
what is the test that distinguishes between a “raw” and “cooked” view of a 
tree?). W noted that nearly anyone who starts to philosophize (ie, to talk 
about behavior rather than just behaving—ie, using words in context) 
immediately goes astray and this book, like most, illustrates this 
continually.  The very quotes that Pears uses give deep insights into this 
process, provided one has the insight to understand them. One has only to 
go back and forth between the (mostly) surgically precise dissections of 
examples by W and the (usually) vague generalizations by others to see the 
hopelessness of much behavioral discourse. 
 
On p74 Pears attributes to W the view that “logically necessary truths are 
not tested in anything like the way that contingent truths are tested” but W 
clearly and constantly showed that there is not, and there cannot be, any 
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test for the innate axioms of our psychology since they are themselves the 
basis for testing. On p78 he again shows a fundamental failure to grasp W 
(and so our intentional psychology) when he quotes from his RFM: “The 
truth of the proposition, that 4+1=5, is so to speak, overdetermined. 
Overdetermined by this, that the result of the operation is defined to be the 
criterion that this operation has been carried out.” Pears claims that this 
“new necessary truth is adopted arbitrarily” and that this sort of situation 
created a problem which W “tried, but failed, to solve later” but I claim that 
he solved it splendidly by showing that this “problem” instantiates our 
innate axiomatic psychology, which determines the necessary modes of 
operation of math, logic, language, thought and life. This is the most basic 
point about behavior and everything about life and the world, for nothing 
makes sense except in the light of evolution. 
 
On p91 he claims that W did “less than justice” to our natural tendency to 
our research and “proof in logic as the discovery of necessary truth” but in 
fact W exhaustively explores the operation of and relations between logic, 
math and language as “necessary truths” (i.e., expressions of our innate 
psychology), and states again and again that their extensions (i.e., all  of 
math, logic, music, art, language, games etc.) are inventions, not discoveries. 
Otherwise, we have to say that Michelangelo “discovered” David in the 
block of marble and anyone else might have done so as well.  Remarks on 
the Foundations of Mathematics and much of his other work explores the 
ideas of necessity and compulsion to get a result vs. prediction of results. 
We ought to keep in mind that W claims that all we can do is to give clear 
descriptions of how we behave (ie, use language, logic, math etc.) and that 
we cannot give explanations. Also, W’s point in his later work was not that 
certainty is based on “truth by definition” (Pears p93) but rather that if we 
comprehend a situation at all, the truth or falsity of statements about it come 
free with our understanding. Part of the problem is that Pears constantly 
refers back to the TLP, dragging its confusions into Wittgenstein’s later 
work. 
 
On nearly every page of every book and article in philosophy and to a lesser 
extent in all the behavioral sciences, much of science, politics, religion and 
everyday discourse, we see the same confusions that W so brilliantly 
described in his works beginning 80 years ago (with clear anticipations in 
his earliest comments nearly a century ago). Whenever people stop using 
language in the normal flow of life and try to step back and talk about 
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behavior (language, mind, meaning, god, truth, the world etc.) they nearly 
always go astray. One of the many simple and beautiful statements of this 
is quoted by Pears (p42): 
 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and 
set it in relief—but it can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses 
itself in the very fact that language can and only does refer to it. For since 
language only derives the way in which it means, its meaning, from the 
world, no language is conceivable that does not represent this world.” 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Remarks S47 
 
Of course, we have to pay our dues with years of study to understand this 
in depth—in our bones.  No pain, no gain. 
 
I suggest that those wishing to understand W, or anything deep about 
behavior, might wish to begin with one of his least studied works—
‘Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics’. It will likely strike most as 
austere, boring, obvious, repetitious and trivial, when it is not hopelessly 
obscure, but for the persistent and perspicacious who approach it as what 
I claim it is—one of the clearest, most careful and penetrating analyses of 
the basic mechanisms of how the mind (language (thought), math, logic) 
works ever written, it will gradually open the eyes in a revelatory manner. 
The seemingly picayune belaboring of the obvious regarding proofs, 
propositions, meaning, and interpretation, with the aim of clearly 
describing (not explaining as W so often insisted) the actual role of these 
words (concepts) in our real practice, is the pain and the dawning of 
understanding of our mind and our life is the gain. 
 
In the last chapter on ego, though there are many good points, Pears again 
disappoints by failing repeatedly to get W’s point that when it comes to the 
first person point of view and our presence in the world, there are no tests, 
nothing that can make us say “Oh yes I was mistaken –I was not the one 
who had that pain!” E.g., on p125 he says that there are cases where “some 
doubt is cast on the referential character of ‘I’”, and on p127 that he is 
“unconvincing” and “implausible” in describing the difference between the 
use of ‘I” and “he” but W constantly stresses that there is no possibility of 
such doubt as the game of doubt applies only when there is a test and what 
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test is there for the pain belonging to myself? Again, on p128 Pears refers 
to “the usual criteria of personal identity” when W has exhaustively 
explained that normally we do not have any such criteria. 
 
Of course, these topics are by no means easy and we have no choice but to 
take W at his word in each of his raw unedited notes, often isolated from a 
satisfactory context. 
 
However, I have found that as one gets a better acquaintance with him 
(especially using the searchable CDROM of his English books as well as 
that of the entire German nachlass, both widely available in libraries and on 
p2p), I find that W is rarely mistaken. W explains with many examples how 
we are led to misunderstand the role of language and give way to the 
pernicious urge to look deeper. Few can accept our innate psychology for 
what it is and resist that urge and Pears in not among them. 
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Review of Ludwig Wittgenstein by Edward Kanterian 
(2007) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
Overall, it is first rate with accurate, sensitive and penetrating accounts of his 
life and thought in roughly chronological order, but, inevitably (i.e., like 
everyone else) it fails, in my view, to place his work in proper context and gets 
some critical points wrong. It is not made clear that philosophy is armchair 
psychology and that W was a pioneer in what later became cognitive or 
evolutionary psychology. One would not surmise from this book that he laid 
out the foundations of the modern concept of intentionality (roughly, 
personality or higher order thought) which has been further advanced by many 
(most notably in philosophy by John Searle in “The Construction of Social 
Reality” and “Rationality in Action”). 
 
There is no clear explanation of how W defined the class of potential actions, 
which he called dispositions or inclinations, (now often called propositional 
attitudes), differentiating them from perceptions, memories and actions and 
showing how they lack truth value. He notes that W spent much of his time 
discussing the foundations of mathematics but fails to provide any explanation 
as to how this relates to his work on language and logic. In fact, as W came to 
realize, they are all names for groups of functions of our innate psychology 
with many differences and none are dependent on the others. It is not really 
made clear that all our behavior depends on the unquestionable axioms of our 
evolved psychology and thus differs totally from the testable empirical facts 
which they enable us to discover. It is not explained that W’s frequent 
references to “grammar” and to “language games” refer to our innate 
psychology. All these failings are the norm in behavioral studies. 
 
He notes that W described thinking and other dispositions or inclinations (W’s 
terms) -- (i.e., judging, feeling, remembering, believing etc.) -- as behaviors and 
not as mental activities but I don’t see that he really makes it clear that another 
pioneering discovery of W’s was that dispositions describe public actions and 
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cannot be mental phenomena for the same reason that he so famously rejected 
the possibility of a private language. 
 
He repeatedly and correctly notes (e.g., p176) that the core of W’s work is the 
nature of language but (again the universal failing) does not make it clear that 
language is for humans (as opposed to animals) almost coextensive with 
thought (public behavior as W insisted) and thus with our evolved psychology. 
Like most people, philosophers or not, Kanterian has not followed W and taken 
the final step towards understanding and describing behavior from an 
evolutionary standpoint, the only viewpoint that makes sense of it, or indeed 
of anything. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). ‘Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!” I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of 
the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a 
suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only one 
early version of his ideas that were confused and often    mistaken, but became 
world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published 
nothing more, and knowledge of his new work in mostly garbled form diffused 
slowly  from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving 
behind over 20,000 pages  of mostly handwritten scribblings in German, 
composed of sentences or short paragraphs with,  often, no clear relationship to 
sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted from other notebooks 
written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings and crossed out 
words so  that many sentences have multiple variants; that his literary executives 
cut this indigestible mass    into pieces, leaving out what they wished and 
struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct meaning of 
sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the universe works  
and that they then published this material with agonizing slowness (not finished 
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after half a   century) with prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it 
was about; that he became as much notorious as famous due to many statements 
that all previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense and that virtually 
nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens of 
thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work 
in which he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in 
such extremely abstract and condensed form that it was impossible to decide 
what was being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and that most books 
and articles on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics    
had only passing and usually erroneous references to him and that many omitted 
him entirely; that  to this day, half a century after his death, there were only a 
handful of people who really grasped    the monumental consequences of what 
he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Over half a century after his death and after decades of relative neglect 
(considering he is viewed by some as the greatest natural psychologist of all 
time) Wittgenstein is again attracting considerable attention. Though there are 
hundreds of books dealing wholely or in large part with him, few have really 
grasped his remarkable advances in understanding behavior, so this fresh look 
is most   welcome. 
 
Overall, it is first rate with accurate, sensitive and penetrating accounts of his life 
and thought in roughly chronological order, but, inevitably (ie, like everyone 
else) it fails, in my view, to place his work in proper context and gets some critical 
points wrong. It is not made clear that philosophy is armchair psychology and 
that W was a pioneer in what later became cognitive or evolutionary 
psychology. One would not surmise from this book that he laid out the 
foundations of the modern concept of intentionality (roughly, personality or 
higher order thought) which has been further advanced by many (most 
noteably in philosophy by John Searle in “The Construction of Social Reality” 
and “Rationality in Action”). 
 
There is no clear explanation of how W defined the class of potential actions, 
which he called dispositions or inclinations, (now often called propositional 
attitudes), differentiating them from perceptions, memories and actions and 
showing how they lack truth value.   He notes that W spent much of his time 
discussing the   foundations of mathematics but fails to provide any 
explanation as to how this relates to his work on language and logic. In fact, as 
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W came to realize, they are all names for groups of functions of our innate 
psychology with many differences and none are dependent on the others. It is 
not really made clear that all our behavior depends on the unquestionable 
axioms of our evolved psychology and thus differs totally from the testable 
empirical facts which they enable us to discover. It is not explained that W’s 
frequent references to “grammar” and to “language games” refer to our innate 
psychology.  All these failings are the norm in behavioral studies. 
 
Kanterian notes (p41) that in W’s first talk on philosophy, given in 1912 at the 
age of 23, he is reported to have said that philosophy is the totality of all 
propositions that are taken as unprovable and basic in science. If one 
understands that “philosophy” is observational psychology, and that 
“propositions” are sentences which depend for intelligibility (truth) on the 
innate axioms of our psychology, it appears that W understood the basic problem 
of philosophy (behavior), and its answer in what I see as the modern two 
systems of thought, right from the beginning—a feat few have accomplished to 
this day. He again made this crystal clear in a letter to Russell quoted by 
Kanterian (p86) in which he stated that the point of TLP: 
 
“is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions –i.e., by language-(and 
which comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed 
by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt) which, I believe, is the cardinal 
problem of philosophy. “ 
 
Note also W’s identification of thought with language and his rejection of the 
idea that there is, between language and thought, another entity such as “the 
language of thought”, a point which he discussed directly and indirectly for 
the next 30 years but which still bedevils behavioral literature nearly a century 
later--another sad consequence of the oblivion to one of our greatest teachers. 
 
Kanterian describes the famous distinction in W’s Tractatus between what can 
be said and what can only be shown but does not explain that one can 
understand this in terms of W’s later denotation of the difference between our 
axiomatic innate psychology, which submits to no test (e.g., our System 1 
nonlinguistic intentionality such as understanding that this is my hand, I am 
reading this page etc.), and the factual or empirical applications of this evolved 
axiomatic system (i.e., our System 2 linguistic intentionality). Perhaps one should 
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not fault Kanterian, since, to my knowledge, nobody else has noticed what I 
regard as this basic and essential interpretation of W’s TLP either—though a few 
have noticed it in his later work. It is essential to understand this distinction 
because any description (following W’s frequent injunction that we cannot 
EXPLAIN but only DESCRIBE our psychology) of animal behavior must do so 
in terms of evolution for the same reasons we must describe the genetics, 
physiology, anatomy and function of the heart in evolutionary terms. The 
alternative “blank slate” view that heart functioning is a matter of one’s 
environment is just as preposterous for the brain. 
 
He does a good job (e.g., p170-171) of describing (as have others, notably Hacker) 
W’s transition from the confusions of TLP to the clarity of his later work, but 
(again in my view following universal practice) does not really grasp that W’s 
ideas of the “atomic facts” and “crystalline logic” that formed the foundations of 
his TLP world view evolved into the notions of an innate axiomatic psychology 
that he explicated for the last 20 years of his life. 
 
He also notes (p80) that by discovering the innateness of “depth grammar” (i.e., 
our inherited psychology that makes language (thought) possible), W 
anticipated Chomsky and others by decades. I noticed this some 40 years ago but 
I have never seen anyone else point it out, so it’s hats off to Kanterian! 
 
With his penetrating understanding of our psychology, W was also prescient 
about larger issues such as the desireability of progress. 
 
“It isn’t absurd... to believe that the age of science and technology is the beginning 
of the end for humanity; that the idea of great progress is a delusion, along with 
the idea that the truth will ultimately by known; that there is nothing good or 
desireable about scientific knowledge and that mankind, in seeking it, is falling 
into a trap. It is by no means obvious that this is not how things are.”) (Kanterian 
p114 from W’s Culture and Value). 
 
Kanterian quotes, without I think fully understanding its implications (again 
like everyone else so far as I know), another very fundamental discovery by 
W—our natural tendency to subsume all uses of a word or sentence under a 
single meaning rather than recognizing that eg, “space” is a complex family of 
uses or concepts (language games as W liked to call them) with quite different 
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applications (meanings) in our life (our intentional psychology). 
 
He notes that W described thinking and other dispositions or inclinations (W’s   
terms) -- (i.e., judging, feeling, remembering, believing etc.)- as behaviors and 
not as mental activities but I don’t see that he really makes it clear that another 
pioneering discovery of W’s was that dispositions describe public actions and 
cannot be mental phenomena for the same reason that he so famously rejected 
the possibility of a private language. 
 
The probable evolutionary explanation for a route to such usage of disposition 
words seems to me to be that several hundred thousand years ago (give or take) 
when we evolved the ability to vocalize events, objects or actions (i.e., when an 
animal as agent was involved), sentences first substituted for them (get spear, 
hunt deer) and only later became usable in a dispositional or displaced manner 
(I want you to get the spear, I think we will hunt deer soon).   Again, to my 
knowledge, W was the first to point this out in any detail with such examples as 
how pain language functions (see p 182). 
 
Kanterian describes (p174) how W (so famously and notoriously) felt he had put 
an end to philosophy as it was understood and how most philosophers reject this 
view (or more commonly simply ignore it if they are aware of it at all), but his 
comments that  this narrows the range of what we can know by abstract thought 
and that   metaphysical questions make no sense, seem to me to completely miss 
the point.  I   think W just called our attention to the fact that “knowing” is 
another set of games or psychological functions which we can only accept as 
they are. Much (we might say ALL) of W’s work can be seen as describing how 
“knowing” works and his last writings published as “On Certainty” regarded as 
the crowning achievement of his life (and of 20th century 
philosophy/psychology). Metaphysical questions have no traction because 
questioning the axioms of our psychology lacks a use in our life (this is not 
“really” my hand, maybe 2+2=4 is not “really” true, perhaps you are not reading 
this page, etc.). Abstract thought (games, music, math, literature, science) is 
limitless but entirely dependent on the axioms. 
 
Kanterian is one of the rare persons who gets it correct (p185) that W rejects a 
“language of thought” for the same reason he rejects private languages and   
dispositions such as thinking, believing etc. as mental processes (p 180-183); 
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namely that this would make it possible to make systematic mistakes in our 
“translations” of thoughts to actions (e.g., thinking “I want that apple” to saying 
“I want that apple”) which is absurd. A translation could always be wrong and 
what test could tell us? We lack the criteria for correctness. We would then need 
some test for showing what we really thought! I might say “I want the apple” or 
“I don’t want the apple” and what connects that to my thought—even for me?  
The words are my thoughts (approximately) which are descriptions of acts. 
 
Kanterian also mentions that, in spite of the fact that a large percentage of W’s 
writing concerned the philosophy (i.e., psychology) of mathematics, very little 
attention is paid to his work by most of those writing on the foundations of math 
over the last 50 years. Unfortunately, he fails to tell us why. One reason is the 
nearly universal failure to understand what W has done as a result of his 
originality, style, failure to publish and premature death. Another is that it took 
so long to properly gather, translate and edit the 20,000 some pages of his 
nachlass that several generations have grown up without access to the full body 
of his work. Even to this day some of the German text remains untranslated and 
one of his most famous and largest works—The Big Typescript—was only 
translated and published in 2005.  In addition, many who were regarded as   
experts on the subject of math and logic (e.g., Dummett, Kreisel, Chihara, Godel) 
totally failed to understand him and much of the writing by others on the 
foundations of math is not about its psychological foundations at all (of which 
they are generally oblivious) but about the details of how math is done. The few 
who have made progress in understanding his mathematical comments have 
been largely ignored (e.g., Gefwert, Shanker) or have published so recently that 
their work has not had time to diffuse (e.g., Rodych, Floyd).  Those interested 
will find further comments and references in my other reviews.  I claim that W’s 
work on this is continuous with the rest of his corpus, and overall, the most 
original and stimulating ever done. 
 
He repeatedly and correctly notes (e.g., p176) that the core of W’s work is the 
nature of language but (again the universal failing) does not make it clear that 
language is for humans (as opposed to animals) almost coextensive with thought 
(public behavior as W insisted) and thus with our evolved psychology. Like 
most people, philosophers or not, Kanterian has not followed W and taken the 
final step towards understanding and describing behavior from an evolutionary 
standpoint, the only viewpoint that makes sense of it, or indeed of anything. 
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Review of Wittgenstein And Psychology- A Practical 
Guide by Harre and Tissaw (2005) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
A major flaw of the book is its failure to note Wittgenstein’s role in destroying 
the mechanical or reductionist or computationalist view of mind. These 
continue to dominate cognitive science and philosophy, in spite of the fact that 
they were powerfully countered by W and later by Searle and others. 
 
There is much talk of W’s use of terms like “grammar”, “rules” etc. but never 
a clear mention that they mean our Evolved Psychology or our genetically 
programmed innate behavior. There are references to Baker and Hacker's 
works and to Malcolm Budd, but none to many standard W refs such as ter 
Hark, Johnston, and especially to the searchable Intelex CDROM of his 
complete works, nor to Searle, and none to the vast literature of evolutionary 
psychology.  
 
Many sections of the book are reasonably successful in describing W’s work 
but there is much aimless wandering and many mistakes and confusions. These 
will hopefully be obvious to those who read the above and my other reviews 
as I cannot recount more than a few of the hundreds of critical comments I 
made in my two readings of this book. A major flaw, common to most writing 
in the behavioral sciences, is the lack of awareness of the S1/S2 two selves or 
two systems of thought mode of describing personality that W pioneered 
(though nobody noticed) and a failure to be clear about nature/nuture issues. 
The fast, automatic perceptions, ‘rules’ and behaviors of S1 are mushed 
together with the slow conscious dispositional thinking, believing and rule 
following of S2 and neither are clearly or consistently distinguished from 
arbitrary cultural behaviors. 
 
I wrote this review several years ago and since then my ideas have evolved 
considerably as evidenced by the table of intentionality which I have inserted. 
Eventually I may revise it but for now the interested reader may consult my 
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many more recent reviews and articles.   
 
Briefly, I now see that virtually all authors failed to give Wittgenstein’s last 
work “On Certainty” the prominent position it deserves and likewise failed to 
take advantage of the powerful dual systems of thought framework. Nor have 
they adopted the useful extensions of Wittgenstein’s work made by John 
Searle. So, I first lay out a framework for intentionality (behavior) and then 
provide some detailed comments.   
 
This book is a reasonable first attempt to bring W’s pioneering work on higher 
order thought to the attention of psychology but it has many failings and needs 
a thorough rewrite. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
 Before remarking on “Wittgenstein and Psychology”, I will first offer some 
comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological 
research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W). It will 
help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, 
Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these two 
geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found 
in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
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 “Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” (Blue Book p18, 1933).  
   
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 
(1933) 
 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
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intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition... There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description." Searle Philosophy in a New Century(PNC) p101-103 
 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science 
is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological 
reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference by the fact 
that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to record 
both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of 
vision...in the sense of `information' used in cognitive science, it is simply false 
to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel 
p312-314 
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These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy is descriptive psychology.  
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: 
“Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our 
subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems 
about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship between 
thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and 
knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of 
mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy 
of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of 
insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of 
reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He 
undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of 
philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human 
understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the 
conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--
'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
 
To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe the 
two systems of thought--fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective 
linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is possible with a 
vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and cannot be 
doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness self, time and space are 
innate true-only axioms.  He noted in thousands of pages and hundreds of 
examples how our inner mental experiences are not directly describable in 
language, this being possible only with terms that substitute for public 
behavior (the impossibility of private language). He invented truth tables and 
predicted the utility of paraconsistent logic. He patented helicopter designs 
which anticipated by three decades the use of blade-tip jets to drive the rotors 
and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow gas turbine engine, designed a 
heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the building of a modernist 
house, and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, subsequently completed by 
others.   He can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist since he 
constantly explained the necessity of the innate background and demonstrated 
how it generates behavior. He described the psychology behind the Wason test-
-a fundamental measure used in EP decades later. He noted the indeterminate 
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nature of language and the game-like nature of social interaction. He described 
and refuted the notions of the mind as machine and the computational theory 
of mind, long before practical computers. He decisively laid to rest skepticism 
and metaphysics. He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of 
the mind lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since.  
 
In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive 
psychology, philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute to this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so 
after noting W’s above remark on science envy, I will quote again from Hacker 
who gives a good start on it. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
... We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p be 
identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say ‘he believes that p, but it is 
not the case that p’, whereas one cannot say ‘I believe that p, but it is not the 
case that p’? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining 
or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one 
know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? Why can 
one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, foolishly, 
thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one know, but 
not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on – 
through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to 
mention the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to 
be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic 
concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various 
forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, 
their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this 
venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, 
neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing 
whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
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Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one.  
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions or abilities 
to act), but the logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking 
of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, pre-linguistic mental 
states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 
Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, 
love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow 
thinking, mentalizing neurons.  That is, of testable true or false, propositional, 
Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional 
(and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, 
knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., 
it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, 
atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical 
use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self 
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Referential (CSR), and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, 
which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way 
home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and 
other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", 
"heuristics" and "biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will 
be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions 
will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made 
clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur without involving much of the 
intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral 
reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W 
and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic 
relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of 
behavior. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and 
contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and 
is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's 
`Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 
beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as 
follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as 
modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with 
how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--
desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid automatic 
primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, 
as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the 
present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly 
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by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is 
that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive 
illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological 
Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work contemporary psychology, that ` will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of 
perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully 
clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. 
The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS 
and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would 
mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W showed 
countless times and biology demonstrates, life must be based on certainty--
automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt 
and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: 
"We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space 
and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result 
sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased 
survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate 
his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the 
paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness 
generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal 
immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons 
of DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the 
ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is right 
but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the 
inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
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Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall 
cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The 
Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') 
is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are 
fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It 
is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as `EP' and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence in a context 
that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. 
 
Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would 
not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his 
comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's 
Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," 
or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always 
comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what 
happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
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some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should 
not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked 
`Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do 
know."  
 
Disposition words refer to Potential Events which I accept as fulfilling the COS 
and my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the 
way dispositions function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, 
intending, desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the 
COS that I express and which can only be expressed by reflexive S1 muscle 
contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
This is another statement of W’s argument against private language. Likewise, 
with rule following and interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable 
acts. And one must note that many (most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, 
being misled by W's frequent referrals to community practice into thinking it's 
just arbitrary public practice that underlies language and social conventions. 
W makes clear many times that such conventions are only possible given an 
innate shared axiomatic psychology which he often calls the background. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are as 
clear as day—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests 
can only be public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’ as 
noted p191 of WAP. I have explained the functioning of dispositional language 
(‘propositional attitudes’) and W’s dismantling of the notion of introspection 
above and in my reviews of Budd, Johnston and several of S’s books.  Basically, 
he showed that the causal relation and word and object model that works for 
S1 does not apply to S2. 
 
W famously rejected behaviorism and much of his work is devoted to 
describing why it cannot serve as a description of behavior. “Are you not really 
a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything 
except human behavior is a fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a 
grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) But real behaviorism is rampant in its modern 
‘functionalist’, ‘computationalist’,’dynamic systems’ forms.  See my review of 
Carruthers’ ‘The Opacity of Mind’ for a recent egregious example.  
Behaviorism etc. have no practical impact.  Unlike other cartoon views of life, 
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they are too cerebral and esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and 
it is so unrealistic that even its adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life.  
Unfortunately, not so with other cartoon theories like SSSM, BS and TPI, widely 
shared by religions, governments, sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, history, 
literature, and mom and dad, in spite of well-known facts, such as that 
personalities of adults adopted as children are as different from those of their 
adoptive siblings and parents as people chosen randomly off the street.  
Religions big and small, political movements, and economics often generate or 
embrace already existing cartoons that ignore physics and biology (human 
nature), posit forces terrestrial or cosmic that reinforce our superstitions, 
wishful thinking and selfishness and help to accelerate the destruction of the 
earth (the real purpose of nearly every social practice).  The point is to realize 
that these fantasies are on a continuum and have the same source. All of us are 
born with a cartoon view of life and few ever grow out of it.  But the world is 
not a cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as the cartoons collide with 
reality. 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never 
seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts 
and commonly there is barely a mention.  
 
Now for some comments on “Wittgenstein and Psychology” (WAP).  
 
Many sections of the book are reasonably successful in describing W’s work 
but there is much aimless wandering and many mistakes and confusions. These 
will hopefully be obvious to those who read the above and my other reviews 
as I cannot recount more than a few of the hundreds of critical comments I 
made in my two readings of this book. A major flaw, common to most writing 
in the behavioral sciences, is the lack of awareness of the S1/S2 two-selves mode 
of describing personality that W pioneered (though nobody noticed) and a 
failure to be clear about nature/nuture issues. The fas, automatic perceptions, 
‘rules’ and behaviors of S1 are mushed together with the slow conscious 
dispositional thinking, believing and rule following of S2 and neither are 
clearly or consistently distinguished from the arbitrary cultural behaviors of 
S3.  Thus Chap 6 on Rules and Rule Following is severely limited by failing to 
note clearly the difference between the automatic unconscious ‘rules’ of S1 
perception and reflexive actions and the deliberate conscious ‘rules’ of S2 
thinking and understanding, both innate, and the arbitrary learned S3 rules 
that constitute the cultural veneer on behavior. S2 rule following is just 
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dispositional behavior of understanding propositions with COS. Throughout 
the book they miss W’s teachings regarding the true only axiomatically based 
two systems of personality (half a century before it became popular) so 
beautifully laid out in his third period and above all in his last work On 
Certainty.   
 
There is a good discussion of W’s remarks on reading in Chap 5 ‘Skills and 
Abilities’ but it fails here or anywhere to make it clear that these are 
dispositions, hence propositional and true or false S2 functions and, like all 
dispositions, have clear meaning due to their public outer Conditions of 
Satisfaction and not to any private internal phenomena. This is another 
demonstration of the impossibility of private language and introspection and 
contrary to its supposed complexity, it is a simple fact that there can be no such 
thing as a private test to determine the truth of any statement. This is the major 
topic of the fine books by Budd and Johnston—the Inner phenomena that we 
experience and the Outer behavior that determines the operation of language 
and all social interaction.  
 
Chap 8 on Cognition is better and Chap 9 on Subjectivity and the PLA is the 
best in the book. It is critical to read p176-7 where the major issues of the rest 
of the book are summarized and answered. Chap 10 is feeble while 11 had some 
good material on intention and action but is crippled by blank slateism without 
any note that W embraced innateness and gave frequent references to our 
inherited background. Like most of the book, it cries out for close study more 
W examples and amalgamation with the powerful framework of Searle. In spite 
of much good material, I again find much to criticize in Chap 12 and 13 on 
Emotions and Perceptions—e.g. W noted that my emotions are basically S1 true 
only automated functions while my understanding of your emotions is most 
often an S2 exercise.  
 
Another major flaw of the book is its failure to note W’s role in destroying the 
mechanical or reductionist or computationalist view of mind. These continue 
to dominate cognitive science and philosophy in spite of the fact that they were 
powerfully countered by W and later by S and others.  
 
There is much talk of W’s use of terms like “grammar”, “rules” etc but never a 
clear mention that they mean our EP or our genetically programmed innate 
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behavior.  There are references to Baker and Hackers works and to Budd, but 
none to many standard W refs such as ter Hark, Johnston, and especially to the 
searchable Intelex CDROM of his complete works, nor to Searle, and none to 
the vast literature of EP.  This is a good first attempt to bring W’s pioneering 
work on higher order thought to the attention of psychology but it has many 
failings and needs a thorough rewrite. 
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Review of Culture and Value by Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(1980) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This is Wittgenstein´s least interesting book, being only random notes dealing 
with art, music, religion and other areas of culture, taken from his notebooks 
over the course of his life. But W is never dull and it's a measure of the awe in 
which he is held that this book was even published. I can´t imagine publishing 
such a book by anyone else; certainly no philosopher. Those interested in W 
should go to nearly any of the other 20,000 odd pages of his works (but NOT 
the Tractatus! )-but those with little acquaintance be forewarned, though W 
may seem a shallow tepid pool, if you jump in you may never stop swimming.  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle (2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle 
see my ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language 
in Wittgenstein and Searle (2017). Those interested in all my writings in their 
most recent versions may consult my Philosophy, Human Nature and the 
Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017). 
 
This is Wittgenstein´s least interesting book, being only random notes 
dealing with art, music, religion and other areas of culture, taken from his 
notebooks over the course of his life. But W is never dull and it’s a measure 
of the awe in which he is held that this book was even published. I can´t 
imagine publishing such a book by anyone else, --certainly no philosopher. 
 
Those interested in W should go to nearly any of the other 20,000 odd pages 
of his works (but NOT the Tractatus!)- but those with little acquaintance be 
forewarned, though W may seem a shallow tepid pool, if you jump in you 
may never stop swimming.  You might wish to consult my other reviews 
such as The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language 
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as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) for detailed comments on W 
and his revelations on language, thought and reality. Nearly all of W’s  
writings are contained on a searchable CD issued by Blackwell and 
available for about $100 from Intelex while his vast and largely 
untranslated nachlass costs about $1000 on CD and another $1000 for the 
CD’s with images of the 20,000 odd pages of the original manuscripts. 
However, like hundreds of other psychology books, they are also available 
via interlibrary loan or on p2p. 
 
Although I´ve never seen anyone say so, W was a history making pioneer 
in cognitive and evolutionary psychology—the first person (and arguably 
one of the few to this day!) to see the structure of our innate intentional 
psychology. As a philosopher (armchair psychologist), all of his research 
was thought experiments and introspection. It is an easily defensible view 
that he is the greatest natural psychologist to date and nobody has ever 
matched his talent for describing the mind at work. 
 
Nearly all the meatiest items from his papers have been culled for other 
works, and mostly the dregs remain for this book, but I have selected a few 
comments that seemed to me of general philosophical interest and since I 
have written extensively on his works, these will constitute the review for 
this one.  
 
``There is no religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical 
expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.`` 
``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that 
we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the 
Greeks. But the people who say this don´t understand why is has to be so. 
It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us 
into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb ´to 
be´ that looks as if it functions in the same way as ´to eat´ and ´to drink´, as 
long as we still have the adjectives ´identical´, ´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as 
long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., 
etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and 
find themselves staring at something which no explanation seems capable 
of clearing up. And what´s more, this satisfies a longing for the 
transcendent, because, insofar as people think   they can see `the limits of 
human understanding´, they believe of course that they can see beyond 
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these.`` 
 
``Philosophers often behave like little children who scribble some marks on 
a piece of paper at random and then ask the grown-up ´what’s that?`  It 
happened  like this: the grown-up had drawn pictures for the child several 
times and said `this is a man´, ´this is a house´,  etc.  And then the child 
makes some marks too and asks `what’s this then?´ 
 
´´ A curious analogy could be based on the fact that even the hugest 
telescope has to have an eyepiece no bigger than the human eye.´´ 
 
´´The power of language has to make everything look the same, which is 
most glaringly evident in the dictionary and which makes the 
personification of time possible: something no less remarkable than would 
have   been making divinities of the logical constants.`` 
 
``Philosophers say ´after death a timeless state will begin´, or: ´at death a 
timeless state begins´, and do not notice that they have used the words 
´after´, and ´it´ and´ begins´ in a temporal sense and that temporality is 
embedded in their grammar.`` 
 
´´The queer resemblance between a philosophical investigation and 
(perhaps especially in mathematics) an aesthetic one. (E.g., what is bad 
about this garment, how should it be, etc.). 
 
´´Unshakeable faith (e.g., in a promise). Is it any less certain than being 
convinced of a mathematical truth? -But does that make the language 
games any more alike?´´ 
 
``Nothing is more important for teaching us to understand the concepts we 
have than to construct fictitious ones.`` 
 
``It´s only by thinking even more crazily than philosophers do that you can 
solve their problems.`` 
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``Ambition is the death of thought.`` 
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Review of The New Wittgenstein-- Crary & Read Eds 
403p (2000) 
      
Michael Stark 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein is the most famous philosopher of modern times but very 
few understand his pioneering work and there has been a collective amnesia 
regarding him in recent decades. Most of the essays are new but some date as 
far back as 1979 and whether they give a new view of his ideas depends on 
one’s understanding of what he said. For me, the interpretations are not new 
and mostly just as confused as nearly all the other commentary on W and on 
human behavior throughout the behavioral sciences and by the general public. 
As usual, nobody seems to grasp that philosophy is armchair psychology, and 
that W was (in my view) the greatest natural psychologist of all time.  He laid 
out the general structure of how the mind works, which is often referred to as 
intentionality and is roughly equivalent to cognition or personality or thinking 
and willing or higher order thought (HOT). He can thus be regarded as a 
pioneer in evolutionary psychology, although hardly anyone but me seems to 
realize it. W was thus nearly 50 years ahead of his time as the first to reject 
(though not entirely consistently) the blank slate or cultural view of human 
nature, though this has gone unrecognized and he has generally been 
interpreted as supporting a communal consensus view of psychology—exactly 
the opposite of his overall thrust (e.g., see Short’s comment on p 115). 
 
I provide my recent (2016) table of intentionality for a current frame of 
reference from the two systems point of view before remarking on each of the 
essays. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
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As always in philosophical writing, it is quite striking that nobody (in my view) 
fully grasps what W was doing and no one to this day has succeeded (and few 
even try) to follow his Socratic method with constant recourse to perspicuous 
examples of our psychological functioning. 
 
His wholly novel ideas and unique style and telegraphic writing, coupled with 
his often solitary, almost solipsistic lifestyle, and premature death in 1951, 
resulted in a failure to publish anything of his later thought during his lifetime 
and only slowly has his huge nachlass of some 20,000 pages been published- a 
project which continues to this day. The only complete edition of the largely 
German nachlass was first issued by Oxford in 2000 with Intelex now 
publishing it, as well as all the 14 Blackwell English language books on a 
searchable CD. The Blackwell CD costs ca. $100 but the Oxford CD is over $1000 
or over $2000 for the set including the images of the original manuscripts. They 
can however be obtained via interlibrary loan and also, like most books even 
free. One reason I mention this is that, though most of his best work has now 
been translated and published in English, it is useful and often indispensable 
to consider his German remarks in the nachlass and few scholars are up to it. 
Editing and translating of his work by his executors has also been less than 
perfect and capturing the precise meaning of the original German is a huge 
problem as several authors here note (e.g., the need in many passages to 
translate “darstellung” as an action and not as a disposition (propositional 
attitude)—one of many distinctions W was the first to elucidate.  One can get a 
graphic view of this by looking at Victor Rodych’s two revelatory articles (the 
first without and the latter with the benefit of the nachlass) on W and Godel in 
the journal Minds and Machines. See my comments in the 2016 article on W 
and Searle.  
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
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arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one.  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language 
as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
It is well known that W dramatically altered his views beginning in 1929 and 
by the mid 30’s essentially totally rejected his prior work, including the famous 
Tractatus. However, the Tractatus continues to fascinate and several of the 
current authors (Diamond, Conant) follow a long tradition in trying to explain 
just what he meant and how this changed or did not in his later work.  For me, 
the only value in this is to see how early in his life (ca 1914) he began to express 
the germs of his later understanding of human psychology.  On this issue, I 
think Hacker’s final essay here is definitive. His affirmative answer to “Was he 
trying to whistle it?” indicates that W of the Tractatus was trying to describe 
what he so famously insisted could not be said but only shown. Hacker (along 
with almost everyone else on the planet) does not seem to realize that this 
meant that W was trying to describe the functioning of the axioms of our innate 
evolutionary psychology by giving examples from our everyday use of 
language (i.e., from our thought), but he does a beautiful job of refuting 
Diamond and Conant’s views in their essays here, and many others elsewhere, 
and provides chapter and verse for this view.  See e.g., various comments on 
pg 360,363, 372, 373, 376-81 for W’s clear references to our innate and 
unquestionable (i.e. denying our axioms lacks sense) intentionality. Hacker 
puts an end (one hopes) to the view that W was actually writing 
Kierkegaardian nonsense. 
 
Crary’s introductory essay is tolerable, but makes a grotesque understatement 
on p3 when she states that there is “something essentially unsatisfactory” about 
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the view that W supported the idea that there is “no such thing as fully objective 
agreement.”  In fact, such a view is utterly mistaken, as is amply demonstrable 
throughout his latter writings in which he shows that our normal behavior is 
the very definition of objective agreement and it’s denial is incoherent (see e.g., 
his last work “On Certainty”).  
 
Cavell was one of the first to begin to penetrate deeply into W and his typically 
brilliant essay (reprinted from 1979) almost gets to the core of the matter, but 
he tends to get rather more florid and poetic than I think useful, and just does 
not quite get that W was laying out the structure of our evolved EP.  Of course, 
he can be forgiven as nobody else does either.  
 
McDowell’s essay from 1981 is quite dated and severely hampered by his 
rather opaque style, but has some good points, in spite of the expected oblivion 
to W’s defining the modern study of innate intentional psychology.  
 
I find Finkelstein’s article on W and Platonism to be excellent and agree that 
Kripke and Wright are wrong and McDowell and Tait are right about this. 
Though neither he nor anyone I have read sees it this way, it seems to me very 
useful to view Plato’s Ideals as our cognitive modules programmed by our 
genes.  No term will be perfect, but if we have to label W’s views, then I agree 
with Finkelstein and McDowell that “naturalistic Platonist” get pretty close. 
Certainly, he dealt the death blow to the idea that an interpretation is required 
to follow a rule.  
 
Read’s comments on word meanings seems unexceptionable but the writing is 
horrific (i.e., more or less standard philosophy).  
 
Stone on W on Deconstruction has its moments but for me Decon and Derrida 
are an utter waste of time and it is comical how he tends to lapse into the typical 
Decon word salad (I first typed “world salad”, which seems apt as well) when 
he discusses Derrida.  Again, we find Kripke’s bizarre skeptical interpretation 
of W discussed and rejected. In spite of occasional lapses, it is clear as crystal 
that W rejected the blank slate community consensus view in favor of his novel 
innate axiomatic description of our psychology. Meaning is normative because 
it’s innate, automatic and invisible and not subject to interpretation—a word 
W reserves for “the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.” 
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(p100). Neither Kripke nor Derrida gets the point since (like nearly everyone) 
they are hopelessly ensnared in the blank slate defaults when trying to explain 
behavior.   
 
Crary’s essay on W and political thought is clever but standard blank slate 
again and so hopeless. Politics, like all of culture, is a slight extension of our 
evolutionary psychology which demonstrates the ineluctable dominance of 
nature over nurture and W’s contribution was to point this out, though usually 
indirectly. 
 
Putnam’s “Rethinking Mathematical Necessity” shows that by 1994 he had 
begun to understand W, but even so it’s a big advance over his earlier work. 
 
Floyd on W and mathematical philosophy is pretty good stuff, but does not 
grasp the overall picture of W as an evolutionary psychologist and math as a 
slight extension of our intuitive psychology. There is no boundary between 
math and the rest of our intentionality and W interleaved math examples 
throughout his work.  Many of his most incisive revelations on our 
psychological functions and the relation of language to the world he 
demonstrated with mathematics or geometry.  Floyd gives a good discussion 
of W’s example of trisecting the angle which requires that we carefully examine 
the operation of disposition words like think, doubt, imagine, believe, know, 
decide and realize they depict actions or potential for actions and not mental 
states, as W first pointed out in the 1930’s. But in this case, as in all cases (ie, all 
of language and philosophy) this is only the beginning of what W shows us 
and we need to realize that “question”, “answer”, “mathematics”, “proof”, 
“equation”, etc., the various uses of which comprise complex language games 
(concepts or cognitive modules or groups of them) which often have little or 
NOTHING in common except that they are all included in our psychology (our 
form of life as he liked to say,) but this all operates invisibly and automatically 
in our subterranean psychology and thus is overlooked by virtually everyone 
including, incredibly, nearly all philosophers (even specialists on W), as this 
book also sadly illustrates.  To Floyd’s great credit, she gets it mostly right and 
the book is worth buying just for her article! Those intrigued by mathematical 
avenues into intentional psychology, as well as a general view of W might find 
a few things of interest in my comments on W and Godel and math in my 2016 
article.  
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Diamond wastes her article on W by spending most of it discussing such items 
of philosophical esoterica as what the Tractatus implied regarding Russell’s 
work, which is probably one of the least interesting ways to investigate human 
behavior. 
 
Cerbone likewise expends his energies mostly on the historical aspects of W’s 
relation to Frege, though he does make some good points about the limits of 
sense along the way (e.g., that the language games W proposed often would 
require a substantial remodeling of our psyche to work).  Sadly and almost 
inevitably (i.e., oblivion to how our mind works is another of the hundreds of 
universals of our EP) he seems to evince no real grasp that it was his insights 
into our evolutionary psychology that gave such power to W’s work, that these 
innate axioms (or concepts or cognitive modules) provide our “conceptual 
skin”(p308), is not clear that T and F do not apply to logic and math in the same 
sense as to empirical facts and that they are extensions of limited parts of our 
psychology, and that if we have a reasonable test for “illogical” then this term 
definitely characterizes much of our behavior.  But a reasonably stimulating 
read nonetheless. 
 
Witherspoon’s article on W and Carnap (member of the Vienna circle and the 
only person W ever directly accused of plagiarism) leaves me cold, as he has 
no insight at all into the workings of the mind, although he uses (abuses) lots 
of the right words— “logical syntax”, “linguistic framework,” “grammar.”  
Yes, he is certainly right that we often misunderstand W, but the really 
important point is that we ought to understand behavior. He justly gives 
attention to W’s last work “On Certainty” which some regard as his best 
(though he was dying of prostate cancer at the time and was often barely able 
to work) and seems on the way to becoming (with TLP and PI) his most famous 
(e.g., see the two recent books by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock).  But, he wastes his 
time on vague theorizing about “quasi-understanding” rather than explicating 
the depths of our intentional psychology, so beautifully laid out by W. 
 
Those who wish to have a more conventional (but in my view typically 
confused-- in spite of some good points) review of this volume may consult 
Philosophical Investigations 24:2p185-92(2001).   
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for the analysis of 
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language and behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language 
as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
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Review of Understanding Wittgenstein's On 
Certainty by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2007) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior 
and this is his last work and crowning achievement. It belongs to his third and 
final period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it shows that all 
behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious 
ratiocination is but icing on unconscious machinations), but as Daniele Moyal-
Sharrock has recently noted, is a radical new epistemology and the foundation 
for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and 
indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains share a 
common ancestry and common genes, and so there is only one basic way they 
work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals 
share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and in humans 
this is extended into a personality based on throat muscle contractions 
(language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be 
regarded as trivial). This book, and arguably all of W's work and all useful 
discussion of behavior is a development of or variation on these ideas.  
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein's death 
and has only recently begun to draw serious attention. I cannot recall a single 
reference to it in all of Searle and one see's whole books on W with barely a 
mention. There are however excellent books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn 
and others and parts of many other books and articles, but hands down the best 
is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume "Understanding 
Wittgenstein's On Certainty" is mandatory for every educated person, and 
perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), 
psychology, philosophy and life. However (in my view) like all analysis of W, 
they fall far short of grasping his unique and revolutionary advance in 
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describing behavior. This exceptional work suffers from the same tunnel vision 
nearly all philosophy does by failing to put behavior in its broad contemporary 
scientific context, which I will attempt here. However, DMS is one of the top 
Wittgensteinians (and thus philosophers) in the world and has written much 
new and ground breaking material since this volume appeared. 
 
 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior 
of all time and this is his last work and crowning achievement. It belongs to his 
third and final period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it shows that 
all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious 
ratiocination is but icing on unconscious machinations), but the foundation for 
all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed 
must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common 
ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that 
this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the 
same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and in humans this is 
extended into a personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) 
that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be regarded as 
trivial). This book, and arguably all of W's work and all useful discussion of 
behavior is a development of or variation on these ideas. 
 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is 
now known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, 
cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal 
behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a vast and 
unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it 
was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other 
behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few in philosophy who 
have more or less understood him have not carried the analysis to its logical 
(psychological) conclusion nor realized the extent of his anticipation of the 
latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (the two selves of fast and slow 
thinking--see below). His heir apparent, John Searle, refers to him periodically 
and his work can be seen as a straightforward extension of W's, but he does not 
really get that this is what he is doing. Other leading W analysts such as Hutto 
and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but (in my view) stop short of putting him 
in the center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs. I eventually 
came to understand much of W by regarding his corpus as the pioneering effort 
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in EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves and the multifarious 
language games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3rd period 
works and reading backwards to the proto-Tractatus. It has been extremely 
revealing to alternate W with the writings of hundreds of other philosophers 
and evolutionary psychologists (as I regard all psychologists and in fact all 
behavioral scientists, cognitive linguists and others). 
 
 
W can e.g., be regarded as the pioneer of evolutionary cognitive linguistics--the 
Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of 
examples of language use in context, to expose the many varieties of language 
games and the relationships between the primary games of the true-only 
axiomatic fast thinking of perception and memory and reflexive emotions and 
acts often described as the mostly subcortical reptilian brain first-self functions, 
and the later evolved higher cortical dispositional abilities of believing, 
knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or false propositional secondary 
language games of slow thinking and the network of cognitive illusions that 
constitute the second-self personality. With this evolutionary perspective, his 
works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that has never been 
equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find this one not only 
lets me understand W, but cuts like a hot knife through the frozen butter of 
discussions of higher order behavior. 
 
 
The failure (in my view) of even the best thinkers to fully grasp W's significance 
is partly due to the limited attention On Certainty (OC) and his other 3rd period 
works have received, but even more to the inability to understand how 
profoundly our view of philosophy, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, 
politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, aesthetics, literature (all of them being 
descriptive psychology), alters once we accept this evolutionary point of view. 
The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily on most 
people, pro or amateur and is the default of the second self of slow thinking 
conscious system 2, which is oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all 
decisions lies in the unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of system 1. 
Steven Pinker's brilliant `The Blank Slate: the modern denial of human nature' 
is highly recommended preparation, even though it is now dated and he has 
no clue about Wittgenstein and hence of what can be regarded as the first really 
deep investigation into the foundations of human nature. He seems not to 
grasp that the Blank Slate is an expression of the cognitive illusions that 
constitute our mental life. 
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To say that Searle has carried on W's work is not to imply that it is a direct 
result of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology 
(for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone 
accurately describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of 
what W said. I find most of Searle foreshadowed in W, including versions of 
the famous Chinese room argument against Strong AI. Incidentally if the 
Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor Rodych's excellent, 
but virtually unknown, supplement on the CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw". 
Rodych has also written a series of superb papers on W's philosophy of 
mathematics (i.e., the EP of the axiomatic system 1 Primary Language Games 
(PLG's) of counting as extended into the endless Language Games of math). 
 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker's books "The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature") that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other "Language of Thought" of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually 
reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is the 
best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, and his 
whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. He rejected the 
idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology and 
computation could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of Language 
Games (LG's) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what is always 
in front of our eyes and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these 
investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). 
 
 
And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we can 
interact) is not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed 
by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the 
later evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Second Self--the 
dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). Some 
of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the different 
(but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking-the epiphenomenality of 
our second-self mental life and the impossibility of private language. The PLG's 
are utterances of and descriptions of our involuntary, system 1, fast thinking, 
true only, untestable mental states- our perceptions and memories and 
involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily later SLG's are descriptions of 
voluntary, system 2, slow thinking, testable true or false dispositional (and 
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often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, 
believing etc. He recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole 
psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our 
language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to 
recognize them as always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look 
deeper (e.g., "The greatest danger here is wanting observe oneself" LWPP1, 
459). 
 
 
W makes these points throughout his works in countless examples and again 
his whole corpus can be regarded as the effort to make this clear. After all, what 
exactly is the alternative? W showed over and over that standard ways of 
describing behavior (i.e., most of philosophy, and much of descriptive 
psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, etc.) are either demonstrably 
false or incoherent. Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of 
regarding "language philosophy" as a separate study apart from other areas of 
behavior, since language is just another name for the mind. And, when W says 
(as he does many times) that understanding behavior is in no way dependent 
on the progress of psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion "The confusion and 
barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a `young science' -
-but cf. another comment that I have never seen quoted "Is scientific progress 
useful to philosophy? Certainly. The realities that are discovered lighten the 
philosopher’s task. Imagining possibilities." (LWPP1, 807).  
 
So, he is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that 
our behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology. 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, but 
all they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, facilitate our 
analysis of language games, and extend our EP, which remains unchanged 
(unless genetic engineering is unleashed to change our EP--but then it won't be 
us anymore). The true-only axioms of `'On Certainty'' are W's (and later 
Searle's) "bedrock" or "background", which we now call evolutionary 
psychology (EP), and which is traceable to the automated true-only reactions 
of bacteria, which evolved and operates by the mechanism of inclusive fitness 
(IF). See the recent works of Trivers and others for a popular intro to IF or 
Bourke's superb "Principles of Social Evolution" for a pro intro. 
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Beginning with their innate true-only, nonempirical  (nontestable) responses to 
the world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into 
further true only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but of 
course like many words, this is a complex language game even in the context 
of mathematics). Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the 
existence of our two hands or our breathing. This totally changes one’s view of 
human nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-
only Understandings of Agency (UA a term I devised 10 years ago) which 
newborn animals (including flies and worms if UA is suitably defined) have 
and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). Likewise, the Theory 
of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, intelligent person 
before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least half a century earlier. 
One cannot help but incorporate T. rex and all that is relevant to it into our 
innate background via the inexorable workings of EP. Once one gets the logical 
(psychological) necessity of this it is truly stupefying that even the brightest 
and the best seem not to grasp this most basic fact of human life (with a tip of 
the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others). And incidentally, the equation of logic 
and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human 
nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only 
extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without 
threatening our sanity. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in 
his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and 
other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense) cannot really get a foothold, 
as "reality" is the result of involuntary fast thinking axioms and not testable 
propositional attitudes. 
 
 
It became clear to me recently that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied 
with throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC, are equivalent to the 
fast thinking or System One that is at the center of current research (e.g., see 
Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W laid out the 
framework over 50 years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and 
which corresponds to the mental states of perception and memory, as W notes 
over and over in endless examples. One might call these "intracerebral 
reflexes"(maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the 
brain). Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another 
network of language games!) second-self  brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
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possible actions, are not mental states, and do not have any definite time of 
occurrence. But disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", 
"believing", which W discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses (or, 
one might say, one major use and one abuse) or language games--a peculiar 
philosophical use by exemplified by Moore (whose papers inspired W to write 
OC) which refers to the true-only sentences based on direct perceptions and 
memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic psychology (`I know these are my hands'), 
and their normal use as dispositions, which are acted out and which can 
become true or false (`I know my way home'). 
 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 
One to combinations of One and Two (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System Two dispositional thinking only, since any 
thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the 
intricate network of the "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral 
reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms" or "background" or "bedrock" (as 
W and later Searle call our EP). 
 
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is 
epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not describe nor determine how we act. 
It is an obvious corollary of his descriptive psychology that it is the unconscious 
automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior and that the 
later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, desiring, 
regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake. This is most strikingly borne out by 
the latest experimental psychology, which is nicely summarized by Kahneman 
in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter ` Two Selves', but of course there is a huge 
volume of recent work he does not cite). It is an easily defensible view that most 
of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions is wholly compatible with 
and straightforwardly deducible from W. 
 
 
Probably the leading current exponent of W's ideas on the language games of 
inner and outer (the `Two Selves' operation of our personality or intentionality 
or EP etc.) is the prolific Daniel Hutto (DH), who teaches at the same University 
as DMS. His approach is called `Radical Enactivism' and is well explained in 
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numerous recent books and papers. See my review of his ‘Radicalizing 
Enactivism’ (2012). He is also author of the best deconstruction I know of 
Dennett's preposterous claim to be following in W's footsteps (in fact he is just 
repeating most of the classic mistakes in grandiose fashion). But of cours,e one 
must read Searle too and the title of his famous review of Dennett's book says 
it well "Consciousness Explained Away". Incidentally, unlike some 
philosophers and other scholars, who make little or no effort to give the general 
public access to their papers, Hutto has put nearly every paper (though of 
course often just proofs and not the final journal version) free online. 
 
 
Here, as throughout W's works, understanding is bedeviled by possible 
alternative and consequently often infelicitous translations from often unedited 
and handwritten German notes, with "Satz" being frequently incorrectly 
rendered as "proposition"(which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when 
referring to our nonfalsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct 
"sentence", which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such 
as "these are my hands" or "Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs 
that lived about 50 million years ago"(and since this is an unavoidable 
extension of our psychology, what does this imply about creationists?). 
 
Incidentally, regarding the view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems 
nobody has noticed that he very clearly explained several times specifically and 
many times in passing, the psychology behind what later became known as the 
Wason Test--long a mainstay of EP research. 
 
 
The view that even the brightest philosophers do not really grasp the context 
in which they are operating is perhaps most strikingly illustrated when they 
attempt to define philosophy. In recent years I have seen such definitions by 
two of those I hold in highest regard--Graham Priest and John Searle, and of 
course they mention truth, language, reality etc., but not a word to suggest it is 
a description of our innate universal axiomatic psychology and its extensions. 
Priest, by the way, has noted that W was the first to predict the emergence of 
paraconsistent logic. 
 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
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aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and 
that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible.  
 
Those wishing a detailed account of Wittgenstein and his relation to modern 
philosophy and psychology may consult my many other articles, especially 
The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as 
Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016), and should also see DMS’s many 
newer writings on Wittgenstein.  
 
I reproduce the table of intentionality from my article here. 
 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems 
(dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can 
also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of 
behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of 
reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the 
Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology 
of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler 
table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three 
recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker.  The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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 Review of 'Tractatus Logico Philosophicus' by 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922) 
         
  Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
TLP is a remarkable document which continues to seduce some the best minds 
in philosophy, with new books and articles dealing partly or entirely with it 
appearing frequently over a century after it was first conceived. The first thing 
to note is that W later rejected it entirely for reasons he spent the rest of his life 
explaining. He was doing philosophy (descriptive psychology) as though the 
mind was a logical mathematical machine that processed facts, and behavior 
was the result. Thus, long before computers W gave the ultimate statement of 
what was half a century later to become known as strong AI, CTM 
(Computational Theory of Mind) and most recently DSM (Dynamic Systems 
Theory). Eventually, W realized that perception and memory were the raw 
material acted upon by our innate psychology (EP) and logic and math were 
some of the results. Being able to say or understand anything presupposed EP 
and trying to make logic primary leads to incoherence, as is evident throughout 
TLP (and the explanation for its many bizarre statements-see e.g. Hutto).  Even 
so, one can “understand” TLP in the sense that one can state the confusions he 
labored under and which most of the world still does.  I briefly review 
Wittgenstein’s work in modern context. 
  
Those wishing to view my writings of a more socio-political slant may see 
Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century (2017). Those interested in more 
of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ 
(2017). 
 
“But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness.  No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false.” (OC 94). 
 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
371  
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." "The Blue Book” p6 (1933)  
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched.  Of course, there are then 
no questions left, and this itself is the answer.”  TLP 6.52 (1922) 
 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts.” 
 Z 220 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions.”  PI 126 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107  
 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new.  That is a mistake.  The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have 
got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in 
the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is 
already there.  Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the 
future.” (said in 1930)  Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle 
(1979)p183 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it.  We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
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solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations.  If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel 
p312-314 
 
And from Paul Horwich a beautiful summary of where an understanding of 
the later Wittgenstein leads us. 
 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 
126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in 
sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory 
or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for 
bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein (W), I often recall the comment attributed 
to Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor 
like him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like 
not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part 
of the world and, like Einstein, nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was 
a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only 
one early version of his ideas, that was quite confused, but became world 
famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published 
nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly garbled form, 
diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died in 
1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in 
German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear 
relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted from 
other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings 
and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his 
literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they 
wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct 
meaning of sentences, which were conveying utterly novel views of how the 
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universe works, and that they then published this material with agonizing 
slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real 
explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous, 
due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even 
nonsense, and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds 
of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists 
knew only his early work, in which he had made a definitive summation of 
Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and condensed form that 
it was difficult to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually 
forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the 
diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous 
references to him, and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, over 
half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who really 
grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is 
precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Had W lived into his 80’s he would have been able to directly influence Searle 
(another modern genius of descriptive psychology), Symons, Habermas and 
countless other students of behavior.  If his brilliant friend Frank Ramsey had 
not died in his youth, a highly fruitful collaboration would almost certainly 
have ensued. If his student and colleague Alan Turing had become his lover, 
one of the most amazing collaborations of all time would likely have evolved. 
In any one case the intellectual landscape of the 20th century would have been 
different and if all 3 had occurred it would almost certainly have been very 
different. Instead he lived in relative intellectual isolation, few knew him well 
or had an inkling of his ideas while he lived, and only a handful within 
philosophy have any real grasp of his work today.  He could have shined as an 
engineer(he has an aviation patent), a mathematician (he sketched out a proof 
of Euler’s theorem, since shown to be valid, and grasped the psychological 
foundations of math , incompleteness, infinity  etc., as perhaps no one else has 
to this day), a physiologist (he did wartime research in it), a musician (he 
played instruments and had a renowned talent for whistling), an architect (the 
house he designed and constructed for his sister still stands), or an 
entrepreneur (he inherited one of the largest fortunes in the world but gave it 
all away). It is a miracle he survived the trenches and prison camps (while 
writing the Tractatus) in WW1, many years of suicidal depressions (3 brothers 
succumbed to them), avoided being trapped in Austria and executed by the 
Nazis (he was partly Jewish), and that he was not persecuted for his 
homosexuality and driven to suicide like his friend Turing.  He realized 
nobody understood what he was doing and might never (not surprising as he 
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was half a century ahead of psychology and philosophy, which only recently 
have started accepting that our brain is an evolved organ like our heart.). 
 
Before TLP there is a ProtoTractatus and a few desultory comments made even 
earlier. It is a remarkable document which continues to seduce some the best 
minds in philosophy, with new books and articles dealing partly or entirely 
with it appearing frequently over a century after it was first conceived. The first 
thing to note is that W later rejected it entirely for reasons he spent the rest of 
his life explaining. He was doing philosophy (descriptive psychology) as 
though the mind was a logical mathematical machine that processed facts, and 
behavior was the result. Thus, long before computers W gave the ultimate 
statement of what was half a century later to become known as strong AI, CTM 
(Computational Theory of Mind) and most recently DSM (Dynamic Systems 
Theory). Eventually, W realized that perception and memory were the raw 
material acted upon by our innate psychology (EP) and logic and math were 
some of the results. Being able to say or understand anything presupposed EP 
and trying to make logic primary leads to incoherence, as is evident throughout 
TLP (and the explanation for its many bizarre statements-see e.g. Hutto).  Even 
so, one can “understand” TLP in the sense that one can state the confusions he 
labored under and which most of the world still does.   
 
In the decades after TLP, W evolved slowly and his ideas crystallized into a 
unique and amazingly deep and prescient description of behavior not yet fully 
appreciated by even his brightest and most ardent admirers (e.g. Hutto, Stern, 
DMS etc.).  Although W wrote thousands of pages and is the most discussed 
philosopher in modern times, only a few have any real grasp of what he did 
and how it anticipates in detail many of the latest advances in psychology and 
philosophy (descriptive psychology).  It is essential to first read some of the 
commentaries on his later work by others.  One of the best is that of Daniele 
Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best 
starting point for understanding Wittgenstein, psychology, philosophy and 
life, since it explains the unconscious, axiomatic structure of animal behavior. 
Next I would suggest the writings of Daniel Hutto, especially his “Wittgenstein 
and the End of Philosophy” (2004).  However (in my view) like all analyses, 
they fall far short of grasping his unique and revolutionary advances in 
describing behavior by failing to put them in a broad evolutionary and 
contemporary scientific context, which I will attempt in skeletal outline here. 
Finally, all of Searle should be read, with special attention to “Rationality in 
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Action” and his more recent works. Though Searle does not say and seems to 
be unaware, most of his work follows directly from that of W. 
 
To say that Searle has carried on W’s work is not to say that it is a direct result 
of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for 
the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately 
describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W said 
(assuming W is correct). I find most of Searle foreshadowed in W, including 
versions of the famous Chinese room argument against Strong AI. Incidentally, 
if the Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor Rodych’s xlnt, 
but virtually unknown, supplement on the CR— “Searle Freed of Every Flaw”. 
Rodych has also written a series of superb papers on W’s philosophy of 
mathematics --i.e., the EP (Evolutionary Psychology) of the axiomatic System 1 
Primary Language Games (PLG’s) of counting as extended into the endless 
System 2 SLG’s (Secondary Language Games) of math.  I will also note that 
nobody who promotes Strong AI, CTM or DSM seems to be aware that W’s 
Tractatus is the most striking and powerful statement of their viewpoint ever 
penned (i.e., behavior as the logical processing of facts—i.e., “information 
processing”—see the work of Hutto and Searle for a lovely dissection of this 
rat’s nest).  Of course, decades later (but before the digital computer was a 
gleam in Turing’s eye) he described in great detail why CTM was an incoherent 
description of mind that must be replaced by psychology (or you can say this 
is all he did for the rest of his life).  
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior of 
all time and TLP and Philosophical Investigations (PI) are his most famous 
works. 
 
His work as a whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only 
axioms (see “On Certainty” for his final extended treatment of this idea) and 
that our conscious ratiocination emerges from unconscious machinations.  His 
corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, 
revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The “must” is entailed 
by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so 
there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic 
structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on 
inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended into a personality based 
on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others 
(with variations that can be regarded as trivial). This book, and arguably all of 
W’s work and all useful discussion of behavior, is a development of or variation 
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on these ideas. Another major theme here, and of course in all discussion of 
human behavior, is the need to separate the automatisms which underlie 
behavior from the effects of culture.  Though few philosophers, psychologists, 
anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly discuss this, it can be seen as the 
major problem they are dealing with.  I suggest it will prove of the greatest 
value to consider W’s work and most of his examples as an effort to tease apart 
not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions vs dispositions--see below), 
but nature and nurture.  
 
What he eventually laid out are the foundations of evolutionary psychology 
(EP), or if you prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher 
order thought or just animal behavior. Sadly, few realize that his works are a 
vast and unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as 
the day it was written.  He is almost universally ignored by psychology and 
other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few in philosophy 
who have more or less understood him, have not carried the analysis to its 
logical (psychological) conclusion, nor realized the extent of his anticipation of 
the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (TOM, framing, the two selves of 
fast and slow thinking etc., —see below). His heir apparent, John Searle, refers 
to him periodically and his work can be seen as a straightforward extension of 
W’s, but he does not really get that this is what he is doing. Other leading W 
analysts such as Hutto and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but (in my view) 
stop short of putting him in the center of current psychology, where he 
certainly belongs. 
 
His last works describe the two selves and the multifarious language games of 
fast and slow thinking, and, by starting from them and reading backwards to 
the proto-Tractatus, one sees how he became the first to grasp the identity of 
language, thought and reality. It should be clear that insofar as they are 
coherent and correct, all accounts of behavior are describing the same 
phenomena and ought to translate easily into one another.  Thus, the recently 
fashionable themes of “Embodied Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” should 
flow directly from and into W’s work. However almost nobody is able to follow 
his example of avoiding jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, so even 
the redoubtable Hutto (see below) has to be heavily filtered to see that this is 
true, and even he does not get how completely W has anticipated the latest 
work in fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking (acting).  
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W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the 
Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of 
examples of language use in context, by exposing the many varieties of 
language games and the relationships between the primary games of the true-
only unconscious, axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive 
emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical 
reptilian brain first-self functions), and the later evolved higher cortical 
dispositional conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that 
constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of slow 
thinking that are the network of cognitive illusions that constitute the second-
self or personality.  He dissects hundreds of language games showing how the 
true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of system one grade into 
the thinking, remembering, and understanding of system two dispositions, and 
many of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly.  With 
this evolutionary perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of 
human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many 
perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems 
view not only lets me understand W, but cuts like a hot knife through the frozen 
butter of all discussions of higher order behavior.  To repeat Dobzhansky’s 
famous comment: “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of 
evolution.” And nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of 
evolutionary psychology. 
 
The failure (in my view) of even the best thinkers (with a few possible 
exceptions) to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to the limited attention 
“On Certainty” (OC) and his other 3rd period works have received, but even 
more to the inability to understand how profoundly our view of philosophy, 
anthropology, sociology, linguistics, politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, 
aesthetics, literature (all of them being descriptive psychology), alters once we 
accept this evolutionary point of view.  The dead hand of the blank slate view 
of behavior still rests heavily on most people, pro or amateur and is the default 
of the second self of slow thinking conscious System 2, (which is oblivious to 
the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the unconscious, fast 
thinking axiomatic structure of System 1). System 1 overlaps with “mirroring” 
(Goldman), “neural resonance” (Gallagher), “biosemantics” (Millikan), and 
“biosemiotics” (Hutto).  Steven Pinker’s brilliant ‘The Blank Slate: the modern 
denial of human nature’ is highly recommended preparation, even though it is 
now dated and limited in various ways, and he has no clue about Wittgenstein, 
and hence of what can be regarded as the first and best really deep 
investigation into the foundations of human nature. Also, he seems not to grasp 
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that the Blank Slate view is an expression of the cognitive illusions that 
constitute our mental life.   
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking  or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other “Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually 
reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is the 
best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, and his 
whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. He rejected the 
idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental psychology 
and computation could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of 
Language Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties he noted are to understand what 
is always in front of our eyes and to capture vagueness (“The greatest difficulty 
in these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness” LWPP1, 
347).  And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we can 
interact) is not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed 
by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the 
later evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of the Second Self--the 
dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). As 
with his other aphorisms I suggest one should take seriously his comment that 
even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we are thinking—
this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind.  That is, since all higher 
behavior originates in the neural automatisms of system 1, even I don’t know 
specifically what I am going to say.  
 
Some of W’s favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the 
different (but interdigitating) LG’s of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or 
roughly PLG’s and SLG’s), the epiphenomenality of our second self and mental 
life (i.e., of our personality), the impossibility of private language and the 
axiomatic structure of behavior.  The PLG’s are utterances by and descriptions 
of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, true only, non-propositional, 
untestable mental states (“it hurts”) - our perceptions and memories and 
involuntary acts (including System 1 Truths and Understanding Of Agency –
UOA1), while the evolutionarily later SLG’s are expressions or descriptions of 
voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 
and UOA2, dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, 
intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. A useful heuristic is to separate 
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behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., 
Thinking 1 and Thinking 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and 
Truths 2 (empirical extensions or “Theorems” which in some cases can be 
False). 
 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole higher psychology 
and all the answers to all truly philosophical questions (i.e., ones not scientific) 
are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the 
answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to 
stop trying to look deeper (e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting to observe 
oneself.” LWPP1, 459).  Introspection gives nothing but language gives 
everything. 
 
W makes these points throughout his works in countless examples and again 
his whole corpus can be regarded as the effort to make them clear. W showed 
that standard ways of describing behavior (i.e., most of philosophy, and much 
of descriptive psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, etc.) are either 
demonstrably false or incoherent. Once we understand W, we realize the 
absurdity of regarding “language philosophy” as a separate study apart from 
other areas of behavior, since language is just another name for the mind.  And, 
when W says that understanding behavior is in no way dependent on the 
progress of psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion “The confusion and 
barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a ‘young science’ 
--but cf. another comment that I have never seen quoted “Is scientific progress 
useful to philosophy? Certainly. The realities that are discovered lighten the 
philosophers task. Imagining possibilities.” (LWPP1, 807). So, he is not 
legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out that our behavior (mostly 
speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology and that all 
discussions of higher order behavior are plagued by conceptual confusions. 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, but 
all they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior and facilitate our 
analysis of language games, while our EP remains unchanged (unless genetic 
engineering is unleashed to change it—but then it won’t be us anymore). The 
true-only axioms most thoroughly explored in ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and 
later Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background” (EP), which is traceable to the 
automated true-only reactions of bacteria, which evolved and operates by the 
mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). See the recent works of Trivers and others 
for a popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb “Principles of Social Evolution” for 
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a pro intro.  
 
Beginning with their innate true-only, non-empirical (automated and non-
changeable) responses to the world, animals extend their axiomatic 
understanding via deductions into further true only understandings 
(“theorems” as we might call them, but of course like many words, this is a 
complex language game even in the context of mathematics). Tyrannosaurs 
and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands or 
our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human nature.  Theory 
of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all (see Hutto) but a group of true-only 
Understandings Of Agency (UOA a term I devised 10 years ago) which 
newborn animals (including flies and worms if UOA is suitably defined) have 
and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes).  However, W noted 
that for much of intentionality there are System 1 and System 2 versions 
(language games)-the fast unconscious UOA1 and the Slow conscious UOA2 
and of course these are multifaceted phenomena.  
 
Likewise, the Theory of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, 
rational, intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at 
least half a century earlier. One CANNOT help but incorporate T. rex and all 
that is relevant to it into our innate background via the inexorable workings of 
EP.  Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is truly 
stupefying that even most of the brightest do not grasp this most basic fact of 
human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others) which was 
laid out in great detail in “On Certainty”.  Incidentally, the equation of logic 
and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human 
nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, points out).  
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only 
extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without 
threatening our sanity. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in 
his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and 
other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) 
cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary fast 
thinking axioms and not testable true or false propositions.  
 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
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throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work), are 
equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current 
research (e.g., see Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but he has no idea W 
laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and 
unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UOA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over 
in endless examples.  One might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% 
of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or 
reflective, more or less “conscious” (beware another network of language 
games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as 
“dispositions” or “inclinations”, which refer to abilities or possible actions, are 
not mental states, and do not have any definite time of occurrence. But 
disposition words like “knowing”, “understanding”, “thinking”, “believing”, 
which W discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses or language games.  
One is a peculiar philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) 
exemplified by Moore (whose papers inspired W to write OC), which refers to 
the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic System 1 psychology (‘I know these are my hands’), and their 
normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out and which can become true 
or false (‘I know my way home’).  
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”.  Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 
1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not 
ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought 
or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of  “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and 
later Searle call our EP).  
 
One of W’s recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer UOA (but of course he 
did not use these terms), which is the subject of major research efforts now. I 
recommend consulting the work of Ian Apperly, who is carefully dissecting 
UOA1 and 2 and who has recently become aware of Hutto, since Hutto has 
now characterized UOA1 as a fantasy (or rather insists that there is no ‘Theory’ 
nor representation involved in UOA1--that being reserved for UOA2). 
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However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the 
groundwork for this between 60 and 80 years ago.    
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is 
epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not describe nor determine how we act.  
It is an obvious corollary of his descriptive psychology that it is the unconscious 
automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior and that the 
later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, desiring, 
regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake.  This is most strikingly borne out by 
the latest experimental psychology, some of which is nicely summarized by 
Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter ‘Two Selves’, but of course 
there is a huge volume of recent work he does not cite and endless other books 
and papers). It is an easily defensible view that much of the burgeoning 
literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is 
wholly compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W.  
Probably the leading exponent of W’s ideas on the language games of inner 
and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our personality or intentionality or EP 
etc.) is the prolific Daniel Hutto (DH), whose ‘Radical Enactivism’ is explained 
in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the 
Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a 
straightforward extension of W’s 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto 
seems only intermittently aware of this). He is also author of the best 
deconstructions I know of Dennett’s preposterous claim to be following in W’s 
footsteps (in fact he is just repeating many classic mistakes (e.g. those in TLP!!) 
in grandiose fashion and hasn’t a clue about W) and of Fodor’s LOT and other 
nonsense. But of course, one must read Searle too and the title of his famous 
review of Dennett’s book says it well --“Consciousness Explained Away”. 
Incidentally, unlike some philosophers and other scholars (e.g. Searle), who 
make little or no effort to give the general public access to their papers, Hutto 
has put nearly every paper (though of course often just proofs and not the final 
paper) free online at www.academia.edu. 
Throughout W’s works, understanding is bedeviled by possible alternative and 
consequently often infelicitous translations from often unedited and 
handwritten German notes, with “Satz” being frequently incorrectly rendered 
as “proposition”(which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when referring to 
our non-falsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct “sentence”, 
which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such as “these 
are my hands” or “Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived 
about 50 million years ago”(and since this is an unavoidable extension of our 
psychology, what does this imply about creationists?). 
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Regarding my view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems nobody has 
noticed that he very clearly explained several times specifically and many times 
in passing, the psychology behind what later became known as the Wason Test-
-long a mainstay of EP research.  
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W in his later works is not 
obscure, difficult or irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that 
he writes aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that 
way, and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures 
possible.  
Those wishing some specific comments on W’s later works can see my reviews 
of OC, PI and books by Hutto and Searle and others or for a comprehensive 
view of his work, its relationship to that of John Searle's and to the two systems 
of thought now prominent in contemporary psychology may see my article The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed 
in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016).  I reproduce the table of intentionality from 
the article here. 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems 
(dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can 
also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of 
behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of 
reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the 
Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC), the Descriptive Psychology 
of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler 
table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three 
recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker.  The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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Review of 'Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy-- 
Neither Theory nor Therapy' by Daniel Hutto 2nd ed. 
(2006) 
      
Michael Starks 
   
ABSTRACT  
 
One of the leading exponents of W's ideas on the language games of inner and 
outer (the `Two Selves' operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc.) 
is the prolific Daniel Hutto (DH). His approach is called `Radical Enactivism' 
and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers (see my review of 
Radicalizing Enactivism) and a new one is appearing as I write (Evolving 
Enactivism). It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now 
current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W's 2nd 
and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of 
this). 
 
Unfortunately, in 2006 Hutto had not yet arrived at his Radical Enactivism, so 
much time is wasted on McDowell and Brandom and of course none of them 
to this day have totally digested the later W and his prescient analysis of 
automatic behavior-so fully in tune with contemporary research. Nor is there 
any discussion of Searle's groundbreaking and completely Wittgensteinian 
(unwittingly) disquisitions on the Construction of Social Reality. Thus, his 
chapters 5 and 6 on Realism and Idealism etc., though superb for 2002, need a 
complete rewrite from a modern two systems viewpoint and I provide a start 
on that in my review. Much time is wasted on Davidson and Williams, etc. but 
one can endure them for Hutto's brilliant analyses and the frequent quotes from 
W. The last chapter gives his critic Rupert Read the counterblast he deserves 
and permits a slight update to 2006. Overall a lovely book and I eagerly await 
the third edition which I hope will ensue. 
Those wishing to view my writings of a more socio-political slant may see 
Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century (2017). Those interested in more 
of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ 
(2017). 
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“But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness.  No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false.”OC 94 
 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." "The Blue Book” p6 (1933)  
 
“What we are ‘tempted to say’ in such as case is, of course, not philosophy, but 
it is its raw material. Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to 
say about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy 
of mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.” PI 234  
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched.  Of course, there are then 
no questions left, and this itself is the answer.”  TLP 6.52 (1922) 
 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions.”  PI 126 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI 107  
 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new.  That is a mistake.  The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have 
got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in 
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the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is 
already there.  Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the 
future.” (said in 1930)  Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle 
(1979)p183 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it.  We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! ….This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations.  If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel 
p312-314 
 
“Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what 
happens as a ‘proto-phenomenon’.  That is, where we ought to have said: this 
language game is played.” PI 654 
 
“What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has 
doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes.” RFM I p142 
 
“Here the temptation is overwhelming to say something further, when 
everything has been described-Whence this pressure?  What analogy, what 
wrong interpretation produces it?” Z 313 
 
“The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway.” Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
“The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of 
philosophy).”  CV p10(1931) 
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(THESE QUOTES ARE NOT SELECTED AT RANDOM AND EACH MAKES A PROFOUND 
POINT) 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching 
ideas about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part 
of the world and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was 
a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only 
one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but 
became world famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years 
published nothing more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly garbled 
form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died 
in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in 
German, composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear 
relationship to sentences before or after; that these were cut and pasted from 
other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, underlinings 
and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his 
literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they 
wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the correct 
meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how the 
universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing 
slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real 
explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous 
due to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even 
nonsense, and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds 
of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists 
knew only his early work in which he had made a definitive summation of 
Newtonian physics stated in such extremely abstract and condensed form that 
it was difficult to decide what was being said; that he was then virtually 
forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the 
diverse topics of modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous 
references to him, and that many omitted him entirely; that to this day, over 
half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who really 
grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is 
precisely the situation with Wittgenstein (hereafter W).  
 
I will first give my view of W as it relates to a contemporary two systems view 
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and then some specific comments on Hutto’s book. 
 
W’s first book, the famous Tractatus (1922) was the only one published during 
his lifetime and is such an amazingly powerful statement of (mostly) the 
mechanical version of mind that it continues to attract some of the best minds 
to this day (see my other reviews for details).  He later totally rejected it and his 
philosophy evolved into the most powerful dissection of behavior ever done. 
His next book, Philosophical Investigations (PI) was not published until 1953, 
2 years after his death, and can be viewed as two quite different books. Part 
one is from his middle or W2 period and Part two is from his final or W3 period 
(which overlaps extensively with his books LWPP1 and 2), when his ideas 
crystallized into a unique and amazingly deep and prescient description of 
behavior not yet fully appreciated by even his most ardent admirers.  Although 
W wrote thousands of pages and is the most discussed philosopher in modern 
times, only a few have any real grasp of what he did and how it anticipates in 
detail many of the latest advances in psychology and philosophy (descriptive 
psychology).  It is essential to first read some of the commentaries on his work 
by others.  One of the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 
volume “Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every 
educated person, and perhaps the best starting point for understanding 
Wittgenstein, psychology, philosophy and life, since it explains the 
unconscious, axiomatic structure of animal behavior. Next I would suggest the 
writings of Daniel Hutto, especially his “Wittgenstein and the End of 
Philosophy” (2004).  However (in my view) like all analyses, they fall far short 
of grasping his unique and revolutionary advances in describing behavior by 
failing to put them in a broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, 
which I will attempt in skeletal outline here. Finally, all of Searle should be 
read, with special attention to “Rationality in Action” and his more recent 
works. Though Searle does not say and seems to be unaware, most of his work 
follows directly from that of W, even though he often criticizes him or “damns 
with faint praise”.  
 
To say that Searle has carried on W’s work is not to say that it is a direct result 
of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for 
the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately 
describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W said. 
I find most of Searle foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous 
Chinese room argument against Strong AI. Incidentally, if the Chinese Room 
interests you then you should read Victor Rodych’s xlnt, but virtually 
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unknown, supplement on the CR— “Searle Freed of Every Flaw”. Rodych has 
also written a series of superb papers on W’s philosophy of mathematics --i.e., 
the EP (Evolutionary Psychology) of the axiomatic System 1 ability of counting 
up to 3, as extended into the endless System 2 SLG’s (Secondary Language 
Games) of math.  I will also note that nobody who promotes Strong AI and 
CTM (Computational Theory of Mind), now more or less superseded by its 
clone Dynamic Systems Theory, seems to be aware that W’s Tractatus is the 
most striking and powerful statement of their viewpoint ever penned (i.e., 
behavior (thinking) as the logical processing of facts—i.e., information 
processing).  Of course, later (but before the digital computer was a gleam in 
Turing’s eye) he described in great detail why CTM was an incoherent 
description of mind that must be replaced by psychology (or you can say this 
is all he did for the rest of his life).  
 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior 
of all time and PI is his most famous work. His work as a whole shows that all 
behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms (see his “On Certainty” for 
his final extended treatment of this idea-and my review thereof for 
preparation) and that our conscious ratiocination emerges from unconscious 
machinations.  His corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of 
animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The 
“must” is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and 
common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this 
necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same 
evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is 
extended into a personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) 
that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be regarded as 
trivial). This book, and arguably all of W’s work and all useful discussion of 
behavior, is a development of or variation on these ideas. Another major theme 
here, and of course in all discussion of human behavior, is the need to separate 
the automatisms which underlie all behavior from the effects of culture.  
Though few philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., 
explicitly discuss this, it can be seen as the major problem they are dealing with.  
I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider W’s work and most of 
his examples as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., 
perceptions vs dispositions--see below), but nature and nurture.  
 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
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throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is 
now known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, 
cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal 
behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a vast and 
unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it 
was written.  He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other 
behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few in philosophy who 
have more or less understood him, have not carried the analysis to its logical 
(psychological) conclusion, nor realized the extent of his anticipation of the 
latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two 
selves of fast and slow thinking etc., —see below).  
 
I eventually came to understand much of W by regarding his corpus as the 
pioneering effort in EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves and the 
multifarious language games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from 
his 3rd period works and reading backwards to the proto-Tractatus. It has been 
extremely revealing to alternate W with the writings of hundreds of other 
philosophers and evolutionary psychologists (as I regard all psychologists and 
in fact all behavioral scientists, cognitive linguists and others).  It should also 
be clear that insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of behavior 
are describing the same phenomena and ought to translate easily into one 
another.  Thus, the recently fashionable themes of “Embodied Mind” and 
“Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from and into W’s work. However 
almost nobody is able to follow his example of avoiding jargon and sticking to 
perspicuous examples, so even the redoubtable Hutto (see below) has to be 
heavily filtered to see that this is true, and even he does not get how completely 
W has anticipated the latest work in fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking 
(acting).  
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the 
Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of 
examples of language use in context, by exposing the many varieties of 
language games and the relationships between the primary games of the true-
only unconscious, pre or protolinguistic axiomatic fast thinking of perception, 
memory and reflexive emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and 
primitive cortical reptilian brain first-self, mirror neuron functions), and the 
later evolved higher cortical dispositional linguistic conscious abilities of 
believing, knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or false propositional 
secondary language games of slow thinking that are the network of cognitive 
393  
illusions that constitute the second-self personality.  He dissects hundreds of 
language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and 
reflexive actions of system one grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of system two dispositions, and many of his examples also 
address the nature/nurture issue explicitly.  With this evolutionary perspective, 
his later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely 
current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, 
but I find that this evolutionary two systems view not only lets me understand 
W, but cuts like a hot knife through the frozen butter of all discussions of 
behavior.  To repeat Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in biology 
makes sense except in the light of evolution.” And nothing in philosophy 
makes sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology. 
 
The failure (in my view) of even the best thinkers (with a few possible 
exceptions) to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to the limited attention 
“On Certainty” (OC) and his other 3rd period works have received, but even 
more to the inability to understand how profoundly our view of philosophy, 
anthropology, sociology, linguistics, politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, 
aesthetics, literature (all of them being descriptive psychology), alters once we 
accept this evolutionary point of view.  The dead hand of the blank slate view 
of behavior still rests heavily on most people, pro or amateur and is the default 
of the second self of slow thinking conscious System 2, (which is oblivious to 
the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the unconscious, fast 
thinking axiomatic structure of System 1). System 1 is more or less equivalent 
to “mirroring” (Goldman), “neural resonance” (Gallagher), “biosemantics” 
(Millikan), and “biosemiotics” (Hutto). Steven Pinker’s brilliant ‘The Blank 
Slate: the modern denial of human nature’ is highly recommended preparation, 
even though it is now dated and limited in various ways, and he has no clue 
about Wittgenstein, and hence of what can be regarded as the first and best 
really deep investigation into the foundations of human nature. Also, he seems 
not to grasp that the Blank Slate view is an expression of the cognitive illusions 
that constitute our mental life.   
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking  or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other “Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually 
reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is the 
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best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, and his 
whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. He rejected the 
idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental psychology 
and computation (now we say Computational Theory of Mind, Strong AI, 
Dynamic Systems Theory, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down 
deconstructions of Language Games (LG’s) did. The principal difficulties he 
noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture 
vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of 
representing vagueness” LWPP1, 347).  And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle 
contractions, the principal way we can interact) is not a window into the mind 
but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present 
and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved Secondary Language 
Games (SLG’s) of the Second Self--the dispositions --imagining, knowing, 
meaning, believing, intending etc.). As with his other aphorisms I suggest one 
should take seriously his comment that even if God could look into our mind 
he could not see what we are thinking—this should be the motto of the 
Embodied Mind.  (But He could see what we are perceiving since perceptions, 
unlike thoughts, are mental states—this is not a theory but a fact about our 
grammar). 
 
Some of W’s favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the 
different (but interdigitating) LG’s of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or 
roughly PLG’s and SLG’s), the epiphenomenality (and for most purposes the 
superficiality) of our second self and mental life (i.e., of our personality), the 
impossibility of private language and the axiomatic structure of all behavior.  
The PLG’s are utterances by and descriptions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true only, nonpropositional, untestable mental states- 
our perceptions and memories and involuntary acts (including System 1 Truths 
and UOA) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
SLG’s are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
mentalizing neuron, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UOA2, 
dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
thinking, knowing, believing etc which can only be described in terms of 
reasons.  
 
A useful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 
and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and Emotions 
2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical 
extensions or “Theorems” which result from the logical extension of Truths 1).  
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He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper (e.g., “The 
greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
 
W makes these points throughout his works in countless examples and again 
his whole corpus can be regarded as the effort to make them clear. After all, 
what exactly is the alternative? W showed over and over that standard ways of 
describing behavior (i.e., most of philosophy, and much of descriptive 
psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, etc.) are either demonstrably 
false or incoherent. Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of 
regarding “language philosophy” as a separate study apart from other areas of 
behavior, since language is just another name for the mind.  And, when W says 
(as he does many times) that understanding behavior is in no way dependent 
on the progress of psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion “The confusion 
and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a ‘young 
science’ --but cf. another comment that I have never seen quoted “Is scientific 
progress useful to philosophy? Certainly. The realities that are discovered 
lighten the philosophers task. Imagining possibilities.” (LWPP1, 807). So, he is 
not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out that our behavior 
(mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology and that all 
discussions of higher order behavior are plagued (as they are to this day) by 
conceptual confusions.  
 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, but 
all they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, facilitate our 
analysis of language games, and extend our EP, which, like all of reality, 
remains ultimately unexplainable and unchanged (unless genetic engineering 
is unleashed to change our EP—but then it won’t be us anymore). The true-
only axioms, most thoroughly explored in ’On Certainty’’, are W’s (and later 
Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, which we now call evolutionary 
psychology (EP), and which are traceable to the automated true-only reactions 
of bacteria, which evolved and operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness 
(IF). See the recent works of Trivers and others for a popular intro to IF or 
Bourke’s superb “Principles of Social Evolution” for a pro intro.  
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Beginning with their innate true-only, nonempirical (automated and 
nonchangeable) responses to the world, animals extend their axiomatic 
understanding via deductions into further true only understandings 
(“theorems” as we might call them, but of course like many words, this is a 
complex language game even in the context of mathematics). Tyrannosaurs 
and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands or 
our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human nature.  Theory 
of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-only Understandings 
of Agency (UOA a term I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals 
(including flies and worms if UOA is suitably defined) have and subsequently 
extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes).  However, as I note here W made it very 
clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 and System 2 versions 
(language games)-the fast unconscious UOA1 and the Slow conscious UOA2 
and of course these are multifaceted phenomena.  
 
Likewise, the Theory of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, 
rational, intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at 
least half a century earlier. One CANNOT help but incorporate T. rex and all 
that is relevant to it into our innate background via the inexorable workings of 
EP.  Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is truly 
stupefying that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most basic 
fact of human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others) which 
was laid out in great detail in “On Certainty”.  Incidentally, the equation of 
logic and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and 
human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, points out).  
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only 
extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without 
threatening our sanity. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in 
his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and 
other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) 
cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary fast 
thinking axioms and not testable true or false propositions.  
 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work), are 
equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current 
research (e.g., see Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but he has no idea W 
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laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and 
unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UOA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over 
in endless examples.  One might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% 
of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or 
reflective, more or less “conscious” (beware another network of language 
games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as 
“dispositions” or “inclinations”, which refer to abilities or possible actions, are 
not mental states, and do not have any definite time of occurrence. But 
disposition words like “knowing”, “understanding”, “thinking”, “believing”, 
which W discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses (or, one might say, 
in philosophical contexts, one major use and one abuse) or language games.  
One is a peculiar philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) 
exemplified by Moore (whose papers inspired W to write OC), which refers to 
the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic System 1 psychology (‘I know these are my hands’), and their 
normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out and which can become true 
or false (‘I know my way home’).  
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”.  Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 
1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not 
ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought 
or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of  “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and 
later Searle call our EP).  
 
One of W’s recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer UOA (but of course he 
did not use these terms), which is the subject of major research efforts now. I 
recommend consulting the work of Ian Apperly, who is carefully dissecting 
UOA1 and 2 and who has recently become aware of Hutto, since Hutto has 
now characterized UOA1 as a fantasy (or rather insists that there is no ‘Theory’ 
nor representation involved in UOA1--that being reserved for UOA2). 
However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the 
groundwork for this between 60 and 80 years ago.    
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Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is 
epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not accurately describe nor determine 
how we act.  It is an obvious corollary of his descriptive psychology that it is 
the unconscious automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior 
and that the later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, 
loving, desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake.  This is most 
strikingly borne out by the latest experimental psychology, some of which is 
nicely summarized by Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter ‘Two 
Selves’, but of course there is a huge volume of recent work he does not cite). 
It is an easily defensible view that most of the burgeoning literature on 
cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is wholly 
compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W.  
 
Throughout W’s works understanding is bedeviled by possible alternative and 
consequently often infelicitous translations from often unedited and 
handwritten German notes, with “Satz” being frequently incorrectly rendered 
as “proposition”(which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when referring to 
our non-falsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct “sentence”, 
which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such as “these 
are my hands” or “Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived 
about 50 million years ago”(and since this is an unavoidable extension of our 
psychology, what does this imply about creationists?). 
 
Regarding my view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems nobody has 
noticed that he very clearly explained several times specifically and many times 
in passing, the psychology behind what later became known as the Wason Test-
-long a mainstay of EP research.  
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and 
that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
One of the leading exponents of W's ideas on the language games of inner and 
outer (the `Two Selves' operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc.) 
is the prolific Daniel Hutto (DH). His approach is called `Radical Enactivism' 
and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers (see my review of 
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Radicalizing Enactivism) and a new one is appearing as I write (Evolving 
Enactivism). It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now 
current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W's 2nd 
and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of 
this). He is also author of the best deconstructions I know of Dennett's 
preposterous claim to be following in W's footsteps (in fact Dennett is just 
repeating most of the classic mistakes in grandiose fashion and hasn't a clue 
about W) and of Fodor's LOT and other nonsense. But of course, one must read 
Searle too on all these issues and the title of his famous review of Dennett's 
book says it well "Consciousness Explained Away" which also characterizes 
much of the writing on this topic. Incidentally, unlike most philosophers and 
other scholars, who make little or no effort to give the general public access to 
their papers, Hutto has put nearly every paper (though of course often just 
proofs and not the final paper) free online at www.academia.edu. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
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Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition
* 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working  
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s PriorIntentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one.  
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language 
as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
`Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory nor Therapy' (WEP) 
is now a decade old and I'm sure Hutto would revise it considerably. Some of 
his recent papers are much more stimulating and up to date than almost 
anything here. This second edition has a new final chapter which is mostly used 
to rebut various comments about the first edition by Rupert Read. I thoroughly 
agree with the rebuttal. The book is intended for philosophers, so there is much 
nitpicking about what Brandom or Rorty or Davidson said in comparison with 
W's views. If one accepts my views as stated above there is very little interest 
in such discussions for the same reasons that there is little in most philosophy. 
The first 3 chapters deal mostly with early W's views and how they relate to 
Russell, Frege, Kant, Hegel etc., but for me all such chitchat is of no interest as 
it merely compares their confusions with his while trying to mine W for some 
gems that show the beginnings of his later ideas. If you have limitless time and 
energy dig in but otherwise you can skip them. Chapter 4 which moves into 
W's later work was mainly interesting to me for its deconstruction of 
behaviorism and of Dennett, who, while presenting himself as an advanced 
evolutionist and Wittgensteinian, writes non-Wittgensteinian claptrap in 
nearly every paragraph including this stupefying anti-evolutionary BS (Blank 
Slateist) characterization of consciousness as `largely a product of cultural 
evolution that gets imparted to brains in early training' and who, to my 
knowledge(and like most philosophers) shows no understanding whatsoever 
of the true-only axiomatic structure of System 1 and its cofunctioning with the 
dispositional System 2 which W laid out in his later work and which is central 
to the modern study of behavior. Likewise he does more or less reasonable 
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decon of Kripke who, though brilliant enough to devise a new proof of Godel's 
Incompleteness Theorem and make major contributions to modal logic, totally 
failed to understand W's later work, attributing a cultural dispositional (i.e., 
System 2) solution to skepticism and the rule following paradox (e,g., quss/plus 
etc., which was by the way not original with Kripke but laid out several times 
with great clarity by W) to W who destroyed them with his elaboration of the 
shared, genetically automated functioning of System 1. The community does 
not have to agree on any rules of real importance since the unconscious 
automatic operation of System 1 guarantees we follow them and any rules we 
are aware of and do have to agree on are the secondary trivia that constitute 
culture. 
 
Unfortunately, Hutto had not yet arrived at his Radical Enactivism, so much 
time is wasted on McDowell and Brandom and of course none of them to this 
day have totally digested the later W and his prescient analysis of automatic 
behavior-so fully in tune with contemporary research. Nor is there any 
discussion of Searle's groundbreaking and completely Wittgensteinian 
(unwittingly) disquisitions on the Construction of Social Reality. Thus, his 
chapters 5 and 6 on Realism and Idealism etc., though superb for 2002, need a 
complete rewrite from the modern viewpoint I have set forth above (or 
something like it). Much time is wasted on Davidson and Williams, etc. but one 
can endure them for Hutto's brilliant analyses and the frequent quotes from W. 
The last chapter gives Read the counterblast he deserves and permits a slight 
update to 2006. Overall a lovely book and I eagerly await the third edition 
which I hope will ensue.
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Review of Making the Social World by John Searle 
(2010) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Before commenting in detail on making the Social World (MSW) I will first 
offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the 
works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to 
place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. It will help 
greatly to see my reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW and other books by these 
two geniuses of descriptive psychology. 
 
S makes no reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism in TLP, 
and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the principal 
deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and the most important 
descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how completely W 
anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many papers and 
books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is vastly 
easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly 
spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my reviews 
of W S and other books for more details. 
 
Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is 
unequaled for basic psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my 
reviews). Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent 
prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, illustrated with W’s 
perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant aphorisms. 
If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
 
Those wishing to view my writings of a more socio-political slant may see 
Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century (2017). Those interested in more 
of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ 
(2017). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
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nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false."  Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 
(1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has 
doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of 
philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description.” Searle --Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p101-103 
 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
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virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume’s 
guillotine, the rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.” Searle PNC p165-171 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action…these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The general 
point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the phenomenological 
illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness 
has no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the 
underlying neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to ontological 
reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and therefore it 
cannot be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, something 
that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfactions, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
 
“So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created 
by collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic 
powers…With the important exception of language itself, all of institutional 
reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts 
that have the logical form of Declarations…all of human institutional reality is 
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created and maintained in existence by (representations that have the same 
logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not 
speech acts in the explicit form of Declarations.”  Searle MSW p11-13 
 
“Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world 
direction of fit. And desires and intentions, like orders and promises, have the 
upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. Beliefs or perceptions, like 
statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in that 
sense, they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world 
direction of fit. The conative-volitional states such as desires, prior intentions 
and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have the world-to-mind 
direction of fit. 
 
They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we would like 
them to be or how we intend to make them be…In addition to these two 
faculties, there is a third, imagination, in which the propositional content is not 
supposed to fit reality in the way that the propositional contents of cognition 
and volition are supposed to fit…the world-relating commitment is abandoned 
and we have a propositional content without any commitment that it represent 
with either direction of fit.” Searle MSW p15 
 
“Just as in intentional states we can make a distinction between the type of state 
…and the content of the state…so in the theory of language we can make a 
distinction between the type of speech act it is…and the propositional 
content…we have the same propositional content with different psychological 
mode in the case of the intentional states, and different illocutionary force or 
type in the case of the speech acts. Furthermore, just as my beliefs can be true 
or false and thus have the mind-to-world direction of fit, so my statements can 
be true or false and thus have the word-to-world direction of fit. And just as 
my desires or intentions cannot be true or false but can be in various ways 
satisfied or unsatisfied, so my orders and promises cannot be true or false but 
can be in various ways satisfied or unsatisfied—we can think of all the 
intentional states that have a whole propositional content and a direction of fit 
as representations of their conditions of satisfaction. A belief represents its 
truth conditions, a desire represents its fulfillment conditions, an intention 
represents its carrying out conditions…The intentional state represents its 
conditions of satisfaction…people erroneously suppose that every mental 
representation must be consciously thought…but the notion of a representation 
as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has 
conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic 
of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its conditions of 
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satisfaction…we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social 
phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction.”  Searle MSW p28-32 
 
“The first four types of speech acts have exact analogues in intentional states: 
corresponding to Assertives are beliefs, corresponding to Directives are 
desires, corresponding to Commissives are intentions and corresponding to 
Expressives is the whole range of emotions and other intentional states where 
the Presup fit is taken for granted. But there is no prelinguistic analog for the 
Declarations. Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create facts in the world by 
representing those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires a 
language” MSW p69 
 
“Speaker meaning… is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on 
conditions of satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human 
cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a 
way that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker 
intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at another level the utterance 
represents something. And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one 
level, it is a physical object like any other. At another level, it has a meaning: it 
represents a type of a state of affairs” MSW p74 
 
“…once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology 
because there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according 
to the conventions of a language without creating commitments. This is true 
not just for statements but for all 
speech acts” MSW p82 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews of books by these two geniuses) are a précis of behavior from our two 
greatest descriptive psychologists. 
 
Before commenting in detail on Making the Social World (MSW) I will first 
offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the 
works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to 
place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. It will help 
greatly to see my reviews of PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW and other books by these 
two geniuses of descriptive psychology. To say that Searle has carried on W's 
work is not to say that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that because 
there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE 
human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing behavior must be 
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voicing some variant or extension of what W said (as they must if they are both 
giving correct descriptions of behavior). I find most of S foreshadowed in W, 
including versions of the famous Chinese room argument against Strong AI 
and related issues which are the subjects of Chaps 3-5. Incidentally, if the 
Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor Rodych's xlnt, but 
virtually unknown, supplement on the CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw.” 
 
S makes no reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as mechanism in TLP, 
and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the principal 
deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and the most important 
descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how completely W 
anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many papers and 
books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is vastly 
easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly 
spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my reviews 
of W S and other books for more details. 
 
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. His 
work as a whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only 
axioms and that our conscious ratiocination (System 2) (S2) emerges from 
unconscious machinations (System 1) (S1) and is extended logically into culture 
(System 3(S3). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his final extended treatment of this 
idea-and my review thereof for preparation. His corpus can be seen as the 
foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind 
works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains 
share a common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic 
way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher 
animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that 
in humans this is extended into a personality (a cognitive or phenomenological 
illusion) based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to 
manipulate others (with variations that can be regarded as trivial). 
 
Arguably, all of W's and S’s work is a development of or variation on these 
ideas. Another major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human 
behavior, is the need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms, 
which underlie all behavior, from the effects of culture. Though few 
philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly 
discuss this in a comprehensive way, it can be seen as the major problem they 
are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider all 
study of higher order behavior as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions- S1 and S2--
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see below), but the logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less 
clear way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you 
prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought 
or just animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works 
are a unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the 
day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other 
behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or less 
understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest 
work on EP and cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two selves of 
fast and slow thinking etc., -- see below). Searle’s work as a whole provides a 
stunning description of higher order social behavior that is possible because of 
the recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while the later W 
shows how it is based on true only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved 
into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
Long before Searle, W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of 
physiology, experimental psychology and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, 
Functionalism, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, Computational Theory of 
Mind, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of Language 
Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties he noted are to understand what is 
always in front of our eyes (we can now see this as obliviousness to System 1 
(roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological illusion’) and to capture 
vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of 
representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). 
 
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s comment 
that even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we are 
thinking--this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes clear, 
of Cognitive Psychology. But God could see what we are perceiving and 
remembering and our reflexive thinking, since these S1 functions are always 
causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS. This is not 
a theory but a fact about our grammar and our physiology. S muddies the 
waters here because he refers to dispositions as mental states as well, but as W 
did long ago, he shows that the language of causality just does not apply to the 
higher order emergent S2 descriptions—again not a theory but a description 
about how language (thinking) works. 
 
This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all 
we can do is give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing 
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theories but of course “theory” and “description” are language games too and 
it seems to me S’s theory is usually W’s description—a rose by any other 
name…. W’s point was that by sticking to perspicacious examples that we all 
know to be true accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of theories 
that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while S wants to 
generalize and inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own 
mistakes in PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account 
for the multifarious language games they get closer and closer to describing 
behavior by way of numerous examples as did W. 
 
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the 
different (but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or 
roughly Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language Games 
(SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., Johnston- ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ on how confusing the two is a major industry in 
philosophy and psychology), the impossibility of private language and the 
axiomatic structure of all behavior. Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first described 
S1 functions but as S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, leading to 
the whole mythology of inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to imagining 
as if it were seeing pictures inside the brain. The PLG's are the simple 
automated utterances by our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror 
neuron, true only, non-propositional, mental states- our perceptions and 
memories and reflexive acts (‘will’) including System 1 Truths and UOA1 --
Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which 
can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later SLG's are expressions 
or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, 
testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UOA2 and Emotions2- 
joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) 
imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can 
only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to 
describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, 
just make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle for good disquisitions 
on this). 
 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons 
(e.g., ` I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms 
of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is 
meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make sense 
in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never. 
 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 
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1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and 
Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical 
extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). 
W recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper. 
 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, to 
provide the physical basis for our behavior and facilitate our analysis of 
language games which nevertheless remain unexplainable--EP just is this way-
- and unchanged. The true-only axioms, most thoroughly explored in 'On 
Certainty', are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the automated true-only 
reactions of bacteria and their descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and 
operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb 
"Principles of Social Evolution". 
 
W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions 
rather than explanations, but of course these too are complex language games 
and one person's description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their 
innate true-only, nonempirical (automated and nonchangeable) responses to 
the world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into 
further true only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but this is 
a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). 
 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our 
two hands or our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human 
nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-only 
Understandings of Agency (UOA a term I devised 10 years ago) which 
newborn animals (including flies and worms if UOA is suitably defined) have 
and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, as I note 
here, W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 
and System 2 versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UOA1 and the 
Slow conscious UOA2 and of course these are heuristics for multifaceted 
phenomena. Although the raw material for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into S1— 
higher cortical feedback to the lowest levels of perception, memory, reflexive 
thinking that is a fundamental of psychology. Many of W’s examples explore 
this two way street (e.g., see the discussions of the duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ 
in Johnston). 
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I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work `On 
Certainty'), are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center 
of current research (e.g., see Kahneman-- "Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has 
no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and 
unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UOA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over 
in endless examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes"(maybe 99% 
of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not 
have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words 
like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed 
extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) exemplified by Moore (whose papers 
inspired W to write OC), which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from 
direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I 
know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which is their normal use as 
dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home'). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 
1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not 
ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought 
or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later 
Searle call our EP). 
 
Though W warned frequently against theorizing and produced more and 
better examples of language in action than anyone, one might say that his 
aggregate aphorisms illustrated by examples constitute the most 
comprehensive “theory” of behavior (“reality”) ever penned. 
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Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and 
that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**           Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***          Searle’s Intention In Action 
****        Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****       Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language 
as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
Now for some comments on Searle’s MSW. I will make some references to 
another of his recent works which I have reviewed- Philosophy in a New 
Century (PNC). 
 
The ideas here are already published and nothing will come as a surprise to 
those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best 
standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and 
groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W seriously 
enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. In various places in his work 
(e.g., p7 of PNC) he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the 
overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed 
definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true-
only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, 
since it is itself the basis for judgment (reason) and cannot itself be judged. In 
the first sentence on p8 of PNC he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this 
kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending 
our axiomatic and non-revisable certainty (Certainty1 of S1) via experience and 
is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic 
example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by 
language” which W demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or 
many) distinct uses. 
 
On p12 of PNC, ‘consciousness’ is described as the result of automated System 
1 functioning that is ‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the 
normal case, a matter of evidence but a true-only understanding in our own 
case and a true-only perception in the case of others. 
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I feel that W has a better grasp of the mind/language connection, as he regards 
them as synonymous in many contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition 
of mind as exemplified in numerous perspicacious examples of language use. 
As quoted above, "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are 
concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." One can 
deny that any revision of our concepts (language games) of causation or free 
will are necessary or even possible. You can read just about any page of W for 
the reasons. It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the world using examples 
from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything 
relevant to our normal use of words. 
 
The deontic structures or ‘social glue’ are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic unconscious universal 
cultural deontic relationships with others (S3). Though this is my précis of 
behavior I expect it fairly describes S’s work. 
 
Those who wish to become acquainted with S’s well-known arguments against 
the mechanical view of mind, which seem to me definitive, may consult Chaps 
3-5 of his PNC. I have read whole books of responses to them and I agree with 
S that they all miss the very simple logical (psychological) points he makes (and 
which, by and large, W made half a century earlier). To put it in my terms, S1 
is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-
propositional, true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be 
described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become 
propositional (T or F). Computers and the rest of nature have only derived 
intentionality that is dependent on our perspective while higher animals have 
primary intentionality that is independent of perspective. As S and W 
appreciate, the great irony is that these materialistic or mechanical reductions 
of psychology masquerade as cutting edge science, but in fact they are utterly 
anti-scientific. Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and cognitive psychology 
(freed of superstition) are becoming hand in glove and it is Hofstadter, Dennett, 
Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the cold. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind 
exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of 
our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think 
through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious (TPI). I find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited psychology 
and its extensions in his OC and other 3rd period works to be deeper than S’s 
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(or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but rather 
it is not open to (not possible to) doubt. 
 
Chapter 5 of S’s PNC nicely demolishes Computational Theory of Mind, 
Language of Thought etc., noting that ‘computation’, ‘information’, ‘syntax’, 
‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, ‘program’, etc., are observer relative (i.e., psychological) 
terms and have no physical or mathematical meaning in this psychological 
sense, but of course there are other senses they have been given recently as 
science has developed. Again, people are bewitched by the use of the same 
word into ignoring the vast difference in its use (meaning).  And of course, this 
is all an extension of classic Wittgenstein. 
 
Every thinking person should read Chapter 6 of S’s PNC “The 
Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI) as it shows his supreme logical abilities and 
his failure to appreciate the full power of the later W, and the great heuristic 
value of recent psychological research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal 
that TPI is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow 
conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic 
Blank Slate blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier 
and also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious 
automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1 (though of course he did 
not use these terms). 
 
But the really important thing is that TPI is not just a failing of a few 
philosophers, but a universal blindness to our Evolutionary Psychology (EP) 
that is itself built into EP and which has immense (and fatal) implications for 
the world. We are all meat puppets stumbling through life on our genetically 
programmed mission to destroy the earth. Our almost total preoccupation with 
using the second self S2 personality to indulge the infantile gratifications of S1 
is creating Hell On Earth. As with all organisms, it’s only about reproduction 
and accumulating resources therefor. S1 writes the play and S2 acts it out. Dick 
and Jane just want to play house—this is mommy and this is daddy and this 
and this and this is baby. 
 
Perhaps one could say that TPI is that we are humans and not just another 
primate-a fatal cognitive illusion. 
 
The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts the muscles) 
of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read my comments 
on W’s OC so he changes the “good reason to believe” at the bottom of p171 
and the top of p172 to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
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A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction 
(COS) on our thoughts (propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or 
dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate term ‘propositional 
attitudes’ by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of 
PNC: “Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of 
satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be 
produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of 
satisfaction.” As S states it in PNC, “A proposition is anything at all that can 
determine a condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that 
such and such is the case.” Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have 
been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear in MSW. Regarding 
intentions, “In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function causally 
in the production of the action.” (MSWp34). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates 
the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat 
muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, 
which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or 
protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle movements were able 
to convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or “RPP1 and 2” or 
DMS’s two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference 
between true-only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions 
describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 
perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they can 
only become T or F (aspectual as S calls them here) after one begins thinking 
about them in S2. However, his point in PNC that propositions permit 
statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and 
fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or proto-linguistic society, 
is cogent. 
 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of 
one event so for IAA “We have different levels of description where one level 
is constituted by the behavior at the lower level…in addition to the constitutive 
by way of relation, we also have the causal by means of relation.” (p37). 
 
“The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and 
intentions-in- action is that the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are 
strikingly different.” (p35). The COS of PI need a whole action while those of 
IAA only a partial one. He makes clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions(PI) are 
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mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result in intentions-in-
action(IAA) which are conscious acts (i.e., S2) but both are causally self-
referential (CSR). The critical argument that both are CSR is that (unlike beliefs 
and desires) it is essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. These 
descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1, which 
Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended one I have 
created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern psychological 
research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W’s true-only vs propositional 
(dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-only perception, 
memory and intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as belief and desire. 
 
So, recognizing the S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking 
representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal 
(e.g., see Hutto and Myin’s ‘Radical Enactivism’) I would change the 
paragraphs from p39 beginning “In sum” and ending on pg 40 with 
“conditions of satisfaction” as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (‘will’) are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior 
intentions and intentions- in-action, we try to match how we desire things to 
be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and 
imagination—desires time shifted and so decoupled from intention) and other 
S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are 
totally dependent upon (have their COS in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive 
true only reflexive S1. In language and perhaps in neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time 
shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in 
the present. The two systems feed into each other and are often orchestrated by 
the learned deontic cultural relations of S3 seamlessly, so that our normal 
experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena 
of cognitive illusions that dominate our life S has described as ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion.’ 
 
He ends this amazing chapter by repeating for maybe the 10th time in his 
writings, what I regard as a very basic mistake that he shares with nearly 
everyone—the notion that the experience of ‘free will’ may be ‘illusory’. It 
follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W’s 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that 
‘will’, ‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 
just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
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demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully 
clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. 
S understands and uses basically this same argument in other contexts (e.g., 
skepticism, solipsism) many times, so it is quite surprising he can’t see this 
analogy. He makes this mistake frequently when he says such things as that we 
have “good evidence” that our dog is a dog etc. The true-only axioms of our 
psychology are not evidential. Here you have the best descriptive psychologist 
since W so this is not a stupid mistake. 
 
His summary of deontics on p50 needs translation. Thus “You have to have a 
prelinguistic form of collective intentionality, on which the linguistic forms are 
built, and you have to have the collective intentionality of the conversation in 
order to make the commitment” is much clearer if supplemented with “The 
prelinguistic axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic dispositions of S2 (i.e., our 
EP) which evolve during our maturation into their cultural manifestations in 
S3.” 
 
Since status function declarations play a central role in deontics it is critical to 
understand them and so he explains the notion of ‘function’ that is relevant 
here. “A function is a cause that serves a purpose…In this sense functions are 
intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent…status functions… 
require… collective imposition and recognition of a status” (p59). 
 
Again, I suggest the translation of “The intentionality of language is created by 
the intrinsic, or mind-independent intentionality of human beings” (p66) as 
“The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is generated by the 
unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1” (p68). That is, one must keep 
in mind that behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
However, I strongly object to his statements on p66-67 and elsewhere in his 
writings that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional 
(i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other 
reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding 
behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They 
both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic 
intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same 
sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was 
philosophy before W would return and in fact life would not be possible (no 
this is not a joke). As W showed countless times and biology shows so clearly, 
life must be based on certainty—automated unconscious rapid reactions. 
Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die. 
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Contrary to his comments (p70) I cannot imagine a language lacking words for 
material objects any more than I can imagine a visual system that cannot see 
them, because it is the first and most basic task of vision to segment the world 
into objects and so that of language to describe them. Likewise, I cannot see any 
problem with objects being salient in the conscious field nor with sentences 
being segmented into words. How could it be otherwise for beings with our 
evolutionary history? 
 
On p72 and elsewhere, it will help to remember that expressions are the 
primitive reflexive PLG’s of S1 while representations are the dispositional 
SLG’s of S2. 
 
Another translation from Philosophese into English is needed for the second 
paragraph on p79 beginning ‘So far’ and ending ‘heard before’. “We convey 
meaning by speaking a public language composed of words in sentences with 
a syntax.” 
 
To his questions 4 and 5 on p105 as to the special nature of language and 
writing, I would answer: ’They are special because the short wavelength of 
vibrations of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information 
transfer than contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders 
of magnitude higher for visual information.’ 
 
On p106, a general answer to question 2 (How do we get away with it—i.e., 
why does it work) is EP and S1 and his statement that “My main strategy of 
exposition in this book is to try to make the familiar seem strange and striking” 
is of course classic Wittgenstein. His claim on the next page that there is no 
general answer to why people accept institutions is clear wrong. They accept 
them for the same reason they do everything—their EP is the result of inclusive 
fitness. It facilitated survival and reproduction in the EEA (Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally 
bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk here (e.g., p114) about ‘extra-
linguistic conventions’ and ‘extra semantical semantics’ is in fact referring to 
EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 which are the basis for 
all behavior. Yes, as W said many times, the most familiar is for that reason 
invisible. 
 
S’s suggestion (p115) that language is essential to games is surely mistaken. 
Totally illiterate deaf-mutes could play cards, soccer and even chess but of 
course a minimal counting ability would be necessary. I agree (p121) that the 
ability to pretend and imagine (e.g., the counterfactual or as-if notions involved 
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in time and space shifting) are, in full form, uniquely human abilities and 
critical to higher order thought. But even here there are many animal 
precursors (as there must be), such as the posturing of ritual combats and 
mating dances, the decoration of mating sites by bower birds, the broken wing 
pretense of mother birds, fake alarm calls of monkeys, ‘cleaner’ fish that take a 
bite out of their prey and simulation of hawk and dove strategies (cheaters) in 
many animals. 
 
More translation is needed for his discussion of rationality (p126 et seq). Saying 
that thinking is propositional and deals with true or false ‘factitive entities’ 
means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the 
true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. 
 
In ‘Free Will, Rationality and Institutional Facts’ he updates parts of his classic 
book ‘Rationality in Action’ and creates some new terminology for describing 
the formal apparatus of practical reasons which I do not find felicitous. 
“Factitive Entities’ do not seem different from dispositions and ‘motivator’ 
(desire or obligation), ‘effector’ (body muscles), ‘constitutor’ (speech muscles) 
and ‘total reason’ (all relevant dispositions) do not, at least here seem to add to 
clarity (p126-132). 
 
We should do something here that rarely happens in discussions of human 
behavior and remind ourselves of its biology. Evolution by inclusive fitness has 
programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often 
give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified by the cultural 
extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in various 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. This may seem infelicitous as 
well, but has the virtue that it is based on fact, and given the complexity of our 
higher order thought, I don’t think a general description is going to get much 
simpler. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S ‘The Phenomenological 
Illusion’) is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which 
we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology 
and psychology knows this view is not credible. 
 
Thus, I would translate his summary of practical reason on p127 as follows: 
“We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire –Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA—i.e., desires displaced in 
space and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), which produce dispositions 
to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that 
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serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those 
closely related).” 
 
Contrary to S’s comment on p128 I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal 
in higher animals and not at all unique to humans (think mother hen defending 
her brood from a fox) if we include the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 
(i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the higher order DIRA of S2/3 or DIRA2 that require 
language are uniquely human. This seems to me an alternative and clearer 
description of his “explanation” (as W suggested these are much better called 
‘description’) on the bottom of p129 of the paradox of how we can voluntarily 
carry out DIRA2/3 (i.e., the S2 desires and their cultural S3 extensions). That is, 
“The resolution of the paradox is that the recognition of desire-independent 
reasons can ground the desire and thus cause the desire, even though it is not 
logically inevitable that they do and not empirically universal that they do” can 
be translated as “The resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 
serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often 
override the short term personal immediate desires.” Likewise, for his 
discussion of this issue on p130-31—it is EP, RA, IF, S1 which ground the 
dispositions and ensuing actions of S2/3. 
 
On p140 he asks why we can’t get deontics from biology but of course we must 
get them from biology as there is no other option and the above description 
shows how this happens. Contrary to his statement, the strongest inclinations 
DO always prevail (by definition, otherwise it is not the strongest), but deontics 
works because the innate programming of RA and IF override immediate 
personal short term desires. His confusion of nature and nurture, of S1 and S2, 
extends to conclusions 2 and 3 on p143. Agents do indeed create the proximate 
reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are not just anything but, with few if any 
exceptions, very restricted extensions of DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). If he really 
means to ascribe deontics to our conscious decisions alone then he is prey to 
‘The Phenomenological Illusion’(TPI) which he so beautifully demolished in 
his classic paper of that name (see my review of PNC). As I have noted above, 
there is a huge body of recent research exposing cognitive illusions which 
comprise our personality. TPI is not merely a harmless philosophical error but 
a universal obliviousness to our biology which produces the illusion that we 
control our life and our society and the world and the consequences are almost 
certain collapse of civilization during the next 150 years. 
 
He notes correctly that human rationality makes no sense without the ‘gap’ 
(actually 3 gaps which he has discussed many times). That is, without free will 
(i.e., choice) in some non- trivial sense it would all be a pointless, and he has 
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rightly noted that it is inconceivable that evolution could create and maintain 
an unnecessary genetically and energetically expensive charade. But, like 
nearly everyone else, he cannot see his way out and so once again he suggests 
(p133) that choice may be an illusion. On the contrary, following W, it is quite 
clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only reflexive actions and 
cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the basis for questioning. 
You cannot doubt you are reading this page as your awareness of it is the basis 
for doubting. 
 
Few notice (Budd in his superb book on W is one exception) that W posed an 
interesting resolution to this by suggesting that some mental phenomena may 
originate in chaotic processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything 
corresponding to a memory trace. He also suggested several times that the 
causal chain has an end and this could mean both that it is just not possible 
(regardless of the state of science) to trace it any further and that the concept of 
‘cause’ ceases to be applicable beyond a certain point. Subsequently, many 
have made similar suggestions based on physics and the sciences of complexity 
and chaos. 
 
On p155 one should note that the Background/Network is our EP and its 
cultural extensions of S1, S2, S3. 
 
Given the above I don’t feel it necessary to comment on his discussion of Power 
and Politics but I will say a few words about human rights. I agree completely 
with his comment on p185 that the UN Declaration of Human Rights is an 
irresponsible document. The rapid and probably inexorable collapse of society 
is due to people having too many rights and too few responsibilities. The only 
tiny ray of hope for the world is that somehow people can be forced (few will 
ever do it voluntarily) to place the earth first and themselves second. 
Consuming resources and producing children must be regulated as privileges 
or the tragedy of the commons will soon end the game. 
 
Overall, MSW is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is 
unequaled for basic psychology once you grasp what he is saying (see my 
reviews). Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent 
prose and generalizations on the operation of S2/S3, illustrated with W’s 
perspicacious examples of the operation of S1/S2, and his brilliant aphorisms. 
If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
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Review of 'John R Searle-Thinking About the Real 
World' by Franken et al eds. (2010) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This book is the result of Searle's stay in the Munster University Philosophy 
Dept in 2009 and all the papers except his introductory one and his final 
response are from persons associated with Munster. However, all the papers 
were written or revised later and so are one of the most up to date looks at his 
views available as of mid-2013. S has in my view made more fundamental 
contributions to higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) than anyone 
since Wittgenstein and has been writing world class material for over 50 years. 
He is also (like W before him) regarded as the best standup philosopher alive 
and has taught and lectured worldwide. He is also one of the clearest and most 
careful writers in the field so one would think that every philosopher writing 
an article on his work would have an up to date and accurate understanding of 
his ideas. Unfortunately, this book shows that this is far from true. All the 11 
articles make major mistakes regarding his views and regarding what he (and 
I) would regard as an accurate description of behavior. 
 
Searle's obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern 
two systems framework, and to the full implications of W’s “radical” 
epistemology as stated most dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is 
most unfortunate (as I have noted in many reviews). It was Wittgenstein who 
did the first and best job of describing the two systems (though nobody else 
has noticed) and OC represents a major event in intellectual history. Not only 
is Searle unaware of the fact that his framework is a straightforward 
continuation of W, but everyone else is too, which accounts for the lack of any 
significant reference to W in this book. As usual one also notes no apparent 
acquaintance with Evolutionary Psychology, which can enlighten all 
discussions of behavior by providing the real ultimate evolutionary and 
biological explanations rather than the superficial proximate cultural ones. 
 
However, his comment on p212 is right on the money—the ultimate 
430  
explanation (or as W insists the description) can only be a naturalized one 
which describes how mind, will, self, intention work and cannot meaningfully 
eliminate them as ‘real’ phenomena. Recall Searle’s famous review of Dennett’s 
‘Conscious Explained’ entitled “Consciousness explained away”. And this 
makes it all the more bizarre that Searle should repeatedly state that we don’t 
know for sure if we have free will and that we have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-
219). 
 
As he notes “The neuro-biological processes and the mental phenomena are 
the same event, described at different levels” and “How can conscious 
intentions cause bodily movement? …How can the hammer move the nail in 
virtue of being solid? …If you analyze what solidity is causally…if you analyze 
what intention-in-action is causally, you see analogously there is no 
philosophical problem left over.” 
 
Also, I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, 
as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our 
representations.” (p223) as “Our life shows a world that does not depend on 
our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
 
This book is valuable principally as a recent synopsis of the work of one the 
greatest philosophers of recent times. But there is also value in analyzing his 
responses to the many basic confusions manifested in the articles by others. 
Since this review, I have written many articles extending the framework of the 
logical structure of rationality and commenting in depth on Searle and 
Wittgenstein which are all readily available on the net. 
 
Those wishing to view my writings of a more socio-political slant may see 
Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century (2017). Those interested in more 
of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2017’ 
(2017). 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
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confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein 
OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187"The limit of language is 
shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds to (is the 
translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence ..." 
Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not 
a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is 
no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as 
from a reservoir.” BBB p143 
 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined 
to make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It 
is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an 
idea that “something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto 
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the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the 
rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence 
and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a 
shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity 
with what it represents.” BBB p37 
 
“Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are 
obviously not aware of the many different usages of the word “proof”; and that 
they are not clear about the differences between the uses of the word “kind”, 
when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word “kind” 
here meant the same thing as in the context “kinds of apples.” Or, we may say, 
they are not aware of the different meanings of the word “discovery” when in 
one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the 
other case of the discovery of the South Pole.” BBB p29 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
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the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer.”  TLP 6.52 
 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions.”  PI 126 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, 
of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) ”PI 107 
“The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new.  That is a mistake.  The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have 
got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in 
the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is 
already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for the 
future.” (said in 1930) Waismann “Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle 
(1979) p183 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
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the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it.  We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! ….This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. 
 
If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (HOT), 
which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked 
–i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. 
 
In addition to failing to make it clear that what they are doing is descriptive 
psychology, philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute to this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, 
so after noting W’s above remark on science envy, I will quote again from 
Hacker who gives a good start on it. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
... We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p be 
identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say ‘he believes that p, but it is 
not the case that p’, whereas one cannot say ‘I believe that p, but it is not the 
case that p’? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining 
or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one 
know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? Why can 
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one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, foolishly, 
thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one know, but 
not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on – 
through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to 
mention the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to 
be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic 
concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, the various 
forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, 
their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this 
venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, 
neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing 
whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
 
Before remarking on this book, I will first offer some comments on philosophy 
and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in 
the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see 
my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the 
Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these geniuses, who 
provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found in psychology 
books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. 
 
To show this framework and how it relates to a contemporary view of 
intentionality I have produced the following table. 
 
The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems 
(dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can 
also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of 
behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of 
reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the 
Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology 
of Thought (DPT) –or better,  the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of 
Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in  my other very recent writings. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler 
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table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three 
recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**           Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***         Searle’s Intention In Action 
****        Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****      Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the 
extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only 
unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional 
propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, pre-linguistic mental 
states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 
Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, 
love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow 
thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, 
Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional 
(and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, 
knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., 
it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, 
atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). 
 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical 
use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self 
Referential (CSR)-called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), and the S2 use, which 
is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can 
become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and 
other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", 
"heuristics" and "biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will 
be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions 
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will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made 
clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur without involving much of the 
intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral 
reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W 
and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic 
relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of 
behavior. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and 
contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and 
is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's 
`Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 
beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as 
follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as 
modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with 
how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--
desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid automatic 
primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, 
as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the 
present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly 
by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is 
that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive 
illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological 
Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work contemporary psychology, that ` will', 
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`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 composed of 
perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully 
clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. 
The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS 
and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would 
mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W showed 
countless times and biology demonstrates, life must be based on certainty--
automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt 
and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: 
"We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include 
Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space 
and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result 
sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased 
survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate 
his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the 
paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness 
generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal 
immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons 
of DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the 
ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is right 
but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the 
inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. Evolution by inclusive fitness has 
programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal actions of S1 which often 
give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified into the cultural 
extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in 
activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators 
in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The 
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Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and 
Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has generated the 
action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, 
but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view 
is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It 
is in language that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything 
metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the 
grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as EP and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher 
order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing 
COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental 
state. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he 
would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" 
and his comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in 
"that's Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which 
it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it 
always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what 
happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should 
not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked 
`Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do 
know." 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He 
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dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, 
memories and reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, 
remembering, and understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many 
of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this 
evolutionary perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of 
human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many 
perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems 
view is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in 
philosophy makes sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
 
He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon 
the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger 
here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). Incidentally, the equation of 
logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding 
W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic 
EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A 
corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a 
foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true 
or false propositions. 
 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never 
seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts 
and commonly there is barely a mention. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”,“framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of 
course these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful ways 
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to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” System 
1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not 
ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought 
or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of  “cognitive modules”,“inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and 
later Searle call our EP). 
 
Now for some comments on “John R Searle: Thinking About the Real World” 
(TARW). 
 
The first and most important comment is that since I wrote this review my ideas 
have continued to evolve so I strongly recommend reading my more recent 
articles first, especially The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind 
and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
 
This book is the result of S’s stay in the Munster University Philosophy Dept. 
in 2009 and all the papers except his introductory one and his final response 
are from persons associated with Munster. However, all the papers were 
written or revised later and so are one of the most up to date looks at his views 
available as of mid-2013. S has in my view made more fundamental 
contributions to higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) than anyone 
since W and has been writing world class material for over 50 years. He is also 
(like W before him) regarded as the best standup philosopher alive and has 
taught and lectured worldwide. He is also one of the clearest and most careful 
writers in the field so one would think that every philosopher writing an article 
on his work would have an up to date and accurate understanding of his ideas. 
 
Unfortunately, this book shows that this is far from true. All the 11 articles 
make major mistakes regarding his views and regarding what he (and I) would 
regard as an accurate description of behavior. 
 
Recently there have been some exchanges between the two recorded in 
“Neuroscience and Philosophy” which appeared as a result of H’s views 
expressed e.g. in Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience which I will review soon. 
Both authors score some points and miss critical ideas in the others work. I have 
noted S’s failure to appreciate W before. Hacker is representing W’s views or 
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at least Wittgensteinian views most of the time so we get as close as we ever 
will to a confrontation between these two geniuses of descriptive psychology -
-W and S. 
 
Anyone interested in a concise demolition of Quine (another great mind who 
totally missed W and thus the whole enterprise of philosophy) should see 
Hacker’s paper ‘PASSING BY THE NATURALISTIC TURN: ON QUINE’S CUL-DE-SAC’ 
(though of course Q’s deconstruction has been done by many including S). 
 
The discussion of the logical (psychological) difference between the S1 causes 
and the S2 reasons in Chapter 7 of Hacker’s recent book Human Nature, esp. 
on p226-32 is critical for any student of behavior.  It is a nearly universal 
delusion that “cause” is a precise logically exact term while “reason” is not but 
W exposed this many times. Of course, the same issue arises with all scientific 
and mathematical concepts. And of course, one must keep constantly in mind 
that ‘action’, ‘condition’, ‘satisfaction’, ‘intention’, and even ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘prior’, 
‘true’ etc. are all complex language games able to trip us up as W so beautifully 
described in BBB in the early 30’s. 
 
On p21 we again run into what I regard as the most glaring flaw in S’s work 
and one that should have been obviated long ago had he only read the later W 
more carefully. He refers to free will as an “assumption” that we may have to 
give up! It is crystal clear from W that will, self, world, and all the phenomena 
of our lives are the basis for judging-the axiomatic bedrock of our behavior and 
there is no possibility of judging them. Can we “assume” we have two hands 
or live on the surface of the earth or that Madonna is a singer etc? Perhaps this 
huge mistake is connected with his blending of true only S1 and propositional 
S2 which I have noted. Amazing that he can get nearly everything else right 
and stumble on this! 
 
On p22 and elsewhere he uses the notion of unconscious intentionality, which 
he first discussed in his 1991 paper in Phil. Issues, noting that these are the sorts 
of things that could become conscious (e.g., dreams). W was I think the first to 
comment on this noting that if you can’t speak of unconscious thoughts you 
can’t speak of conscious ones either (BBB). Here and throughout his work it is 
unfortunate that he does not use the S1, S2 concepts as it makes it so much 
easier to keep things straight and he still finds it necessary to indulge in very 
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un-Wittgensteinian jargon. E.g., “Once you have manipulable syntactical 
elements, you can detach intentionality from its immediate causes in the form 
of perceptions and memories, in a way that it is not possible to make 
detachments of unsyntactically structured representational elements.” (p31) 
just says that with language came the dispositional intentionality of S2 where 
conscious thought and reason became possible. 
 
Regarding reasons and desires (p39) please see above and my reviews of his 
other works. 
 
S’s continued reference to dispositions as mental states and his reference to 
mental states as representations (actually ‘presentations” in here) with COS, is 
(in my view) counterproductive. On p25 e.g., it seems he wants to say that the 
apple we see is the COS of the CSR (i.e., cause is built in) perception of the apple 
and the reflexive unconscious scratching of an itch has the same status (i.e., a 
COS) as the deliberate planned movement of the arm. Thus, the mental states 
of S1 are to be included with the actions of S2 as COS. Though I accept most of 
S’s ontology and epistemology I don’t see the advantage, but I have the greatest 
respect for him so I will work on it.  I have noted his tendency (normal for 
others but a flaw in S) to mix S1 and S2 which he does on p29 where he seems 
to be referring to beliefs as mental states. It seems to me quite basic and clear 
since W’s BBB in the 30’s that S2 are not mental states in anything like the sense 
of S1. 
 
The paragraph beginning “Because” on p25 is discussing the true only 
unconscious percepts, memories and reflexive acts of S1—i.e., our axiomatic 
EP. As noted, one can read Hutto and Myin for a very different recent account 
of the nonrepresentational or enactive nature of S1. 
 
The table of intentionality on p26 updates one he has used for decades and 
which I have used as the basis for my extended table above. 
 
Nearly half a century ago S wrote “How to derive ought from is” which was a 
revolutionary advance in our understanding of behavior. He has continued to 
develop the naturalistic description of behavior and on p39 he shows how 
ethics originates in our innate social behavior and language. A basic concept is 
the Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA) which is explained in his 
447  
various books. For an outline see my reviews of his MSW and other works. He 
tends to use the proximate reasons of S2 and S3 (i.e., dispositional psychology 
and culture) to frame his analysis but as with all behavior I regard it as 
superficial unless it includes the ultimate causes in S1 and so I break his DIRA 
into DIRA1 and DIRA2. This enables the description in terms of the 
unconscious mechanisms of reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness. Thus, I 
would restate the last sentence on p39 “…people are asked to override their 
natural inclinations by making ethical considerations prevail” as “…people are 
compelled to override their immediate personal benefits to secure long term 
genetic benefits via reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness.” 
 
I won’t comment on the 11 papers, mostly of poor quality, which critique S, 
since he does a great job in his replies. However, I must draw attention to the 
only reference to W (p49) where the authors show they don’t have a clue about 
what he did. 
 
Any discussion of behavior benefits greatly from S’s concepts such as Prior 
Intention, Intention in Action, intentional gaps, DOF, COS, CSR etc. but these 
authors seem only vaguely aware of most of his writings. 
 
S’s obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two 
systems framework, and to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology 
as stated most dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is most unfortunate 
(as I have noted in many reviews). It was W who did the first and best job of 
describing the two systems (though nobody else has noticed) and OC 
represents a major event in intellectual history. Not only is S unaware of the 
fact that his framework is a straightforward continuation of W, but everyone 
else is too, which accounts for the lack of any significant reference to W in this 
book. As usual one also notes no apparent acquaintance with EP, which can 
enlighten all discussions of behavior by providing the real ultimate 
evolutionary and biological explanations rather than the superficial proximate 
cultural ones. 
 
Thus, S’s discussion of the two ways to describe sensations (‘experiences’) on 
p202 is in my view vastly clearer if one realizes that seeing red or feeling pain 
is automatic true only S1, but as soon as we attend to it consciously (normally 
in msec) it becomes ‘seeing as’ and a propositional (true or false) S2 function 
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that can be expressed publicly in language (and other bodily muscle 
contractions) as well. Thus, the S1 ‘experience’ that is identical with red or the 
pain vs the S2 ‘experience’ of red or pain once we begin to reflect on it normally 
are blended together into one ‘experience’. And for me by far the best place to 
get an understanding of these issues is still in W’s writings beginning with the 
BBB and ending with OC. Nobody else has ever described the subtleties of the 
language games with such clarity. One must keep constantly in mind the 
vagueness and multiple meanings of ‘mistake’, ‘true’, 
‘experience’,‘understand’, ‘know’, ‘see’, ‘same’ etc., but only W was able to do 
it—even S stumbles frequently. And it is not a trivial issue—unless one can 
clearly restate all of p202 separating the true only nonjudgeable S1 from the 
propositional S2 then nothing about behavior can be said without confusion. 
And of course, very often (normally) words are used without a clear meaning—
one has to specify how ‘true’ or ‘follows from’ or ‘see’ is to be used in this 
context and W is the only one I know of who consistently gets this right. 
 
Again, on p203-206, the discussion of intrinsically intentional unconscious 
causal dispositionality only makes sense to me because I look at it as just 
another way to describe S1 states which provide the raw material for conscious 
S2 dispositionality which, from a biological evolutionary point of view (and 
what other can there be?) has to be the case. Thus, his comment on p212 is right 
on the money—the ultimate explanation (or as W insists the description) can 
only be a naturalized one which describes how mind, will, self, intention work 
and cannot meaningfully eliminate them as ‘real’ phenomena.  Recall S’s 
famous review of Dennett’s ‘Conscious Explained’ entitled “Consciousness 
explained away”. And this makes it all the more bizarre that S should 
repeatedly state that we don’t know for sure if we have free will and that we 
have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). 
 
Also, I once again think S is on the wrong track (p214) when he suggests that 
the confusions are due to historical mistakes in philosophy such as dualism, 
idealism, materialism, epiphenomenalism etc., rather than in universal 
susceptibility to the defaults of our EP—TPI as he has noted, and bewitchment 
by language as beautifully described by W. As he notes “The neurobiological 
processes and the mental phenomena are the same event, described at different 
levels” and “How can conscious intentions cause bodily movement? … How 
can the hammer move the nail in virtue of being solid? …If you analyze what 
solidity is causally…if you analyze what intention-in-action is causally, you see 
analogously there is no philosophical problem left over.” 
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I would translate his comment (p220) “A speaker can use an expression to refer 
only if in the utterance of the referring expressions the speaker introduces a 
condition that the object referred to satisfies; and reference is achieved in virtue 
of the satisfaction of that condition.” As “Meaning is achieved by stating a 
publicly verifiable condition of satisfaction (truth condition).” “I think it is 
raining” is true if it is raining and false otherwise. 
 
Also, I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, 
as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our 
representations.” (p223) as “Our life shows a world that does not depend on 
our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
 
This book is valuable principally as a recent synopsis of the work of one the 
greatest philosophers of recent times. But there is also value in analyzing his 
responses to the many basic confusions manifested in the articles by others. 
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Review of ‘Philosophy in a New Century’ by John 
Searle (2008) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Before commenting on the book, I offer comments on Wittgenstein and Searle 
and the logical structure of rationality. The essays here are mostly already 
published during the last decade (though some have been updated), along with 
one unpublished item, and nothing here will come as a surprise to those who 
have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best standup 
philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and 
groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W seriously 
enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. Just a few examples: on p7 he 
twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the overwhelming 
weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed definitively in ‘On 
Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true-only axiomatic 
structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is itself 
the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 
he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might 
call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and non-revisable 
certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is 
propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic example of the “battle 
against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” which W 
demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or many) distinct uses. 
 
His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) 
would also benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s two 
books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true 
only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This 
strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as 
propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about 
them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or 
potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a 
huge advance over pre or proto-linguistic society, is cogent. As he states it “A 
proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of 
satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the case.” 
Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined 
to be the case. 
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Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is 
unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read 
together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated 
with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much 
younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017). 
 
" But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false."  
Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 
(1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has 
doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
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sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of 
philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 
“Could a machine process cause a thought process? The answer is: yes. Indeed, 
only a machine process can cause a thought process, and ‘computation’ does 
not name a machine process; it names a process that can be, and typically is, 
implemented on a machine.” Searle PNC p73 
 
“…the characterization of a process as computational is a characterization of a 
physical system from outside; and the identification of the process as 
computational does not identify an intrinsic feature of the physics, it is 
essentially an observer relative characterization.” Searle PNC p95 
 
“The Chinese Room Argument showed that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax. 
I am now making the separate and different point that syntax is not intrinsic to 
physics.” Searle PNC p94 
 
“The attempt to eliminate the homunculus fallacy through recursive 
decomposition fails, because the only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the 
physics is to put a homunculus in the physics.” Searle PNC p97 
 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description.” Searle PNC p101-103 
 
“In short, the sense of ‘information processing’ that is used in cognitive science 
is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological 
reality of intrinsic intentionality…We are blinded to this difference by the fact 
that the same sentence ‘I see a car coming toward me,’ can be used to record 
both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of 
vision…in the sense of ‘information’ used in cognitive science, it is simply false 
to say that the brain is an information processing device.” Searle PNC p104-105 
 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
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virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and 
evaluations? ...The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to 
pose Hume’s guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the 
use of which already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.” Searle PNC 
p165-171 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action…these deontic 
structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The general 
point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for 
action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons 
for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the phenomenological 
illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness 
has no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the 
underlying neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to ontological 
reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and therefore it 
cannot be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, something 
that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfactions, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
 
Before commenting in detail on Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) I will first 
offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its 
relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the 
works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to 
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place Searle or any commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. 
 
Though S does not say and seems to be largely unaware, the bulk of his work 
follows directly from that of W, even though he often criticizes him. To say that 
Searle has carried on W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W study, 
but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same 
reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately 
describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W said 
(as they must if they are both giving correct descriptions of behavior). I find 
most of S foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room 
argument against Strong AI and related issues which are the subjects of Chaps 
3-5. Incidentally, if the Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor 
Rodych's xlnt, but virtually unknown, supplement on the CR--"Searle Freed of 
Every Flaw". Rodych has also written a series of superb papers on W's 
philosophy of mathematics --i.e., the EP (Evolutionary Psychology) of the 
axiomatic System 1 ability of counting up to 3, as extended into the endless 
System 2 SLG's (Secondary Language Games) of math. W’s insights into the 
psychology of math provide an excellent entry into intentionality. I will also 
note that nobody who promotes Strong AI, the multifarious versions of 
behaviorism, computer functionalism, CTM (Computational Theory of Mind) 
and Dynamic Systems Theory (DST), seems to be aware that W's Tractatus can 
be viewed as the most striking and powerful statement of their viewpoint ever 
penned (i.e., behavior (thinking) as the logical processing of facts--i.e., 
information processing).  
 
Of course, later (but before the digital computer was a gleam in Turing's eye) 
W described in great detail why these were incoherent descriptions of mind 
that must be replaced by psychology (or you can say this is all he did for the 
rest of his life). S however makes little reference to W’s prescient statement of 
mind as mechanism, and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has 
become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and 
the most important descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize 
how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the 
many papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s 
work is vastly easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is 
mostly spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my 
reviews of W and other books for more details. 
 
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. His 
work as a whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only 
axioms and that our conscious ratiocination (System 2) (S2) emerges from 
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unconscious machinations (System 1) (S1). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his final 
extended treatment of this idea-and my review thereof for preparation. His 
corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, 
revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed 
by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so 
there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic 
structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on 
inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended into a personality (a 
cognitive or phenomenological illusion) based on throat muscle contractions 
(language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be 
regarded as trivial). 
 
Arguably, all of W's and S’s work is a development of or variation on these 
ideas. Another major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human 
behavior, is the need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms, 
which underlie all behavior, from the effects of culture. Though few 
philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly 
discuss this in a comprehensive way, it can be seen as the major problem they 
are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider all 
study of higher order behavior as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions- S1 and S2--
see below), but nature and nurture. 
 
What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less 
clear way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you 
prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought 
or just animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works 
are a unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the 
day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other 
behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or less 
understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest 
work on EP and cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two selves of 
fast and slow thinking etc., -- see below). Searle’s work as a whole provides a 
stunning description of higher order social behavior that is possible because of 
the recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while the later W 
shows how it is based on true only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved 
into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
I suggest the key to W is to regard his corpus as the pioneering effort in 
deciphering our EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves of S1 and S2 
and the multifarious language games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting 
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from his 3rd period works and reading backwards to the Proto-Tractatus. It 
should also be clear that insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts 
of behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought to translate easily 
into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes of "Embodied Mind" 
and "Radical Enactivism" should flow directly from and into W's work (and 
they do). However, almost nobody is able to follow his example of avoiding 
jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, so even the redoubtable Searle 
has to be filtered and translated to see that this is true, and even he does not get 
how completely W has anticipated the latest work in fast and slow, two-self 
embodied thinking (writing, speaking, acting). 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—
which can be regarded as the Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution 
via the careful analysis of examples of language use in context. He exposes the 
many varieties of language games and the relationships between the primary 
games of the true-only unconscious, pre or protolinguistic axiomatic fast 
thinking of perception, memory and reflexive thinking, emotions and acts 
(often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain first-
self, mirror neuron functions), and the later evolved higher cortical 
dispositional linguistic conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. 
that constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of 
slow thinking that are the network of cognitive illusions that constitute the 
second-self personality of which we are so enamored. W dissects hundreds of 
language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and 
reflexive actions of S1 grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of S2 dispositions, and many of his examples also address the 
nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his later 
works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current 
and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find 
that this evolutionary two systems perspective illuminates all higher behavior. 
Dobzhansky famously commented: "Nothing in biology makes sense except in 
the light of evolution." And nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the 
light of evolutionary psychology. 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker's books "The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature") that language is a 
window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that 
there must be some other "Language of Thought" of which it is a translation, 
were rejected by W (and likewise by S), who tried to show, with hundreds of 
continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that 
language is the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human 
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nature, and W's whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. 
Long before Searle, he rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of 
physiology, experimental psychology and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, 
Functionalism, Strong AI, DST, CTM, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down 
deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties he 
noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes (we can now see 
this as obliviousness to System 1 (roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological 
illusion’) and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these 
investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). And 
so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a 
window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic 
blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later 
evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Second Self--the 
dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). 
 
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s comment 
that even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we are 
thinking--this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes clear, 
of Cognitive Psychology. But God could see what we are perceiving and 
remembering and our reflexive thinking, since these S1 functions are always 
causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS. This is not 
a theory but a fact about our grammar and our physiology. S muddies the 
waters here because he refers to dispositions as mental states as well, but as W 
did long ago, he shows that the language of causality just does not apply to the 
higher order emergent S2 descriptions—again not a theory but a description 
about how language (thinking) works. This brings up another point that is 
prominent in W but denied by S, that all we can do is give descriptions and not 
a theory. S insists he is providing theories but of course “theory” and 
“description” are language games too and it seems to me S’s theory is usually 
W’s description—a rose by any other name…. W’s point was that by sticking 
to perspicacious examples that we all know to be true accounts of our behavior, 
we avoid the quicksand of theories that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL 
language games), while S wants to generalize and inevitably goes astray (he 
gives several examples of his own mistakes in PNC). As S and others endlessly 
modify their theories to account for the multifarious language games they get 
closer and closer to describing behavior by way of numerous examples as did 
W. 
 
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the 
different (but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or 
roughly Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language Games 
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(SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., Johnston-‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking 
the Inner’ on how confusing the two is a major industry in philosophy and 
psychology), the impossibility of private language and the axiomatic structure 
of all behavior. Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first described S1 functions but as 
S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, leading to the whole 
mythology of inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were 
seeing pictures inside the brain. The PLG's are utterances by and descriptions 
of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, 
nonpropositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories and 
involuntary acts (including System 1 Truths and UOA1 (Understanding of 
Agency 1) and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described 
causally, while the evolutionarily later SLG's are expressions or descriptions of 
voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, 
propositional, Truth2 and UOA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating, the 
dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of 
reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of 
neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make no sense--see W for 
many examples and Searle for good disquisitions on this). 
 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons 
(e.g., ` I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms 
of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is 
meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make sense 
in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never--(e.g., "The 
greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459). 
 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 
1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and 
Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical 
extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). 
W recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper. 
 
Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of regarding "language 
philosophy" as a separate study apart from other areas of behavior, since 
language is just another name for the mind. And, when W says that 
understanding behavior is in no way dependent on the progress of psychology 
(e.g., his oft-quoted assertion "The confusion and barrenness of psychology is 
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not to be explained by calling it a `young science' --but cf. another comment 
that I have never seen quoted-- "Is scientific progress useful to philosophy? 
Certainly. The realities that are discovered lighten the philosophers task. 
Imagining possibilities." (LWPP1,807). So, he is not legislating the boundaries 
of science but pointing out that our behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest 
picture possible of our psychology and that all discussions of higher order 
behavior are plagued by conceptual confusions. 
 
FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are 
fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, to 
provide the physical basis for our behavior and facilitate our analysis of 
language games which nevertheless remain unexplainable--EP just is this way-
- and unchanged. The true-only axioms, most thoroughly explored in 'On 
Certainty', are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the automated true-only 
reactions of bacteria and their descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and 
operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb 
"Principles of Social Evolution". 
 
W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions 
rather than explanations, but of course these too are complex language games 
and one person's description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their 
innate true-only, nonempirical (automated and nonchangeable) responses to 
the world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into 
further true only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but this is 
a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). 
 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our 
two hands or our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human 
nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true- only 
Understandings of Agency (UOA a term I devised 10 years ago) which 
newborn animals (including flies and worms if UOA is suitably defined) have 
and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, as I note 
here, W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 
and System 2 versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UOA1 and the 
Slow conscious UOA2 and of course these are heuristics for multifaceted 
phenomena. Although the raw material for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into S1— 
higher cortical feedback to the lowest levels of perception, memory, reflexive 
thinking that is a fundamental of psychology. Many of W’s examples explore 
this two way street (e.g., see the discussions of the duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ 
in Johnston). 
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The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, 
intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least 
half a century earlier. One CANNOT help but incorporate T. rex and all that is 
relevant to it into our true only background via the inexorable workings of EP. 
Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is truly stupefying 
that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most basic fact of 
human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others) which was 
laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation of logic and 
our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature 
(as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only 
extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without 
threatening our sanity. Football or Britney Spears cannot just vanish from my 
or our memory and vocabulary as these concepts, ideas, events, developed out 
of and are tied to countless others in the true only network that begins with 
birth and extends in all directions to encompass much of our awareness and 
memory. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own 
unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other 
minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot 
really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of involuntary fast thinking 
axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work `On 
Certainty'), are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center 
of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has 
no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and 
unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UOA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over 
in endless examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes"(maybe 99% 
of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not 
have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words 
like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed 
extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) exemplified by Moore (whose papers 
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inspired W to write OC), which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from 
direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I 
know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which is their normal use as 
dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home'). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways 
to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 
1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not 
ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought 
or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later 
Searle call our EP). 
 
One of W's recurring themes was what is now called Theory of Mind (TOM), 
or as I prefer Understanding of Agency (UOA), but of course he did not use 
these terms, which is the subject of major research efforts now. I recommend 
consulting the work of Ian Apperly, who is carefully dissecting UOA1 and 2 
and who has recently become aware of one of the leading Wittgensteinian 
philosophers Daniel Hutto, since Hutto has now characterized UOA1 as a 
fantasy (or rather insists that there is no `Theory' nor representation involved 
in UOA1--that being reserved for UOA2). However, like other psychologists, 
Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this between 60 and 80 years 
ago. 
 
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is 
epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not accurately describe nor determine 
how we act—now a pillar of the behavioral sciences. See ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion’ in PNC for a grand example from philosophy. It is 
an obvious corollary of W’s and S’s descriptive psychology that it is the 
unconscious automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior 
and that the later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, 
loving, desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake. This is most 
strikingly borne out by the latest experimental psychology, some of which is 
nicely summarized by Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter `Two 
Selves', but of course there is a huge volume of recent work he does not cite 
and an endless stream of pop and pro books issuing). It is an easily defensible 
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view that most of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms 
and higher order thought is wholly compatible with and straightforwardly 
deducible from W. 
 
Regarding my view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems nobody has 
noticed that he very clearly explained several times specifically and many times 
in passing, the psychology behind what later became known as the Wason Test-
-long a mainstay of EP research. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and 
that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists 
but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed 
to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in 
certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
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System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, 
possible actions etc. 
** Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and 
their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my 
article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language 
as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Now for some comments on 
Searle’s PNC. 
 
The essays here are mostly already published during the last decade (though 
some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, and nothing here 
will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is 
regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is 
solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take 
the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions.  
 
On p7 he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the 
overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed 
definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true- 
only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, 
since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. In the first 
sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, 
which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and 
nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it 
is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic example of the “battle 
against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” which W 
demonstrated over and over again. One word- two (or many) distinct uses. 
 
On p10 he chastises W for his antipathy to theorizing but as I noted above, 
‘theorizing’ is another language game (LG) and there is a vast gulf between a 
general description of behavior with few well worked out examples and one 
that emerges from a large number of such that is not subject to many 
counterexamples. Evolution in its early days was a theory with limited clear 
examples but soon became just a summary of a vast body of examples and a 
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theory in a quite different sense. Likewise, with a theory one might make as a 
summary of a thousand pages of W’s examples and one resulting from ten 
pages. 
 
Again, on p12, ‘consciousness’ is the result of automated System 1 functioning 
that is ‘subjective’ in several quite different senses, and not, in the normal case, 
a matter of evidence but a true-only understanding in our own case and a true-
only perception in the case of others. 
 
As I read p13 I thought: “Can I be feeling excruciating pain and go on as if 
nothing is wrong?” No! —this would not be ‘pain’ in the same sense. “The inner 
experience stands in need of outer criteria” (W) and Searle seems to miss this. 
See W or Johnston. 
 
As I read the next few pages I felt that W has a much better grasp of the 
mind/language connection, as he regards them as synonymous in many 
contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of mind as exemplified in 
numerous perspicacious examples of language use. As quoted above, "Now if 
it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities 
of the mind lie open before us." And as explained above I feel the questions 
with which S ends section 3 are largely answered by considering W’s OC from 
the standpoint of the two systems. Likewise, for section 6 on the philosophy of 
science. Rodych has done an article on Popper vs W which I thought superb at 
the time but I will have to reread it to make sure. Finally, on p25, one can deny 
that any revision of our concepts (language games) of causation or free will are 
necessary or even possible. You can read just about any page of W for the 
reasons. It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the world using examples 
from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything 
relevant to our normal use of words.  
 
On p31, 36 etc., we again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy and 
life) of identical words glossing over the huge differences in LG’s of ‘belief’, 
‘seeing’ etc., as applied to S1 which is composed of mental states in the present 
only, and S2 which is not. The rest of the chapter summarizes his work on 
‘social glue’ which, from an EP, Wittgensteinian perspective, is the automatic 
fast actions of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably 
and universally expanded during personal development into a wide array of 
automatic unconscious deontic relationships with others, and arbitrarily into 
cultural variations on them. 
 
Chapters 3 to 5 contain his well-known arguments against the mechanical view 
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of mind which seem to me definitive. I have read whole books of responses to 
them and I agree with S that they all miss the very simple logical 
(psychological) points he makes (and which, by and large, W made half a 
century earlier before there were computers). To put it in my terms, S1 is 
composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-propositional, 
true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be described in terms 
of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious dispositions to behavior 
(potential actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F). Computers 
and the rest of nature have only derived intentionality that is dependent on our 
perspective while higher animals have primary intentionality that is 
independent of perspective. As S and W appreciate, the great irony is that these 
materialistic or mechanical reductions of psychology masquerade as cutting 
edge science, but in fact they are utterly anti-scientific. Philosophy (descriptive 
psychology) and cognitive psychology (freed of superstition) are becoming 
hand in glove and it is Hofstadter, Dennett, Kurzweil etc., who are left out in 
the cold. 
 
Page 62 nicely summarizes one of his arguments but p63 shows that he has still 
not quite let go of the blank slate as he tries to explain trends in society in terms 
of the cultural extensions of S2. As he does in many other places in his writings, 
he gives cultural, historical reasons for behaviorism, but it seems quite obvious 
to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the same 
reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of our EP which seeks 
explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through slowly, rather 
than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious. Again, on p65 
I find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions 
in his OC and other works to be deeper than S’s (or anyone’s), and so we are 
NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but rather it is not open to doubt. 
 
Chapter 5 nicely demolishes CTM, LOT etc., noting that ‘computation’, 
‘information’, ‘syntax’, ‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, ‘program’, etc., are observer relative 
(i.e., psychological) terms and have no physical or mathematical meaning in 
this psychological sense, but of course there are other senses they have been 
given recently as science has developed. Again, people are bewitched by the 
use of the same word into ignoring that vast difference in its use (meaning).  
All extensions of classic Wittgenstein and I recommend Hutto’s papers too. 
 
Chapter 6 “The Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI) is by far my favorite, and, 
while demolishing that field, it shows both his supreme logical abilities and his 
failure to grasp the full power of both the later W, and the great heuristic value 
of recent psychological research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal that TPI 
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is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow 
conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic 
Blank Slate blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier 
and also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious 
automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1. Like so many others, 
Searle dances all around it but never quite gets there. Very roughly, regarding 
‘observer independent’ features of the world as S1 and ‘observer dependent’ 
features as S2 should prove very revealing. As S notes, Heidegger and the 
others have the ontology exactly backwards, but of course so does almost 
everyone due to the defaults of their EP. 
 
But the really important thing is that S does not take the next step to realizing 
that TPI is not just a failing of a few philosophers, but a universal blindness to 
our EP that is itself built into EP. He actually states this in almost these words 
at one point, but if he really got it how could he fail to point out its immense 
implications for the world. 
 
With rare exceptions (e.g., the Jaina Tirthankaras going back over 5000 years to 
the beginnings of the Indus civilization and most recently and remarkably 
Osho, Buddha, Jesus, Bodhidharma, Da Free John etc., we are all meat puppets 
stumbling through life on our genetically programmed mission to destroy the 
earth. Our almost total preoccupation with using the second self S2 personality 
to indulge the infantile gratifications of S1 is creating Hell On Earth. As with 
all organisms, it’s only about reproduction and accumulating resources 
therefor. Yes, much noise about Global Warming and the imminent collapse of 
industrial civilization in the next century, but nothing is likely to stop it. S1 
writes the play and S2 acts it out. Dick and Jane just want to play house—this 
is mommy and this is daddy and this and this and this is baby.  Perhaps one 
could say that TPI is that we are humans and not just another primate. 
 
Chapter 7 on the nature of the self is good but nothing really struck me as new. 
Chapter 8 on property dualism is much more interesting even though mostly a 
rehash of his previous work. The last of his opening quotes above sums this up, 
and of course the insistence on the critical nature of first person ontology is 
totally Wittgensteinian. The only big blunder I see is his blank slate or (cultural) 
type of explanation on p 158 for the errors of dualism, when in my view, it is 
clearly another instance of TPI—a mistake which he (and nearly everyone else) 
has made many times, and repeats on p177 etc., in the otherwise superb 
Chapter 9. The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts 
the muscles) of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read 
my comments on W’s OC so he changes the “good reason to believe” at the 
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bottom of p171 and the top of p172 to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
 
A critical point is made again on p169. “Thus, saying something and meaning 
it involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that 
the utterance will be produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have 
conditions of satisfaction.” One way of regarding this is that the unconscious 
automatic System 1 activates the higher cortical conscious personality of 
System 2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which inform others that 
it sees the world in certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge 
advance over prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which only gross 
muscle movements were able to convey very limited information about 
intentions and S makes a similar point in Chapter 10. 
 
His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) 
would also benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s two 
books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true 
only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This 
strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as 
propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about 
them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or 
potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a 
huge advance over pre or proto-linguistic society, is cogent. As he states it “A 
proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of 
satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the case.” 
Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined 
to be the case. 
 
Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over 
Wittgenstein resulting from S’s half century of work, but in my view, W still is 
unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read 
together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated 
with W’s perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much 
younger I would write a book doing exactly that. 
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Can there be a Chinese Philosophy? -- a Review of 
Searle's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy--Bo 
Mou Ed 440p (2008) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This book is invaluable as a synopsis of some of the work of one the greatest 
philosophers of recent times. There is much value in analyzing his responses 
to the basic confusions of philosophy, and in the generally excellent attempts 
to connect classical Chinese thought to modern philosophy. I take a modern 
Wittgensteinian view to place it in perspective. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
This book is a unique attempt to correlate classical Chinese philosophy with 
that of Searle (S), whom I regard as the best since Wittgenstein (W) and his 
intellectual heir. The quality of the articles is unusually high for such a 
collection, which must be due to Mou’s careful selection of papers. Readers will 
find it instructive to compare this with another recent volume of papers on S’s 
philosophy – “Thinking About the Real World”— another book on which I 
have written the only review. As with W, everything that S writes is a treasure, 
but sadly this tome has attracted so little attention that this appears to be the 
only review, even though it appeared 6 years ago. Its only real deficiency is the 
failure to print S’s reply to Allinson, since it would correct his numerous 
substantial mistakes. As noted in my other reviews, such mistakes are of 
interest since they are the universal defaults of our psychology due to the fact 
that our language lacks perspicuity, as W first noted in the BBB (Blue and 
Brown Books) ¾ of a century ago. As the conference was taped, I tried to get 
the video or a transcript of S’s reply from Mou, S, Allinson and 3 persons at 
HKUST but nobody would help. 
472  
The issue of spirituality is inevitably mixed in with the language issues of 
philosophy in some of the papers here. The many subtleties on the road to 
dispelling the illusion of the ego and the attaining of enlightenment are another 
issue entirely, although as in all other arenas, philosophical confusions 
inevitably arise when talking about religion, as opposed to practicing it. That 
is, philosophy in the broad sense, as musing on ethics, religion, morality, how 
we ought to live or feel about our life and the world is not the narrower sense 
in which W and S are practicing it, though inevitably and almost universally 
the broad sense gets mixed with issues about how language (the mind as W 
showed us) works. 
 
As always, the first thing to keep in mind is W’s dictum that there are no new 
discoveries to be made in philosophy nor explanations to be given, but only 
clear descriptions of behavior (language). Once one understands that all the 
problems are confusions about how language works, we are at peace and 
philosophy in his sense has achieved its purpose. As W/S have noted, there is 
only one reality, so in the narrow sense, there are not multiple versions of the 
mind or life or the world that can meaningfully be given, and we can only 
communicate in our one public language. W famously showed that there 
cannot be a private language and any “private inner” thoughts cannot be 
communicated and cannot have any role in our social life. It should also be very 
straightforward to solve philosophical problems in this sense. "Now if it is not 
the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the 
mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein" The Blue Book" p6(1933) 
 
We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior 
(human nature or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the 
bedrock or background, and reflecting upon this we generate philosophy 
which S calls the logical structure of rationality and I call the descriptive 
psychology of Higher Order Thought (HOT) or, taking the cue from W, the 
study of the language describing HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s 
comments on philosophical aspects of human behavior (HOT) is to see if its 
translation into the W/S framework gives some clear descriptions which 
illuminate the use of language.  If not, then showing how they have been 
bewitched by language dispels the confusion. As Horwich has noted on the last 
page of his superb ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’ (see my review):“What 
sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no 
depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
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perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and 
truth should be found satisfying enough.” 
 
Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W suggested we ought to say 
“describing”) and S states that the logical structure of rationality constitutes 
various “theories”, and there is no harm in it, provided one realizes they are 
comprised of a series of examples that let us get a general idea of how language 
(the mind) works and that as his “theories” are explicated via examples they 
become more like W’s perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by any other name...” 
When there is a question one has to go back to the examples or consider new 
ones. As W noted, language (life) is limitlessly complex and context sensitive 
(W being the unacknowledged father of Contextualism), and so it is utterly 
unlike physics, where one can often derive a formula and dispense with the 
need for further examples. Scientism (the use of scientific language and the 
causal framework) leads us astray in describing HOT and for me it is essential 
to keep in mind another of W’s famous comments: “Philosophers constantly 
see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask 
and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source 
of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.” (BBB p18). 
Unlike so many others, S has largely avoided and often demolished scientism, 
but there is a residue which evinces itself when he remarks in various writings 
that he is prepared to give up causality, will or mind. W made it abundantly 
clear that such words are constituted by many language games, which are the 
innate axiomatic basis of thought, and giving them up or even changing them 
substantially is not possible. I think the residue of scientism results from the 
major tragedy of S’s (and nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his 
failure to take the later W seriously enough (W died a few years before S went 
to England to study). And, as it seems to me critical to understand the 
difference between the dispositional language games of “explaining” and 
“understanding”, permit me to quote W again. 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel 
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p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
“Every sign [WORD] is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be 
capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation” W’s BBB p34 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of the 
reptilian subcortical System One (S1) composed of perceptions, memories and 
reflexes, and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving 
sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear, they are the basis 
for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology 
are not evidential. 
 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting W’s 
above remark on science envy, I will quote from P.M.S Hacker (the leading 
expert on W) who gives a good start on it and a counterblast to scientism. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
...What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of 
our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, 
the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and 
purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To 
this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, 
psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute 
nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- 
p15(2005) 
 
Before making detailed remarks on the book, I will first offer some essential 
comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological 
research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) 
et al. It will help to see my reviews of S’s PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), 
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Making the Social World (MSW), Seeing Things As They Are (STATA) and W’s 
BBB (Blue and Brown Books), PI (Philosophical Investigations), OC (On 
Certainty), and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear 
description of higher order behavior, not found in complete detail anywhere 
that I have seen, that I will refer to as the W/S framework. 
 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of 
Social Reality (the title of Searle’s well known book) and I will give some 
perspective. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 
years ago had evolved to describe present events (perceptions, memory, 
reflexive actions with basic utterances that can be described as Primary 
Language Games (PLG’s) describing System 1—i.e., the fast unconscious 
automated System One, true-only mental states with a precise time and 
location). We gradually developed the further ability to encompass 
displacements in space and time to describe memories, attitudes and potential 
events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional 
preferences, inclinations or dispositions) with the Secondary Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false propositional attitudinal 
thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities and not mental states). 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, 
Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, 
capacities, hypotheses. Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W   RPP2 p148). “I 
believe”, “he loves”,“they think” are descriptions of possible public acts 
typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are 
true-only (excluding lying) while third person statements about others are true 
or false (see my review of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase 
since believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not 
propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., 
Consciousness and Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent 
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mental representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in 
time or space while the evolutionarily more primitive System One mental 
states of perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now. 
This is one way to characterize System 2 and System 3--the second and third 
major advances in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to 
represent events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time 
(Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition 
and volition). S1 are potential or unconscious mental states (Searle-- Phil Issues 
1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 
or primary LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, 
no tests possible, so they can be true-only. Dispositions can be described as 
secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, 
even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I know what I believe, think, feel until 
I act). Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as well as 
being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 
1930’s) and are not Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto, 
Read, Hacker etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of 
evolutionary psychology, contextualism, enactivism, and the two systems 
framework, and his work a unique investigation of the functioning of our 
axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with System 2. Though few 
have understood it well (and arguably nobody fully to this day) it was further 
developed by a few --above all by John Searle, who made a simpler version of 
the table below in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on 
W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed 
from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work 
On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior 
or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or the 
logical structure of Higher Order Thought (HOT), and in my view the single 
most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology), and thus in the 
study of behavior. See my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) 
and the recent work of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. 
 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly 
Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Referential (Causally self-
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reflexive-Searle) --the unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality 
over which no control is possible). Emotions evolved to make a bridge between 
desires or intentions and actions. Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are 
descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities--described in 
SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit the world. 
 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions 
as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion or TPI of Searle). W understood this 
and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of 
language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to 
working memory and so we use consciously apparent but typically incorrect 
reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves of current research). Beliefs and 
other Dispositions are thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind 
to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior 
Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA- Searle) plus acts which try to 
match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., 
C+L p145, p190). 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the 
table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed 
over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in 
turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form 
tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking 
processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to 
compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I 
offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete 
and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete 
analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of 
arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between 
S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, 
believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words 
are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses 
(meanings or COS). 
 
In accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the 
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representations of S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this 
sense S1 such as perceptions do not have COS. In other writings S says they do 
but as noted in my other reviews I think it is then essential to refer to COS1 
(private presentations) and COS2 (public representations). To repeat this 
critical distinction, public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to 
by Searle and others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or 
COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as 
presentations by others (or COS1 by myself). 
 
Likewise, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and 
his ‘Direction of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’. System 1 is involuntary, 
reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and 
is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see 
Searle). 
 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of 
minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about 
brain function). Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but 
I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**           Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***         Searle’s Intention In Action 
****        Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****       Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) 
of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts 
at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is 
critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic 
and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination 
of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this 
one. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, 
perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are 
automated and generally happening in less than 500msec, while System 2 are 
abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in 
consciousness (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently 
repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A -my terminology). There 
is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 
2 and long term memory of System 1. 
 
For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather than T 
or F. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.G., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will 
be True only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive (self-referential), 
cause originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise 
duration, change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special 
quality, do not need language, are independent of general intelligence and 
working memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have 
voluntary content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words cannot precisely match the 
actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial 
explosion of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and this is why it’s not 
possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws which would have 
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to state all the possible contexts – hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against 
theories. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions and some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only mental states with aprecise time and location) and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical S2 with the further ability to describe 
displacements in space and time (conditionals, hypotheticals or fictionals) of 
potential events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or 
fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions - the Secondary or 
Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 slow, cortical, conscious, 
information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction-
Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 
for private S1 and public S2), representational—which I again divide into R1 
for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional attitudinal 
thinking, with all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and 
not mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic 
Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, 
Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, 
Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly developing and 
changing results of S2 dispositions (W RPP2 148) while others are typical S1—
fast and automatic to appear and disappear.  “I believe”, “he loves”, “they 
think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. 
My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. 
S1, while third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my 
reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the   
1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase 
since believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not 
propositions nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf 
Consciousness and Language p118).  They are intrinsic, observer independent 
public representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of 
System1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in 
time or space while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories 
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and reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize 
System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—
the ability to represent events and to think of them as occurring in another place 
or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing 
cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ are potential or unconscious mental 
states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 
or primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, 
NO TESTS possible so they can be True Only. 
 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the 
dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I 
KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or some event occurs—see my 
reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and Budd 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). Note well that Dispositions also 
become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted   out in other 
ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). 
 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and 
his work a unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 
psychology and its interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the 
groundwork for the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the 
Blue and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who 
made a simpler version of this table in his classic book Rationality in Action 
(2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary 
psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully 
laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the 
foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the 
same), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view the 
single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus 
in the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion 
are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be 
described in PL G’s, in which the mind automatically fits the world (is Causally 
Self Referential--Searle) -- the unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of 
rationality over which no control is possible). Preferences, Desires, and 
Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities—
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that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit the world. 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions 
as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this 
and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of 
language (the mind) in action throughout his works. 
 
Reason has access to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often 
incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes 
of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as 
thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of 
fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In 
Action-IAA-Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—
world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L    p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states 
(‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they 
act or might act --‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive 
modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions 
— (believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc.,-actual or potential 
PUBLIC ACTS (language, thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, 
Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language 
(concept, thought) of PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no 
private language, thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and 
to that extent they have a public psychology. 
 
Perceptions: (“X” is True): Hear, See, Smell, Temperature, Pain, Touch 
 
Memories:  Remembering, Dreaming? 
 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions (X might become True): 
 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
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Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
expecting, wishing, wanting, hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my 
thoughts): Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, 
obliged to do INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, 
Asserting(describing, teaching, predicting, reporting), Promising , Making or 
Using Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs –these are Public and 
Voluntary and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the 
Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of 
behavior. 
 
WORDS EXPRESS POTENTIAL ACTIONS HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE AND 
ARE NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT. 
 
The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—
roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of 
neurons organized into inference engines), which, with perceptions and 
memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to intentions and 
then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all 
these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense 
is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when 
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including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of 
the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive 
in evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions 
and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our 
psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding by giving 
clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, 
psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and 
computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) 
gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are 
algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self and in normal human 
adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require 
public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase 
our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility--Bayesian utility 
maximization but Bayesianism is highly questionable) via dominance and 
reciprocal altruism (Desire Independent Reasons for Action-Searle- which I 
divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2)  and impose Conditions of 
Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction -Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts to the 
world via public acts ( muscle movements –i.e., math, language, art, music, sex, 
sports etc.). The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural 
psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear 
foreshadowings back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by 
John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological 
phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 
p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (i.e., of our language games) admits of 
degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. 
All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in 
some contexts as they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of 
using the dispositional verb “thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow 
thinking of S1 and S2. It is useful to regar d these as language games and not 
as mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or 
internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even 
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for oneself and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. 
Thinking like all dispositions (inclinations, propositional attitudes) lacks any 
test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no 
information until it becomes a public act in speech, writing or other muscular 
contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have information (meaning-
i.e., a public COS) only when they are manifested in public actions, for only 
then do thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for 
ourselves. 
 
(Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon). Developing 
language means manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. 
TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called UA-Understanding of Agency –
my term-and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in S1 and S2 ) –and can also be 
called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically 
programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to 
intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles. Thus, “propositional 
attitude” is a confusing term for normal intuitive rational S2D or nonrational 
automated S2A speech and action. We see that the efforts of cognitive science 
to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not 
going to tell us anything more about how the mind (thought, language) works 
(as opposed to how the BRAIN works) than we already know, because “mind” 
(thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any phenomena that are 
hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or 
string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is 
composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and 
chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. 
Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we 
only examine carefully the workings of language. Language (mind, public 
speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social 
interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. Its 
grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions 
automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and 
sentences have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have 
profoundly different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he 
believes. The present tense first person expressive use of inclinational verbs 
such as “I believe” describe my ability to predict my probable acts and are not 
descriptive of my mental state nor based on knowledge or information in the 
usual sense of those words (W). It does not describe a truth but makes itself 
true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, 
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disposition verbs used in first person present tense are causally self-referential-
-they instantiate themselves but as descriptions of possible states they are not 
testable (i.e., not T or F). However past or future tense or third person use--“I 
believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain information that is true 
or false as they describe public acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, 
“I believe it’s raining” has no information apart from subsequent actions, even 
for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially 
verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information 
(or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000) Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are 
Non-Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them 
functions or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahneman). Prior Intentions 
are stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1 but again I think one must 
separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the 
conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., 
some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 
and are automatic, nonreflective, non-Propositional and non-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology 
(Moyal- Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
“The basic form of the game must be one in which we act.” Wittgenstein in 
Klagge Philosophical Occasions p397(1993) 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order thought (HOT) is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow 
S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the 
extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while the later W shows how 
it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious 
dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our subcortical, involuntary, System 1, 
fast thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non-propositional, pre-linguistic 
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mental states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including 
System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such 
as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily 
later linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of cortical, voluntary, 
System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, S2 consists of testable 
true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, 
hating) -- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, 
intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in 
terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms 
of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, 
Hacker etc.). UA is my term for what is usually called ‘theory of mind” and I 
think it is a critical distinction as it keeps in front of us the fact that the basis for 
our interaction with other beings is an automatic part of S1 and not an 
empirically decidable or modifiable function of S2. This is the basis for most of 
what is called “enactivism” or “embodiment” and it comes straight from W 
(though rarely acknowledged). 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and 
other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", 
"heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language games so there will 
be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions 
will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made 
clear), but not of S2 only, since HOT cannot occur without involving much of 
the intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", 
"intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or 
"bedrock" --as W and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of universal cultural deontic 
relationships (S3) so well described by Searle. I think this fairly well abstracts 
the basic structure of behavior. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and 
contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has content (i.e. 
is representational in the W/S sense of having public COS) and is downwardly 
causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical 
Enactivism'), I would translate the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning 
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"In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP (“first 
self”) as modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to 
be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and 
imagination-- desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 
propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved “second self”, are 
totally dependent upon (have their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) 
originating in) the Causally Self Referential (CSR) rapid automatic primitive 
true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are 
intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or 
remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, 
as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the 
present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly 
by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal experience is 
that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive 
illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological 
Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. 
One refers to the true-only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes 
(including basic speech) and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology 
which are Causally Self Referential (CSR)- (called reflexive or intransitive in 
W’s BBB), and the S2 use as disposition words (thinking, understanding, 
knowing etc.) which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I 
know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are 
not CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
 
Note that COS, CSR, DOF, DIRA, Word to World etc. are all terms introduced 
or standardized by Searle but their division into COS1, COS2 etc. to 
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accommodate the now dominant two systems framework is my own, which I 
regard as indispensable. 
 
To get S’s framework clear I have picked several quotes from his recent works. 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32  
 
And a last comment from W—one of his most penetrating and universally 
relevant to thinking about behavior. 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviorism arise? 
 
– The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk about processes 
and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know 
more about them-we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way 
of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to 
learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick 
has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent). — And 
now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. 
So, we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored 
medium. And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And 
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naturally we don’t want to deny them.   W   PI p308 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. 
However, since what S and various authors here call the background (S1) gives 
rise to S2 and is in turn partly controlled by S2, there has to be a sense in which 
S1 is able to become propositional and they and Searle note that the 
unconscious activities of S1 must be able to become the conscious ones of S2. 
They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic 
intentionality of S1 generates that of S2, but if S1 were propositional in the same 
sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was 
philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be 
possible. It would e.g., mean that truth and falsity and the facts of the world 
could be decided without consciousness. As W stated often and showed so 
brilliantly in his last book “On Certainty”, life must be based on certainty--
automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt 
and pause to reflect will die-- no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Another crucial notion clarified by S is the Desire Independent Reasons for 
Action (DIRA). I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of 
MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which 
typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires 
displaced in space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that 
commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive 
fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." 
And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as 
"The resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term 
inclusive fitness generates the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short 
term personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the 
proximate reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted extensions of 
unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the 
poor because it is “right” but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain 
chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1, which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for 
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action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall 
cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The 
Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') 
is that S2/S3 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are 
fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is, as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd-
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology) "It is in language that wish and 
fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one 
might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that 
in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is 
about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) as one can find— beyond even Searle. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing 
COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental 
state. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he 
would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" 
and his comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in 
"that's Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which 
it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it 
always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what 
happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should 
not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"... ”Suppose it were asked 
`Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do 
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know." 
 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He 
dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, 
memories and reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, 
remembering, and understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many 
of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With an 
evolutionary perspective, W’s later works are a breathtaking revelation of 
human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many 
perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems 
view is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in 
philosophy makes sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
 
W recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon 
the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger 
here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459).  Incidentally, the equation of 
logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding 
W and human nature (as Daniele Moyal Sharrock (DMS) but afaik nobody else, 
points out). 
 
Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic 
EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A 
corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a 
foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true 
or false propositions. 
 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never 
seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts 
and with rare exceptions there is barely a mention. 
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The authors in this book are, like most philosophers and behavioral scientists, 
largely in the dark regarding subjects that I consider essential to a description 
of behavior—a good understanding of W and S, evolutionary psychology, 
automaticity of behavior and the two systems of thought. Nevertheless, they 
are generally thought provoking since they have as their theme the scintillating 
works of S.  The title of the first article on p35 by Cheng shows a basic and just 
about universal misunderstanding as it proposes to present a Neo- Confucian 
view of S’s philosophy. It should be obvious from the above that the basic 
philosophical issues are always about mistakes in language used to describe 
our universal innate psychology and there is no useful sense in which there can 
be a Chinese, French, Christian, Feminist etc. view of them. Such views can 
exist in the broad cultural or non- universal sense of philosophy, but that is not 
what philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me what any interesting and 
substantive philosophy) is about. It would take the whole review just to start 
on a reply to it and S does an excellent job, so I will just comment that re p35 
propositions are S2 and not mental states which are S1, as W made quite clear 
over ¾ of a century ago, and that both Quine and Davidson were equally 
confused about the basic issues involved (both Searle and Hacker have done 
xlnt demolitions of Quine). As often, S’s discussion is marred by his failure to 
carry his understanding of W’s “background” to its logical conclusion (a failing 
of Hacker as well, as DMS has noted), and so he suggests (as he has frequently) 
that we might have to give up the concept of free will—a notion I find (with W) 
is incoherent as it is not something we can decide about. If some description of 
behavior is to have teeth, we should always be asking ourselves what actual 
impact it has on our life if we adopt it. If “choice” is a “meaningless” illusion, 
then there is really no COS at all, or does it have the same COS when our arm 
goes up when we want to scratch our ear as when it is pulled up by a string? 
 
S himself has countless times used W’s example of the difference between our 
arm going up because someone moves it, and going up because we make it do 
so. There is no further division of its going up to scratch our ear into voluntary 
and involuntary scratching. This is the bedrock or background--as W puts it, 
explanations and descriptions stop here. 
 
Philosophy, neuroscience and physics have nothing to add that changes the 
description in any way. 
Likewise (p62) nobody can give arguments for the background (i.e., our 
axiomatic EP) as our being able to talk at all presupposes it (as W/S note 
frequently). “Reduction” along with “monism”, “reality”, etc., are complex 
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contextual language games and they do not carry meaning along in little 
backpacks. One must dissect ONE usage in detail to get clear and then see how 
another usage (context) differs. The 20,000 pages of W’s nachlass are hands 
down the best lesson on how this has to be done, but Cheng has no idea and so 
lapses into incoherence many times a page. He can of course take comfort in 
the fact that he has millions for company. 
 
Fraser’s article (as S notes) is generally excellent as he does a rare thing—he 
actually understands alot of what S has written and gives a clear account of it. 
If only he had some grasp of all the other subjects I outlined above. Regarding 
his note 5 one needs to remember that dispositions (e.g., thinking, knowing) 
that state a COS are thereby true or false and a function of S2 (as opposed to S1 
which are true only). And the “radical under-determination of meaning” was 
first solved by W who noted that S1 is true only. 
 
In another recent volume, S comments “The heart of my argument is that our 
linguistic practices, as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists 
independently of our representations”, to which I would add “Our life shows 
a world that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly 
challenged.” We need to remind ourselves that the basic problem of philosophy 
is that, when the context is not clear—i.e., almost always when philosophizing-
- you can say anything, but you cannot mean anything –i.e., only certain COS 
can apply in this context. 
 
Fraser’s discussion of intention p67-69 is good, but again in my view it is critical 
to be mindful of the difference between S1 (unconscious, involuntary, true 
only, nonlinguistic mental states) and S2 (conscious, voluntary, true or false, 
often linguistic and not mental states). A COS, or mental state or desire 
independent reason for action in S1 is utterly different from one in S2 and as I 
have often suggested (following W) one ought not to speak of them as S1 
phenomena at all. As noted in my other reviews, if one insists to use such terms 
for both S1 and S2 then one should use COS1, COS2, DIRA1, DIRA2 etc. and 
keep firmly in mind that COS1 are “internal criteria” (i.e., not really criteria at 
all) while COS2 are external public criteria that can be true or false. See Fraser’s 
notes 10 and 11. Fraser notes on p89 that insofar as wu-wei is the idea that life 
can become entirely automated it must be confused—this would mean S2 or 
our conscious voluntary life disappears and we join the bacteria. Regarding 
note 37 I would comment that “background” is W’s concept long before it 
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became S’s and that muscle contraction, though carried out by S1 is often 
generated by S2—the only end result possible for our consciousness is 
contraction of muscles. S’s response mentions “high level” and “low level” 
which we should interpret as S2 and S1. 
 
Krueger’s article is a generally good “enactivist” or “embodied” account but 
we should note that W was the first enactivist and that S is one as well as they 
both insist on the COS as the test of meaningful behavior, and on the S1, S2 
framework (though they do not use these terms). He does however go 
overboard in suggesting wu-wei is superior to S’s account and makes the usual 
error in suggesting that we “explain” behavior rather than just describing it 
and, like nearly everyone, has no clue that the best description of behavior and 
of the axiomatic functioning of S1 is that of W, especially in his last work “On 
Certainty”. Again, I suggest the recent book by Hutto and Myin for a rigorous 
account of the S1, S2 orientation in “Radicalizing Enactivism” (see my review). 
Krueger calls this the “internalism/externalism” debate. His 
misunderstandings are nicely summarized on p106 when he says the wu-wei 
refers to “inner states” and that its depiction of action without representation 
is at odds with S’s account. But it is clearly not, as it depicts S1 and S perfectly 
well describes S1. At issue here is what S has nicely termed The 
Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), which roughly means that S1 is not available 
to consciousness and so is not “real”. On p122 he indicates that S implies 
intentionality is solely present in the brain but neither S nor W ever says this 
and constantly show that the basic concept of meaning is COS, which is a public 
act or occurrence. The confusion of his statement of embodiment or enactivism 
is epitomized in the last sentence of section 5 on p123 with “Intentionality is 
not a logical feature of mentality but rather a lived relation that is enacted 
through our embodied engagement with the world.” The cure is to cross out 
“not” and change “but rather” to “and”. S1 and S2 feed back into each other 
and combine the primitive automatic reflexive behaviors with the advanced 
conscious linguistic dispositions to produce actions with public COS. S’s 
response is a classic description of intentionality and TPI which should be 
memorized by all those interested in human behavior. One should read his 
article “The Phenomenological Illusion” and my reviews of his books and those 
by and about W, especially that of Johnston’s “Wittgenstein: Rethinking the 
Inner.” S condenses a huge cloud of philosophy into a few drops of grammar 
in the first paragraph on p126 when he notes that our intentionality (i.e., the S2 
part of it) is representational because it can succeed or fail--i.e., be true or 
false—i.e., be propositional as it has external public COS whereas S1 does not. 
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Allinson makes most of the basic mistakes about how language works, as most 
people do when they philosophize, and so it is inevitable that he gets S wrong 
as well. 
 
As noted, it would be of great interest to have S’s response to Allinson, but it 
was not printed and nobody was able to help me get it. So there is only a short 
comment by S who thinks these are not Chinese but Western confusions, but it 
is clear they are universal ones. 
 
The next few papers had some mildly interesting comments on Chinese 
philosophy and religion but nothing of any substance on S or philosophy in the 
narrow sense. Martinich is a well-known author on language but sadly he has 
hardly a clue about what S or W have done. Regarding Willman there is again 
nothing about the basic framework for describing behavior and so the 
unconscious true-only S1 gets mixed with conscious dispositional S2 with the 
usual disastrous results (see middle of p265), and again S is way too kind. 
 
Nuyen’s paper brings up the fact that few people understand that in most 
contexts, if behavior varies from one person to another that means it’s cultural 
and not innate. Every normal person enjoys eating but its culture that makes 
some like raw earthworms. Regarding S’s response, the quickest and clearest 
way I know to understand desire independent reasons for action (and how to 
separate DIRA1 from DIRA2) is to read my reviews of S. 
 
Chong’s paper is mostly about philosophy in the broad sense and I would only 
comment that pretty much all previous notions of morality, ethics and rights 
seem obsolete. As we head for total collapse of what passes for civilization we 
need to have a long term global ecological basis for these, as is commonly 
noted. One of my favorites in this regard is the Wittgensteinian philosopher 
Rupert Read, who has used this perspective to deconstruct the work of Rawls 
(e.g., “A Theory of Justice”). 
 
The article by Fraser and Wong shows some grasp of S but (as is almost 
universal) it is truly amazing to see people try to describe (not explain as that 
takes us in a whole different direction—i.e., to a dead end) behavior with little 
understanding of S1, S2, dispositions, evolutionary psychology, automatism, 
twin studies etc. Only p316-17 were of interest to me and I have already 
499  
commented on this. 
 
Stroll is a senior scholar and W expert but I see problems in both his remarks 
and S’s on the subject of our certain knowledge. The comments on p345 fail to 
note the complex and highly varied language games subsumed by 
“knowledge”, “certainty”, “evidence”, “true”, “proof” etc. We can speak of 
“evidence” of water when we see what looks like a pond in the distance but 
not when we are standing next to it watching the ducks swim around. Only 
philosophers would use it the latter way and it’s not an intelligible use. Hands 
down the best treatment I know of how falsifiable statements become true only 
and of the axiomatic basis of knowledge is W’s “On Certainty”. 
 
Lum’s paper is pretty good, as we would expect from a former student of S’s, 
but there is some unclarity. Perhaps we see the origin of this in S’s reply p377, 
where he fails to demarcate S1 and S2 and so COS1, COS2 and says 
unconscious states (i.e., S1) can function in virtue of their propositional 
contents, which needs very careful elaboration describing how S1 generates 
and merges into S2 (as W did so well in ”On Certainty”). 
 
Zheng is mostly excellent with the paragraph in the middle of p386 being fine, 
once translated into the S1, S2 dispositional language, and most of p392-3 on 
the background or network or bedrock (i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology) being as good a summary description of high level behavior as I 
have seen. 
 
I have no new comments on the final contribution by Mou, but S felt it showed 
TPI which is a contagious disease in modern philosophy, as it must be, since it 
is another manifestation of what W often referred to as the lack of perspicuity 
of language. 
 
This book is invaluable as a synopsis of some of the work of one the greatest 
philosophers of recent times, and in my view one of the very best since 
Wittgenstein. There is much value in analyzing his responses to the many basic 
confusions manifested here and in the generally excellent attempts to connect 
classical Chinese thought to modern philosophy. It is a great pity that it 
remains a rare expensive volume that nobody reads. 
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Seeing With the Two Systems of Thought—a Review 
of ‘Seeing Things As They Are: a Theory of 
Perception’ by John Searle (2015) 
 
Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but 
exposes the author’s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make 
sense of the language game ‘Seeing things as they are’ and whether it’s possible 
to have a ‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’ (which can only be about how 
the language of perception works), as opposed to a scientific one, which is a 
theory about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. This is classic Searle—
superb and probably at least as good as anyone else can produce, but lacking a 
full understanding of the fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein and 
with no grasp of the two systems of thought framework, which could have 
made it brilliant. As in his previous work, Searle largely avoids scientism but 
there are frequent lapses and he does not grasp that the issues are always about 
language games, a failing he shares with nearly everyone. After providing a 
framework consisting of a Table of Intentionality based on the two systems of 
thought and thinking and decision research, I give a detailed analysis of the 
book. 
 
Those interested in my other writings may see Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, 
Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet (2017) or those 
articles with a socio-political slant in Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st 
Century (2017) 
 
As with Wittgenstein (hereafter W), everything that Searle (hereafter S) writes 
is a treasure and it is wonderful that he remains sharp as he nears 80. Unlike 
most, even his early work is still relevant and he is working on several other 
books. I also suggest his 100 or so lectures and interviews on youtube, vimeo 
etc., which, though inevitably a bit repetitious, contain many statements not in 
his writings. I have read almost all of his work, and listened to all the lectures, 
most of them 2 or 3 times. These are of special interest as (like Wittgenstein) he 
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does not read from notes, and so each is unique and not a replica of a paper, 
and he is a superb extemporaneous speaker who mostly uses unpretentious 
language (both so different from most others). The recent lectures given at 
European Universities are superb, but don’t miss the old ones such as the BBC 
lecture “A Changing Reality-the science of human behavior”, which gives an 
excellent account of why the lawful repetitious causality of the brain’s fast 
automatic, nonlinguistic system 1 (S1) is fundamentally different and not 
describable in the same way as the limitless complexity of reasons 
characterizing the slow deliberative, linguistic conscious system 2 (S2), which 
generates a combinatorial explosion not usually representable in a useful way 
by scientific laws. The dual system (S1, S2) method of describing thought used 
in this review, common to reasoning research for some 20 years now, is my 
own and not Searle’s. Since I have recently written a 75p article analyzing 
Searle’s work in comparison with that of Wittgenstein (The Logical Structure 
of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle) I will not repeat it and will concentrate on this 
book only. 
 
First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –
that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments or 
data gathering) are the same—confusions about how to use language in a 
particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language 
can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of 
Satisfaction or COS, a term not used by W and popularized principally by S) 
are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean 
(state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a 
very specific context. Thus, W in his last masterpiece ‘On Certainty’ (OC) looks 
at perspicuous examples of the varying uses of the words ‘know’, ‘doubt’ and 
‘certain’, often from his 3 typical perspectives of narrator, interlocutor and 
commentator, leaving the reader to decide the best use (clearest COS) of the 
sentences in each context. One can only describe the uses of related sentences 
and that’s the end of it—no hidden depths, no metaphysical insights. There are 
no ‘problems’ of ‘perception’, ‘consciousness’, ‘will’, ‘space’, ’time’ etc., but 
only the need to keep the use (COS) of these words clear. It is useful to keep in 
mind two comments by W that summarize scientism. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, 
in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set 
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theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means 
of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness."(BBB p18). 
 
More than most, S avoids scientism but there are frequent lapses which I have 
pointed out in my many reviews of his work and in spite of his being perhaps 
the best all-around philosopher since W, he does not fully grasp that it is all 
about language games, a failing he shares with nearly everyone. 
 
As so often in philosophy, the title not only lays down the battle line but 
exposes the author’s biases and mistakes, since whether or not we can make 
sense of the language game ‘Seeing things as they are’ and whether it’s possible 
to have a ‘philosophical’ ‘theory of perception’, which can only be about how 
the language of perception works, as opposed to a scientific one, which is a 
theory about how the brain works, are exactly the issues. The subtitle (A theory 
of Perception) is likewise contentious (for Wittgensteinians at least) since W 
warned repeatedly against theorizing and even insisted it was impossible to 
produce theories about behavior, as everyone would agree with them—i.e., 
they would be truisms about our use of language. Anything that looks like a 
theory of higher order thought (mind, behavior) is really just a description of 
what we do, unless of course they are making the near universal mistake of 
giving a scientific theory of how the brain or the world works-a different kind 
of ‘philosophy’ entirely—i.e. ‘Scientism’. Searle is well aware of this and has 
commented on it many times, insisting W is wrong about theories, but I don’t 
think so. Only science has theories, i.e., propositions that can be shown true or 
false and often new evidence leads us to change or even abandon them, while 
philosophy proper (the elucidation in a given context of a language game 
describing our higher order behavior) will be obviously correct and not subject 
to revision as we all recognize it as true—i.e. as a correct use of language. But 
if S wants to call his generalizations about language use ‘theories’ that’s fine, 
just so long as we are not led astray. I have dealt with these issues at length in 
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my other writings and in particular my review of Carruthers’ ‘The Opacity of 
Mind’. 
 
It is very useful to read the little volume ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ where 
Searle, Dennett, and Bennett and Hacker have at one another over which 
language games should be played. Bennett and Hacker have given the most 
detailed exposition of these games in ‘Philosophical Foundations of 
Neuroscience’(2003) which is continued in Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on 
Human Nature. 
 
W insisted that there are no new discoveries to be made in philosophy, nor 
explanations to be given, but only clear descriptions of behavior (language) in 
a particular context. Once one understands that all the problems are confusions 
about how language works, we are at peace and philosophy in W’s sense has 
achieved its purpose. As W and S have noted, there is only one reality, so there 
are not multiple versions of the mind or life or the world that can meaningfully 
be given, and we can only communicate in our one public language. There 
cannot be a private language and any ‘private inner thoughts’ cannot have any 
role in our social life. It should also be very straightforward to solve 
philosophical problems in this sense. "Now if it is not the causal connections 
which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before 
us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933).  In our modern idiom, perception 
is the automatic, causally self-reflexive (Searle), rapid, true-only mental states 
or presentations (Searle) of System 1 (S1), while most of what we ‘mean’ by the 
‘mind’ are the deliberate, slow, reasoned dispositions with public true or false 
representations (conditions of satisfaction-COS) of System 2 (S2). 
 
Searle waits until p45 to present the most recent version of a table he has used 
before. I have been expanding it for some years and as I find it critical to 
understanding behavior, I begin by presenting its most recent version here. In 
accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the 
representations of S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this 
sense the ‘phenomena’ of S1 such as perceptions do not have COS. In other 
writings Searle says they do, but as noted in my other reviews, I think it is then 
essential to refer to COS1 (“private” presentations) and COS2 (public 
representations). Likewise, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause 
Originates From’ and his ‘Direction of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’. 
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After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest 
topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering 
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, 
and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, 
Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following 
table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects 
or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and 
voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the 
Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality 
(LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality 
(LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of 
Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, 
the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms 
introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
 
I will make minimal comments here since those wishing further description 
may consult my articles and reviews of books by Wittgenstein, Searle and 
others on academia.edu, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, vixra.org and 
abbreviated versions on Amazon. 
 
The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler 
table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three 
recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come 
principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues 
as revised by myself. 
(Involuntary –automated-Rules R1) Thinking(Cognition) (No gaps) 
 (Voluntary-deliberative- Rules R2) Willing (Volition)(3 gaps) 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others 
as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while 
the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 
by myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**           Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***         Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****     Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******  (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter 
Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular 
context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., 
philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there 
is only one philosophical problem—the use of sentences (language games) in 
an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— showing the correct 
context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, 
perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are 
automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 2 is 
abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in conscious 
deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently 
repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There 
is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 
2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they 
are successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since 
the description of our perceptual experience-the presentation of our senses to 
consciousness, can only be described in the same words (as the same COS - 
Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the percept or COS1 to 
distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will 
be True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will 
not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise 
duration, change in intensity, occur here and now, commonly have a special 
quality, do not need language, are independent of general intelligence and 
working memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have 
voluntary content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language 
games) cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain 
(behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts in sentences 
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and in the brain states), and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher order 
behavior to a system of laws, which would have to state all the possible 
contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. This is a special case 
of the irreducibility of higher level descriptions to lower level ones that has 
been explained many times by Searle, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), P.M.S. 
Hacker, Wittgenstein and others. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat 
muscles to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe 
present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, 
subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, 
informationless, true-only mental states with a precise time and location, and 
over time there evolved in higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to 
describe displacements in space and time of events (the past and future and 
often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games 
(SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, 
transitive (having public Conditions of Satisfaction-Searle’s term for 
truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and 
public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 representations 
and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all S2 functions having 
no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. Preferences are 
Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, 
Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional 
Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and not to 
propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W- ‘Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic 
and fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in space-time. My first-
person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while 
third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews 
of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive 
acts and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 
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1930’s and termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been 
termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that 
this is an incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, 
remembering etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown 
e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). 
 
Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as 
opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or 
space, while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and 
reflexive actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize 
System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—
the ability to represent (state public COS for) events and to think of them as 
occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., 
the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain processes of System One) are 
potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe.  Dispositions can be described as secondary 
LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for 
me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act 
or some event occurs—see my reviews of the well-known books on W by 
Johnston and Budd. Note that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or 
written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to 
Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 
1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder 
of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the 
functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with 
System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 
30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table 
in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the 
axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On Certainty’ 
(OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or 
epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and 
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pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view 
(shared e.g., by DMS) the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control 
is possible). 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries 
to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our 
default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 
working and describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The 
Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it 
with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in 
action throughout his works. Reason has access to memory and so we use 
consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two 
Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other 
Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the 
world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act 
(Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which try to 
match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., 
Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states 
(‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they 
act or might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. 
 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—
(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential public 
acts such as language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, 
Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language 
(concept, thought) of private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no 
private language, thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and 
512  
to that extent they have a public psychology. Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, 
See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature Memories, Remembering : (X was true) 
 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions: (X might become True) 
 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring , 
Expecting, Wishing , Wanting, Hoping( a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, 
Depression. Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive 
fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of 
perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation between 
S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
We can think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting 
(Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using 
Maps, Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary 
and transfer Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, 
Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior (The 
Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank Slate or the Standard Social Science 
Model--SSSM). 
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Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the 
names of objects nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans 
are governed by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or 
schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference 
engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of 
preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or 
intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or only 
preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of 
cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including 
neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of 
the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive 
in evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions 
and actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our 
psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding and increase 
our power by giving clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them 
(culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, 
logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them faster and more 
efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as conditional 
probabilities which are algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various 
aspects of behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules 
which create and require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human 
adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require 
public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase 
our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility or Bayesian utility 
maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly questionable due to severe 
underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This 
occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire 
Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and 
DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle 
movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics 
of this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig 
Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 
1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in 
the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for 
exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of 
intentionality (e.g., our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, 
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inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates 
(functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as 
they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of 
using the dispositional verb “thinking“)—non-rational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow 
thinking of S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as 
mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or 
internal “experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even 
for oneself and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. 
Thinking like all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental state (unlike 
perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act or 
event such as in speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our 
perceptions and memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) 
only when they are manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, 
feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which 
become psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates 
S2. Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced 
humans to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for 
acts (gross contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is 
much better called UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 
for such functions in S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology 
or Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of 
consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions 
by contracting muscles—i.e., Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and 
Knowing. Thus,“propositional attitude” is an incorrect term for normal 
intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow deliberative functioning of System 2) 
or automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of frequently practiced System 2 
functions of speech and action into automatic fast functions). We see that the 
efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying 
neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we 
already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public 
view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, 
genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social 
life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described 
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by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so 
famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind 
(thought, language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings 
of language. Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) 
was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, 
survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, 
intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely confusing when we try 
to analyze it. This has been explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many 
others. 
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences 
have multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly 
different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The 
present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” normally 
describe my ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) 
but can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental 
state and so not based on knowledge or information (W and see my review of 
the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a 
truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” 
makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present tense 
can be causally self-reflexive--they instantiate themselves but then they are not 
testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past or future tense or third person 
use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain or can be resolved 
by information that is true or false, as they describe public acts that are or can 
become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart 
from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will 
think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime 
that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Non-reflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are 
Non-Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them 
functions or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahneman). Prior Intentions 
are stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must 
separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the 
conscious deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., 
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some emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 
and are automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal 
functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology 
(Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Thus when Searle introduces some terminology on p6 of STATA we see that 
VisExp (it is raining) is S1 while Bel(it is raining) or Assert(it is raining) is S2. 
 
We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior 
(human nature or evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the 
bedrock or background and reflecting upon this we generate philosophy which 
S calls the logical structure of rationality and I call the descriptive psychology 
of Higher Order Thought (HOT) or, taking the cue from W, the study of the 
language describing HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s comments on 
philosophical aspects of human behavior (HOT) is to see if its translation into 
the W/S framework gives some clear descriptions which illuminate the use of 
language. If not, then showing how they have been bewitched by language 
dispels the confusion. As Horwich has noted on the last page of his superb 
‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’ (see my review): “What sort of progress is 
this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no depths have been 
plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered or 
reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as 
Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should 
be found satisfying enough.” Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W 
suggested we ought to say “describing”) and S states that the logical structure 
of rationality constitutes various theories, and there is no harm in it, provided 
one realizes they are comprised of a series of examples that let us get a general 
idea of how language (the mind) works and that as his “theories” are explicated 
via examples they become more like W’s perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by 
any other name...” When there is a question one has to go back to the examples 
or consider new ones. As W noted, language (life) is limitlessly complex and 
context sensitive (W being the unacknowledged father of Contextualism), and 
so it is utterly unlike physics where one can often derive a formula and 
dispense with the need for further examples. Scientism (the use of scientific 
language and the causal framework) leads us astray in describing HOT. 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness.”(BBB p18). Unlike so many others, S has largely avoided 
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and often demolished scientism, but there is a residue which evinces itself 
when he remarks in various writings that we can understand consciousness by 
studying the brain or that he is prepared to give up causality, will or mind. W 
made it abundantly clear that such words are the hinges or basic language 
games and giving them up or even changing them is not a coherent concept. 
As noted in my other reviews, I think the residue of scientism results from the 
major tragedy of S’s (and nearly all other philosopher’s) philosophical life --his 
failure to take the later W seriously enough (W died a few years before S went 
to England to study). 
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks 
as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not 
anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel 
p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of the 
reptilian subcortical System One (S1) composed of perceptions, memories and 
reflexes, and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving 
sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear, they are the basis 
for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology 
are not evidential. 
 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to 
contribute that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting W’s 
above remark on science envy, I will quote from P.M.S Hacker (the leading 
expert on W) who gives a good start on it and a counterblast to scientism. 
 
“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
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and a further condition …, or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
...What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is the web of 
our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts hang together, 
the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and 
purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To 
this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, 
psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute 
nothing whatsoever.” (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- 
p15-2005) 
 
Before remarking further on ‘STATA’ I will first offer some essential comments 
on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as 
exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It 
will help to see my reviews of S’s PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making 
the Social World (MSW) and W’s BBB (Blue and Brown Books), PI 
(Philosophical Investigations), OC (On Certainty), and other books by and 
about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, 
not found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the W/S framework. 
 
As noted in my other reviews, philosophical mistakes are of interest since they 
are the universal defaults of our psychology, due the fact that our language 
lacks perspicuity, as W first noted in the BBB (Blue and Brown Books) ¾ of a 
century ago. 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior (HOT) is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow 
S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the 
extensions of S2 into culture (S3). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning 
description of higher order S2/S3 social behavior, while the later W shows how 
it is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious 
dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, pre-linguistic mental 
states- our perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 
Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, 
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love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
linguistic functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow 
thinking, mentalizing neurons. That is, of testable true or false, propositional, 
Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2 (joyfulness, loving, hating) -- the dispositional 
(and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, 
knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., 
it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, 
atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W, S, Hacker etc.). 
 
The investigation of System 1 has revolutionized psychology, economics and 
other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", 
"heuristics" and "biases". Of course, these too are language games so there will 
be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions 
will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made 
clear), but not of S2 only, since it cannot occur without involving much of the 
intricate S1 network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral 
reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W 
and later S call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic 
relationships so well described by Searle. I expect this fairly well abstracts the 
basic structure of behavior as described in my other reviews. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and 
contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has content (i.e. 
is representational) and is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my 
review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would translate the 
paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with 
"conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as 
modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match how we desire things to be with 
how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--
desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally 
dependent upon (have their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) originating in) 
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the Causally Self Reflexive (CSR) rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive 
S1. In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases 
such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal 
connection of the COS with S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the 
future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other 
and are often orchestrated seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations, 
so that our normal experience is that we consciously control everything that we 
do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has 
described as `The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. 
One refers to the true-only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes 
(including basic speech) and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology 
which are Causally Self Reflexive(CSR)-(called reflexive or intransitive in W’s 
BBB), and the S2 use as disposition words (thinking, understanding, knowing 
etc.) which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my 
way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and are not 
CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes 
notice. We talk about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. 
Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them-we think. But that is just 
what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a 
definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The 
decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very 
one we thought quite innocent). — And now the analogy which was to make 
us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet 
uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as 
though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny 
them.   W’s PI p308 
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"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a 
representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of 
the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of 
satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. However, since what 
S and various authors here call the background (S1) gives rise to S2 and is in 
turn partly controlled by S2, there has to be a sense in which S1 is able to 
become propositional and they and Searle note that the unconscious activities 
of S2 must be able to become the conscious ones of S2. They both have COS and 
Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2, but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would 
mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W 
would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. It would e.g., mean 
that truth and falsity and the facts of the world could be decided without 
consciousness. As W stated often and showed so brilliantly in his last book On 
Certainly, life must be based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid 
reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die--
no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Another crucial notion clarified by S is the Desire Independent Reasons for 
Action (DIRA). I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of 
MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which 
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typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires 
displaced in space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that 
commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive 
fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." 
And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 as "The 
resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term 
inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short 
term personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the 
proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are very restricted extensions of 
unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the 
poor because it is “right” but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain 
chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their distant ancestors. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
which generates endless cultural extensions, and which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 
causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by 
changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall 
cognitive illusion (called by Searle `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker 
`The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science 
Model') is that S2 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we 
are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and 
psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the 
verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think 
with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd-
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology) "It is in language that wish and 
fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one 
might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that 
in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is 
about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) as one can find—beyond even Searle. 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” W’s BBB p34 
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Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing 
COS in a context that can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental 
state. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he 
would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" 
and his comments that the whole problem of representation is contained in 
"that's Him" and "...what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which 
it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it 
always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what 
happened the wish that that should happen"..." the question whether I know 
what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that 
some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should 
not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked 
`Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do 
know." 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics. He 
dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, 
memories and reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, 
remembering, and understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many 
of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this 
evolutionary perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of 
human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many 
perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems 
view is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s famous comment: “Nothing in 
philosophy makes sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology.” 
 
W recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole psychology and all the 
answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and 
that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always 
here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look deeper and to abandon 
the myth of introspective access to our “inner life” (e.g., “The greatest danger 
here is wanting to observe oneself.” LWPP1, 459). 
Incidentally, the equation of logic or grammar and our axiomatic psychology 
is essential to understanding W and human nature (as Daniele Moyal Sharrock 
(DMS) but afaik nobody else, points out). 
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Our shared public experience becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic 
EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. That is, the 
consequences of an S1 ‘mistake’ are quite different from an S2 mistake. A 
corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a 
foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary axioms and not testable true 
or false propositions. 
In spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades 
(and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have never 
seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in behavioral science texts 
(i.e., philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, literature etc.) and with 
rare exceptions there is barely a mention. 
It should be obvious from the above that the issues are always about mistakes 
in language used to describe our universal innate psychology and there is no 
useful sense in which there can be a Chinese, French, Christian, Feminist etc. 
view of them. Such views can exist of philosophy in the other sense but that is 
not what philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me what any interesting and 
substantive philosophy) is about. As often occurs, S’s discussion is marred by 
his failure to carry his understanding of W’s “background” to its logical 
conclusion and so he suggests (as he has frequently) that he might have to give 
up the concept of free will, which I find (with W) incoherent. Not that we ought 
not to give it up but there is no sense that can be made of such a suggestion 
anymore that one can give up running, desiring, intending, hoping etc. 
Likewise, nobody can give arguments for the background (i.e., our axiomatic 
psychology), as our being able to talk or to live at all presupposes it (as W noted 
frequently). Yes, it’s also true that “reduction” along with “monism”, “reality”, 
etc., are complex language games and they do not carry meaning along in little 
backpacks! One must dissect ONE usage in detail to get clear and then see how 
another usage (context) differs. The 20,000 pages of W’s nachlass are hands 
down the best lesson on how this has to be done. 
 
One needs to remember that dispositions (e.g., thinking, knowing) that state a 
COS are thereby true or false and a function of S2 (as opposed to S1 which are 
true only). And the “radical underdetermination of meaning” aka “the 
combinatorial explosion” was first solved by W who noted that S1 can be true 
only. 
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In another recent volume, S comments “The heart of my argument is that our 
linguistic practices, as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists 
independently of our representations”, to which I would add “Our life shows 
a world that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly 
challenged.” 
 
Now that we have a framework, we can consider Searle’s comments on the 
nature of perception. 
 
As one expects from any philosophy, we are in deep trouble immediately, for 
on page 4 we have the terms 
‘perception’ and ‘object’ as though they were used is some normal sense but 
we are doing philosophy so we are going to be undulating back and forth 
between language games have no chance of keeping our day to day games 
distinct from the various philosophical ones. Again, you can read some of 
Neuroscience and Philosophy’ or 
‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ to get a feel for this. Also, a quick 
review of the table of Intentionality above will place his terms, ‘causally self-
reflexive’ etc. in context. Sadly, like nearly all philosophers, Searle (S) has not 
adopted the two systems framework, so it’s much harder to keep things 
straight. 
 
So on p6, Believing and Asserting are part of system 2 which is linguistic, 
deliberative, slow, with no precise time of occurrence and ‘it is raining’ is their 
public Condition of Satisfaction (COS2) (Wittgenstein’s transitive) –i.e., it is 
propositional and representational and not a mental state and we can only 
intelligibly describe it in terms of reasons , while Visual Experience (VisExp) is 
system 1 and so requires (for intelligibility, for sanity) that it be raining (it’s 
COS1) and has a determinate time of occurrence, is fast (typically under 
500msec ), non-testable (Wittgenstein’s true-only), and nonpublic, automatic 
and not linguistic i.e., not propositional and presentational and only 
describable in terms of causes of a mental state. In spite of this on p7 after 
crushing the horrific (but still quite popular) term ‘propositional attitude’, he 
says that perception has propositional content, but I agree with W that S1 is 
true-only and hence cannot be propositional in anything like the sense of S2 
where propositions are public statements (COS) that are true or false. 
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On p12 keep in mind that he is describing the automaticity of System 1 (S1), 
and then he notes that to describe the world we can only repeat the description 
which W noted as showing the limits of language. The last sentence on to the 
end of the paragraph middle of p13 needs translating (like most of philosophy!) 
so for “The subjective experience has a content, which philosophers call an 
intentional content and the specification of the intentional content is the same 
as the description of the state of affairs that the intentional content presents you 
with etc.” I would say ‘Perceptions are System 1 mental states that can only be 
described in the public language of System 2.” And when he ends by noting 
again the equivalence of a description of believing with that of a description of 
our perception, he is repeating what W noted long ago and which is due to the 
fact that S1 is nonlinguistic and that describing, believing, knowing, expecting, 
etc. are all different psychological or intentional modes or language games 
played with the same words. 
 
On p23 he refers to private ‘experiences’ but words are S2 and describe public 
events, so what warrants our use of the word for ‘private’ S1 ‘experiences’ can 
only be their public manifestations—i.e., language we all use to describe public 
acts as even for myself I cannot have any way to attach language to something 
internal. This is of course W’s argument against the possibility of a private 
language. He also mentions several times that hallucinations of X are the same 
as seeing X but what can be the test for this except that we are inclined to use 
the same words? In this case, they are the same by definition so this argument 
rings hollow. 
 
On p33 his ‘basic forms’ of intentionality are S1 while the ‘derivative forms’ are 
S2 and the two modes ‘seeing’ and ‘thinking’ as used here are S1 and S2 but the 
universal problem is that these words can be used for either S1 or S2 and 
nobody keeps them distinct. 
 
On p35 top he again correctly attacks the use of ‘propositional attitude’ which 
is not an attitude to a sentence but an attitude (disposition) to its public COS, 
i.e., to the fact or truthmaker. Then he says “For example, if I see a man in front 
of me, the content is that there is a man in front of me. The object is the man 
himself. If I am having a corresponding hallucination, the perceptual 
experience has a content, but no object. The content can be exactly the same in 
the two cases, but the presence of a content does not imply the presence of an 
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object.” The way I see this is that the ‘object’ is normally in the world and 
creates the mental state (S1) and if we put this in words it becomes S2 with 
COS2 (i.e., a public truthmaker) and this does entail the public object, but for 
an hallucination (or direct brain stimulation etc.) the ‘object’ is only the similar 
mental state resulting from brain activation. 
 
On p37 as usual in describing human behavior it seems to me very useful to try 
to keep S1 and S2 separated so here we can refer to the perception of something 
as P1 but when we describe it we can refer to the perception as P2. 
 
As W showed us, the big mistake is not just about understanding perception 
but not understanding language—all the problems of philosophy proper are 
exactly the same—failure to look carefully at how the language works in a 
particular context so as to yield clear COS. 
 
On p53 what exactly is the test (COS2) that shows that the cause of or mental 
state of an hallucination is the ‘same’ as that when there is no hallucination? 
Even if we ‘see’ our long dead mother, with a few possible rare exceptions of 
insanity, brain damage etc., we know it’s not her—i.e., it’s false and we take the 
failure to distinguish the two as a sign of illness. So, the COS2 in hallucination 
is only that we feel as if she were present, though we (normally) know it cannot 
be, while the COS2 when she was alive is that we can confirm by a public test 
it is her. But he is correct that there is a more or less common percept in the two 
cases so that the presentation or COS1 is similar and conceivably could 
sometimes be as identical as any two mental states, thoughts, feelings etc. ever 
get—i.e., not very. 
 
On p59 I believe that the argument from transparency originated with W. "The 
limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." (Wittgenstein CV p10). At the bottom of the page, once again the 
presentation is S1 and the description or representation is S2. 
 
Middle of p61 we see the confusions that arise here and everywhere when we 
fail to keep S1 and S2 separate. Either we must not refer to representations in 
S1 or we must at least call them R1 and realize they have no public COS—i.e., 
no COS2. 
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On p63 nondetachability only means that it is a caused automatic function of 
S1 and not a reasoned, voluntary function of S2. This discussion continues onto 
the next page, but of course is relevant to the whole book and to all of 
philosophy, and it is so unfortunate that Searle, and nearly all in the behavioral 
sciences, cannot get into the 21st century and use the two systems terminology 
which renders so many opaque issues very clear. Likewise, with the failure to 
grasp that it’s always just a matter of whether it’s a scientific issue or a 
philosophical one and if philosophical then which language game is going to 
be played and what the COS are in the context in question. 
 
On p64 he says the ‘experience’ is in his head but that is just the issue—as W 
made so clear there is no private language and as Bennett and Hacker take the 
whole neuroscience community to task for, in normal use ‘experience’ can only 
be a public phenomenon for which we share criteria, but what is the test for my 
having an experience in my head? At the least, there is an ambiguity here which 
will lead to others. Many 
think these don’t matter, many think they do. Something happens in the brain 
but that’s a scientific neurophysiological issue and certainly by ‘experience’ or 
by ‘I saw a rabbit’ one never means the neurophysiology. Clearly this is not a 
matter for investigation but one of using words intelligibly. 
 
On p65 indexical, nondetachable, and presentational are just more 
philosophical jargon used instead of System 1 by people who have not adopted 
the two systems framework for describing behavior (i.e., nearly everyone). 
Likewise, for the following pages if we realize that ‘objects and states of affairs’, 
‘visual experiences’, ‘fully determinate’ etc., are just language games where we 
have to decide what the COS are and that if we just keep in mind the properties 
of S1 and S2 all of this becomes quite clear and Searle and everyone else could 
stop ‘struggling to express’ it. Thus (p69) ‘reality is determinate’ only means 
that perceptions are S1 and so mental states, here and now, automatic, causal, 
untestable (true-only) etc. while beliefs, like all dispositions are S2 and so not 
mental states, do not have a definite time, have reasons and not causes, are 
testable with COS etc. On p70 he notes that intentions in action of perception 
(IA1 in my terms) are part of the reflexive acts of S1 (A1 in my terms) which 
may originate in S2 acts which have become reflexive (S2A in my terminology). 
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On the bottom of p74 onto p75, 500 msec is often taken as the approximate 
dividing line between seeing (S1) and seeing as (S2) which means S1 passes the 
percept to higher cortical centers of S2 where they can be deliberated upon and 
expressed in language. 
 
Regarding p100, see W’s ‘On Certainty’ and DMS’s papers and books on it or 
just my brief analysis of their efforts in my LSR paper. On p101 we can usually 
substitute COS for ‘truth conditions’. 
 
On p100-101 the ‘subjective visual field’ is S2 and ‘objective visual field’ is S1 
and ‘nothing is seen’ in S2 means we don’t play the language game of seeing in 
the same sense as for S1 and indeed philosophy and a good chunk of science 
(e.g., physics) would be different if people had realized they were playing 
language games and not doing science. 
 
On p107 ‘perception is transparent’ because language is S2 and S1 has no 
language as it’s automatic and reflexive so when saying what I saw or to 
describe what I saw I can only say “I saw a cat”. Once again W pointed this out 
long ago as showing the limits of language. 
 
On p108 we can say that deliberate acts (A2) always must happen by activating 
S1 just as must reflexive acts (A1). On p109 we might rephrase ‘…whenever 
you consciously perceive anything, you take the cause of your perceptual 
experience to be its object’ as ‘perceptions, like all functions of S1 are 
nontestable’. 
 
P110 middle needs to be translated from SearleSpeak into TwoSystemsSpeak 
so that “Because presentational visual intentionality is a subspecies of 
representation, and because all representation is under aspects, the visual 
presentations will always present their conditions of satisfaction under some 
aspects and not others.” becomes “Because the percepts of S1 present their data 
to S2, which has public COS, we can speak of S1 as though it also has public 
COS”. On p111 the ‘condition’ refers to the public COS of S2, i.e., the events 
which make the statement true or false and ‘lower order’ and ‘higher order’ 
refer to S1 and S2. On p112 the basic action and basic perception are isomorphic 
because S1 feeds its data to S2, which can only generate actions by feeding back 
to S1 to contract muscles, and lower level perception and higher level 
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perception can only be described in the same terms due to there being only one 
language to describe S1 and S2. On p117 bottom it would be much less 
mysterious if he would adopt the two systems framework so that instead of 
“internal connection” with conditions of satisfaction (my COS1), a perception 
would just be noted as the automaticity of S1 which causes a mental state. 
 
On p118 if W did commit the Bad Argument it was in the TLP and not his later 
work, and in any case the ‘fact’ is the COS (the representation) or the 
truthmaker of S2 stated by a sentence which is just the right description. 
 
On p120 the point is that ‘causal chains’ have no explanatory power because 
the language games of ‘cause’ only make sense in S1 or other non-psychological 
phenomena of nature, whereas semantics is S2 and we can only intelligibly 
speak of reasons for higher order human behavior. One way this manifests is 
‘meaning is not in the head’ which enmeshes us in other language games. 
 
On p121 to say it’s essential to a perception (S1) that it has COS1 (‘the 
experience’) merely describes the conditions of the language game of 
perception—it is an automatic causal mental state. 
 
On p 122 I think “First, for something to be red in the ontologically objective 
world is for it to be capable of causing ontologically subjective visual 
experiences like this.” is not coherent as there is nothing to which we can refer 
‘this’ so it should be stated as “First, for something to be red is just for it to 
incline me to call it ‘red’”—as usual, the jargon does not help at all and the rest 
of the paragraph is unnecessary as well. 
 
On p123 the ‘background disposition” is the automatic, causal, mental state of 
S1 and as I, in agreement with W, DMS and others have said many times these 
cannot intelligibly be called ‘presuppositions’ as they are unconsciously 
activated ‘hinges’ that are the basis for presuppositions. 
 
Section VII and VIII (or the whole book or most of higher order behavior or 
most of philosophy in the narrow sense) could be titled “The language games 
describing the interaction of the causal, automatic, nonlinguistic transient 
mental states of S1 with the reasoned, conscious, persistent linguistic thinking 
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of S2” and the background is not suppositional nor can it be taken for granted 
but it is our axiomatic true-only psychology (the ‘hinges” or ‘ways of acting’ of 
W’s ‘On Certainty’) that underlie all suppositions. As is evident from my 
comments I think the whole section, lacking the two systems framework and 
W’s insights in OC is confused in supposing it presents an “explanation” of 
perception where it can at best only describe how the language of perception 
works in various contexts. We can only describe how the word ‘red’ is used 
and that’s the end of it and for the last sentence of this section we might say 
that for something to be a ‘red apple’ is only for it to normally result in the same 
words being used by everyone. 
 
Speaking of hinges, it is sad and a bit strange that Searle has not incorporated 
what many (e.g., DMS an eminent contemporary philosopher and leading W 
expert) regard as maybe the greatest discovery in modern philosophy— W’s 
revolutionizing of epistemology in his ‘On Certainty’ as nobody can do 
philosophy or psychology in the old way anymore without looking antiquated. 
And though Searle almost entirely ignored ‘On Certainty’ his whole career, in 
2009 (i.e., 6 years before publication of this book) he spoke at a symposium on 
it held by the British Wittgenstein Society and hosted by DMS, so he is certainly 
aware of the view that has revolutionized the very topics he is discussing here. 
I don’t think this meeting was published, but his lecture can be downloaded 
from Vimeo. It seems to be a case of an old dog who can’t learn new tricks. 
Though he has probably pioneered more new territory in the descriptive 
psychology of higher order behavior than anyone since Wittgenstein, once he 
has learned a path he tends to stay on it, as we all do. Like everyone, he uses 
the French word repertoire when there is an easier to pronounce and spell 
English word ‘repertory’ and the awkward ‘he/she’ or reverse sexist ‘she’ when 
one can always use ‘they’ or ‘them’. In spite of their higher intelligence and 
education, academics are sheep too. 
 
Section IX to the end of the chapter shows again the very opaque and awkward 
language games one is forced into when trying to describe (not explain as W 
made clear) the properties of S1 (i.e., to play the language games used to 
describe ’primary qualities’) and how these feed data into S2 (i.e., secondary 
qualities’), which then has to feed back to S1 to generate actions. It also shows 
the errors one commits by failing to grasp Wittgenstein’s unique view of ‘hinge 
epistemology’ presented in “On Certainty”. To show how much clearer this is 
with the dual system terminology I would have to rewrite the whole chapter 
(and much of the book). Since I have rewritten sections here several times, and 
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often in my reviews of Searle’s other books, I will only give a couple brief 
examples. 
 
The sentence on p129 “Reality is not dependent on experience, but conversely. 
The concept of the reality in question already involves the causal capacity to 
produce certain sorts of experiences. So the reason that these experiences 
present red objects is that the very fact of being a red object involves a capacity 
to produce this sort of experience. Being a straight line involves the capacity to 
produce this other sort of experience. The upshot is that organisms cannot have 
these experiences without it seeming to them that they are seeing a red object 
or a straight line, and that “seeming to them” marks the intrinsic intentionality 
of the perceptual experience.” Can be rendered as “S1 provides the input for 
S2 and the way we use the word ‘red’ mandates it’s COS in each context, so 
using these words in a particular way is what it means to see red. In the normal 
case, it does not ‘seem’ to us that we see red, we just see red and we use ‘seem 
to” to describe cases where we are in doubt.” 
 
On p130 “Our question now is: Is there an essential connection between the 
character of things in the world and the character of our experience?” can be 
translated as “Are our public language games (S2) useful (consistent) in the 
description of perception (S1)?” 
 
The first paragraph of Section X ‘The Backward Road’ is perhaps the most 
important one in the book, as it is critical for all of philosophy to understand 
that there cannot be a precise 1:1 connection between or reduction of S2 to S1 
due to the many ways of describing in language a given event (mental state, 
i.e., percept, memory etc.). Hence the apparent impossibility of capturing 
behavior in algorithms (the hopelessness of ‘strong AI’) or of extrapolating 
from a given neuronal pattern in the brain to the multitudinous acts (language 
games) we use to describe it. The ‘Backward Road’ is the language (COS) of S2 
used to describe S1. Again, I think his failure to use the two systems framework 
renders this quite confusing if not opaque. Of course, he shares this failing with 
nearly everyone. Searle has commented on this before and so have others (e.g., 
Hacker) but it seems to have escaped most philosophers and almost all 
scientists. 
 
Again, Searle misses the point in Sect XI and X12 –we do not and cannot ‘seem 
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to see’ red or ‘seem’ to have a memory or ‘assume’ a relation between the 
experience and the word, but as with all the perceptions and memories that 
constitute the innate axiomatic true-only mental states of System 1, we just have 
the experience and “it” only becomes ‘red’ etc., when described in public 
language with this word in this context by System 2. We know it’s red as this 
is a hinge—an axiom of our psychology that is our automatic action and is the 
basis for assumptions or judgements or presuppositions and cannot intelligibly 
be judged, tested or altered. As W pointed out so many times, a mistake in S1 
is of an entirely different kind than one in S2. No explanations are possible—
we can only describe how it works and so there is no possibility of getting a 
nontrivial “explanation” of our psychology. As he always has, Searle makes the 
common and fatal mistake of thinking he understands behavior (language) 
better than Wittgenstein. After a decade reading W, S and many others I find 
that W’s ‘perspicuous examples’ , aphorisms and trialogues usually provide 
greater illumination than the wordy disquisitions of anyone else. 
 
“We may not advance any kind of theory, there must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and 
description alone must take its place.” (PI 109). 
 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything.” (PI 126) “In philosophy we do not draw conclusions” (PI 
599) 
 
“If one tried to advance theses in philosophy it would not be possible to debate 
them, because everyone would agree to them” (PI 128) 
 
On p135, one way to describe perception is that the event or object causes a 
pattern of neuronal activation (mental state) whose self-reflexive COS1 is that 
we see a red rose in front of us, and in appropriate contexts for a normal English 
speaking person, this leads us to activate muscle contractions which produces 
the words ‘I see a red rose’ whose COS2 is that there is a red rose there. Or 
simply, S1 produces S2 in appropriate contexts. So on p136 we can say S1 leads 
to S2 which we express in this context by the word ‘smooth’ which describes 
(but never ‘explains’) how the language game of ‘smooth’ works in this context 
and we can translate “For basic actions and basic perceptions the intentional 
content is internally related to the conditions of satisfaction, even though it is 
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characterized non-intentionalistically, because being the feature F perceived 
consists in the ability to cause experiences of that type. And in the case of action, 
experiences of that type consists in their ability to cause that sort of bodily 
movement.” as “Basic perceptions (S1) can lead automatically (internally) to 
basic reflex actions (A1) (i.e., burning a finger leads to withdrawing the arm) 
which only then enters awareness so that it can be reflected upon and described 
in language (S2). 
 
On p150, the point is that inferring, like knowing, judging, thinking, is an S2 
disposition expressed in language with public COS that are informational (true 
or false) while percepts are non-informational (see my review of Hutto and 
Myin’s book) automated responses of S1 and there is no meaningful way to 
play a language game of inferring in S1. Trees and everything we see is S1 for 
a few hundred msec or so and then normally enter S2 where they get language 
attached (aspectual shape or seeing as). 
 
Regarding p151 et seq., it is sad that S, as part of his lack of attention to the later 
W, never seems to refer to what is probably the most penetrating analysis of 
color words in W’s “Remarks on Colour’, which is missing from nearly every 
discussion of the subject I have seen. The only issue is how do we play the game 
with color words and with ‘same’, ‘different’, ‘experience ‘etc. in this public 
linguistic context (true or false statements—COS2) because there is no language 
and no meaning in a private one (S1). So, it does not matter what happens in 
the mental states of S1 but only what we say about them when they enter S2. 
It’s clear as day that all 7.6 billion on earth have a slightly different pattern of 
neural activation every time they see red and that there is no possibility for a 
perfect correlation between S1 and S2. As I noted above it is absolutely critical 
for every philosopher and scientist to get this clear. 
 
Regarding the brain in a vat (p157), insofar as we disrupt or eliminate the 
normal relations of S1 and S2, we lose the language games of intentionality. 
The same applies to intelligent machines and W described this situation 
definitively over 80 years ago. 
 
"Only of a living being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being 
can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or 
unconscious.” (PI 281) 
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It is a sign of Wittgenstein’s unique genius that even though I have spent many 
years reading the best philosophers and psychologists of our times, I always 
have to resist the urge to throw the book down and go back to the master, and 
when I come to a quote from him it is like coming upon a glass of cold water 
while trudging through the desert. 
 
Chapter 6: Yes, disjunctivism (like nearly all philosophical theses) is incoherent 
and the fact that this and other absurdities flourish in his own department and 
even among some of his former students who got top marks in his Philosophy 
of Mind classes shows perhaps that, like most, he stopped too soon in his 
Wittgenstein studies. Also, we all start with default language use which is full 
of confusions or as W likes to say it is not ‘perspicuous’. 
 
On p188, yes veridical seeing and ‘knowing’ (i.e., K1) are the same since S1 is 
true-only- i.e., it is the fast, axiomatic, causally self-reflexive, automatic mental 
states which can only be described with the slow, deliberative public language 
games of S2. 
 
On p204 -5 we are reminded that the first and maybe best refutation of mind as 
machine was given by W in the 30’s. Representation is always under an aspect 
since, like thinking, knowing etc., it is a disposition of S2 with public COS, 
which is infinitely variable. 
 
Once again, I think the use of the two systems framework greatly simplifies the 
discussion. If one insists to use ‘representation’ for ‘presentations’ of S1 then 
one should say that R1 have COS1 which are transient neurophysiological 
mental states, and so totally different from R2, which have COS2 (aspectual 
shapes) that are public, linguistically expressible states of affairs, and the notion 
of unconscious mental states is illegitimate since such language games lack any 
clear sense. 
 
Discussions of blind sight (p209), like those of split brains (commissurotomy) 
and so much else in cognitive science are typically incoherent due to the fact 
that the phenomena are new and the usual language games are not applied in 
a clear and consistent way. Bennett and Hacker, among others, give some 
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excellent discussions of this. Sadly, on p211 Searle for maybe the tenth time in 
his writings (and endlessly in his lectures) says that ‘free will’ may be illusory, 
but as W from the 30’s on noted, one cannot coherently deny or judge the 
‘hinges’ such as our having choice, nor that we see, hear, sleep, have hands etc., 
as these words express the true-only axioms of our psychology, our automatic 
behaviors that are the basis for action. Libet’s famous experiments have been 
debunked in various ways by philosophers and by other experiments. 
 
On p214 the reflexes referred to are the formerly deliberative conscious actions 
of S2 which have become automated and part of S1 which I call S2A 
(automated) as distinct from S2D or those which remain deliberative and 
conscious. 
 
On p219 bottom and 222 top—it was W in his work, culminating in ‘On 
Certainty’ who pointed out that behavior cannot have an evidentiary basis and 
that its foundation is our animal certainty or way of behaving that is basis of 
doubt and certainty and cannot be doubted (the hinges of S1). He also noted 
many times that a ‘mistake’ in our basic perceptions (S1) which has no public 
COS and cannot be tested (unlike those of S2), if it is major or persists, leads 
not to further testing but to insanity. 
 
P222 section II brings us again to the definitive statement on this foundational 
issue which W addressed in ‘On Certainty’. Searle makes further comments in 
the 5th of his audiotaped lectures on the Philosophy of Society (see youtube). 
 
Phenomenalism p227 top: See my extensive comments on Searle’s excellent 
essay ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ in my review of ‘Philosophy in a New 
Century’. There is not even any warrant for referring to one’s private 
experiences as ‘phenomena’, ‘seeing’ or anything else. As W famously showed 
us, language can only be a public testable activity (no private language). And 
on p230 the problem is not that the ‘theory’ ‘seems’ to be inadequate, but that 
(like most if not all philosophical theories) it is incoherent. It uses language that 
has no clear COS. As W insisted, all we can do is describe—it is the scientists 
who can make theories. 
P233. The most basic of the primary qualities or axioms of our psychology are 
time, space, event, object etc., which following W, we can call the basic hinges, 
but it does not seem clear how to distinguish these from color, shape, size etc. 
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See the excellent recent papers and books of DMS on this. 
 
The bottom line is that this is classic Searle—superb and probably at least as 
good as anyone else can produce, but lacking understanding of the 
fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein, and with no grasp of the two 
systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant 
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle 
on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my 
starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that  all truly ‘philosophical’ 
problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular 
context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used 
in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or 
COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot 
mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in 
a very specific context. I analyze various writings by and about them from the 
perspective of the two systems of thought, employing a new table of intentionality 
and new dual systems nomenclature. 
 
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, 
language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less 
accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so 
it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else 
(history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality 
and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes 
both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions 
or reflexes.  
 
Thus, all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how 
to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our 
automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy 
but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope 
would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, 
Husserl and Heidegger, (or that that they differ only in degree from drug and sex 
addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their frontal cortices by the delivery 
of dopamine (and over 100 other chemicals) via the ventral tegmentum and the 
nucleus accumbens), but it’s clearly true.  While the phenomenologists only 
wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth and their descendant’s 
future.  
 
Although there are countless books on Wittgenstein, in my view only a few very 
recent ones come close to a full appreciation of him.  None make a serious attempt 
to relate his work to one of the other modern geniuses of behavior John Searle and 
nobody has applied the powerful two systems of thought framework to 
philosophical issues from the viewpoint of evolutionary psychology. I attempt to 
do this here.   
 
